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III

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

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

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THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS

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OXFORD UNION SOCIETY

THE INTERNATIONAL
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OCTOBER, 1910.

THE PREDICTION OF HUMAN CONDUCT: A STUDY IN BERGSON.*

B. BOSANQUET.

1. The root of Bergson's views lies in his idea of 'duration' as contrasted with that of mathematical time or time spatially symbolized, or taken as the measure of change in inorganic nature.

The mathematician's time, as I understand the contrast which Bergson draws, is symbolized by the uniform movement of a point, and his time-units are the imaginary successive positions of such a point, which he speaks of as T_1 T_2 T_3. Their meaning, as the mathematician employs them, is that a certain configuration of physical points coincides with each of these supposed positions of the uniformly moving point. Their meaning, therefore, has no reference at all to the intervals traversed by the imaginary point. They mark a number of simultaneities, or correspondences, between positions of different points and the position of the uniformly moving point.

As a proof of this it is pointed out (what the present writer has drawn attention to in combating the idea of absolute time), that if we suppose all physical move-

* An address delivered at University College, Cardiff. This was an attempt to make clear Bergson's position on certain questions to a general audience. It may be of interest to general readers; and it indicates an attitude to his views which I believe to be the right one.

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ments to halve or to double their actual velocity, the change would not affect any mathematical formula, so long as the ratios of all the units to each other were preserved. The series of positions would run past faster or slower, but it would be no less complete, and there would be nothing to indicate the change of absolute velocity.

Time, thus conceived, is not cumulative. It carries along with it nothing of the past. If a configuration recurs, it is as if it were a new thing. The fact that it is a recurrence in no way affects the points composing it. Hence, a previous position can be identically repeated; for repetition awakens nothing of the past, and thus makes no difference. In a word, such a conception of time excludes the notion of history. Nothing is gained or carried forward. In the intervals between the positions, the system might as well not be.

Duration proper, on the other hand, is one with life, or rather, with living. Its successive parts are essentially not homogeneous nor uniform; it is the experience of a being radically progressive and creative, whose states or acts are not outside one another, but carry their past with them. This is why the experience is essentially creative, productive of novelty. It is always gaining, by the addition of the new to an old which is retained. For such an experience, as opposed to mathematical time as above described, the *intervals* are the reality. It is what it is, by living through them; growing and changing, gaining in every moment. Hence in this case no true repetition is possible. But there is a history, and the movement is irreversible. No prior state can be truly repeated. The fact of its being 'repeated' would be enough to make it different, because its prior occurrence, and what has come between, have *ex hypothesi* left their mark.

Now Bergson makes his general complaint against both philosophy and common sense, that we confuse true and false duration; we confuse life with the uniform

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movement of a point; in a word, we confuse time with space.

For all our common wants and common sense are profoundly falsified by space perception and the analogy of space. Language, practical social needs, current natural science, are all of them deformed by spatial distinctions,—*e. g.,* by the distinction of things, objects in space, which is rooted in practice and governs language. Concepts of things and events are all practical and spatial (it is almost the same) at root. They provide us with a scheme of *what is where,* and *what happens when.* This is all we want to know,—when or where we must act to be dealing with the due situation or configuration. The coincidence of an act with the relevant state of facts is what matters to us. The interval is as unimportant to our common sense as to the mathematician. Our intelligence is at home in geometry and mechanism, in repetitions of occurrences according to law. Its motto is 'Same produces same,' 'Same cause produces same effect.' In face of genuine life, genuine duration, it is bewildered. True, we can make to ourselves a picture, as we imagine, of history and continuous occurrence. But (it is a constant and characteristic simile in Bergson) our picture of duration is only a cinematograph picture. We snapshot in our minds a number of successive positions of occurrences, and by running them rapidly past our mental vision, we produce or reproduce what seems to be an experience of duration,—of continuous living, of uninterrupted time. But the thing is an illusion, like the bioscopic picture itself. We have not, in gathering these images, recorded the experience of the lapse of living. Our images mark the ends of short intervals; and they give us no record, represent no intimate apprehension, of the intervals themselves.

So it is our tendency in all our current reflection to confound duration with so-called uniform time. But this time is really space, *i. e.,* succession symbolized by the uniform movement of a point. We think of ourselves

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as being in time, just as we think of a thing's being in time, *i. e.,* as passing through a succession of events. Our very self is disguised by superficial connections as in hypnotic suggestion, or association of an idea with an act. And thus we actually fail to enter into our own true duration. We are called in the morning and get up; we have made it a routine connection, almost of the type of 'pull the trigger and the gun goes off.' The perception releases the action.

2. Hence Bergson's criticism of determinism and indeterminism alike. Both, he urges, are rooted in the spatial symbolism of time. We state, as the crucial question, "Could I have done otherwise than I did?" In stating the question thus, we substitute for the experience of duration the picture of a hypothetical point traversing a uniform line, and, *ex hypothesi,* to an end which we already know. Then, in order to express the fact of choice, we are driven to imagine the moving point confronted by a bifurcation of the line; one way leading to X, the other to Y, and the moving point as oscillating between them, before it takes one of the two alternative routes.

All this means that we have split up the living self, which has all sorts of tendencies within it, by which it grows and develops its action,—we have split this up into an indifferent point and two tracks lying outside it, such as can be retraversed in our quasi-mathematical thought. This is really a gratuitous imagery. The developing consciousness, holding together within itself varying inclinations, and developing by their means into something new at every moment, is altogether a different thing. So, however common sense states the question of freedom, it naturally represents it in sharp verbal or spatial distinctions. Could I have done otherwise than I did? Could the point, which has gone to X, have gone to Y instead?

This statement of the question, Bergson urges, however you answer it, in the end gives up the game to the

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determinist. You have split up the conscious life into lines and points in space; and if you take account of the knowledge which *ex hypothesi* you possess, you are driven to admit that the point was moving, all along, to X or to Y, and therefore was not an indifferent point. The indeterminist may assert, "You could have done otherwise; at the place of bifurcation, it was still open to the moving point to travel to Y, instead of traveling as it did, to X." But that is wilfully using only a part of his knowledge, which tells him what you really did, *i. e.,* that you did the action X, and therefore, according to this mode of representation, were all along going to do the action X.

The fault which makes this result inevitable is representing time as space. Real time, or duration, is the growth of a being which contains the two lines,—the conflicting tendencies,—and much more besides, within itself; and it will develop at a certain stage into a certain action. But there is no indifferent point, no homogeneous line, and no ready-made alternative routes, lying there like roads on a map, or objects waiting for choice on a counter. You cannot think back in spatial terms and say, I, being what I was before and after, was there, as I might be again, between these two alternatives laid down for me. This all comes from mapping your course after the action, like a route laid down and existent in space. It in no way corresponds to the nature of an action. An action is not free because some other action 'could have been done,' or unfree because the other 'could not have been done.' It is free, if it is free at all, because of a certain character in itself, which is not present in all actions, and where present, is present in various degrees.

3. What is a free action? A free action is one which expresses the whole 'me.' That, of course, is not a new thing to say. If Bergson has a new point to make in saying it, this point lies in his hostility to our current self. For him, this is a sort of crust over our true or fundamental self, formed by language, common-place

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education, traditional ideas, social practice and social relations. In all this, he sees the enemy, the influence of spatial distinction and the spatial symbol of time, as expressed in the external world of things and the connections of simultaneous events, and the connection of events with the conduct which follows on them by a mechanical routine or habit of reaction. All this he thinks of, to repeat the phrase, as a crust[1] formed over the true self which lies in immediate experiences, in feelings in the depths of personality. "To act without a reason is often the best reason." What does guide us when we are free is differently phrased as "the total of our sentiments," "our personal idea of happiness and honor." But, as a rule, Bergson is hostile to the term idea. He is inclined to identify it with all that he opposes to the true personality, with a superficial idea, a hypnotic or quasi-hypnotic suggestion,[2] which makes up a great part of what we mistake for ourselves. "Many people," Bergson says, "never do a free action at all," *i. e.*, they act from routine in which by association the occurrence releases the deed; they act out of purely formal and traditional conceptions of social duty. They never enter into themselves and ask themselves what they, as complete personalities, really want. "They never once possess their souls," as Matthew Arnold has it. They are dominated by associationist images, and their mind is fixed not on their spiritual growth, the life and development of their whole being, but so to speak, on what is to be done when

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[1] If I remember right, he does not refer to Wordsworth:

> And custom lie upon thee with a weight
> Heavy as frost, and deep almost as life.

[2] It will be remembered that for M. Tarde our consciousness of the social self as our own is of the nature of a hypnotic illusion. "Les lois de l'imitation," p. 83: "L'état social, comme l'état hypnotique, n'est qu'une forme du rêve, un rêve de commande et un rêve en action. N'avoir que des idées suggerées et les croire spontanées; telle est l'illusion propre au somnambule, et aussi bien à l'homme social." The conception betrays a total failure to apprehend the nature of identity.

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the hour strikes, and the half-hour, and the hour after that. They live not in the lapse of duration, but in the conjunctures of occurrence. This is, as I understand it, the connection between his disparagement of the superficial self, and his theory of the defective symbolization of duration by space.

4. Now we are prepared to consider Bergson's view of prediction in case of human conduct. From the above conception of duration flows a clear distinction between (1) prediction concerning purely natural events, *e. g.*, in astronomy, and (2) prediction in matters of human conduct.

In the former case you have only to deal with time units, as described above, which are in effect merely numbers, imaginary points in a uniform movement, and do not depend upon the intervals they divide. Prediction in this case only means, as it were, making them pass you very fast; reducing the intervals between them to almost nothing; doing the work of millenniums in a few minutes. This, as we saw above, makes no essential difference in the work to be done. All the occurrences occur without change; the time units are rattled off; only the intervals between them are shorter than those which occur in fact. In this case you can *do the thing before it occurs,* without affecting its nature. And this is everywhere the true essential of prediction. You can predict, where and in as far as you can do a thing before it happens or is done, and not elsewhere or otherwise.

In the life of conscious being the case is different. Here duration is a cause; the intervals are experienced in transitions of feeling; and to shorten one of them is to change the quality and outcome of its content. Shorten your day by one half, and you have cut out half the actual felt experience of it.

True, as appeared above, it is possible to run over past experiences very quickly in the memory; and hence it may seem that they undergo no alteration by a change

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of the duration which they occupy. But the fact is not really so. To run them over in this way, it is essential to have named them; and by naming them they are essentially altered. They are made into concepts, extracts or essences, comparable to the things and events of common sense. Language is one of the great falsifiers; one of the great agents in the conspiracy to turn time duration into the spatial symbol of time. This distrust of language is remarkable, and from a philosophical point of view, ominous. However, it is the present point. Our experiences, thus recalled and reviewed, are no longer what they were in immediate experience, and would no longer suggest to us the results which in actual experience they would produce. Therefore, prediction being essentially to do a thing before it is done, you are in the case of human conduct shut up to two alternatives.

(Note at this point that Bergson makes a sharp distinction between probable prediction, based upon a man's past conduct, and absolute prediction, claiming to rest upon calculation. We shall see that this distinction coincides with one drawn long ago by Mr. Bradley in "Ethical Studies" (1876). Bergson appears to make too little of the type of prediction which he admits, when he denies that it is a true link between past and future.)

The case is, you, A, are to predict the course of action of B absolutely and by strict calculation or deduction from detailed data, not by mere analogy to conduct in previous circumstances. Then there are two sub-cases. You, A, may have the factors of B's duration (sentiments, motives, impulses) present in your mind symbolically, *i. e.*, through language and in the medium of knowledge. Then, as we have seen to be Bergson's view, the factors are not in A's mind what they are or will be or have been in B's mind. You cannot indicate their several intensities and their consequent result and bearing within the personal life, unless you know the total course of life within which they are to behave as factors. And this would be to know precisely what you are challenged to predict.

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You can have these factors in your mind, that of A, beforehand by way of knowledge and communication through language; but then you do not possess them in their aspect of forces and portions of a life. They are stripped of the power to grow and combine and produce the result which, in their true duration, they would produce. A cannot, in this way, do B's action before it is done. Granting that he can intellectually possess the data, they will not, for him, live the life which belongs to them.[3]

Or again, you, A, may possess the factors, actually, as they are, experiencing their value and intensity and power, and not merely possessing these data in an intellectual shape. But then it would inevitably follow that your, A's, 'duration' would be one and the same with that of the person B whose future action is to be predicted. And that means that you are one and the same with him; for any deviation, a different body, a different date or life-history, would destroy some of the living experience necessary to the result. Therefore you fail in one of the conditions of prediction. You, A, would be doing B's act, but you would not be doing it beforehand. You would have turned into B, and be doing the act when and as B actually does it.

5. So, to sum up Bergson's view. By calculation, after the manner of astronomy, you can never predict a course of consciousness. For a course of consciousness can never be possessed apart from its own duration. You can predict, of course, probably, from knowledge of individual character and its expression in analogous situations. But that is not the kind of prediction in question. You cannot predict demonstratively from previous knowledge of psychical factors, because they have not their full nature

[3] Mr. Bradley, in stating the alternative of prediction by calculation, requires it to be from data such as can exist before the birth of B. Bergson apparently admits rather more, in suggesting that the actual factors of B's mind should be present as data to A.

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except in being experienced. And you cannot take refuge in applying the idea of causation to the psychical nexus. Causation has no meaning in conscious duration, because repetition is there impossible, for the reason pointed out above; and *the principle of causation 'Same produces same' only applies where true or precise repetition can take place, i. e.,* only in mathematical time, but not in duration. *For in duration there can never be any recurrence of the same.*

Freedom then is the relation of the concrete 'me' to its action. This relation is indefinable; because, if fixed in a conception, and analyzed, it drops out the nature of creative novelty which belongs to true duration, and you find yourself handling the spatial chart of time, and not the living experience. Thus every definition of freedom must establish determinism; and yet determinism is false.

6. The above view, as I observed, coincides in certain points with that of Mr. Bradley's "Ethical Studies." Calculation of a man's conduct from pre-natal data, it is there observed, if possible, would be objectionable in the highest degree to the plain man. Whereas prediction based on experience of an individually formed character, as displayed in his habitual action, is an everyday fact, and is not objectionable, but on the whole acceptable, to the plain man. And, in general agreement with Bergson, it is there pointed out that the instinctive objection of a reasonable man is not against foreknowledge, but against what I may summarize as 'reduction.' What a man minds, is being treated as something different from what he feels himself to be; as something that can be mastered from the outside and put together out of alien data or factors; out of circumstances and conditions disparate with himself. He does not dislike being known and understood as he really is, or at least as the sort of being he takes himself to be. What he dislikes is a process of understanding which seems to imply that he is not in the least the sort of being he takes himself to be. So far

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Bergson's views have a great deal in common with the best idealism.

But his opposition seems to be limited, so far as English philosophy is concerned, to such writers as Bain and Mill. And he therefore appears not to meet the contentions of idealism in their developed form. Idealism would, I imagine, accompany him in his campaign against associationism, but would make other demands as against his own anti-intellectualism.

Here are some points by which such a criticism might be illustrated.

(1) The principle of intelligence is not bare identity, as Bergson throughout maintains. Causation, as the principle of science, is not dependent on mere repetition of conditions. Therefore this alleged distinction[4] between life and inorganic nature,—that causation is a principle which can apply to the latter and not to the former, ceases to be tenable. Everywhere, intelligence lies in the tracking of the universal, which is continuity through difference, essentially creative, and not dependent on unchanged recurrence. On the contrary, such recurrence is essentially destructive of intelligent comprehension, by leaving nothing for it to comprehend. Bergson, as it seems to me, is not really disposed to accept the extreme mathematical theory of homogeneous units of matter, but employs it as a *reductio ad absurdum,* by making it typical of the operations of intelligence and the principle of causation. But, as described by him and by other critics, it is not identical with either; and you cannot at once apply it as a *reductio ad absurdum,* and assign it as the true principle of investigation in the inorganic world. In short, the distinction between true duration and the spatial symbolism of time,—which may be a working abstraction,—is one thing. But the suggestion that the latter gives the true characteristic of actual

[4] It is a distinction which Hegel maintains up to a certain point, but not absolutely.

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inorganic nature, and that it is adequate to the operation of intelligence and the nexus of causation, is altogether another thing.

(2) We find the same bias in the disparagement of thought, language, ideals, social relations. The general conception is that articulateness involves falsity. "Reality is richer than thought." Life, feeling, personality, become unknowable things in themselves. We are watching the rise of a new agnosticism, which necessarily develops into a new pessimism. It is always pessimism which tells you that ideas, language, social relations, take you away from the depths of reality and from the springs of life and feeling.

(3) To this point of view belongs the neglect of the conception that psychical sequence and the genesis of actions may be knowable as logically determined, though not, or not merely, a case of causation. We know that logic is latent in the most casual association, and this fact might give us a clue by which logical determination might be regarded as the true mode of initiative where free causes[5] are at work. Thus much might be known and understood about the action of human beings without, or in addition to, prediction by calculation. Reduction might be avoided, but so also might the agnosticism of personality, into which the modern movement is falling as the opposite extreme.

If the three points just referred to were rectified, what is valuable in Bergson's attitude might be retained, while the agnosticism would go. Freedom of action might be held a logical mode of initiative, though not in the common sense a causal one. This would give a much better prospect of reconciliation with a causal system of nature, and with the whole of individuality, which is mutilated by the agnosticism we have described.

For example: Bergson rightly complains of the bad

[5] It is noticeable that the term 'free cause' is common to Bergson and to Green.

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habit of taking very trivial choices as the tests of freedom; mere cases of routine where the whole personality does not 'vibrate.' He likes to think of the typical choice as what happens when an appeal is made to your whole passionate nature, and it rises up and defies tradition and you do something worth calling new. Now I am disposed to turn the same objection in another way. It has always seemed to me that the really typical choices, those which show human freedom and the true nature of initiative at their fullest, are the great logical choices which occupy years in the making, as when a man chooses his religion, or his profession, or his political party, working by long processes of suggestion and elimination, till he has found, or nearly found, a self-expression which includes the whole of him, and in which therefore he can rest. Well, but, it may be said, this is to make the typical choice nothing less than the whole process of experience which constitutes a man's life. So it is, no doubt, and so, I hold, it ought to be. If the free act is the act which expresses the whole self, it is here if anywhere that you get it. I certainly agree that you do not get it in the trivial choice,—am I or am I not free to blow out this candle?—but neither, I think, do you get it at all completely in moments of rebellion against tradition and of upheaval of the whole passionate nature. You get it most fully, and see the working of it most plainly, when the self has time and opportunity to search for and to find the expression that is really appropriate to it. And it is in as far as referred to such a process, and as stages in it, that momentary choices have their freedom.

When we take such a point of view, and return to the conception that ideas have hands and feet, and get rid of the agnosticism of personality, we are able to draw a deeper result from the discussion of foreknowledge, while adhering to Bergson's and Mr. Bradley's main results. Let us recall Bergson's own main principles in dealing with prediction. Prediction means doing a thing

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before it is done.[6] And you can do this for conscious beings as far as, but only as far as, you are the same with them. Now if we abandon agnosticism, acknowledge identity as something other than tautology, and accept ideas as the fullest form of finite experience, a good deal follows from this.

Both the world, and intelligence, we should be able to say, are in principle one. It is possible in various degrees for individuals to contain others, and to be identical with them. This is illustrated in the history of inventions, which so constantly shows independent lives working out to the same conclusion at the same time; or in the logic of practice applied to the great problems of statesmanship, when an earlier mind will lay down the lines on which all subsequent minds must and will proceed for, say, a century to come. Or more generally, in the relation of great thinkers to those who come after them, or in common life of men who have great capacity, to those whose performances are wholly covered by theirs. Or ultimately, in so far as we can conceive the relation of the individual to God in religion as one of identity and inclusion, the supposed difficulty of foreknowledge falls away.

It may be said that this sort of inclusion or covering, as when a minor philosopher moves wholly within the orbit of a greater thinker, is not the 'prediction' which forms the difficulty. It does not tell us whether or whom a man will marry or how long he will live, or what he will die of. I leave these two latter instances, although they are not in point, because the fact that they occur to one so naturally is in itself significant. They are not matters of conduct but of natural causation, and therefore they do not illustrate the prediction of conduct. They do not. But are they not just typical of the incidents which most readily spring to mind when we pronounce prediction im-

[6] This would hardly apply to irrational prediction if such a thing were possible. See Mr. Bradley's interesting remarks in "Ethical Studies," p. 17.

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possible? Is not the obvious suggestion, when we review our attitude to such incidents, that lines of conduct are capable of being known and entered into from without in proportion to their magnitude and importance, and that it is really the physical and the comparatively trivial which we cannot enter into by way of knowledge or foreknowledge? If a statesman is going to take the Secretaryship for India, it may well be possible for some persons to foresee what line of policy he will adopt, and surely this is a more important point, entering deeper into his personality, than even the question whether or whom he will marry, not to say, what he will die of.

And this is not merely the case, admitted above, of probable prediction from character. It is a form of knowledge depending on the profound study of a difficult problem, and involving the identity which intelligence,—being in principle one,—is capable of developing in what are called different minds. There is no doubt, in principle, that one mind can include another, or share its content with another, though, of course, with finite minds, the inclusion or participation cannot extend to every detail.

I conclude then by repeating: the important principle is that not foreknowledge, but reduction is the impossible and objectionable thing. You can predict for others in as far as you are the same with them. And, contrary to Bergson's agnosticism, we can be and are the same with others in a considerable degree.

LONDON. B. BOSANQUET.

THE IDEALISM OF RUDOLPH EUCKEN.

S. H. MELLONE.

IDEALISM is a word of many meanings. In its most essential and general significance we take it to stand for the conviction that the universe is the work or embodiment of reason, mind, or spirit.

A century ago, when Napoleon was shaking the political

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powers of Europe to their foundations and moving from victory to victory, an impulse to idealistic theory and construction spread like a wave through group after group of German thinkers and writers, and produced what the late Dr. Hutchison Stirling called a kind of metaphysical 'fermentation.' It is said that Hegel wrote part of his "Phenomenology of Spirit" within sound of the artillery of the battle which laid Prussia at the conqueror's feet. But the name of Hegel, like that of Fichte, is one of those which are associated, in this period of 'romantic' philosophy, not merely with confident metaphysical construction, but with philosophical achievements of abiding worth.

Fichte's idealism is determined by his conviction of the infinity of human nature and destiny and its demand that all things shall be subdued to the higher life of man. With him, idealism is essentially practical: "it determines not what is, but what ought to be"; nature is only material for the realization of duty; and duty is an eternal ideal, an eternal 'thou shalt.' Its realization involves perpetual strife; but the cessation of this strife would involve the extinction of morality and indeed of consciousness itself. Hence for Fichte, the true philosopher is before all things an ethical reformer.

Hegel stands in important respects in marked opposition to Fichte. The task of philosophy is to understand *what is real;* and what is real is reason. Hence the philosopher is not a reformer. The universe is rational through and through and to the smallest detail. Hegel sometimes carries this conception so far as to represent *progress* as an illusion, from the philosophical point of view: "The accomplishment of the Infinite Purpose consists merely in removing the illusion which makes it still seem unaccomplished; this illusion it is under which we live, and it alone supplies the actualizing force on which our interest in the world depends.[1] More often, however,

[1] "Encyclopedia," § 212 (Wallace, p. 351).

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Hegel abandons this type of statement, and surrenders the claim to demonstrate the utter rationality of existence; and his modern followers usually maintain, not that idealism is or can be completely demonstrated, but that in human life and history it is in process of demonstration, or rather,—to use the more pregnant term favored by Professor Henry Jones, of Glasgow,—in process of *verification.* The most important philosophical and ethical issues of the present day start from the question of how this verification takes place.

The writings of Professor Rudolf Eucken, of Jena, constitute a weighty contribution to this question. We find in him many points of affinity with the work of the British and American writers who have been most influenced by Hegel; but what is, in my opinion, more significant, is that we also find in him the best spirit of Fichte revived, with a wider and fuller conception of what is involved in the higher life of humanity and its relation to nature.

Professor H. Weinel, of Jena, has recently spoken of the growing demand for a deeper understanding of life, and the desire for a religion which shall meet that need.[2] As a mark of the strength of this movement in Germany, he points to the fact that Eucken's books are the most widely current philosophical writings of the time. His influence as a thinker has been felt far beyond the borders of his native land,—a fact indicated by the appearance of translations in many foreign languages, and by the high distinction conferred on the author two years ago, when he was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature. In the English-speaking world, however, it appears that Professor Eucken's presentation of idealism is only beginning to be known.

The following may fairly be named as the most important among his writings: "Grundbegriffe der Gegenwart" (1878, second edition, 1893); "Geistige Strömungen der Gegenwart" (1904, the third edition of the "Grund-

[2] *Hibbert Journal,* July, 1909, p. 725.

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begriffe"; fourth edition, 1909);[3] Der Kampf um einen geistigen Lebensinhalt" (1896); "Die Lebensanschauungen der grossen Denker" (1897; seventh edition, 1907); "Der Sinn und Werth des Lebens für den Menschen der Gegenwart" (1907); "Einführung in eine Philosophie des Geisteslebens" (1908). In a volume of convenient size, now in its second edition, Mr. W. R. Boyce Gibson has given a useful survey of Eucken's work, under the title "Rudolf Eucken's Philosophy of Life." But it is desirable that English readers should have access to some of this influential writer's representative works. This need has been to a considerable extent met through the appearance of reliable translations of the last three of the books named above: the "Lebensanschauungen" appeared last year in an English version by Mr. W. R. Boyce Gibson and Professor W. S. Hough, entitled "The Problem of Life" (the original work is described as "eine Entwickelungsgeschichte des Lebensproblems der Menschheit von Plato bis zur Gegenwart"); the "Sinn u. Werth," translated by Mr. and Mrs. W. R. Boyce Gibson, appears as "The Meaning and Value of Life"; and the "Philosophie des Geisteslebens" appears as "The Life of the Spirit," in an English translation by Mr. F. L. Pogson.

It must be remarked that, in most of his writings, Eucken's thinking has an appearance of abstractness which readers of a certain type of mind dislike. The reason is that through the greater part of his work he is dealing with *elemental* principles, as it were,—with the universal material out of which alone all philosophical and religious truth, as he conceives it, can be built up. His thinking is only in appearance abstract; in reality the principles to which he points are infinitely concrete. Another characteristic is that he uses certain terms of fundamental import,—such as 'spiritual,' 'natural,' 'real,' 'ideal,' 'eternal,'—in meanings which, though uniform and consistent, have to be discovered by the reader.

[3] The substitution of *Strömung* for *Begriff* is significant.

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I trust the reader will not be repelled if I summarize the general position in a series of short paragraphs, as follows: (*a*) The only reality which can be grasped by the human mind must have the characteristics always found in our own conscious life: growth from within,—spontaneous activity, leading to ever-expanding development. Man is creative, endowed by nature with the capacity of bringing forth, in continuous power of production, new forms of mental life. This alone gives the possibility of amelioration in human beings, the life of the individual undergoing perpetual renewal. (*b*) The fact that man is capable of rising above himself, of comparing himself with others, and of passing judgment on his own character, proves that he shares in a life which is not finite and individual, but infinite and universal. Hence men feel constrained to search for and realize truth in thinking,—the source of all science and philosophy; they feel constrained to realize goodness in character and social conduct, and to seek for and delight in beauty in nature and in human life. (*c*) Man, therefore, while in part a continuation and portion of visible nature, at the same time manifests powers and purposes which point to forms of reality altogether different from visible and tangible things. As a spiritual being he is related to an unseen order, demanding his intelligent coöperation. The true home of his ideals is in the unseen world, where is the ground of all being and the ever-active source of spiritual life. In all high purposes man is attaching himself to the deepest reality and meaning of the world. (*d*) To be in a state of spiritual health, a man must look on and up to purposes beyond the private individual self; to these purposes the center of gravity of existence must be transferred. Then first begins the formation of a new and higher kind of inner life, the true spiritual life, bringing man into touch with the unseen. (*e*) Man, as creative, is summoned to act and decide for himself; he has to coöperate with the movement of the universe, and not merely arrange it in his thoughts. Where problems of

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the inner life are concerned, truth is reached more by the vital energies welling up when the soul is concentrated on good purposes in life.

From these summary statements it will be seen that while the author always appeals to human experience for the grounds of his philosophical and religious convictions, he has in view a fully concrete and not an abstract estimate of experience. To limit experience to the *senses* is to take an abstract view of it,—to treat the part as if it were the whole. Human experience is the experience of a being who lives not only a 'natural' life among material things in space and time, but shares in a larger life not thus limited; and it is also a *growing* experience, whose growth depends partly upon the activities of human beings. Thus Eucken's appeal to experience means something more than mere observation and analysis,—it requires sympathy and active effort in the present, and a broad historical outlook on the past. Our present experience is in part, but none the less really, *made by ourselves;* and this is above all true of moral and spiritual experience. Hence,—he says in effect,—if you want to believe in God, you must create much of the evidence for yourself. Thought is the interpretation of life which is made by action. And there is something analogous in our attitude to the past. As the translators well say:[4]

> If we are to rise above our finitude and grasp our true infinite nature as persons, we must turn to the manifold witness of history, and *relive* in sympathetic thought the world's heroic struggle for a spiritual existence. We must study the great movements of the human spirit until we learn to see in all their illuminating diversity the connected and progressive expression of a single spiritual need. We shall then find that in seeking to solve the problem of human life on the large historical scale, we are at the same time unravelling our own.[5]

By way of concrete illustration of the author's method,

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[4] "Meaning and Value of Life," Preface.

[5] *Cf.* Eucken's essay on the "Philosophy of History" in the volume "Systematische Philosophie," edited by Hinneberg ("Die Kultur der Gegenwart," Vol. I, 1907).

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let us take a brief glance at the volume on the "Meaning and Value of Life." The purpose of the book is to suggest an answer to the ancient question, Is life worth living? After what we have said, the reader will not be surprised to find that, for Eucken, this question resolves itself into another: How can we *make* life worth living?

In dealing with this latter question, the author first criticises and rejects certain solutions (characteristic of modern culture) which he calls 'realistic.' Civilization is the result of work; and we have a new 'gospel of work,'—uttered or unexpressed,—but acted out on a vast scale. And out of the heart of this arises "the discrepancy between *material results* and the claims of the soul." The soul, forever discontent with mere results, asks how its own inner life has profited. What answer can be given? In like manner the author exposes the bankruptcy of would-be scientific or philosophical solutions such as naturalism, intellectualism, and mere humanism. His own solution is summed up as follows:

> The answer, we decided, could be obtained only when our human life made searching inquiry into its own resources. Illumination cannot come from without, but only from the teaching and experience of life itself. Now there was one fact which really did yield an affirmative result, the fact that within our life a new depth of reality is disclosed which could not possibly belong to man as a purely natural being. Through the recognition of the independence of the spiritual life we won an insight into the spiritual self-realization of the universe; a perception of that deeper-lying foundation which sustains all life and gives it a personal character. Such advance was no mere extension of a given order of existence [*e. g.*, of nature regarded merely as a physical or biological process] nor yet a mere development of it. Rather, it opposed to the given order an altogether new life, a life which, in attaining spiritual immediacy, first discovers the true source and standard of all reality.

We may say in conclusion what we have implied in much of the preceding discussion,—that Eucken's philosophy is a genuine contribution to the understanding of what is called the 'mystical' element in religion and life. Mr. Boyce Gibson has treated the subject from this point of view in an interesting volume entitled "God with us." [6]

[6] "God with Us: A Study in Religious Idealism," London, 1909.

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The late Father Tyrrell said:

> Social religion grows from and lives by man's mystical need of converse with the invisible world, with *that Whole of which the few aspects that filter through our limited senses* constitute *the visible world.* That root remains safe in the soil of humanity, after its institutional and rational manifestations have been hewn down by criticism. For a time men may try to be satisfied with the root; but inevitably religion must reintegrate itself according to the law of its nature.

Mr. Boyce Gibson's method, in the volume to which we have referred, is first to give a sympathetic statement of Eucken's philosophy of that "converse with the invisible world," of which Father Tyrrell spoke; and then critically to compare the position with that of a number of leading British and American thinkers. The book is calculated to conduce to a better mutual understanding, and to the prevalence of a "peace policy in philosophy."

It is clear, however, that Professor Eucken's idealism is a direct challenge to the main surface-tendencies of modern 'civilization.' Perhaps the reception given to his work is a sign that 'civilized humanity' is tired of starving that very part of human nature for which man was made. The routine of social intercourse and common existence seems, as it were, an unconscious but largely successful conspiracy to conceal the possibility of the spiritual life; and a great deal of the social and economic order of 'civilization' seems an unconscious, but largely successful conspiracy to destroy the possibility of such a life. We welcome the work of a writer who seeks to make philosophy herself inspire as well as analyze, and to teach the world that the individual self, with its cravings for satisfaction, only becomes a center of reality when it freely makes itself an essential part of a universal life, and gives "the uttermost for the whole."

S. H. MELLONE.

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PERSONALITY AND A METAPHYSICS OF VALUE.

J. A. LEIGHTON.

IT is pretty generally recognized to-day that the fundamental problems of philosophy center in the questions that have to do with the relations of value and existence, namely: What are the fundamental intrinsic values of human experience and deed? Under what existential conditions, and in what ways, do these values possess effective reality or validity? and *vice versa*. What are the intrinsic values of existence?

In such a way of setting forth the problems of philosophy, it is obvious that ethical problems are of great interest, since, if any philosophical discipline or science is concerned with intrinsic values, that science is ethics. On the other hand, the values of beauty and holiness are hardly reducible to ethical values, and the problem of truth-values must occupy a peculiarly central position, since the values of truth are bound up with the truth and reality of other values.

There are some philosophers who would confine philosophy to the analysis and description of values as actual functions and processes in experience, and who would drop all questions which might arise in regard to a metaphysics or ontology of values. If this be, indeed, what is meant by defining philosophy as the theory of values, the limitation is, I think, an impossible one to carry out. Intrinsic values are, indeed, psychical phenomena and functions and, therefore, susceptible of a descriptive psychological treatment; nevertheless, by their very nature, they claim to be more than contingent psychical phenomena, or occasional elements in a phenomenal causal complex of experience. Philosophy, since it is concerned with the final problems that arise out of the character of experience as fragmentary and partially incoherent, cannot be satisfied with an empirical psychological analysis

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and description of values. The problem of truth-value is the central one. For the value of truth is no longer valid, is no longer an intrinsic value, and has no meaning in contrast with error, if truth be no more than an occasional, or even a frequent, product of a blind and unthinking complex of causal conditions. If truth be just a causal product in a psychological series, just one element in the psychical complex of finite experiences, this proposition is no truer than its opposite and there is no truth. A partially parallel situation obtains in regard to goodness, beauty, and holiness: although in these cases the situation is somewhat different, for, if there be no intrinsic validity in truth, there can be no sense in pursuing farther the inquiry as to the reality and truth of other forms of value.

To say that the problem of values is preëminently the problem of philosophy, means, then, that the fundamental philosophical problem is that of the relation of the mind's valuing, purposing, and attitude-seeking in knowing, contemplating, doing, and worshiping, to the course of reality. And, we do not evade metaphysics, or issue in a new era of thought, for which these questions will appear juvenile, by talking about values, *in abstracto,* rather than about valuing selves.

A classification and survey of values is an important part of systematic philosophy, only in so far as thereby we may be able to set in a clearer and fuller light the dynamic idealizing and purposive tendencies and functions of selves or persons. A metaphysics of values can only be regarded as a special way of formulating a metaphysics of persons.

With this principle in mind I offer here, in outline, a tentative classification of the most significant and important human valuations. The list is not exhaustive, and I do not claim for the classification either logical completeness or inherent necessity. I do not know how one could proceed to satisfy either of these claims. I found my guiding principles simply by examining the

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empirical character and relations of personality. The classification is made as a means of getting forward with the main contention that the metaphysics of values must be, in effect, a metaphysics of persons, and that the final reality and supremacy of values in the world-order stands or falls with the reality and persistence of persons in this world-order. I hold that a person is, by the nature of the case, a more real reality, if the phrase be permissible, than even the most 'over-individual' and 'ineffable' value.

The three fundamental relations in which the human person stands, takes attitudes, and has typical experiences, are to nature, fellowman, and God or the supreme reality and unity, however this may be conceived. The classification of intrinsic valuing attitudes may then be determined with reference to these three types of relationship. And, in and for the valuing person, there are three main types of valuing attitudes. These are: (1) theoretical or truth-attitudes; (2) practical or overt-action attitudes; (3) immediate emotional or feeling-attitudes. Each one of these types of valuing attitudes may be differentiated in each one of the three fundamental relationships of the experiencing and attitude-taking self. Further, in each group there will be a differentiation of values uncontrolled by any single numerical principle. And, since persons do not live and function as machines or series of compartments, there are complex cross-valuations. Of these a complete enumeration is not necessary, or, perhaps, even possible.

In the truth-value attitudes, which have to do with the acceptance and interpretation of fact-in-relation, we get: (1) The reality of nature in its separate elements and in their connections as parts of a whole. In knowing the physical world we accept it as it is, independent of our feelings and desires, and we find worth in interpreting it and submitting our minds to its leading, as thus accepted in all the variety of its elemental features and their connections. Thus we get and value natural science,

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as a systematic account of the given world-order. (2) The reality of our fellow-men. We find an intrinsic worth in knowing the actual character of human nature as expressed in its deeds and utterances in the living present and in the historical past. A systematic and growing knowledge of human nature in all the variety and interrelatedness of its elements constitutes the psychological, social, and historical sciences. (3) The reality of God, the Supreme Unity of the real. We find a worth in knowing God and our relations with him, and this knowledge, if there be such, constitutes theology and part of metaphysics. I am not, of course, here attempting to discuss the question whether there be a God or supreme unity, and whether there be any science of systematic theology. It is sufficient for my present purpose that a considerable number of intelligent persons hold that there is a real and knowable God and value the reality and knowableness of God. For such persons the being of God and the science which deals therewith, have fact and truth-values. And I think that these values are not the immediate emotional values of religion. A man may take keen interest and satisfaction in theological inquiry without having very much personal religious experience. Such, then, are the chief types of theoretical valuation.

The practical value-attitudes refer to the chief types of overt action. The respective objects of these valuations may be valued mediately, because they are means to the conservation and enhancement of other values, or they may, in some cases, come to be valued immediately, or on their own account. Normally, they are usually mediate values which tend to run into or be fused with the immediate emotional and theoretical values which they facilitate. The chief types are: (1) Technology, which comprises all the methods and instruments for the adjustment of human life to the order of nature, and the control of this order for the conservation and enhancement of human well-being. These technological instruments comprise all the applied arts from engineering and

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every-day physical labor to medicine and hygiene. (2) The instrumentalities of social order and well-being. These are the methods and instruments for the regulation of our social relationships. They include all social customs and civil, political, and economic laws and arrangements; including the work of administration and teaching. In short, the whole machinery of our social life, when considered as machinery or instrumentality, falls under this head. (3) The methods and instruments for entering into right relationships with God. These comprise all forms of worship, prayer, meditation, and conduct, which may be regarded as practical means for gaining access to the supreme object of religion and for communion with him.

Finally there are the immediate emotional value-attitudes. These valuations never subserve any more remote ends. They are regarded as wholly self-sufficing; and other values, both theoretical and practical, are made subservient and instrumental to these. The chief types are: (1) The emotional values of nature, namely, the feelings of beauty, picturesqueness, grandeur, and sublimity aroused by contemplation of nature. The æsthetic values of nature represent to the feeling soul, which contemplates the harmoniously beautiful landscape, the picturesque waterfall, or the sublime range of snow-clad mountain peaks, a living harmony or unity of the manifold, a majesty of power or form, self-complete and self-sufficient. Similarly, the reproductions of nature in art and literature enchance these feelings by limitation and selection, by the exclusion of all discordant elements and of all features suggestive of natural incompleteness or lack of harmony and balance. (2) The emotional values of human fellowship or social life. Such are the feelings of companionship, comradeship, friendship, tender emotion, and love. These emotions, and others akin to them, are distinctively interpersonal emotional values. They run from the wider and vaguer sentiments of humanity to the narrower and more intense sentiments

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of the family and romantic sexual love. Their antitheses are the negative social feelings, the anti-social social emotions one might call them, since they, too, depend on interpersonal relationships. I mean such emotions as hostility, distrust, hatred. Every principal feeling, doubtless, has its antithesis, and there is a negative aspect to every form of valuation; but we are now concerned with the primary and positive aspects of valuation. The sum or, rather, the organic unity of the emotional values of interpersonal relationship might be called the ethical emotional value-attitude of personality. This would constitute the entire disposition of the person toward other persons. It is doubtful whether there is, in all persons, such an ethical unity of disposition, since in many individuals personality is very imperfectly achieved. The generally recognized moral values, such as truthfulness, justice, and honesty, are conceptual generalizations and incipient plans of action in relation to other persons, which have their root and origin in the ethical emotional dispositions of persons. Ethical dispositions have a conceptual or thought aspect, but, primarily, in their immediacy, they are emotional dispositions or tendencies to act. The degree of unity and harmony in the ethical disposition is expressed in the degree of unity which obtains in the interpersonal dispositions or sentiments.

Here, too, belong the æsthetic values of social and cultural life. In art and literature the emotions and deeds of individuals, the clashing and reconciliation of wills in society with one another and with nature and fate, are presented to the beholder in ideally self-complete unities of feeling and action. Art and literature produce elevation, harmony, and repose, of feeling in regard to human deeds and destinies, by lifting them out of the actual, by isolating them in a designed unity, and thus eliminating the incompleteness, the reference beyond themselves, and the discords, of the romantic and tragic episodes of actual life.

(3) Religious emotional values. Communion or felt

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personal relationship with God would seem to be the final goal of all religious thought and practice. Worship, prayer, meditation, are instruments or means toward the end of fellowship or communion with God. Inasmuch as the final object of religious value is taken to be the Supreme Reality and Ultimate Unity, religious experience promises to afford the most self-complete, comprehensive, and satisfying type of emotional value. It is not surprising that religious devotees have found in it that type of value-experience in which all other intrinsic human valuations find their union and consummation. Art performs a similar service for religious emotional valuations and for social emotional valuations. Art lifts religious emotions out of the imperfect actuality and sets them forth in their own harmonious unity, self-sufficiency, and self-completeness.

I have not given a special place in this classification to æsthetic values, for the reason that these values do not seem to me to constitute a single unified type. The æsthetic values are complex and varied, according to their reference to nature, or fellow-man, or God. All art is an instrument of social expression of emotions and sentiments. In art we find, besides the reproduction of the æsthetic feelings engendered by the contemplation of nature, the expression, with a freedom, harmony, and self-completeness, which is lacking in actual life, of the interpersonal emotions of social life. Creative art, in so far as it deals with human themes, lends an ideal grace to life, and the life is the life of men in its social and cultural aspects.

The above classification of values involves, as do all such classifications, the sundering of things that in actual experience are found together. For example, social and religious values interpenetrate. Æsthetic values are found in close association with both social and religious emotions and sentiments. Ethical and religious values are found fused together. In the practical values control of nature and social control constantly intermingle.

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In the theoretical values natural science and humanistic science influence one another's methods and conceptions, and both influence theology and religious metaphysics. The manifold interdependences of nature and human society are reflected in the interpenetrations of human values; and, if the values of religion and theology are to be taken as real and intrinsic values, these values, by the very character of their objects and their modes of expression, must interpenetrate with the values of the natural order and of human fellowship.

What, in general, are the relations between the theoretical, practical, and emotional values?

The practical value-attitudes are normally instrumental. They are means to ends. The normal relation between the practical and the theoretical values is that of instruments to the determining conditions of their fashioning and operation. The successful outcome of the activities represented by the values of technology, law, politics, custom, and morality, depend on their conformity with reality, or, in other words, with the orders of existence represented by the theoretical or truth-values. Truth of fact and truth of law in science are means to practical ends only in the sense that they dictate the conditions for the realization of the practical and emotional values of action.

In the case of the religious values, the success of the modes of action represented by worship, prayer, and meditation, depends upon the assumed conformity of these actions with the ultimate reality of God. A man may, indeed, believe in a certain kind of God because he wants or wills so to believe. To worship the God whom one craves, and to feel oneself in communion with him, may be the most profoundly satisfying experience of value that a finite mind can have; but the continuance and meaningfulness of this value is possible only if the God is held to be a reality, not a product of the worshiper's wishes.

The general goal of the activities initiated by the prac-

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tical value-attitudes is the enlargement, enrichment, and harmonization of the immediate emotional values of personality. Inasmuch as truth-values represent the determining conditions for such emotional or feeling fulfilment, we may say that the ultimate intrinsic values for personal deed and experience are the reactions of personal feeling, in which the truth or knowledge which we accept or discover, and the overt activities in which we engage, whether with reference to nature, fellow-men, or God, bear their fruits in a richer, more harmonious, and continuing feeling-experience. The final intrinsic values of life are the personally possessed unities of truth and feeling.

If this view seems to reduce truth and reality, which is the object of truth's reference, to the position of mere handmaids of emotion, it is to be borne in mind, on the other hand, that the emotional values of experience are progressively realized and conserved only in so far as they are the fruits of practices in harmony with the real constitution and course of the universe. Emotional experience or feeling, to be permanently and fully satisfying, must conform to the truth of things. If there were no real and determinate nature of things, independent of our transient feelings and wishes, there would be no reason why any desire or wish, or any number of incompatible desires might not all be fully satisfied *ad libitum*. If beggars could be choosers, we might all ride in automobiles. A false science of nature will not yield permanently good results in its practical applications. Laws and moral injunctions will be in vain unless they are in harmony with the actual constitution of human nature which, in turn, may be revealed in very significant aspects by social customs, law, and morality. Even friendship and love must take account of the actual individuality of friends and lovers, if these values would endure.

The immediate emotional values of experience then are not independent of the truth and reality values. The latter values yield their appropriate emotional satisfactions,

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and the former values, in turn, are sustained and illuminated by the truth values. Since the immediate unity of the personality is a unity of feeling, the acts and the truth-attitudes which yield the personal values of experience do so by being appropriated into and fused with the personal self-feeling. No purely emotional value is self-sustaining and no intellectual or theoretical value is without emotional coloring. In their immediate reality for the person, all intrinsic values involve the union, with varying emphasis, of truth and feeling, or intellection and emotion.

In this work of classification we have been dealing in abstractions. If we ask what is the ultimate principle for the unification of values, and what is the final sustaining ground of values, I think we must answer, to both questions, personality!

Valuations, as incentives to and appraisals of actions, and values as felt attributes of truth and reality, are simply attitudes of persons, affirmations which enhance and appraise experiences. Anything consciously desired and purposively sought is thus desired and sought because it represents some worth for a person either in private or social relations. I have not, in my classification, included a separate set of 'personal values,' because it seems to me that, in the last analysis, all values are personal facts and attitudes. And the distinction, so frequently drawn, between individual and overindividual values, is simply a distinction in universality, rationality, and comprehensiveness, of content and scope, within the scale of personal values. A person is a more or less socialized and universalized individual, and, as such, may be described in terms of his valuations. These are measures of his degree of personalization. The choice of ends by a more or less rational agent depends on a series of judgments of value or worth. Theoretical, no less than practical, activities are guided by the affirmation of a series or scale of life-values. The history of a man's valuations tells the story of his judgments on life

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and of his attitudes in relation to its varied experiences. In typical and contrasting forms of culture, such as those of China and Europe, we find broadly defined and differing standards of value in regard to science, social life, art, religion, etc. The history of the mutations of culture can be compactly expressed in terms of the evolution of valuations. This would give us a sublimated *Kulturgeschichte.*

On the other hand, considered as immediate and effective realities, values are valuations, that is, affirmations and attitudes which exist and function only in personal centers of experience and deed. No formal logical and metaphysical principle for the final unification and cosmical grounding of values can be found outside the unity of personal attitude and experience. In the lives of finite persons there are two complementary and mutually indispensable features: diversity or wealth of content, and internal harmony of experience, There are, in actual developing persons, all grades of relationship between the diversity and the harmony of experiences, but in a sane self neither can be wholly absent. The growth of unity in diversity in the self can be expressed in terms of the organization of values in increasing universality and harmony. The so-called overindividual values are representative of the more universal and rational intrapersonal and interpersonal attitudes. The 'normative' or 'ideal' values of truth-seeking and truth-knowing, sympathy, justice, love, beauty, holiness and fellowship with God, are generalized expressions of fundamental attitudes and contents of spiritual and rational selves. Spiritual selfhood or personality is actualized precisely through the affirmation and service, in concrete situations, of these universal standards or norms. In this sense, our definitions of ideal values and of the spiritual and rational self, are and must be circular. The person is the rational unity of conscious life, in and for which values are realized; and the person develops in and through the universalizing value-attitudes.

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The so-called 'absolute' values or overindividual types of valuation can be nothing other than generalized formulations of the ways in which persons actually attain self-fulfilment through the progressive harmonization and universalization of their actions and experiences. Since there are overindividual types of intrinsic valuation, this means that persons are conscious individuals whose vocation it is to unify and rationalize their lives by finding and affirming certain universal interests and ends which belong to their deepest and truest selfhood. In other words, it means that the development of personality takes place through the effective working, in separate individuals, of certain common or universal potencies of reason and spirit.

Beyond the harmonious enrichment and expansion of personal experience, as at once individual and universal, there is no principle discoverable for the unification of values. Values *per se,* apart from the attitudes and achievements of selves, have no substantive existence. The evolution of values is the evolution of personality. Hence, in affirming and realizing the most universal values the self is discovering and affirming the conditions of its own spiritual and rational functioning.

If the so-called absolute values have no self-existence beyond the interpersonal and intrapersonal affirmations of selves, it follows that there can be no universal cosmical ground and sustaining unity of human values, unless there be a cosmical ground for the lives of finite persons. Logical, ethical, æsthetical, and religious valuations can have no absolute basis unless personality have an absolute basis. The ultimate foundation of spiritual values must reside in a supreme self or nowhere. If personality have a metaphysical basis of reality, then ideal values may be permanently valid and effective in the cosmical process; but the ground of the permanent validity of values must not be so conceived as to rob the evolution of finite personalities of all significance.

In brief, the authority and persistence of the intrinsic

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values of human experience require the hypothesis of a supreme conscious unity and ground and conservator of values, that is, of a Self who is the sustainer of all these values which are progressively discovered, affirmed, and realized in the social, ethical, æsthetic, intellectual, and religious experiences of human persons.

It would take us too far afield here, and occupy too much space, to enter upon a careful consideration of the relation between the hypothesis of a permanent cosmical ground of the reality and efficiency of values and the place of values in the actual evolutionary process. The problem is evidently that of the compatibility of a permanent directing principle of personality with the actual character of cosmical evolution. Such a momentous metaphysical problem is too large to be discussed here. I may remark in conclusion, however, that evolution evidently has directions whether or not it have a director, or possibly a board of directors; that the directions of evolution have resulted in the emergence, enhancement, and expansion of the values of personality; finally, that an intrinsic valuation always involves teleological or purposive activity, whether the agent be clearly conscious or not; and that no conception of evolution which is adequate to all the facts can escape employing the notions of purpose and value in some form. No matter how human and personal values got into the evolutionary process, they are here, and, probably they are growing in wealth of content and effectiveness of expression. By whatever mechanism it may have happened, the evolutionary process has brought forth human and spiritual values, and it continues to manifest them to an increasing degree and with a growing wealth of content. It can hardly have produced them out of nothing and by chance in a blind chaos. It would seem that a humanistic principle, a power not ourselves making for personality, must have been at work in it all along. If so, the evolutionary process only fully explains itself in terms of its labor, however slowly and toilsomely the work may seem to be

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accomplished, to bring forth persons and their valuations of their experiences. If the process of evolution be not capable of some such interpretation I cannot see that it is explicable at all. For truth, the central determining value of conscious reflective life, and goodness, beauty, and holiness, the other determining values of personality, by their very nature claim to be more than occasional precipitations of cosmical weather. These values, and the conscious spirits in which they inhere and function, must claim to be continuously valid principles for the interpretation of reality, and continuously effective principles in the evolution of the same reality. Without the recognition of such principles, evolution is unintelligible, since intelligible change involves continuity of direction and of ends. It is precisely such a progressive continuity of meaning that is afforded by the hypothesis of the persistent reality and effectiveness of persons and their valuations. If intrinsic values are valid, and if the world-process has a continuous whole of meaning, then persons must, no matter when or how they may make their appearance in the history of the temporal universe, be the true and most adequate manifestations of a Supreme Personality, or, if the term be preferred, of a Suprapersonality.

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ON THINKING ABOUT ONESELF.

HELEN WODEHOUSE.

"REALIZE yourself." "Perfect yourself." "Forget yourself." "He is so selfish; he always thinks of himself." "He is not selfish, but one feels that he is always thinking about himself." "Examine yourself." "Look out, not in." "Self-admiration is intolerable." "A good man thinks little of himself." "Self-respect is the first condition of morality." Such phrases as these,

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in the world of popular ethics, indicate a group of intricately crossing and conflicting ideas, and the aim of this essay is to distinguish and describe a few of the states and qualities which the ordinary moralist calls 'thinking of oneself,' 'thinking well of oneself,' and 'self-consciousness.' They seem to include one thing which is looked on as the root of most evil, one which is condemned though not quite so vigorously, one which is coming to be condemned more and more, and one which is sometimes described as the crown and foundation of virtue. That is, we shall have to deal with the natures of the egoist, the self-satisfied person, and the *poseur,* and finally with the self-consciousness of the moral man.

The case of the egoist is clear enough in theory. It is that of a man possessed by a particular set of his needs and interests; those, namely, which are more or less private. The comfort of the chair in which he is to sit has a disproportionate importance to him as compared with the comfort of chairs in general; that a post should be held by himself has an unusual excess of desirableness over the general alternative that the best man should hold it. It is a state which may be due originally either to the strength of the private interests or to the weakness of the rest, but in all cases it tends to weaken and strangle these others, the 'disinterested interests.' Æsthetic enjoyment, for instance, as Volkmann remarks, must always be limited for the egoist. A friend of mine was lately shown round a private garden of which the owner was justly proud. When in the course of their tour she admired a certain chestnut tree her host replied with indifference, "That belongs to the next house."

We find many people whose warm interests stop abruptly, not at the boundary of their strictly private self, but at the boundary of their family, or class, or immediate circle of friends. We find the man who can love only the garden of his own college, admire only the institutions of his own country. Lookers-on are apt to

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misrepresent this man when they say that he loves these things because they are his own. The truth probably is that he cannot love what is not intimate and near, but that his affection in its origin is otherwise direct and unself-conscious. 'Class-selfishness,' indeed, is in this sense a very misleading term; for whilst the uneven distribution of interest is common to the 'class-selfish' man and to the egoist, the relation of this unevenness to the self-limit is the very thing which distinguishes the two. The egoist's is only one particular case of lack of balance amongst the direct affections, of disproportion in interests, of the stiff unphilosophic temper which to some extent appears in all of us. With everyone the limits of the space of warm vivid interest are drawn more abruptly and irrationally than they should be; but with the egoist these limits are unusually narrow and abrupt, and they are drawn somewhere near the boundary of a nearly private personal experience. These are the only facts which are essential to egoism. Self-consciousness is not essential; it is just possible for an egoist never to 'think about himself' at all.

Self-consciousness, however, is for an obvious reason very near to such a man. It is normally awakened by conflict with obstacles, especially with human obstacles, and a man who cares abnormally much about getting a comfortable chair and abnormally little about other people getting one will be peculiarly beset by such conflict. He will have less chance than others of that steady peaceful absorption in which the sense of ego and non-ego lies dormant or disappears; this sense will be continually pricked into vehement unrestful life; the man who at first thinks only about the chair will, in the stress and friction of self-versus-the-world, presently think a great deal about himself, and will in a manner be justified in his resentful feeling that it is fate and other people that make him do so. For the obstacles as well as the egoism are a necessary factor; a truth which is sometimes forgotten by educators. We used to be told, for instance,

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that shyness in company implied self-consciousness, and we were meant to infer that the self-consciousness was due to egoism. No doubt a perfectly unselfish person would not be shy, but our own excess of awkwardness and constraint, if we were ordinary young people, was certainly due not to the excess of our wish to be liked and admired, but to the excessive difficulty we found in the art of social intercourse. As this difficulty wore off the self-consciousness wore off with it, even though the selfish state of our hearts remained much the same.[1]

Let us pass next to the case of the self-satisfied person. The word is ambiguous, and I wish for the present to confine its reference to simple self-confidence, and to that simplest form of pride into which this is transformed by the awakening of self-consciousness. We must distinguish these not only from self-display, which will be mentioned in the next section, but from self-applause or self-approval, which will come at the end.

Self-confidence and egoism are not bound up together. An egoist may be diffident, and a self-confident person may be very unselfish. Nevertheless they seem to correspond to each other on their different planes. As the space of warm interest for the egoist is disproportionately warm and ends suddenly, so with the other man's space of warm belief. Certain near and intimate opinions and maxims and ways of behavior are 'of course' right, and his marginal knowledge and the suggestions of other people have no weight as against them. Certain fixed points of view are sufficient for surveying the universe, as for the other certain fixed inclinations are sufficient for attempting to arrange the universe. ('Humility' is generally taken to cover the opposites of both frames of mind.) To be simply self-confident is distinct from being proud, just as one may have confidence in one's bodily strength without being proud of it. Our ordinary lan-

[1] A similar theory led a Quaker friend to explain to me that selfishness was at the root of the difficulty of learning to ride a bicycle. For, she said, we should not be nervous if we were not concerned for our own safety.

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guage here is misleading as usual, and the person we describe as 'having a good conceit of himself' or 'thinking a good deal of himself' may sometimes be only unreflectively self-confident. This attitude is in general not severely condemned unless we think it badly mistaken or dangerous, and then it is often only blamed as ignorance in general is blamed; less, for instance, in the young than in the old. But competition and comparison with others speedily awaken self-consciousness and turn self-confidence into pride, which is harder for one's neighbors to bear.

Just as egoism was a particular case of badly distributed interest, so self-confidence and pride are particular cases of unevenness in the distribution of confidence. We find class-confidence and college-confidence as we find the so-called class- and college-selfishness, and in each case it is equally unjust to regard the group-sentiment as if it were derived from the self-sentiment, which is only a special case of the same thing. The valuation, in fact, usually spreads the other way, and the self derives part of its title to admiration from being a member of the magnificent class, family, or country in question. It is more common to admire oneself excessively for being a gentleman or an Oxford man than to admire gentlefolk or Oxford men excessively because they include oneself.

This pride is awakened out of confidence, in the general case as in the particular, wherever competition comes in. We begin by using the standards of our family or our class as the natural and unquestionable norm, and then the forcing of comparison, if it does not destroy this habit, establishes it as the habitual and conscious setting of these standards above others. This also is provoking to the rest of the world, and the patronizing of a Birmingham man as such by an Oxford man as such may be as irritating as the patronizing of Jones by Smith, but both the contempt and the resentment are of a rather nobler kind.

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The trade of dictator, like those of the schoolmaster, lecturer, and Pharisee, is a dangerous one. When one feels vividly and constantly the difference between oneself and other people it is difficult not to hope that other people are feeling it too. Pride passes into vanity; self-confidence into self-display; the lecturer to an audience becomes an actor before an audience, and the conceited man becomes a *poseur*.

This most obscure and complicated subject, the nature of the pose, is still awaiting an attempt at adequate treatmen from the side of psychology and morals. Several modern novelists have made valuable contributions to its description, but no philosopher, so far as I know, has tried seriously to coördinate all its problems. There are problems enough. Is the habit as universal as it seems? and why is it so universal? How has it managed to get established in the course of evolution? What is its connection with that indulgence in emotion for emotion's sake with which it seems so closely associated? Why does it give such keen pleasure, and why do we disapprove of it so fiercely in other people? Why does the applause of an imaginary audience, if its unreality is not rudely forced upon us, give us almost as much pleasure as real applause? These questions would need a volume to themselves, and in the present essay I shall simply leave them on one side. I shall merely use a provisional definition to mark off this kind of 'thinking about oneself' from the other kinds; describing it as the sort which involves pleasure in the attention of a real or imaginary audience, and in its real or imaginary respect, pity, sympathy, or astonishment.[2]

Leaving this subject, then, let us pass on to the fourth and perhaps the most interesting,—that self-consciousness which has sometimes been taken to be the basis of rational morality.

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[2] This definition is provisional only; I am by no means sure that it will serve.

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The marking out of this state of mind is a curiously difficult task. Self-consciousness of this kind must, of course, be kept quite distinct from posing, and from comparing oneself with other people, though both these habits may accompany it. All things considered, the best mark to take seems to be this, that in 'rational' self-consciousness a man contemplates his life (or his character) as forming, relatively speaking, a whole. Now there is a temptation to think that this attitude is the only natural one to adopt so soon as one is rational enough to contemplate wholes at all, but a moment's reflection should remind us that there are plenty of other relative wholes which might be contemplated instead. There are two possibilities. I may look primarily on my own life as an organized system, and on my family relations, my trade, and my public work as entering into this. Or I may primarily regard the family life and the trade and the public work as organized systems in themselves, and my own life as entering into them. My life may be looked on as a relative whole in itself, or as made up of parts of other wholes. Rational self-consciousness, as opposed to what we may call rational object-consciousness, is a matter of division lines.

These two arrangements are, of course, no more antagonistic to each other than $6 = 3 + 3$ is antagonistic to $6 = 3 \times 2$. A perfect mind would presumably see all the universe in all its arrangements at once, as 6 is transparent to the mathematician's eye. But even a mathematician, if he is human, takes 6 in different aspects according to his purpose, and so do we. We alternate between the two ways of regarding the universe. Both are indispensable, and it is interesting to examine the advantages of each.

Both, it must be observed from the beginning, are rational systems, and capable of delivering us from the slavery of the moment's impulses and temptations. I may give extra preparation to a lecture in spite of wanting to be idle, either because I wish to live an industrious

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life or because I wish my class to understand the theory of analogy. Both, again, may be organized on either a worthy or an unworthy plan. Richard III may resolve (objectively) to murder his wife and his nephews and his friends, or he may resolve (self-consciously) 'to be a villain.' A soldier may keep a dangerous post through the night for the sake of his companions, or because he desires to be a true man and no coward. A county councillor may undertake a disagreeable piece of public work primarily because he wants the work done, or primarily because it would be the act of a cad to refuse. The nobleness or meanness of being absorbed in the pursuit of an object depends on whether the object itself is noble or mean. And the worthiness or unworthiness of 'saving our own soul' depends entirely on what we try to save it for.

Again, the use of either system seems always possible. Even the most divided or distracted life may be regarded as a whole, as one's own life; and even on a desert island one might look on oneself as an instrument for taming the animals and cultivating the ground. But certainly in many cases one system seems more suitable than the other. We should disapprove, I think, of the man who refrained from some particularly ugly animal pleasure chiefly because it might hinder some work he was interested in; we demand that his own ideal of life shall make such arguments unnecessary. On the other hand, we should certainly disapprove of the mother who had to remind herself of what a mother's life should be before she tended her sick child. The general education of the young is most naturally looked on as an incident in their separate lives; the special training of an apprentice falls more easily into its place, for some people at any rate, as an incident in the carrying on of the trade as a whole. Many matters, such as the spiritual effects of a moral self-conquest or of the reading of Dante by an amateur, are unimportant for any single system except that of the individual life; taking the case at its best, we may

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say that my professional work is a little better done, my family a little better served, my neighbor at a dinner table a little better entertained, because I have gained strength of character in some private battle, but only when we survey my life as a whole in itself can all these tiny improvements be added together and 'much better' pronounced. Hence it is well that such matters should be regarded from the point of view of the individual life. On the other hand, we usually demand that a life shall not be made up entirely of things of this kind.

On the whole and broadly speaking, an excessive use of the 'subjective' point of view is the fault of under-vitalized people, and an insufficient use of it is the fault of unorganized and un-self-controlled people. Its use is always necessary, of course, when we have to decide on the apportionment of our lives amongst the various interests that claim us, and it is necessary for keeping us straight in these ever-recurring elements in our behavior which do not affect any one of these interests in an immediate or obvious way. It fills the place of a central government amongst local bodies (or rather, perhaps, amongst associations which have branches in other countries as well), and it has the same office of insisting that general rules shall be kept even when their good effect is not evident for the moment. On the other hand, that is a weak country whose local interests are not strong enough to carry any enterprise through by themselves without interference from the center. A mother, we feel, ought to take care of her children for the children's sake; a teacher ought to be able to give a good lesson for the sake of his school, and a politician make a good speech for the sake of his party; and, except in times of disillusionment and depression, none of them should have to call in his central as opposed to his local conscience, or be obliged to reflect much upon the position of these activities in his life as a whole.

Besides being in this way the mark of a certain weakness, the excessive use of the self-conscious division suf-

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fers from a defect common to all over-centralization, in that the resulting procedure is apt to become conventional and inelastic, and insufficiently related to facts. Our ideal of a life or character tends to be a much more conventional sort of thing than our ideal of the way to manage a particular shop or guide a particular committee or help a particular friend. The lack of obvious and immediate results of which we spoke in the last paragraph means also the lack of obvious and immediate tests of the value of our behavior, such as elsewhere force education and growth upon us; and thus our general ideal is a little apt to slip out of relation to our special businesses. In this way we get the person who 'acts on principle' in the abstract, and has to twist either his natural conduct or his account of his conduct in order to bring it under his theory of life. One instance is found in the people who, with a genuine simple love of theater-going, explain that they go for educational reasons. Another I quote from a book of sermons which holds it up to admiration:

> I read the other day a characteristic anecdote about Professor Faraday. The lecture was over and he was leaving the class room, when some little article dropped from his hand on the floor. The professor searched for it, but it was nowhere to be found. . . . And one of his students who was with him said, "Never mind, sir, it is of no consequence whether we find it to-night or no." "That is quite true," said the professor, "but it is of the greatest consequence to me that I be not baffled in my determination to find it."

Let us hope that the story is not true. There is a paradox of perfectionism as well as of hedonism, and if we think too uninterruptedly about our own life and character these will be apt to suffer from it.

Again, whilst in the last example the habit led to magnifying details, it may in other ways lead to their underestimation. We saw that various acts of self-culture and self-control might be undervalued by the objective-minded man, because their importance was small in regard to each of the systems that interested him; and that

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the subjective view was therefore required to pull us up 'morally,' to tighten our general principles. The corresponding danger on the other side is that we should hold to these and miss the details of their working, be morally earnest and intellectually slack. No ideal of a life, but only the ideals of business, can show an official how he ought to keep his books. A teacher's general conscience can make him prepare his lessons well, but he needs an intelligent zealous knowledge of education and of child life to tell him what in each lesson he ought to teach. The organization of charity is probably hindered continually because people are more concerned with the duty of almsgiving than with the methods of relieving the poor. And if men are thus intellectually idle, their very goodness may make disputes between them all the longer and more bitter. I quote an example of dangerous doctrine from the Jesuit in "John Inglesant."

> Hereafter it will be of little importance which of these new names, Cavalier or Roundhead, you are called by, . . . but it will matter very much whether you acted as became a man, and did not flinch ignobly at the moment of trial. Choose your part from the instinct of your order, from your birth, or from habit or what not; but having chosen it, follow it to the end. Stand by your party or your order, and especially in the hour of trial or danger be sure you never falter; for, be certain of this, that no misery can be equal to that which a man feels who is conscious that he has proved unequal to his part. . . . I pray God that such misery as this may never be yours.

In other matters the same fault appears as dilettantism. If we are interested in self-culture much more than in philosophy, mathematics, or literature, we shall probably not get far in any of the three. An energetic maiden lady may have plenty of interests, but if she has never met an interest strong enough to make her feel herself an appendage to it, she will wear them all as appendages to herself, and is likely to wear them by turns.

Once more, an excessive use of the subjective division leads easily to an excessive inwardness, or rather a defective outwardness, of morality. Private thoughts and feelings, though the least obvious part of the world's con-

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cerns, are the most obvious part of our own life. Known facts of the universe lose the importance they deserve as compared with our realization of those facts and our feelings about them. It is hardly necessary to say that neither this nor the other disadvantages described are inseparable from moral self-consciousness, or that if this were accompanied by complete wisdom it would be free from them all. We are only describing the faults into which it does most frequently fall, and we are omitting an equally full description of the faults accompanying the other point of view only because they are so easily seen. On the whole, one might suggest that a good woman is most exposed to the temptations of excessive subjectivity, and a good man to the other kind; a fact which has occasioned a certain disadvantage in the age-long preaching to women by men.

Finally, there is no doubt that this division of the universe into 'my business' and 'not my business' is a dangerous one as regards its dichotomous nature. The negative part may become unduly vague and dark. There is, indeed, a certain complication of moral self-consciousness which goes far to remove this disadvantage. But before coming to this we must deal with two smaller matters subordinate to self-consciousness, namely, self-approval and self-respect.

Self-approval in the sense in which I shall use it has reference to one's own life; one's voluntary conduct, and the making of character for oneself; and is thus distinguished from pride, which relates to moral and mental possessions. "How much better is my party than other people's parties" is pride; "I have done well to attach myself to this party" is self-approval. "I am by nature and by practice a self-controlled person" is the one; "I have creditably improved my self-control" is the other. The following is a mixture; it was poured out to me by an elderly acquaintance in a state of great emotion after a street accident: "The Lord's given me back to my poor husband and children; He's spared me to repent.

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Not that I've anything to repent of. I haven't been like some people; I've always tried to do kindnesses, and I often say I'd rather give a thing away than have it myself; I'm made like that. I've tried to do my best all my life, and the Lord's been very good to me. Well, and He ought to be good to me."

Is self-approval to be condemned? The blame sometimes bestowed on it depends partly, I think, on the opinion that the self-approver in question is exaggerating the value of his own conduct, and partly on a belief that he is not only approving, but posing. Where both these complications are eliminated, our condemnation hesitates. An argument often used, that a person could not admire himself unless his ideal were low, would, of course, weigh equally against any admiration of other people. So far as self-approval is justly blamed at all, the blame seems to be based mainly upon two other arguments. The first of these applies only in so far as self-approval involves favorable comparison of one's own life with other people's, and it urges that, in such high matter, to take pleasure in this is an indication of a meanly competitive habit of mind. The other is more general, and amounts to the plea that a workman should not waste time by gloating over his own work. Similar arguments apply against mere humiliation and self-disgust.

It is a curious fact in popular ethics that, while we are forbidden to love ourselves and discouraged from admiring or approving ourselves, we are constantly exhorted to respect ourselves. The subject of self-respect as a moral motive is both interesting and obscure. I place it under the head of moral self-consciousness because it seems to involve the contemplation of the individual life as a relative whole, in the light of the desire to make this life worthy of the individual personality.

There is no doubt that we are often apt to attribute this motive where it does not exist, or exists only to an unimportant degree. Some actions that are attributed to its influence are of a direct and simple nature that in-

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volves no contemplation of wholes; probably most of the readers of this journal refrain from getting drunk, dirty, or uproarious simply because such conduct seems to them ugly and distasteful. Other actions involve the contemplation of wholes, but not of our life as a whole,—we regard rather the objective systems which cut across the individual life. In this case our motive is not self-respect, but office-respect, class-respect, or position-respect. It is the university official who must not take a millionaire's bribe; the gentleman who must not run away from danger; the uniform or the family name that must not be disgraced. (It may be urged that we have here respect for one of the universals which make up our particular self, and therefore have what may be called self-respect; but then to be consistent we must say that it is self-respect which makes us angry with other gentlemen who betray their class standards, for the acting motive is exactly the same.) Again, even when our own life is the whole considered, the guiding motive need not be respect for ourselves. The desire to be respect-worthy, for instance, is different from this, and so is the general desire to make a good thing of our life as an end in itself. We say that we attempt by our help and encouragement to reawaken self-respect in a beaten and dejected man, but what we do awaken is usually the sense that his life is a piece of work worth going on with. Of course, all these may be called self-respect if we choose, but the name seems dangerously misleading.

When these distinctions have been made, the range and importance left to self-respect in the literal sense seem to be small and doubtful. I believe, however, that the motive does exist in certain cases where we revolt from a mean affection or tarnishing regret with the definite sentiment, "I am too good for this." A solitary man might keep up his standard of life by help of the reflection that he must no more cheat his own soul of its due than he would cheat the soul of another. But here we are already on the borders of another and greater motive.

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Respect for 'the god in our breast' evidently passes with ease into respect for the God who dwells in the heart of man. And this leads up to our final point,—the influence of religion upon moral self-consciousness.

The briefest possible indication of this influence will serve us to conclude with. We saw at the beginning of the section that a rational being, who guides himself by the contemplation of details in the light of wholes, has a constantly recurring alternative before him. A special detail may usually be regarded either as part of the whole of his individual life, or as part of some system which cuts across that life. Now the advantages of the former plan would be greatly strengthened and its disadvantages greatly reduced if one addition to it could be made,—if my life, whilst remaining a whole, could itself be part of a larger whole. It is just this addition that religion supplies. If *natura naturata* is a network of objective systems, *natura naturans* is a kingdom of souls. The dichotomous division of the world is turned into a true classification; my life is no longer 'my business' as opposed to 'not my business'; it is a section of public work; 'a charge to keep.' The philosophic mind, which in object-consciousness can see each objective system in its relation to the universe, in subject-consciousness can see the individual self in relation to God. Hence, as the objectively conscious person had better be a practical philosopher, the self-conscious person had better be a religious man.

The advantage is the same in each case, that of relaxing the strains round the limits of finite wholes by letting the main tensions of a larger whole take their proper place. The teacher, who, with growing philosophy, comes to realize his own department as only a detail in his university, will be less cramped and rigid, and less likely to insist on one special way of managing that department; and it is the same with the man whose growing religion turns the ideal of his own life into one part of his ideal of the whole kingdom of souls. The relief

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from strain may be great when he realizes that this individual life need not even be fashioned into something which looks finished and intelligible on its own account; that the Spirit may conceivably use it best by breaking it into pieces, by dividing it among distracting interests, and filling the spaces with details which have really no significance except as interpreted with regard to quite other lives. In so far as he is in no way religious, the self-conscious moral man must try to make a good thing of his own life; the religious man need not. The kingdom of the Middle Saxons, to justify and explain itself, must make a clear and well-composed history of its own, a thread distinguishable in the skein. Modern London, with a far richer self-consciousness, may be content with an unwritable story, without plot or connection or climax, beginning or end, wound and buried beyond any tracing in the vast web of the history of England. Practical philosophy, then, relaxes the tensions round the objective division lines, and religion those round the subjective. The lines then cease to be attempts to fashion the universe on opposite plans, and become, as they should be, mere guides to different ways of looking at it. By natural expansion of this view, the conflict between the saint and the zealous worker disappears. Each life and each objective interest falls into its place in the ideal life of the universe, where *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*, variously patterned, are still only the two sides of the shield.

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IS BELIEF ESSENTIAL IN RELIGION?

BY HORACE M. KALLEN.

THAT religion, next to hunger and love, has been one of the most potent molds of human character and human destiny is a truism so obvious as to be profound.

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Professional religionists harp upon it in modern apologetic; the sentimental see in it a reason for identifying their accidental fads and private loyalties with religious excellence, the tough-minded take it as their warrant for the complete rejection of religion from the life of reason. It rarely occurs to ask, in this agreement on importance in the midst of the disagreement concerning value, whether the disputants are also agreed on the nature of their subject or the central theme of their dispute. Yet one cannot help suspecting profound and irreconcilable differences between the eternal religion of Pius X and the 'religion of the future' of Charles W. Eliot, between the religion of the Australian blackfellow and the religion of Abbé Loisy. The systematic or sporadic extension of the environment through imaginal extrapolations like gods, angels, saints, and demons is a far cry from the perfervid pietism, the passionate humanism, or vague 'loyalty to the good' of 'morality tinged with emotion.' Currently both these extremes have been emphasized. On the one hand, the papacy, with no uncertain voice, has reaffirmed the supernaturalism of historic religious tradition; on the other, the modernists, whether Loisy or Eliot, have affirmed just as certainly the naturalistic faith in the happy destiny of all men. One party insists that the essence of religion is the presence and efficacious operation, in this our world, of supernatural personalities; the other defines the essence of religion as belief.

To determine which of these definitions is correct would task any moralist, concerned about the instruments of life in its struggle for happiness. Religion has been a tool second to none in its potency for good and evil, and its valuation for future use must depend considerably on its character and functional outcome. To ask, then, what is essential in religion, is to put a question pregnant with moral consequences.

If popular and literary usage be a sanction, belief must be considered the essential element in religion. The terms

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religion, loyalty, faith, and belief have for generations been used interchangeably. Wherever faith occurs, wherever there is prominent a devotion or a loyalty deep and unswerving, toward *any* object, that loyalty or belief may be identified with religion. This is particularly the case where the object believed in is held to be an omnisolvent for the world's ills, where there is attributed to it a universal and instantaneous potency, either remedial or mutative. We hear, therefore, of such objects as the 'religion of socialism,' 'of science,' 'of beauty,' 'of love,' 'of humanity,' 'of might.' In each case some dominant motive or program of conduct is acclaimed an object of religious faith or is assigned an almost miraculous prepotency in the subjugation of evil and the conservation and creation of excellence. Of programs of social reform or ethical doctrines this is particularly characteristic, since in these some single dogma or principle or term is believed in, first for its (hypothetical) exclusive power in achieving and maintaining some desired end, then for itself. Dr. Eliot's 'religion of the future' is a highly generalized adumbration of the more concrete current 'religions' of social alterations. Religion is, from this point of view, as Professor Perry writes, "belief on the part of individuals or communities concerning the final or overruling control of their interests;" and "the term God signifies not the environment in its inherent nature, but the environment in its bearing on the worshiper's interests."[1]

> If it be true that in religion we mean by God a practical interpretation of the world, *whatsoever* be its nature, then the personality of God must be a derivative of the attitude and not of the nature of the world. . . . My God is my world practically recognized in respect to its fundamental or ultimate attitude to my ideals. . . . To be religious is to believe that a certain correlation of forces, moral and factual, is in reality operative and that it determines the propriety and effectiveness of a certain type of living.[2]

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[1] "The Moral Justification of Religion," *Harvard Theological Review*, Vol. II, No. 2, pp. 163, 167.

[2] "Approach to Philosophy," pp. 109, 97.

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Here what is important is not the object believed *in*, but the attitude of belief. A Godless religion, as various commentators on Mr. Eliot's paper show, is as 'religious' as a religion with a whole Catholic hierarchy. In point of fact, the word 'God' is robbed of its essential function of standing any longer for an independent, objective, existent supernatural personality. Tradition, orthodoxy, and instinctive sense, as well as professional theologians, would insist that the important element in religion is not *belief*, but the *object* believed in,—the supernatural personality, God. Contemporary religious piety may be apportioned between two classes, the one identifying the essence of religion with belief or piety, with the psychological attitude, the other identifying it with the specific object or occasion of the attitude, supernatural personality.

To determine which of these parties is right lies far beyond the scope of this paper. All that can here be done is to suggest the main lines that such an investigation would need to follow. The principle to be laid down as the major premise is the obvious and hence unremembered one that things are definable only in so far as they *differ* from other things, not in so far as they are identical with those things. Thus, when some philosopher announces, "The world is idea," he equates 'idea' with all objects actual or possible, and robs it of its function and meaning. Where everything is equally 'idea,' nothing in particular is more 'idea' than any other thing, and it becomes necessary to invent a new term for that particular and different entity which 'idea' was formerly used to define. So again, if religion and belief or religion and belief in supernatural personal agencies are interchangeable, it either must be true that one or both of these terms characterizes 'religion' absolutely, differentiating it from all other objects such as science or art, or that religion and one of the other terms are absolutely equivalent and exhaust each other. We must find what it is, in the complex called religion, that makes and keeps it *that* and not something else.

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I have just called religion a complex. I know that much protestant and modernist and generally liberal feeling will rebel against this characterization. It is fashionable nowadays to apply 'religion' to any favored or cherished state of mind or to call it indefinable and unutterable. But it is nevertheless a fact that historical religions are not indefinable or unutterable. If they were, they could not be *historical.* And whatever be the religion of the future, present-day religions are deep-rooted in history and thinkable in its terms. Consider the very simplest or most complex form of the religion most familiar to western civilization, Christianity. Whether as Unitarianism or as Catholicism, we find it to have definite namable parts and concrete functions. These we may call science or cosmology, ethics, art, and belief. All religions, primitive or sophisticated, contain these four elements. Their specific content may differ, but their function, which defines them, is the same. Science or cosmology is a vision of the nature and character of the universe; ethics is a formulation of the rules of adaptation to that universe; art is the specific business of adaptation, the application of the rules; belief, of which we shall have much more to say, is the underlying human attitude without which the rest of the business could not occur.

Now when we consider the 'science' of religion, we find it possibly identical with what is ordinarily called science, but differing at least in the one particular that the whole object of unreligious science is made dependent on the will and attitude of at least one supernatural personality, or is identified therewith. This is the case in Unitarianism. Where the divine is not so denumerate or diaphanous and the cosmology is different, we still find the object of science, the world, dependent on a whole hierarchy of supernatural personalities, demons, saints, angels, thrones, dominations, and principalities, all these ultimately dependent on God. Such is the case in Catholicism. In un-Christian religions the nature of religious

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cosmology is still more obvious. It differs in every case from unreligious cosmology or science in its using at least one additional factor, supernatural personality.

The same thing is true when we distinguish religious from unreligious ethics. The two differ often solely in the fact that one has not a supernatural or magical sanction, while the other has. The taboos and categorical implications are religious when they are said to voice the desires and mandates of supernatural beings, and where their infraction involves penalties arising from the displeasure of the supernatural. They are, in a word, rules of *adaptation to the supernatural* through the *medium of nature*. Catholicism, with its clear and distinct cosmic system, its inferno, purgatory, and paradise, its supernatural sanctions and impositions, its peculiar system of virtues and vices, is an obvious and magnificent example of this. But Unitarianism, vague though it is, does not fail of it, nor does any religion, whatever its anthropological status.

Religious art is logically the direct outcome of religious cosmology and religious ethics. Its primary function is to render solid and concrete the imaginative extension of nature made by religious science. It gives the supernatural a local habitation and a name, a point of contact with nature. That point of contact may be an image, a rite, a ceremony. Whatever else it be, it is man's concrete instrument of adaptation to the supernatural. The *Ave* goes better *via* the image of Mary just as *mana* goes better via crystals or dead ancestor's bones. The Arunta on the plateaus of Australia, solemnly partaking of his totemic kangaroo on the eve of his hunting expedition, the Christian in Rome, partaking of the sacrament on the eve of some enterprise real or determined by the saints' calendar, are both, by an organized method, adapting themselves to the supernatural, are getting it on their side. Religious art may be symbolic, it may be magical; but there is no one form of it, anywhere, which, if really religious, is not a tool in adapting mankind to the super-

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natural. And it is in this fact, and in this fact alone, that its difference from other forms of art consists.

Thus religion as science, as ethics, as art differs from what is ordinarily denoted by these terms by considering an additional single or multiform factor,—supernatural personality. There seems, so far, little reason for identifying religion exclusively with belief. Nor is there any greater justification therefor in the nature of belief itself.

According to Perry, "the believing experience is cognitive in intent, but practical and emotional as well in content, . . . the object of my belief is not merely known, but also felt and acted upon. *What I believe expresses itself in my total experience.*"[3] This is a fair summary. Every belief, even the simplest, is a complex thing. It is composed of at least two diverse elements, and, as in the ordinary beliefs of the daily life, may contain any number of these elements. They may be broadly divided into the *objects* of belief and the *attitude* of belief. The object may be anything, no matter what,—mind-stuff, will, mud, cobwebs, stardust, fairies, bread, or policemen. To the psychologist it may be a dream, a hallucination, a mere figment of the diseased mind which believes it. To that mind, however, it is acutely real, independent of his belief in it, evocative of the believing attitude. No belief, not even a false one, is a belief in nothing. However arisen, and of whatever stuff created, in each belief an object is given, the occasion of its appropriate attitude. Now the character of that attitude varies with its object, not in nature, but in intensity. Its nature is that of practical assent to the object. It is an acknowledgment, a recognition or acceptance, of the object's status. It is invariably a positive, immediate, and definitive reaction to the object, wherever that be and whatever its seat.

The converse of this attitude is not what is called 'disbelief,' denial, for that is merely a complex form of belief. When I 'disbelieve' in ghosts I am not altering the

[3] "Approach to Philosophy," p. 58.

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nature of ghosts, I am simply assigning them a different status, I am making them move, let us say, from the realm of existence to that of ideas, but their nature remains unchanged. The converse of belief is doubt or agnosticism, and this is not really an attitude, but a contradiction or conflict of attitudes,—properly so, since the opposite of attitude cannot be *an* attitude. Doubt may be defined as an inner maladjustment corresponding to a struggle of events, whether ideal or existential, for place. It denotes physical and psychic instability. It is a division of the mind against itself in a diremption of attention, and is hence a menace againt the continuity and articulation of life. It involves inaction or conflicting actions, as the life of the 'doubters' in literature suggests, and at its intensest does actually break up the organic equilibrium of consciousness. For this reason doubt, agnosticism, or scepticism are actually never more than very ephemeral conditions of the spirit. They are suicidal. Our world is such that any defined or definable object either makes a pragmatic difference in it or does not. If it does, something positive is, by that fact, obviously believed of it; if it does not, its status is *ipso facto* positively defined, though perhaps not so obviously. In either case, no doubt enters the definitive attitude. That is possible only if the absence or presence of the pragmatic difference remains uncounted and ignored, but then also, life is arrested and ultimately destroyed. Belief, therefore, is inevitable.

An example will make this point clearer. And fortunately religion offers the best. Agnostics and skeptics conceive themselves to be actually holding: "I do not know whether God exists or not." This proposition is intended to express the state of 'doubt.' Now to have meaning, it must, like all other propositions, contain terms that in themselves are not only undoubted, but are also significant. If our agnostic does not know *what* God is, and *what* existence is, and if he does not believe that each is *that* 'what' and not another, his statement is mere

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nonsense. Doubt presupposes and depends upon belief.

Of beliefs, the most important, it need not be argued, are those which assert the *existence* of their objects. An existent *must* be counted, recognized, reacted to according to its nature and proper requirements, while a non-existent in the same field of belief is relatively negligible. The non-existent requires the minimum of reaction; the existent the maximum. So, for example, in the field of belief called this room there are actual tables and chairs and a hypothetical fire. With regard to the former I must guard my movements and adapt my actions. I may not handle them with impunity; I must recognize and defer to their characters and demands if they are to serve my purposes or I am to live among them. But the fire I may do as I like with. I must recognize its identity, but I can sit on it, carry it in my hands, breathe it, scatter it,—do an infinite number of things with it I should not dare to do with an *existing* fire. Existence, while not altering its character or identity, would give it the quality of command, would make it *count* potently. Thus existence alters, not things, but the importance of things for mankind.

The situation with regard to the object God in the proposition, 'God exists,' is now evident. A non-existent God is not an unreal or characterless one. A non-existent God is an unimportant one, one that makes no pragmatic difference in man's life of adaptation. So then, the proposition, 'I do not know whether God exists,' may with perfect justice be interpreted as, 'I do not know how to conduct myself toward an object, God, in my total environment.' In this form the agnostic proposition indicates either continual inaction, or contradictory actions, on the part of those who hold it. And in this instance it must be life-long, since God is by definition such, that if he exists, he must be counted with at every moment of human life. But agnostics have none of them been inert and few of them inconsistent. They must therefore either have believed or denied the proposition, 'God exists,' but

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they never for any time really doubted it. Their 'I do not know whether God exists' is better interpreted as a historical summary of three attitudes, which may be expressed thus: (1) Sometimes I act toward God as an existent and sometimes I act toward God as a non-existent; (2) I do treat God as an existent; (3) I do treat God as a non-existent.

Of these, the first is probably commonest. It indicates, as do the other two, that, for the affair of living, God at any moment must be believed to exist or to not exist, but that there is no middle way. Thus, in religion at least, belief, positive or negative, is inevitable. That it is just as inevitable in all realms of life would be easy enough to prove in detail. But for the purposes of this discussion the foregoing brief exposition must suffice.

The upshot is that the mere presence of any entity, whatever its status, evokes at once the believing attitude. Life is no more than a flux of beliefs, a movement from one equilibrium of faith to another. And in this movement the attitude is unvarying, it is only the objects that vary, jostling and pushing each other for place in the whirl of experience, challenging each other's right to be and jumping each other's claims. The successful one determines belief; *it* and not the attitude determines the character of the belief. To be religious, belief must contain a religious object,—*i. e.*, supernatural personality, particularly God. Here again, it is the object, not the intrinsic character of the attitude itself, which makes belief religious. Belief, like science, ethics, and art becomes religious only when attached to the religious object, God. That is the essential thing.

This being the case, it becomes of more than passing interest to determine the grounds for the very widespread identification of belief with religion, an identification, grown almost into the texture of our human speech. The root of the matter will be found in the popular distinction between belief and knowledge. Belief seems to have reference to the element of menace and challenge

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which appears to fall to the share of so many objects in the universe. A man 'believes' when he is not sure, when the object may be different. He 'knows' when change in the object is, to his mind at least, out of question. This means no difference in nature between belief and knowledge; it means merely that the equilibrium of faith is not sufficiently stable nor adequately assured. The object of belief has not, for the believer, so firm a footing in the environment as the object of knowledge. At bottom, $2 + 2 = 4$, and *God exists* are both beliefs, but *God exists,* it seems, is not so capable of maintaining itself in the environmental flux. In their primary intention belief and knowledge are identical. It is only by the very process of life, by the unbroken activity of believing, that they become differentiated, and knowledge attains the signification of valid and firmly established propositions, while belief refers to shaky ones, with claims unsubstantiated and places still to earn. Knowledge is fit belief; belief is knowledge with its fitness still to prove.

If, then, religion is called belief, it is not so called because it is useful, or has practical reference, or is possessed of any of the other properties assigned to it by Perry. Religion is called belief because it has its fitness still to prove, because its object has not yet really found a place in the efficacious world. This may be seen in three directions, one looking from the immaterialty of God, another from the doubtfulness of his presence where his presence is imputed, and the final one from the infinite number of alternatives to his power.

Immateriality, far from being a good thing as is popularly supposed, is a bad thing. Common sense has a very ancient and deep-rooted tendency to identify all immaterialities but the religious ones, with the non-existent and the unreal. It is notable, in this connection, that all religious objects were once material, and that in our own time the most long-lived and deep-rooted religions, like Catholicism, make use of the greatest number of material objects. Unless God has a material manifestation he

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does not much matter. Now all in all, this manifestation is rare and difficult to find. Some delicate souls identify it with the order or design in the universe; some, indeed most, with coincidences and chance happenings which habit does not sanction, with magic and miracle,—*i. e.*, with the interruption and distortion of design. The conflict of these identifications raises inevitably a social doubt which could not have occurred had God been material, *i. e.*, had a definite cognizable, indisputable form, like man or chair. In consequence much of the authority of religion depends on the testimony of persons who have seen God *in propria persona,* in a direct intuition or perception, just as we ordinarily see chairs and the rest of the environment. Medicine-men, priests, prophets, saints, and mystics are the supporters and renovators of human faith in the religious object, and the mystical religious experience is the *fons et origo* of the life of religious faith. And what is the religious experience? It is an interruption of the organized routine of the daily life, and even those who defend it recognize it as a breaking up and disintegration of the normal consciousness. In it the ordinary world disappears. To the psychologist, what takes its place is that complex of somatic and proprioceptive sensations which the needs of the daily life keep submerged. These appear now to fill the focus of consciousness, acutely pleasurable or painful, and about them in the first stage of ecstasy, there seems to gyrate a nimbus or fringe of visual or auditory elements organized in a variety of ways. In the second stage, these may subside and a very vivid sense of 'presence' may take their place; or they may intensify, the huddle of them may become dominated by one or two exceedingly energetic visual or auditory hallucinations about which there grows a massive, optimal emotional complex wherein fear and elation alternate and by which the complex may be defined. The total field of consciousness is vague and indefinitely emotional, all the while shot through with sharply defined hallucinations of the higher senses. In

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a word, the psychologist need see in the mystic or religious experience nothing more than the shattering of the whole laborious machinery of perception and the reduction of life to its almost protoplasmic inchoateness of feeling and movement. The experience is not, for the psychologist, religious *by itself alone,* since he finds all of its criteria wherever, for any reason, there is a disintegration of the normal conscious life. The causes may be drugs, disease, physical fear, great emotional strain,—anything that breaks down the reasonable habits of the soul. When so caused, it is considered anti-social. Religion, however, which produces it in its practices, sanctions and socializes it, and it hence becomes appropriated to religion. Occurring wherever sense shatters habit and 'pure' feeling dominates and inhibits the natural interpretation of sense, *its most obvious and immediate content, the emotional complex, is apprehended as a manifestation of God, because it is itself most conspicuous in an environment and a practice which has reference to God as an element.* Thus the *material* object of the religious experience is as likely to be merely psychological as existential, and there is no description of it which cannot with all fairness and with greater ease be interpreted as mental abnormality.

This one alternative admits, of course, of many others. Its possibility rests on the very immateriality of God; and it is that which might be called the source of the uncertainty of his presence and of the alternatives to his efficacy. The religious experience cannot exclusively point to the religious object as its cause. Give it an intellectual and social environment other than religious, say mathematical, and custom may decide its phenomena to be, as they well can, exclusively mathematical. What, in the case of the mystical experience, is of the uttermost importance, is not the experience, for its content, as we have seen, is decidedly dubious. What is important is the interpretation of the experience, the judgment concerning its cause and origin. It is the postulation here of an inde-

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pendent, supernatural efficacious personality that makes the mystical experience religious. But that postulation is generally made *after* the fact, and for definite empirical reasons. This makes it uncertain, and the uncertainty is further intensified by the existence of many rival interpretations. Wherever God is said to be or to be efficacious, something natural might be said to be or to serve just as well. He seems, as Laplace said, a hypothesis of which there is no need. He seems a violation of the law of parsimony. It is the vision of this inadequacy of the proof of the existence of the divine object and the failure of intuition to discover or exhibit him that is responsible for that branch of theological activity called apologetics. Apologetics is the symbol of vital and intellectual inadequacy. Thus it is the vagueness and uncertainty of its object that in religion makes belief so conspicuous.

The subconscious motive of such 'religions of the future,' as described by Dr. Eliot, and such interpretations of religion as Perry's, is largely the rationalistic one of eliminating the need of apologetic, of making religion stand firmly on its own feet. Now it is true that by emphasizing the attitude rather than the object of a belief, much is gained in the way of firmness, since no element of uncertainty need unnecessarily be admitted. But it is perforce gained at the cost of some perversion and insincerity. Insincerity is inevitable because religion becomes, in the case of intelligent believers, a *pathetic fallacy* of which they are aware. Actually their religion is Godless, and they know they are calling that God which is not God. And the perversion comes in the destruction of a genuine and necessary distinction by identifying belief with the object of belief. Then a belief that Mars is inhabited, that the solar system is menaced by a comet, is of exactly the same status as a belief in God. The defining element is the attitude, not the object, and the attitude is the same in all fields of human endeavor.

Here, then, is an anomalous situation. The religion of common sense identifies itself as belief because of its

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object's uncertainty, the belief being more intense as its object grows more insecure, while the religion of rationalism identifies itself as belief because it seeks to free religion from uncertainty and challenge. One is 'belief' because it clings to God, the other is 'belief' because it abandons God. That the latter is more in keeping with the spirit of the time I shall not attempt to deny. I choose rather to indicate that the former is more in keeping with the spirit of man. To cling to God in the face of his inability to maintain himself in existence is more human than to abandon him. To the human spirit God is intrinsically the most congenial of all essences. He is like ourselves in nature; the very devil is like ourselves in nature. We are at home with these personalities as we cannot be with rigid physical laws and systems; God and the devils and angels stir us as nothing else not human can. They are referred to an environment in which occur, as we have noted, very intense affectional complexes, perhaps the intensest accorded to human experience. And in this environment alone are these complexes socially respectable. Moreover, they are generally referable to moral crises antecedent or consequent. They arise on the pressure of great need, on the intensity of aspiration, on the feeling of depression and sin. They are associated with salvation therefrom. Psychologically, they are themselves that salvation,—the soul's mode of purging itself of spiritual invasions. But in social discourse they only reveal salvation. The power to grant it and the immutable will to grant it are fundamental attributes of God. Whatever the status of the evil principle, the devil, in the end God, the principle of excellence, is the sole and victorious arbiter of universal fate. All religions, from the naïve instrumental spiritism of the Australian blackfellow to the sophisticated instrumentalism of Christian dogmatics, represent the religious objects as ultimately good, as conservative of whatever values, private or communal, there happen to be posited in that organic equilibrium we call life. The most obvious illus-

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tration of this fact is the universality with which the most fundamental value of all,—immortality, the continuity of life itself,—is referred to religion and not to science. Religion, as Höffding somewhere points out, is primarily an instrument in the conservation of values. Had experience not perennially challenged them, or had the emotional outburst been all-sufficient, there would have been no place for belief as opposed to knowledge, and for religion as opposed to science. Science is no less instrumental than religion, religion is no less cognitive than science. But religion envisages a world more congenial than the one man actually lives in, a world controlling the actual one and serving to conserve eternally and immediately all the good man ever desired and hoped for. Science, no less than religion, is fundamentally 'belief'; it also symbolizes the self-conserving activity of the 'will-to-live'; but being relevant to the *conditions* of desire, rather than to desire, it is felt as uncongenial and hard and inexorable. Religion, therefore, has over science an apparent advantage; and where an object of science is abandoned on almost any distinct challenge,—as, for example, were the *n*-rays,—the object of religion is clung to in spite of challenge. Religion envisages perennially an object of belief battered and threshed and denied by experience. For this reason the history of religion is fundamentally discontinuous, is a history of protestantisms and rebellions. The 'will-to-live,' in the effort to conserve its values, passes from one instrument to another,—all instruments, in religion, having in common, reference to supernatural personality, prepotent in the conservation of those values. This, the object of religious belief, is held to against evidence to the contrary; and because of the *conspicuity* the attitude gains thereby, religion is identified with belief. Liberals in religion then proceed to claim the conspicuous as the essential.

But conspicuity does not constitute essence. The inhabitants of Mars, a menacing comet, centaurs, mooncalves and goblins and *n*-rays are as infrequent and

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hypothetical in direct experience as are God and his emissaries; they are as relevant to conduct and relevant to values, though not as ultimately conservative of them. Undergoing the perennial challenge of experience as they do, belief in them is as conspicuous as belief in God. Yet they are not called religious beliefs, and if they were, it would be impossible to draw the line between belief as religion, as common sense, as superstition, or as science. For all objects believed in undergo challenge and contradiction in some degree, all are relevant to conduct and the conservation of values. Belief, we must conclude, is no more essential to religion than to any other human institution. Religion is distinguished not by belief, but by belief's object,—prepotent, benevolent, supernatural personality, independently existing. Religion is belief indeed, but it is religious belief only as belief in the reality of an actual personal God powerful for the excellent outcome of human destiny.

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TWO MODERN SOCIAL PHILOSOPHIES.*

ERNEST L. TALBERT.

THE followers of Comte predicted a disappearance of the traditional 'philosophy'; but present indications do not entirely fulfill their prophecy. What we find to-day is a shifting of emphasis and a re-reading of the philosophic masters. We note a tendency to eclecticism; an indisposition to construct synthetic philosophies (owing to the influence of a tentative, anti-dogmatic scientific method); and a reliance upon subjective, individual attitudes on the one hand, and an enthusiasm for a reinterpretation of objective social problems on the other. America is rich in its possession of more or less fruitful and sane speculations regarding life; while the persistence and strength of the New Thought, Spiritualism, and Christian Science betoken the constant call for an explanation which satisfies human needs and theoretical demands. If the world jars upon our delicate sensibilities, if our sympathies grow narrow, we are urged to cultivate a 'cosmic consciousness' and become in tune with the Infinite. If we are beset with worry and nerve fag, we are asked to seek power through repose and absorption in positive, expansive feelings. The apostolic casting out of devils and communion with departed spirits seem a memory; yet we are advised to think away the apparent brutality of matter and disease, and through the vast reaches of our subconscious selves enter into conversation with those who have gone into the Spirit Land.

These rejuvenations of ancient practices and doctrines

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have resulted variously in good and evil, according to Coe and James. Broadly speaking, however, they have one limitation; they are dominantly quietistic and personal in the narrow sense; they are cures for the sick soul. They tell us to believe ourselves well, to negate matter, to appeal to the vanished, and cleave to positive, expansive, and clean feelings; very much as if our beliefs, attitudes, and comfort were solely a matter of individual, subjective interest, or at most, concerned with the happiness of ourselves in relation to the small circle in which we happen to live. It is assumed that the problem of society is primarily one of picking out separate units, inducing certain chosen beliefs and practices, and allowing the resultant sunniness of temper to radiate toward our relatives and friends. Disease, grief, sin, worry, injustice, and poverty can all be transcended equally well by subjective reactions against their objective persistence; the importance of the sciences which seek to discover the processes of consciousness, the nature of sub-consciousness, the movement and composition of matter, the progress of disease and neurasthenia, the laws of the distribution of wealth, and the function of social institutions, is minimized because they are seemingly remote from that intimately subjective disposition which creates the reality of external friction.

We do not, of course, desire to disparage the therapeutic and psychological value of suggestion and of checking the 'materialistic' bias. No one can ignore the peace and joy generated in thousands of the weary and defeated and hopeless, for, to recall Baldwin, the 'subjective' moment in the dialectic of personal growth is an essential one. The point to be urged is that there are also 'ejective' and 'projective' moments, and that the dialectic of personal growth is an abstraction from a larger process of social dialectic. Our consciousness has physical, personal, and social references; and without the stimulus of extra-individual references, our merely personal attitudes take on a cramped and indi-

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vidualistic color, however consoling and transforming they may immediately be.[1]

In contrast with this prevalent current, there are in modern society two social philosophies which are not entirely subjective and anti-collectivistic, movements of thought which are linked with a distinguished philosophic ancestry, and have practical importance for those who believe in a union of speculation and social welfare. The two philosophies are socialism and anarchism. It is proposed to outline a few of the antecedents, characteristics, and meanings of these objective interpretations of social growth; since only the salient features can be mentioned, the danger of oversimplification and lack of balance cannot be avoided.

A preliminary contrast may be ventured. Socialism as a world-view is an outgrowth of continental rationalism as it found expression in Hegel's dialectic. Its symmetry, definite concepts, logical consistency, and emphasis upon organization and control by social machinery, show the influence of medieval devotion to a Roman Empire, a universal and militant church, Roman law, and the rationalistic eulogy of the Absolute, the One. It is born of factory, large manufacturing city, and minute industrial processes of international scope. Anarchism is born of small workshop, guild, farm, Russian mir, love of communal custom, diversified, noncentralized industry, and opposition to crystallization. On the philosophical side, it has more affinities with empiricism and the French-British simplification of motive and institution. The contrast is not entirely just to the mutations of both doctrines, as will be seen later, but, in the large, it holds true.

The strength of socialism has become apparent to the most casual and hostile reader of popular literature; and

[1] In Milwaukee a group of respectable devotees of an 'anti-materialistic' philosophy of life have refused to ally themselves with a collective movement to introduce into the public schools practical sanitary devices and instruction in some fundamental principles of social hygiene.

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its importance is not limited to Finland, Germany, and England. It is an undercurrent flowing against our traditional American spirit, and is not to be measured by number of voters; subtly, by means of free-lance magazines, a radical daily press, constant propaganda, and the logic of events, it has penetrated the barrier of ostracism and misinterpretation, and its adherents can no longer assume the *rôle* of martyrs. As a philosophy, social and political, it has had a long, dramatic, and complex history; and branching from its trunk, Marxian socialism, are a host of radical offshoots more or less tenable. The form which is really militant is the revolutionary, class struggle, anti-capitalistic, surplus-value, materialistic-interpretation-of-history form,—that of Karl Marx, the spokesman of the Hegelian left. As conceived by him, it had as its background a compound of French mechanical materialism and utopianism, the utilitarian animus of the English radicals, and a reaction against, but a use of, the Hegelian dialectic. The contributions of Bentham, Ricardo, Mill, Fichte, La Mettrie, and Feuerbach to the structure of this system should not overshadow the specifically Hegelian element. The movements of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis of the Hegelian logic, terminating in the absolute idea, were used by Marx, not to prove the self-unfolding of reason, but to justify the destruction of the capitalistic *regîme* (the negative moment) on the ground of its inner contradiction, and to establish the inevitable coming of the synthetic, classless, frictionless stage of the coöperative commonwealth. Hegel idealized the Prussian monarchy, its professional orders, its police, its disparagement of public opinion, its right to legislate for the non-reflective people, its devotion to war, its distribution of economic goods, and its ideal of the family. Marx claims that to identify the real with the rational is to become anti-social and non-progressive. It means eulogy of the prince, when he is no longer functioning; of war, when the working people must suffer most; of the professional

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estates, philosopher, professor, lawyer, priest, and capitalist, when they are a parasitic group existing on the surplus value produced by labor. It means repression of forces working from below, in the proletariat. It sanctions inhuman competition, exploitation, destruction of the family, and the right of labor to see the meaning of its work. But he goes on to urge that the evils of capitalism, by their darkness, generate the light of the coöperative commonwealth. Economic crises, increasing centralization of the means of production, and concentration of wealth, make the 'system' too big for the capitalist; increasing poverty and exploitation breed a 'class consciousness' and power to coöperate against the professional holders of 'ideas' and resources; all these forces working together, by inevitable necessity, precipitate the third stage in the trinitarian process. The consummation, however, is not to be attained by social impulses, sentimental 'love' or sympathy, but by utilitarian counting of units of advantage, both in employer and employé. Marx assumes the right of the worker to the full product of his toil according to quantity of work or labor units; and protest against the present system arises, according to him, because workers feel that their rights and 'pleasure' are being infringed. Similarly, in his opinion, the capitalist is guided by self-regarding propensities; indeed the destruction of the present system depends upon the utilitarian calculation of increments of pleasure by the exploiting *entrepreneur* capitalist.

Workingmen are without a country because of the increasing standardization, mechanical efficiency, and division of labor: any particular region depends upon the coöperation of the whole economic world; the workers, merged into an international class, must struggle together to achieve recognition of their fundamental importance. The state, as now organized, will merge into a coöperative civil society, perfectly organized to distribute socially owned and managed goods according to

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a principle of service rendered. The present professions, which are anti-social and adapted to an essentially vicious, parasitic order of things, will be transformed: the function of the professions will be met, not by privileged highly paid castes, but by the voluntary service of individuals especially fitted for specialized activities. In other words, the future society will be organized and systematized in as absolute a manner as the idea of Hegel's logic of reality.

This original Marxian position was fatalistic, dialectical, materialistic,—its large outlines romantic and Hegelian, its psychology and ethics hedonistic and utilitarian. But, in the last two decades, forces proceeding from Darwinism and the experimental sciences, and the need of adapting dogma to fact, have worked some change in the original Marxian formulas. The standpoint is known as 'revisionism,' or opportunism. Instead of a logical unfoldment of society according to economic necessity, we have a recognition of origins and sequences which cannot be told beforehand. The quantitative, inductive procedure is used; the value of remedial expedients is acknowledged; and, in general, a reconstruction of the original Hegelian-Marxian theory is taking place. Still, however, in the background is the picture of the coming society, inciting to devotion and worship; and all measures of compromise are gauged in terms of the end of the social process,—a redeemed humanity. In varying proportion the elements of the socialist philosophy already mentioned persist: its Hegelian perspective; the inevitableness of socialism; its utilitarian animus, modified by an opportunistic and experimental logic; its hedonistic ethics, modified by some appeal to social impulses; its emphasis upon struggle; its denunciation of the present capitalistic State with its arbitrary laws, judges, and priests; its economic interpretation of history; its presumption that socialization and brotherhood are best attained through organization and control, local and central, and by international division of labor;

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its faith in the constructive and coöperative nature of a future civil society; and its dictum that technique and theory must proceed, not from the *élite,* the leaders, the geniuses, but from immanent forces rising out of the experience of the fourth estate, the 'proletariat.'

It is evident that socialism is not a mystical or a subjective philosophy. The forces of society are for it cosmic and extra-personal; there is no overwhelming conviction of sin, no appeal to the supernatural, no denial of the reality of food or machinery or 'matter' in any form. The workers are promised a 'world to gain'; there are the sounds of battle in each day's record of capitalistic waste of resources and of human life. Recognized ethical characteristics,—honesty, loyalty, business honor, and frugality,—are in many cases condemned, because they are class virtues hypocritically inculcated and designed to keep the working classes in subjection. Socialism is an objective, militant movement; its framework a majestic dialectic of economic environment; its psychology the anti-professional, hedonistic turn of English empiricism.

It is difficult to draw a composite picture of anarchism. One should take into account its debt to French materialism, to the impetus of the French Revolution, to the tyranny of an oriental monarchy transplanted to Russian shores, to German and French governmental oppression, and to Swiss democratic ideals; one should trace the changes of doctrine as it has evolved in nineteenth-century Russia, its amalgamation with some features of socialism; one should consider Proudhon, Godwin, Bakunin, Reclus, Tolstoi, and Ibsen. One should analyze the refinements made by advances in anthropology and the evolutionary concepts of modern science; for anarchism, too, shows development from its negative, atomistic, individualistic origins. For the sake of brevity, and because one of its most accomplished, scientific, and fair-minded exponents is still living, the present

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treatment follows closely the views of Prince Peter Kropotkin, in the writings of whom may be detected the various historical threads constituting its present pattern.

Anarchism believes in a more loosely organized world than does socialism. Its early mechanistic and atomistic form, patterned after the ideal of Hobbes and Godwin, has been partly discarded by the more subtle and intelligent philosophical anarchists, such as Kropotkin, but the aversion to centralization, system, force, and delicate universal social adjustment still clings to the faith. As has been said, it is a doctrine born of guild and commune and small workshop, not of factory and city, like Marxian socialism. It is natural, therefore, that anarchism should oppose anything approaching a fixed, supernatural, metaphysical interpretation of life. So we find in Kropotkin an eloquent denunciation of philosophy in all its systematic metaphysical forms (outside of his own mechanical-scientific one). Poor Kant receives another drubbing because of his ambitious categorical imperative, and, as by Marx, the secrets of Hegel are mercilessly uncovered and condemned.[2] Kropotkin does not regard law as the objectification of truth, law and morality as identical, nor does he consider a self-evolving idea, embodied in Prussian monarchy, an outcome of history; for, as he says, "the discoveries of the nineteenth century in mechanics, physics, chemistry, biology, physical psychology, anthropology, psychology of nations, etc., were made not by the dialectic method, but by the natural science method, the method of induction and deduction."[3] It is not, therefore, in metaphysics, with its praise of reason lodging in a few upper class minds,—the governing classes,—but in a democratic, hypothetical attitude to all problems, that the anarchist derives satisfaction. He finds

[2] Kropotkin, "Modern Science and Anarchism," N. Y., 1908, pp. 36 *ff.*
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 57.

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the intellectual founders of his voluntary communism in the anti-dogmatic scientists and protesters of the modern period, in Laplace, Holbach, Lamarck, Diderot, Rousseau, Godwin, Helmholtz, Mill, Darwin, Wallace, Spencer, and others,—all of them seeking in one way or another to apply a critical, unbiased method to all problems. To quote from "Modern Science and Anarchism":

> Anarchism is an attempt to apply to the study of the human institutions the generalizations gained by means of the natural-scientific inductive method: and an attempt to foresee the future steps of mankind on the road to liberty, equality and fraternity, with a view to realizing the greatest sum of happiness for every unit of human society. . . . Anarchism is a world-concept based upon a mechanical explanation of all phenomena embracing the whole of nature,—that is, including in it the life of human societies and their economic, political, and moral problems. Its method of investigation is that of the exact natural sciences by which every scientific conclusion must be verified. Its aim is to construct a synthetic philosophy comprehending in one generalization all the phenomena of nature,—and therefore also the life of societies, avoiding, however, the errors . . . into which . . . Comte and Spencer had fallen. It is therefore natural that to most of the questions of modern life anarchism should give new answers, and hold with regard to them a position differing from those of all political and, to a certain extent, of all socialistic parties, which have not yet freed themselves from the metaphysical fictions of old. Of course, elaboration of a complete mechanical world-conception has hardly been begun in its sociological part,—in that part, that is, which deals with the life and the evolution of societies. But the little that has been done bears a marked, though not often fully conscious, character. In the domain of philosophy of law, in the theory of morality, in political economy, in history (both of nations and institutions), anarchism has already shown that it will not content itself with metaphysical conclusions, but will seek in every case a natural scientific basis. It rejects the metaphysics of Hegel, of Schelling, and of Kant; it disowns the commentators of Roman and Canon Law, together with the learned apologists of the State; it does not consider metaphysical political economy a science, and it endeavors to gain a clear comprehension of every question raised in these branches of knowledge, basing its investigations upon the numerous researches that have been made during the last thirty or forty years from a naturalist point of view (pp. 53, 54).

The words of Kropotkin, here quoted, indicate the anti-dialectical, anti-metaphysical, and inductive tendencies already noted; and the reference to the sum-total-of-happiness concept would seem to reveal some predilection for the utilitarian scheme of ethics. However, the hedonistic position is greatly enlarged. Kro-

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potkin's suggestive book, "Mutual Aid a Factor in Evolution," endeavors to correct an emphasis for which the Darwinians are responsible,—the exaggeration of the brutal, struggle phase of the evolutionary process. He shows how in all grades of life the social impulses have always been strong, and that, when conflict occurs, it is predominantly a group conflict. As regards philosophical antecedents, he returns to the French encyclopedists, to Hutcheson, and Adam Smith in his "Theory of Moral Sentiments," reviving the view that the moral dispositions "have developed in man from the feeling of pity (sympathy), through his ability to put himself in another's place; from the fact that we always feel pain and grow indignant when a child is beaten in our presence." Thus moral dispositions, sociability, are generated "through experience and inheritance, and subsequently perfected by further observation of social life."[4]

Control in the social world, therefore, is secured by the potency of the feeling of 'consciousness of kind.' Kropotkin felt the difficulty of all approaches to atomism,—how to organize the fragments. For evidently the social impulses are not adapted to vast world organization and supervision of industry with its necessary mechanism and functionaries, as the socialists dream; there must be a limitation of the size of groups and possibility for the individual to pass from one craft or occupation to another. In his "Conquest of Bread" (Chapter XVI) and "Fields, Factories, and Workshops" (Chapters I and II), he shows the fallacy of the economist's eulogy of the territorial division of labor; each locality must be and can advantageously be more or less self-sufficing if only the productive resources of the soil be fully utilized by scientific agencies, free and unmonopolized, and by stimulation of the 'inventive' power now lying dormant in the masses.

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[4] "Modern Science and Anarchism," pp. 15, 16.

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That this flexible small-group life may become possible, there must be a non-governmental communism; whatever authority exists must be the compulsion coming from the work to be done coöperatively. Kropotkin assumes that when our impulses, now repressed by external impact, are allowed free play, the dominance of creative and sympathetic tendencies ("unity of aims and mutual confidence") will insure peaceful forms and useful customs accepted gladly by all concerned. But the State, in its constitutional-monarchy and representative-government form, with its retainers and parasites, is a product of capitalism and exploitation; and all the present professions are necessarily anti-social in so far as they depend upon the holders of privilege. What is needed, preparatory to the outburst of repressed popular creativeness, is to break down the class divisions, written laws, and the authority of State and church.[5] The individual must be emancipated from the power of the State; the principle of free agreement, leading to independent associations, which may (if it is desired) unite in federations, must be made basal. "The life of society itself," as Kropotkin says, "we understand, not as something complete and rigid, but as something never perfect,—something ever striving for new forms, and ever changing these forms in accordance with the needs of the time. This is what life is in nature."[6]

Such are the main features of a recent version of anarchism, made by an able and keen scientist. Anarchism has some aims in common with socialism. Both are revolutionary, objective movements, professing to owe their rise to demands of the fourth estate, whose

[5] *Cf.* "Modern Science and Anarchism," p. 10: "Anarchism owes its origin to the free creative activity of the people, by which all institutions of communal life were developed in the past, and to a protest,—a revolt against the external force which has thrust itself upon these institutions; the aim of this protest being to give new scope to the creative activity of the people, in order that it might work out the necessary institutions with fresh vigor."

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 80.

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experience and contribution are considered fundamental and significant. Both react against reason and 'brain work' as a badge of distinction and prowess, and insist upon the value of creative labor directed toward social ends; anarchism, however, emphasizing the simpler handicraft and agriculture more than does Marxian socialism. Both are anti-metaphysical; socialism, however, owing its mold to the idealistic dialectic of a thinker summing up centuries of rationalistic thought. Both deny the validity of *bourgeois* ethics, economics, institutions, and professions; socialism aiming directly at the abolition of capitalism, at the same time upholding the authority of a civil society which shall own and control its means of life; while anarchism would abolish anything savoring of the State and governmental authority as an external means of control. Socialism has a more definite concept of a future society and a better machinery (dialectic) for reaching its goal; anarchism is more tentative, hypothetical, and flexible in method; the spontaneous creative activity of an untrammeled people guided by scientific laws and technique must determine the future form of its institutions. Socialism in its recent guise accepts present capitalistic, representative government and legislative chambers as its proper field of service; it accepts political action in the present State. Anarchism thinks that socialism, by compromise and vote getting, is becoming non-revolutionary and *bourgeois,* and cannot thereby cure the social disease. It consequently relies upon the progress of anthropological and social science to enlighten the people, and a propaganda of word and deed, hundreds of communal revolts acting as preludes to the final bursting of chains and entrance upon creative, flexible, and functional social forms.

By way of criticism it may be said that the weakness of both positions,—anarchism and socialism,—results from their philosophical and psychological antecedents; both retain the traces of their origin as reactions, and are limited in application because of the peculiar historical

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conditions in which they arose. It is possible to argue that socialism, as a social philosophy, encounters the difficulty which those, at least, who have not mastered the secret of Hegel, feel,—how to connect a present empirical purpose with a final absolute purpose. Socialism in its fatalistic, rationalistic, and dialectical dress tends to dissipate attention from the concrete present problems. In its empirical, hedonistic doctrine, it is guilty of dealing with abstractions. It postulates economic men, ruthless exploiters, and distrusts the social impulses now working out in employer and employé, profession and working class, *bourgeoisie* and proletariat. It minimizes the absolute value of present ethical standards in order to show, by contrast, the superior goodness of a future society, which shall be in perfect equilibrium and without friction.

Anarchism is negative and atomistic even yet, lacking balance and definiteness, as befits its function of protest. It has an overfaith in small-group harmony, and a lack of faith in an international organization, based upon the national division of labor and interdependence. It does not recognize that even sympathy and social impulses may need control and standardization, especially under present complex conditions. Its assumed communal propensities need an objective embodiment in law and government, not only to check below-grade members of the group, but also to facilitate the energies of functional members. It directs attention to undoubted anti-social practices in law and the professions, but disregards the positive and constructive function of the established order. Although it eulogizes growth and the hypothetical logical method, it fails to give due reverence to the fact that all growth and invention depend upon an attained structure and objective conditions without which change and reconstruction are impossible. It does not see the complexity and interrelations of human society, and the ceaseless necessity of compromise and dependence of ideal upon present fact. Its adherents are either violent reactors, who see clearly present oppression and injustice,

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or passive idealistic observers, laboring under conviction not of personal, but of social sin.

However, there are three problems which anarchism and socialism have brought to focus,—problems needing attention in America. 1. There is a call to revise our concept of the 'American spirit'; of the basis, under present economic conditions, of our so-called common and statutory law in relation to all classes of society, so that we may mediate between anarchistic atomism and individual rights, however tinged with mutual aid, and a dogmatic and schematized socialism. 2. There is a need for criticism and appraisal of the socialistic and anarchistic denunciation of the professions. How far have free speech, initiative, and opportunity for development been suppressed in the 'lower classes' because of the non-social attitude of newspaper, predatory-business interest, judge, and policeman? 3. There is a need for working out a consistent and comprehensive social psychology, based upon biological, statistical, and exact observation-methods. In particular, the study of the psychology of social impulses, begun by McDougall, Wallas, and Cooley, needs further refinement, so that social psychology may become the basic discipline of the social sciences and the center of remedial social practice.

Finally, modern radicalism has emphasized three valuable points: 1. There is a never-ending necessity of balancing the claims of individual freedom and social organization. Liberty is a function, not an attainment once for all. 2. The revisionist socialist and the philosophical anarchist both insist that the method of hypothesis, experiment, and investigation be used, not only in the laboratory, but also in the field of human interests, for the benefit of those who must bear the burden of our unwieldy monopolistic and competitive social system. 3. A constructive democracy means the recognition of the contribution in daily work and theory of all members of the community, and not only of the demands of privileged, possibly non-functional and parasitic, special interests,

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whom chance and favor, and not service, have sent to pivotal and commanding places.

One conclusion may be suggested. The problems of modern society cannot be adequately solved by inducing purely subjective attitudes in individuals, without relation to objective communal forces conditioning personal happiness. Such social problems cannot be left for solution to fanatics who meet in dingy halls over questionable saloons; all the intelligence, fairmindedness, and technique of investigation which modern science and education have produced are needed to sift the justice of the protests of radicalism. It is not by repression, suspicion, prejudice, and aloofness, but by candor, sympathy, discussion, and participation that the philosophical attitude seeks expression. Those who believe that political and social theory and practice are in the making, need to read their Socrates once more and revive their conviction that philosophy is not only the idealization of the real, the rationalizing of established values, but also the remaking of the existent in terms of a constructive reason.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

THE PROBLEM OF HUMAN LIFE AS VIEWED BY THE GREAT THINKERS FROM PLATO TO THE PRESENT TIME. By Rudolf Eucken. Translated from the German by Williston S. Hough and W. R. Boyce Gibson. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909. Pp. xxv, 582.

Eucken's is distinctively the ethical and religious,—one is at moments tempted to say, the homiletic,—history of European philosophy. The scope and method of the book are, indeed, so largely determined by a special purpose that it can be classified as a history of philosophy only by a somewhat elastic application of that term. The interest which dominates the author's survey of occidental reflection, and prescribes what aspects of that various history he shall note and what ignore, is partly, though only partly, indicated by the title which the translators have chosen for the English version. His concern is (though the antithesis itself is a strained one) with the *Lebensanschauungen* rather than the *Weltanschauungen* of the great philosophers; and it must be added that by the former expression he usually means any element of a system of doctrine,—whether theology, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, or aesthetics,—which can be regarded either as an anticipation or a negation of one or more of the constituents of his own conception of *das Geistesleben*. The book might as aptly have borne the title of one of the author's other writings, *Der Kampf um einen geistigen Lebensinhalt;* for it is the vicissitudes of the secular struggle after what Eucken signifies by "a spiritual content of life" that the present work is designed to set forth.

The treatment of the historical material being limited by this preoccupation of the writer's mind, the reader must not expect to find in the book what it evidently was not intended to provide. Much that is ordinarily looked for in a modern history of philosophy is here absent. The amount of space allotted to the several philosophers is, for example, dictated by the pertinency of their doctrines to Eucken's personal interests, rather than by the degree of their originality, or their importance as types, or their historic influence. Thus, only two and a half

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pages are devoted to Hume, while twice as many are given to St. Gregory of Nyssa; St. Augustine, with thirty-eight pages, gets nearly twice as much space as Kant, nearly three times as much as Hegel, nearly five times as much as Descartes. The aspects of the history of thought which are dwelt upon are for the most part similarly determined by a personal and selective interest. No one will be likely to learn from reading these pages that a great part (though, assuredly, by no means the whole) of European speculation has consisted in the attempt to solve certain definite problems of a primarily dialectical sort, to trace out, without falling into antinomies in the process, the 'necessary' implications of the fundamental and constitutive concepts of the human understanding. Indeed, the untechnical reader, who is sure to get much of the highest value from the book, is also sure to get a decidedly one-sided apprehension of what the 'great thinkers' were about. They were not, as a rule, consciously engaged in struggling solely for a *geistigen Lebensinhalt;* they were often doing so commonplace a thing as trying to think connectedly and consistently, or so shamelessly 'intellectual' a thing as making analytical inquiries in the logic of concepts. The present book, however, as its author observes in his preface to the English translation, "is designed to afford historical confirmation of the view that conceptions are determined by life, not life by conceptions." One could wish that the view which history is supposed to confirm were a little less vaguely and equivocally expressed; but if it means in part that other influences besides the constraining force of logical demonstration and of established empirical fact have enriched the content and directed the movement of European philosophy, it unquestionably contains much truth. Yet if ratiocination has played a smaller *rôle* in the affair than has sometimes been supposed, it has none the less played a greater one in history than it does in the pages of "The Problem of Human Life."

Eucken's use of historic facts is given a distinctive character, not alone by his desire to correlate other systems with his own, but also by an eagerness to make the history practically edifying, to "bring it nearer to the personal experience of the reader." Even as an historian Eucken's temper is rather that of the prophet than that of the savant; and to this fact the book owes both its best and its worst qualities. No history of philosophy since Hegel, perhaps, has more of the unity and

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dramatic interest which come from conceiving of the whole movement of reflection as one continuous and often tragic adventure of the human mind in quest of a satisfying vision of the meaning of its own existence. And few historians have shown so quick a sense for the bearing even of seemingly purely theoretical doctrines upon morally significant inner attitudes of will on the part of the adherents of those doctrines. But with these qualities are closely associated certain traits not wholly favorable either to philosophic clarity or historical objectivity. To the personal taste of the present reviewer the book is much marred by an excessive use of what can only be called cant phrases,—by the wearisome iteration of a few Mesopotamian terms which, in the contexts in which they appear, sometimes serve less to convey to the reader a clear idea than to awaken in him an obscure but grateful sense of edification. That blessed but not altogether unequivocal word 'life,' and that scarcely less equivocal word 'spiritual,' recur far more insistently than seems desirable in a work of popular philosophical instruction. It is, indeed, true that Eucken has elsewhere attempted to assign a special and somewhat definite connotation to the term *Geist*. But that meaning is hardly made explicit to the reader of this book alone, who will need to turn to the *Geistige Strömungen* or to Mr. Boyce Gibson's book for the glossary. And, in any case, the word seems to be used in ways too various to fit the definition,—which is itself far from unequivocal. This difficulty, it should be said, has been increased by translation. *Geist* and *geistig* are ambiguous enough in German; 'spirit' and 'spiritual' not only are equally ambiguous, but also fail to parallel exactly the ambiguities of the German originals. The translators, however, have done well to adhere to the single rendering, even in contexts where 'mind' and 'mental' or 'intellectual' would seem more natural in English; for much of the unity of the volume comes from the iteration of the term, and much of its thought is involved in the term's ambiguities. But the translators would have more successfully naturalized Eucken's thought in the Anglo-American world,—even though something of literal fidelity had been lost thereby,—if they had trimmed the rhetorical exuberance of such purple passages as the following, to make them conform to the more restrained traditions of English style:

> Plato is, above all, the kingly thinker, penetrating beyond all appearance and rising triumphantly above all figurative thought and speech to

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the invisible essence of things: with a transcendent power he sets worlds over against worlds, moves inert masses as with the lightest touch, and makes fluid the most stubborn of contradictions. But the great thinker is also by divine prerogative an artist, who is everywhere impelled to creative vision, who sketches powerful images with convincing vividness, and whose versatile fancy moulds all the work of thought into a thing of splendour.

In its English form, at any rate, this passage surely is a sort of fustian which ill becomes a book of philosophy.

The interpretation of the movement of European reflection which Eucken desires to convey thus has its outlines obscured by an overabundance of earnest but cloudy eloquence. The reader who would grasp it must endeavor, as best he can, to make clear to himself the nature of that constantly but dimly intimated entity, *das Geistesleben*, whose fortunes are so evidently intended to be the principal theme of the narrative. The clue through the confusion may perhaps be found by noting the ambiguities of the antithesis which is even more determinative in Eucken's thought than is that of 'form' and 'content' in Kant's,—the antithesis of 'inner' and 'external.' This presents itself to Eucken primarily, I think, in its religious aspect. An essential requirement in the objects of religious interest and devotion in all the deeper forms of the religious consciousness has been that those objects shall have a certain inwardness, shall be untouched by external vicissitudes, shall be—or seem—an inalienable possession which 'the world' did not give and cannot take away. Now the personal trait which most of all seems to give direction to Eucken's philosophizing is a sense of the vanity of an existence given over to the *naïve* interests and scattering activities of the natural man, and an urgent need of an object for the will that shall give to life a more adequate meaning,—one, therefore, that shall be single and secure and enduring, because inward. Eucken's philosophy, in short, seems to develop as a response to a typical phase of religious experience; and the 'spiritual life' in its original sense is a life which has been 'twice born,' which is unified by the dominance of a supreme interest, and rendered serene by an inner self-possession. Thus the chief article in Eucken's criticism of the Socialists is the externality, and therefore the inadequacy, of the goods which they promise men. Socialism's philosophy of history fails to apprehend the historic process as "a transformation of the world into a process of thought, and so into an inner life."

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But "as certainly as man is a spiritual being, and in proportion as he is spiritual," the goal which Socialism proposes can never suffice him. "All the material comfort would mean only emptiness of soul. As a spiritual being he cannot reconcile himself to a life devoid of content."

Eucken's fundamental antithesis thus seems to have a primarily practical and religious import. But his method in philosophizing apparently consists largely in taking most of the historic contrasts and oppositions in philosophy and treating them as severally equivalent to this moral contrast of inner and outer, of spiritual and non-spiritual. It appears to be interchanged promiscuously with the epistemological contrast between subject and object in cognition; and with that between *a priori* and *a posteriori* elements in knowledge; and with the logical contrast between the universal and particular; and with the metaphysical contrast between material and immaterial; and with that between the 'organic' and the 'mechanistic' modes of unity; and with an extensive assortment of ethical antitheses. Thus the principal thing which Eucken finds to say of Leibniz is that to him "the mind shows itself able to produce from its own resources a coherent system of thought. . . . Mathematics brings spiritual activity into close union with the outside world, and gives to thought the proud consciousness of carrying within itself the key to the universe." So Eucken goes up and down the history of philosophy looking everywhere for recognitions or denials of the power and primacy of the inner life. But, unfortunately, all these antitheses are *not* the same antithesis, nor these inwardnesses, either logically or in their ethico-religious import, the same kind of inwardness. To treat them as such is to give to the history of occidental reflection a unity that is verbal rather than real; and it is, at the same time, to present a distorted treatment of a number of problems and systems.

I lack space to discuss certain special questions of exegesis about which doubts suggest themselves, and also to point out some illuminating felicities in the characterization of the spirit and tendencies of certain periods and schools. Upon one minor matter, however, I think it worth while to comment. Under the term "the Enlightenment" Eucken includes all movements of thought in any sense 'rationalistic,' from the early seventeenth century to (but not embracing) Hume; it is with Galileo that we first "breathe the air of the Enlightenment," while Spinoza

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is preëminently the philosophical representative of the Enlightenment's spirit. So wide a departure from current usage in the employment of a semi-technical term is needlessly confusing, and involves the blurring of certain significant contrasts. The word is one about whose connotation and scope some agreement should prevail among historians of literature and philosophy. It is no service to the historiography of ideas to widen such a term's meaning to the point of extreme indefiniteness.

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT. By John Grier Hibben. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1910. Pp. xii, 311.

This book and one by Mr. Hicks, of Cambridge, on "Stoic and Epicurean," make their appearance together as the initial volumes of a series entitled "Epochs of Philosophy," of which Professor Hibben is the editor. Thirteen volumes in all are announced in this series. The purpose, as is stated in the editorial announcement, is "to present the significant features of philosophical thought in the main periods of its development." No attempt is to be made to deal exhaustively with all the names and doctrines of the various periods, "but rather to estimate and interpret the characteristic contributions which each age may have made to the permanent store of philosophical knowledge." Moreover, "it is hoped that the present series will serve, in some slight measure at least, to deepen the impression of that fundamental unity which characterizes the progress of philosophy through the many phases of its development."

The volume before us carries out this program for the eighteenth century, the great central period of modern philosophy. The 'epoch' of the Enlightenment begins virtually in the year 1690 with the publication of Locke's famous "Essay Concerning Human Understanding," and is brought to a close in the year 1781 with the appearance of Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" (p. 3). England, France, and Germany are the countries in which the transforming influences of the Enlightenment

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were chiefly felt, and it is with the philosophical movement in these countries that Professor Hibben deals. Moreover, in the eighteenth century, philosophy was no mere affair of the closet, but stood in close relation to the great scientific and political movements of the time. It was the integrating and sustaining factor of the entire intellectual and social life. To give an adequate representation of its period, with all its manifold forms and various activities, is consequently an exceedingly difficult problem. What principle of unity will serve to exhibit the relation between phenomena so various in character as, for example, the scepticism of Hume and the dogmatism of Wolff? In his introductory chapter, Professor Hibben describes the characteristics of the enlightenment spirit and the dialectic of its movement. "It was an age characterized by a restless spirit of inquiry,—a century of challenge. A new life was awake and stirred in the minds of men. Traditions which had been long venerated became the objects of searching investigation and criticism. The authority of the church, of the State, and of the school was no longer regarded as the court of last appeal. The old beliefs which failed to justify themselves at the bar of reason were discarded. The foundations of time-honored systems seemed shifting and uncertain. There was an insistent demand for the free play of the individual judgment. There was, also, a constant reference to the light of reason, the inner illumination shining bright and clear in contrast to the shadows of mysticism, or to the false and flickering light of dogmatism. Hence the name of the age of illumination or enlightenment,—the name, also, of the age of reason" (pp. 3, 4).

After the introduction, three chapters are devoted to Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, respectively, then follow chapters on the materialistic movement in England and France, Rousseau's philosophy of feeling, the philosophy of Leibniz, the conflict of typical philosophical influences in Germany, and the critical philosophy of Kant; while the final chapter gives a brief account of some of the more important practical influences of the enlightenment. At the end of each chapter is given a useful list of references, and the book concludes with a chronological table of the important philosophical works of the whole period.

Professor Hibben's account of the philosophy of this period is clear, comprehensive, and well balanced. It is popular in the best sense, and should help to extend the circle of

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readers of philosophical books. There is abundant evidence of wide reading and careful scholarship; and while the volume makes no claim to any special originality in point of view, it nevertheless serves to concentrate attention anew upon the achievements of this remarkable age.

It seems to me, however, that the book would have been even more successful in this respect if the author had laid greater emphasis upon the positive results and the permanent gains for humanity, both theoretical and practical, which issued from this movement. Professor Hibben follows too closely the conventional interpretation of certain German historians of philosophy, according to which the whole eighteenth-century movement ends in disaster and negations, leaving the foundations of philosophy to be laid anew by the genius of Kant. For certain purposes it may be allowable to dramatize the story in this way; but, as a matter of fact, the movement was much more many-sided than the conventional formulas lead us to suppose. It might be possible, I think, to represent the thought of the period as a process of immanent criticism, in which its initial presuppositions were being progressively transformed and rendered more adequate. This would necessitate some account of the seventeenth century, and of the new dogmatism and obscurantism that had taken possession of both Catholic and Protestant theology, and had almost succeeded in stamping out the free thought that the Renaissance had ushered in. It would be necessary, too, to give some account of the results of the new science, and of Descartes and Hobbes (especially of Hobbes), the men who asserted the validity of scientific methods, and the authority of clear and distinct ideas, and are therefore to be regarded as making the Enlightenment possible. To exhibit eighteenth-century philosophy in this way, as continuing the great liberating movement to which we owe our modern civilization, gives a clearer conception of its significance and essential unity than if we emphasize too much its shortcomings and failures. It was a great thing that the necessity of individual freedom and of clear and distinct ideas was brought home to the consciousness of these great European nations. For it is, after all, to the watchwords of the Enlightenment that humanity must always appeal, as it is constantly required to fight and do battle against entrenched superstition and the advances of obscurantism. Philosophy belongs exclusively to the 'insurgents'; when it

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wears the colors of the dominant parties in church and state, it degenerates into scholasticism. Materialism and scepticism were only incidental to the Enlightenment movement; but even if this were not true, there are worse things than a live materialism and scepticism.

Professor Paulsen, in the preface to his book on Kant, expresses the hope that the twentieth century may be more like the eighteenth than like the nineteenth. Such statements may, of course, be easily misunderstood; yet it is not difficult to see the need of returning in a sense to the program of the eighteenth century, and to its faith in freedom and in the transforming power of clear and distinct ideas. It is true that the last century gave to us in the conception of development a new and more powerful instrument of analysis than the age of the Enlightenment possessed. This conception also has enabled us to discover unity and continuity where they were formerly unperceived. All this is, of course, a great and permanent gain. Nevertheless, it seems that philosophy at the present day is "too much at ease in Zion," too ready to accept in a spirit of compromise and indifferentism anything and everything as good and rational. The imperishable glory of the enlightenment spirit was that its war with oppression and superstition was *à l'outrance*. It knew its foes and had not a shadow of doubt as to the outcome. We, on the contrary, seem to have lost, with our complacent sense of a broad historical point of view, that militant faith in reason that distinguished the thinkers of the eighteenth century. No one who reflects, however, can fail to perceive that at the present day various forms of irrationalism are threatening our civilization. Freedom is regarded as something visionary and unpractical, an outworn doctrine which modern men have learned to disregard for the sake of "getting things done." On the other hand, morbid sentimentalism in many forms and under many names is warring against light and reason. It is time to sound the trumpet. Philosophy can never afford to take refuge in complacency. It is not its mission to bring peace, but a sword. And it must always remember

> There is no truce with Adam-Zad,
> The Bear that looks like a man.

J. E. Creighton.

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SCIENCE AND RELIGION IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY. By E. Boutroux. Translated by Jonathan Nield. London: Duckworth & Co., 1909. Pp. xi, 400.

How can things form at once a single whole and have a separate existence? Religion consists in believing that there is one being,—God,—who realizes this miracle through the beings that live in him. "Religion, within those souls which it really invades, is,—one may say,—a value that is unique and infinite: attributed not by imagination, but by consciousness, properly so called, to certain ideas, to certain feelings, to certain actions with a view to ends which surpass humanity." This is the view Professor Boutroux takes of religion as an all-inclusive reality. His book is an eloquent attempt to justify it against current theories, both destructive and constructive. Only the barest outline of its contents is possible. They fall into three parts of unequal length. The Introduction is a masterly sketch of the relation of science and philosophy to religion from the time when philosophy began in Xenophanes by "striking at the breast of its nurse" to the beginning of the nineteenth century. The note of the last of the three periods into which this history is divided is the opposition between rationalism and the romanticism of Rousseau, whose doctrine represented "nature with its irresistible spontaneity, life, passion, faith, action, breaking in upon a literature in which mind was supreme." The eighteenth century thus ends with a "radical dualism," science and religion dividing the empire of human nature. So long as each was content with a part peace was possible. But this could not long continue.

The second and main portion of the book is occupied with the criticism of the attempts made to reconcile the two rivals; the attempts are distinguished according as they lean to naturalism or to spiritualism. Among the former come Comte, Spencer, Haeckel; under the latter, Ritschl and William James. What is here likely to attract most attention in his own country is the author's criticism of what he calls *psychologisme* and *sociologisme* in Chapter IV. By the first he means the attempt to explain religious phenomena by psychological hypotheses of suggestion, exaggerated affective commotions, and the like. *Sociologisme* is the theory which finds the source of religion in the sense of obligation, which arises in a community in relation to the beliefs and practices necessary to its existence and

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development. M. Boutroux meets these forms of phenomenalism by insisting on the objective reference implied in individual and social consciousness. A psychology which fails to recognize that consciousness is not exhausted by the present moment, but "is charged with the past and has an eye cast on the future,"—lives in eternity and with the eternal,—ignores the chief characteristic of its subject-matter. Again, the growth of societies presupposes in man an impulse to go beyond himself; and it is this, and not any sense of obligation to the *status quo,* that is the essence of religion. What we call the social spirit shows itself in a love of peace and justice, a devotion to ideals, which are far more cause than effect of social solidarity. "Evidently," he concludes, "it is not of real and given society that we are speaking when we explain by the action of society the religious attributes of the human soul. It is of ideal society, of society in so far as it strives after that, that justice, that happiness, that truth, that superior harmony, of which religion is the expression."

English and American students will probably find the center of interest in this section in the discussion of William James's "Varieties of Religious Experience." After a sympathetic account of the work, M. Boutroux presses home the fatal difficulties which it encounters from the side both of science and religion. No subjective vividness or impressiveness of the experiences in question can stand against the scientific demand for objective verification. "To believe in God is in some way to believe that God exists independently of our belief in him." Similarly, from the religious side, it is not a question of an "overplus, a beyond, an illimitable": it is a question of its value. The *bulk* of the larger subconscious self does not matter: what we worship is not quantity but quality, appearing in our own conscious life, which we may or may not ascribe to the operation of the subconscious. But the chief defect of James's theory is the assumption that religion takes its origin in the soul of the mystic, spreading thence by suggestion and imitation to society, and that its main moral manifestations are the 'cloistered virtues' of purity, holiness, humility, obedience. "A community also is a kind of person, capable of exhibiting its own virtues,—justice, harmony, and humanity. . . . If feeling is the soul of religion, beliefs and institutions are its body; and there is life in this world only for souls united with bodies." This is good criticism;

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it has always been surprising to find a pragmatist consistently ignoring the moral qualities of larger selves, and a radical empiricist consistently indifferent to the operation of religious ideas in corporate life.

In setting forth his own theory, Boutroux starts from the apparent opposition between the ideals of science and of religion, and puts the question whether the one does not, in fact, leave room for the other. He begins by reiterating the doctrines familiar to readers of his work on "The Contingency of the Laws of Nature." Science can no longer be regarded as the simple record of facts and laws impressed upon us by nature; it is a work of art which the mind substitutes for the primordial data, and it leaves us in the end with nothing but conceptions which have the value merely of experimental hypotheses,—explanations which, "though they may be sufficient, are not on that account necessary." Not only so, but we have come to admit that nature herself evolves "perhaps fundamentally," and with it the scientific spirit. Pledged by its ideal to unity, science is helpless before the diversifying movement of mind and experience,—*a fortiori,* before the last great diversity of mind and object. Hence if science takes possession of things in her own way, she does not lay hold of them altogether; and to satisfy the aspiration for a deeper grasp, a different movement, apparently a different faculty is necessary. By this the mind rises from 'being' to 'beings,' from the homogeneous to the differentiated, and lastly to personality, as it appears not merely in the individual, but in the higher forms of individuality we call the family, society, country, humanity. Deeper than the maxim, "Act as though everything were the repetition of a single phenomenon," is the maxim, "Act as though some of nature's combinations possessed a peculiar value," involving a tendency to be and continue on their own account. The life inspired by this maxim involves: first, faith, no blind acceptance of tradition, but a trust in "reason, instinct, the sense of life, as well as example and tradition"; second, an ideal, again no mere irrational venture, but "an ideal which seeks to conform to the demands of the intellect and the will"; third, "an affection or enthusiasm, a love, compelling to the expression of what is best in life." These are the "three moments in the development of the religious spirit." Mere life is, of course, possible without these principles; but re-

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ligion offers a richer and deeper life, a synthesis of instinct and intellect, in which each is transfigured and exalted, and possesses a creative power to which its separate action could not attain. Again, "religion goes beyond morality, offering it the support of divine perfection, carrying it beyond humanity to communion with God the Father of the universe, and declaring not only the duty but the power to love." "Whence then," he asks, "the impression that humanity is getting ready to repudiate religion and to seek some new guide? Merely from the failure of religion to adapt itself to the growth of science, of morality, and social organization. Let religion display herself in the world according to her own nature, as an altogether spiritual activity, aspiring to transform men and things from within and not from without: by persuasion, by example, by love, by prayer, by fellowship of souls, and not by compulsion or statecraft, and it is certain she has nothing to fear from the progress of science, from morality or from institutions." But religion cannot live without rites and dogmas of which the fundamental are two—the existence of God, of a living, perfect, almighty God, and the relationship of this God with man. Contradictory as these may appear to the order of nature as science reveals it, we have already seen that science does not give us the final aspect of things. It may therefore be that nature is not an immutable mechanism, but that "in her living reality she contains not being but beings," and that religion is the power which transforms the apparent into the real and reveals her hidden meaning.

In this eloquent vindication of the rights of religion there is so much that claims my heartiest sympathy and agreement that it is with reluctance that I turn from exposition to criticism. But it is because I regard his conclusions so vital and on the whole valid that I desire to see them placed on a basis which is beyond question. There is much clearly in common between Professor Boutroux and English and American Idealism. Yet there is one fundamental point on which there is disagreement and which I believe to be the main obstacle to a complete understanding between the representatives of religious philosophy on different sides of the Channel. The whole argument turns, as we have seen, on an alleged essential difference between the point of view of science and the point of view of life. Thus the author is led to reject the attempt of nineteenth century writers to establish a continuity between science and religion,

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and seeks to solve the problem (1) by assigning separate territories to science and religion, and (2) by denying the necessity supposed to attach to the conclusions of science. He is indeed forced to admit in the end that his solution is only relative and proximate; we have "two autonomous powers," which "can only advance towards peace, harmony and concord without ever claiming to reach the goal." Now I cannot believe either that science will abate its claim to necessity founded on the identity that underlies the difference of the terms of its problems, or that religion will be content with the precarious tenure thus assigned to it. I believe further that the supposed need to enforce this abatement comes from a misunderstanding of the nature of the identity that is sought. Identity is taken to be exclusive of difference. Is logical thought committed to the ideal of such an abstract identity? This view certainly underlay the logic of Kant; and Jevons carried it in this country to its legitimate conclusions. But a long line of logicians have since Hegel devoted themselves to its refutation; and it can now only be regarded as a survival. If the French philosophy as represented by Professor Boutroux, and as far as I understand him, his distinguished colleague, Professor Bergson, does not recognize this, the grounds of the denial require a far more careful statement than they have yet received. In the meantime we must insist that mathematical and physical sciences are as much concerned to maintain the reality of difference as the *quasi* sciences of life and mind. The distinction between these two groups of sciences consists in the kinds of difference and the kinds of identity with which they are respectively concerned. If this is so, we may maintain that the attempt to reconcile religion and science, not by establishing separate territories or functions, but by showing them to be distinct stages in a common function, is essentially right. Comte, Spencer, and Haeckel erred, not in seeking for continuity, but in not rightly apprehending the terms to be connected. The advance of psychology, individual and social, has made it easier for us than for them to realize the import and distinction between the abstract and inorganic, on the one hand, and the concrete and organic on the other. But our broader outlook should help us to realize that one is no less permeable by the light of intelligence than the other. On no other view is it possible to escape the dualism which Boutroux's writings once more emphasize.

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There are indeed not wanting definite suggestions of a different view, showing how dissatisfied the author himself is with such a dualism. "The method," he tells us, speaking of the claims of intelligence in the field of religion, "consists in making use of all the resources of intellect combined with life, and not in seeking a standpoint beyond the intellect's reach. Rather than go further and further in search of a refuge against science and reason, we ought to be reconciled with this same science to the utmost possible extent, to ensure for reason all the development of which she is capable, and to create by means of all these data instruments for the attainment of ideal ends." Nothing could be better said; but is it consistent with what he says elsewhere of the nature and function of intelligence? I cannot pursue the subject here, but I would venture to suggest that what is needed is the establishment of a real relation between the two faculties, which, following Kant, M. Boutroux calls the understanding and the reason. Religious philosophy should seek, not to limit the action of intelligence, but to differentiate the fields of its operations, which are also stages of its progress. Such differentiation science itself cannot deny without falsity to its own ideal of the unprejudiced acceptance of the facts which the world as a whole reveals. To accept it with all heartiness and to reinterpret its own operations,—the meaning of the identity it seeks in the light of it,—is to have got beyond its supposed antagonism with religion.

The translation of French works which, like that of M. Boutroux, are marked by high literary discussion is a fine art. Mr. Nield has, I think, been fairly successful; but such misprints as Hutchinson, on page 259, and the unintelligible sentence at the foot of page 364 ought not to have been allowed to pass.

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THE PRINCIPLES OF RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENT: A PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY. By George Galloway, M.A., B.D., D.Phil. London: Macmillan and Company, 1909. Pp. xx, 364.

What Dr. Galloway offers in this book is in the first place a study of the principles which underlie and are disclosed in the development of religion. "Of course it was only possible to execute such an undertaking by drawing freely and con-

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stantly on the materials supplied by the History and Science of Religion" (p. xix); but to supply such a history or science is not the author's purpose. It is obvious that the principles referred to must be discussed from some definite standpoint, and that "a constructive theory is implied in adequately carrying out the work of selection and valuation" (p. xx); hence the work begins with an examination of the idea of development which seeks to bring out the distinctive character of spiritual as contrasted with natural evolution.

The author maintains that neither the development of civilization in general, nor that of religion in particular, can be compared to organic growth, in which there is the constant unfolding of an idea potential in the beginning and strictly fixed in all its stages. "The point is that we are not able to find a meaning in history, viewed as a mundane process in time, which will satisfy the reason and do justice to the moral values involved. That the process is not meaningless we are bound to assume. Accordingly we make the postulate that the ultimate meaning of history must lie in a sphere which transcends the present temporal order; and the postulate will justify itself in the degree in which it meets the demands of our moral and intellectual life. It will not do so if the possibility of continuity between the temporal and transcendent values is excluded. . . . If our postulate is to work, the transition from the temporal to the eternal must be accomplished within the personal life, and cannot come merely as the result of historic progress. For it is persons who make history and embody the worth of the historic life; and as we have seen, we involve ourselves in contradictions if we treat them as a pure means to a hypothetical development of the race in the future. By insisting on the inner relation of each personal life to the Eternal, it seems possible to do justice to personal values and likewise to maintain that the meaning of history is being realized at each stage of the temporal process" (pp. 37, 38). Thus, to give a meaning to the conception of development in history, including the history of religion itself, the author finds it necessary to have recourse to a religious interpretation of the world.

In discussing the psychological basis of religion, the author starts from the position that religion has its roots in human nature, of which it is a normal development; and, in an interesting series of chapters, a selection of typical facts in the

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development of religion is effectively described and analyzed in the light of the traditional psychological distinction of feeling, will, and thought. It is shown that as society develops, the interaction of the *personal* and *social* factors becomes important, while (at the same time) the interaction of the psychical factors becomes prominent with the development of the inward side of religion. Thus religion tends to become an expression of the concrete nature of man, which in its highest stage reveals a transcendent aspect. Psychology, however, cannot determine the *validity* of the process of development. The problem of the ultimate meaning of religion must be handed over to metaphysics.

A chapter on the place of the moral ideal in the religious consciousness forms a transition to the speculative treatment of the subject. "Our regress on the Ultimate Ground of Experience is along two lines, proceeding in the one case by judgments of fact and in the other by judgments of value. The one path is that of reflective thinking on experience, the other that of examining the needs of faith and the demands of the inner life. Both ways converge upon the same goal, but each presents a view of the object which is not disclosed by the other." The postulate to which they point is, that the ultimate ground of experience (the universe itself fundamentally understood) is at once rational and righteous. The special interpretation of this position, which commends itself most to the author, is found in a modified form of the metaphysics of Lotze.

The significance of this volume at the present time lies chiefly in its protest against the tendency to lay exclusive stress, in religion and generally in life, on feeling, will, and 'results,' rather than on reason. A recent critic has well said that "if reason leads us astray, the remedy is more and better reasoned reason: the attempt to change the center of experience to another factor in the process breaks down on this essential fact of human nature, that reason is the distinctive note of man. Reason, in short, is the compass by which we steer; discard it, and, as experience has shown, and still shows, there is no superstition, however riotous or exploded, that is not at hand." The book may be highly commended as an interesting and instructive contribution to the problems of the philosophy of religion as they are now shaping themselves.

S. H. MELLONE.

Edinburgh.



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THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGION. By Irving King, Ph.D. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1910. Pp. xxiii, 371.

This book is the product of an earnest endeavor to apply the general concepts of functional psychology to the problems of the origin and development and interpretation of religion. It is, in a sense, a continuation of the author's earlier work, "The Differentiation of the Religious Consciousness," and it is characterized, as was its predecessor, by broad and conscientious scholarship, scientific method, and an open and tolerant spirit. Unfortunately, again like its predecessor, it is not marked by skill in presentation and arrangement nor by clearness of exposition. The incautious reader is constantly getting lost in the mass of illustrations and cannot see the forest for the trees; and though the thesis of the book is continually reiterated, it is usually in such abstract and indefinite terms that one might be excused if at the end he were unable to say exactly what it was the author meant to prove. Repetitions of constantly increasing indefiniteness do not help matters. If the book had been half as long, it might have been twice as clear.

In general it may be said that the book consists of three theses and a description. The first thesis concerns the nature, problems, and methods of the psychology of religion; the second and third have to do with the nature of religion and its origin; while the rest of the book,—the larger and better portion,—is given up to a description of the development of religion and a discussion of various incidental and related subjects.

Dr. King means by religion not any particular belief, but an attitude of appreciation toward one's universe (which, of course, may be very small), in so far as this universe is related to one's life and to the meaning of life. "The religious consciousness is an attitude built up about the larger meaning of experience which we *feel,* but cannot *state,* except in relatively vague symbolic forms. . . . It represents the attempt of some minds to grapple with this larger reality or meaning of life, to give it a symbolism that may render it more definitely available or capable of playing some explicit part in our social interactions" (p. 340).

Yet though religion is not a *belief,* it often gets itself expressed in terms of belief; and every religious belief is therefore a more or less symbolic expression of the religious attitude.

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This, as I understand it, is Dr. King's position; but it is far from clearly expressed. He tries to make his view plainer by constant use of the term *value,* in order, apparently, to differentiate religion from mere belief. Thus, "the religious attitude may be said to be the consciousness of the value of action in terms of its ultimate organization" (p. 85). In fact, the whole book is largely a discussion of religious 'values.' This way of putting things may at times have been a help to the author in his thinking; but it is questionable whether the reader will find it anything but a hindrance. The reason for this is perhaps merely the author's unfortunate mode of expression; but it also seems in part due to his not having a perfectly clear notion himself of what he means by the term. A long discussion is given up to the nature and origin of the consciousness of value: it arises, we are told, from impeded action; delay in gaining one's end is necessary to it; and the various methods and activities involved in gaining the end thus come to be valued on their own account. In this long section the term *value* is used in its ordinary sense. The reader, therefore, feels rather disconcerted to find the word thereafter used synonymously with *belief* or *concept,* or even identified with material things. Thus on page 32 we are told that the "values" of religion "may range from the secret names and the sacred bull-roarers of the Australians to the conception of a divine organization of the universe." Likewise, from page 77, we learn that in a certain tribe "the most complex and remote value of all" is "a theory regarding the origin of the tribe," *etc.* Similar uses of the word are to be found everywhere throughout the book, so that it is frequently difficult to make out exactly what the author is writing about; and the conclusion seems to be that theories of the universe, secret names, and bull-roarers originate, like *other* values, from impeded action.

The origin of the religious attitude is to be sought, according to our author, not in any 'inherent tendency' or 'innate sense' of man, but in the various social situations, with their correlative needs, in which primitive men found themselves. To explain religion as an 'instinct,' or to say that man is 'incurably religious,' or that he is endowed with an innate "perception of the infinite," is to give no explanation at all. Even if one should grant the existence of a religious instinct, this itself would require explanation, for instincts are not original,

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but arise from, and are to be explained by perfectly definite situations. Religion (like instinct) is always a response to a situation. The really instructive question is, therefore, What are the concrete situations out of which the religious attitude has developed? Dr. King's thesis in response to this is best expressed in his preface: "The religious attitude has been built up through the overt activities which appear in primitive social groups, activities which were either spontaneous or playful, or which appeared with reference to meeting various needs of the life process; and the development of emotional values has been mediated through the fact that these activities were in the main social" (p. viii).

One other factor, however, as King points out, is of considerable influence in building up religion in anything like its complete form: namely, the belief that many things possess, (or are possessed by), a 'mysterious power' ('manitou,' 'wakonda,' 'orenda,' 'mana'), as it is variously named. This power is entirely impersonal, and the belief in it is merely the correlative to the savage's feeling that here and there he must "watch out." This belief is not religion, but it contributes its share in the origin and development of religion. Given this feeling or belief as a background, the various practical and playful habitual activities of the social group will develop into a religious cult, and the religious attitude of mind will thus result. It is one of the weak points in Dr. King's book that he fails (in spite of many laborious pages) to show us just why and how the religious attitude of mind should result. That various social activities which have a purely practical or playful origin, in time become religious,—*i. e.*, come to be regarded as religious,—he makes beautifully clear. And this is an important thing. But it throws but little light on the origin of religion. For it presupposes that the tribesmen already knew what they meant by *religious*, and that they had a religion. In short, it cannot be said that Dr. King has contributed much toward the (chiefly speculative) question of the origin of religion. For if religion is not a particular belief or emotion, but a very general "attitude built up about the larger meaning of experience," it is not to be explained by any particular type of situation, whether individual or social, but only by life itself and the whole nature of man. Which seems to bring us round again to the rejected view that man is 'incurably religious.'

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Dr. King is much more successful in his treatment of the development of particular religious practices, attitudes, and beliefs from particular social organizations and situations,—and this, in fact, is the most important part of his book. He has shown clearly and with great wealth of illustration how the kind of religion which a primitive people has is always dependent upon its environment and its social structure. And in this connection his treatment of several incidental questions (notably that of the subconscious and its relation to religion) is especially to be commended.

In conclusion, a few words must be added concerning Dr. King's view of the psychology of religion.. In his opinion, no peculiarity of content is to be found in the religious consciousness. Hence it can be differentiated from other forms of experience only with reference to its function and end. To treat it scientifically, therefore, is to apply to it the concepts of functional psychology and see its position within the life process. Moreover, the presupposition of such a scientific treatment, according to our author, must be the thesis that religious states are of the same nature as other mental states and are governed by the same psychological laws. Otherwise it would be impossible to deal with them scientifically. Not only must the phenomena of religion be treated as entirely explicable by the facts and laws of psychology; no other kind of causation than the ordinary human sort can be entertained for a moment as a possible explanation. Both the older supernatural view and the more recent pseudo-psychological one (for which, *e. g.*, Professor James's "Varieties" stands) are equally unscientific. "If preternatural causation were possible through the subconscious region of the mind, there could be no psychology of religion" (p. 18). "Psychologically God is not perceived, nor can the divine mind be regarded as something in some way continuous with the experience of the psychologist through its subconscious phases" (p. 264).

There can be no doubt that Dr. King is right in insisting that the psychology of religion must seek a complete explanation of all religious phenomena in purely human psychology. The question, however, will still remain open to anyone who wishes to raise it, whether this search can be successful. Nor can I see that the counter hypothesis of causation through a divine mind would be any more destructive of the psychology of re

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ligion than the existence of the previously invisible Neptune proved to the science of astronomy. Dr. King is certainly incorrect in his assertion that the religious man "would hardly claim that his deity is a phenomenon" (p. 264). The God of the common religious man and of the pluralist philosopher (when he has one) is just that,—a phenomenal conscious being like the rest of us. And it might perfectly well transpire in the course of psychological investigation that certain facts,—say those of the mystic consciousness,—would be better explained on the hypothesis of such a (hitherto) unknown but communicating consciousness than on the supposition that we already have knowledge of all the relevant causes. It must be admitted, however, that while this is a possibility, it is one which the psychologist would hardly be justified in acting upon and using as a serious hypothesis until he has in vain exhausted all other modes of explanation.

The chief value of Dr. King's book lies in its emphasis upon the influence which social structure and custom have in determining the direction and detail of religious development. The careful study of primitive peoples,—with which nearly all this book is taken up and which is now becoming so generally popular,—certainly throws considerable light upon the higher phases of religion. Too much, however, must not be expected from this sort of thing. We must beware of seeking to explain the better known by the less known. And when all is said, the key to our own deeper religious problems must be sought here and now,—in the spiritual life of the cultured nations and individuals of the twentieth century, rather than in Australia or among the Semites of the year 1000 B. C.

JAMES B. PRATT.

Williams College.

HANDBOOK OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS. By T. Clark Murray, LL.D., F.R.S.C. London: T. and T. Clark, 1909. Pp. 328.

Opinions differ as to what the term Christian Ethics should stand for. Should it mean the teaching of Jesus? A view of life which would be an interpretation of the life of Jesus? The teaching of the early disciples or of the 'Christian Church?' Professor Murray's book is not a handbook of Ethics which is specifically Christian in any of the senses referred to. It is based

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largely on the teaching of Jesus, but that teaching has gone through a process of winnowing and modification to bring it into line with idealistic ethics of the kind that we are familiar with in this country through the teachings of T. H. Green. Our author tends to suspect what is original. All would agree with him that the primary question is not whether an idea is original, but whether it is true, and he is perhaps right when he says that "to the scientific thinker absolute originality is so far from being any recommendation of a doctrine that it would be viewed rather as a ground of suspicion" (p. 40). The 'scientific thinker,' however, in his desire to obtain universal statements, is too prone to forget that a real personality is original, and that his life cannot be briefly summarized as an instance of an abstract general law. 'Scientific' thinking is sometimes in danger of being applied exclusively to the method of investigation prevalent in the abstract physical sciences where universal statements are obtained through leaving out the manifold variety of the concrete world. True science, it need scarcely be said, should take account of the actual facts of life, recognizing differences where they exist. A criticism one is compelled to pass on this handbook is that it ignores certain characteristics of the teaching and life of Christ. For example, the index does not contain the words cross, sacrifice, eschatology; and a perusal of the book itself shows that this is no oversight. The significance of these conceptions, which meant so much for Jesus and the early disciples, and, in a modified form, have meant so much for the church since, is not discussed. The suggestion of the possibility of irreconcilable antagonism between the good to others resulting from the individual's action and his own good is dismissed with the remark that it would "reduce moral life from an intelligible order to an unintelligible chaos and render any science of it impossible." But is any account of life, as we know it, which does not recognize this possibility intelligible? It is surely not obvious how denying father, mother, wife, child, and even life itself for the sake of Christ and his Gospel is for the individual's own good. And it is far less obvious how, in view of such statements, the Christian principle of life for the individual is "to love his neighbor as himself,—not less, but also not more." Jesus died on the cross; and many who have given similar service to their fellow-men have had the same bitter kind of experience. If they found their own lives, it

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was after dying and through dying. Professor Murray does not consider the tragic element in life, although at the centre of Christianity there stands a Cross. Neither does he recognize the pessimistic attitude which Jesus seemed to take towards the possibility of the world's gradual improvement, an attitude emphasized by many in recent years. Our author has a cheerful belief in moral evolution and progress. Consequently he attaches no importance to the eschatological aspects of Christ's teaching, differing in this respect from the general practice of the church. A book on Christian ethics should, we think, take account of these matters; and whether they are dismissed as ephemeral, or resolved into something different, reasons should be given for the course pursued.

The author's aim seems to have been to compare and correlate what he considered to be the best ethical teachings of all countries. And in this he has succeeded. Many thinkers, ancient and modern, greet us in his pages. Greek thinkers, naturally, contribute very largely to the discussion. The description of the ethical ideal is as much Greek as Palestinian in form: "Christian morality consists in loving our fellow-men as we love ourselves, such love being a rational habit of life, which is revealed in Christ as the realization of God's will with regard to man, and therefore of man's love to God." And love "is essentially reason or intelligence in its application to the mutual relations of intelligent beings" (pp. 25-27). But was not the emotional element in love the more prominent in the thought of Palestine? Was there not in it something akin to the unreasoning, not to say unreasonable, 'passion for souls' emphasized by 'evangelical' preachers?

Professor Murray emphasizes the dependence of ethics on theology or metaphysics. He has no belief in a 'creedless morality'; but calls for a simplified and practical creed which can receive the "assent of the scientific intelligence." A creed which cannot be "verified by experiment and observation" will satisfy nothing but idle curiosity. How such tests are to be applied to ultimate metaphysical problems he does not tell us. Their application is, of course, beyond the scope of this book. To sum up. Our chief criticism is that the author tends to oversimplify the intricate problems of life, and that the 'simple,' 'practical' solutions he aims at are of doubtful value. Apart from this oversimplification,—a simplification which our author

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may be inclined to defend on the ground that he only intended to write an introductory manual,—the work is valuable as a clear and interesting presentation of a difficult subject. It is well arranged and abounds in illustrations and literary allusions.

DAVID PHILLIPS.

Bala, North Wales.

IDEALISM AS A PRACTICAL CREED. By Henry Jones, LL.D., D.Litt. Glasgow: James Maclehose and Sons, 1909. Pp. ix, 299.

This book consists of lectures delivered before the University of Sydney. Though described as lectures, they might almost as well be described as sermons,—sermons on texts from Hegel: for they are most of them concerned with the application of philosophy to life. And very eloquent sermons they are. The rhetoric is perhaps at moments a little too exuberant for a cold Anglo-Saxon taste; but their intellectual distinction is undeniable.

These lectures are intended to give the educated but not professedly philosophic hearer or reader some notion of the bearing upon life of the philosophy which their author represents. And that purpose they may be said fairly to achieve from the point of one who still finds the well-known formulæ of what may be called the Cairdian wing of the Hegelian school as satisfying and as important as they seemed to be to so many thirty or forty years ago. Those who have never been able fully to appreciate the profundity of the Hegelian commonplaces will perhaps at moments find themselves not so much questioning the truth of the familiar dicta, as marveling at the unction with which Professor Jones enunciates them. "We do not consider that we understand anything rightly,—nor plant, nor animal, nor man, not even the fixed strata of the earth's crust, or the planet itself,—till we can indicate its place in a process" (p. 23). "Civilization is nothing but the process of revealing and realizing the Nature of Man, and the revelation is still going on, mysteriously and tortuously enough" (p. 34). "It is the spirit which has built up the social world that becomes in its own members aware of what it has achieved. By means of their mind, it examines itself and achieves freedom" (p. 57). "The Greeks, says Hegel, had no conscience" (p. 72). "Hence the ethical enquiries of Socrates were fatal to the Greek

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State, more fatal even than those of the Sophists" (p. 77). "Thus does freedom show itself to be no merely negative thing. It is emancipation, non-interference, exclusion, independence for the individual, and great, indeed, is the price which civilization has paid to secure these for him. But it is much more. It is life *within* the State: it is the life *of* the State within its members, for his duties to himself are duties to the State" (p. 124). Most of this is undeniably true (though one may be allowed to doubt the wisdom of the sayings about Socrates), but for some of us the real difficulties both of thought and of life seem to begin just where these vaguely stimulating generalities end; and such persons will find it a relief when Professor Jones reaches more solid ground in his interesting attempt to develop the message to the modern world of Wordsworth and Browning. Then we have a chapter on the Call of the Modern Age, the net result of which is "the conviction that in these days the religious and ethical experience of reflective men has thus outgrown the definite creeds" (p. 227), though not "the deeper principles which the creeds were meant to express." The last two chapters contain the real gist of the book, at least from the point of view of the student of philosophy. They are entitled "The Answer of Idealism." Idealism of course means for Professor Jones Hegelian idealism, or rather that particular version of Hegelianism in which it may be doubted whether there is as much of the real Hegel as of the interpretation read into him by the late Master of Balliol and his school. These chapters are valuable as expressing more definitely than is sometimes done by its representatives what is the relation of this philosophical creed to the beliefs and hopes which are commonly spoken of as religious by ordinary men and women. They make it quite plain that God is for Professor Jones personally,—whatever may be the case with some who habitually employ almost the same technical phraseology,—a consciousness which is not exhausted by, though it includes, the consciousness of men and animals; that it is a will and not merely a thinker; that 'idealism' is essentially in harmony with the Christian view which regards love as the most essential feature of the divine character, and that it at all events allows us (with Professor Jones himself) to cherish the hope of personal immortality.

The last chapter of the book contains a somewhat violent defence of the unqualified Hegelian optimism, and an equally

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violent attack upon its critics,—pessimists, Bradleians, and others. Professor Jones's most formidable artillery is reserved for those who find a difficulty in combining a recognition of the objective validity of our moral judgments with the assertion that everything in the universe is very good and the work of a God who is both perfectly good and, in the most crude and literal popular conception of the term, 'omnipotent.' With the utmost desire to sit at Professor Jones's feet and be instructed, I cannot find that he adds much to the controversy. Professor Jones's vindication of optimism appears to turn upon the usual assumption that, because "good implies evil," therefore the evil is not really there. "Not being objects of our experience, we must conclude that these contrasts [absolute good or absolute evil] are fictions, products of our imagination which first abstracts, and then gives a false reality to its abstractions." Then there comes the time-worn misrepresentation that those who speak of a limitation of God's power mean a limitation from the outside. "Not less evident is it that a God who is not infinite but limited is a God who is neither self-subsistent nor self-determined. If he acts, it is only under conditions which he has not called for, and he operates upon an environment over which he has not complete control. He owes his being to the causation of a prior and presumably a higher power," etc. (p. 250). Professor Jones must know perfectly well that the people whom he is criticising regard God as without beginning: how such a Being can be supposed to be 'caused,' it is difficult to understand. Professor Jones seems unable to grasp the idea of a Being who is limited by his own eternal nature, who possesses a certain definite amount of power and no more. Does he suppose, for instance, that God could commit suicide, and is not this, in a sense, a limitation? There is nothing novel about such a position. There may be difficulties in Leibniz's view of a God who makes the best of all possible but not of all imaginable worlds; but it cannot be upset by such a travesty of his position as Professor Jones's criticism implies. There may be (as Professor Jones seems to think) something peculiarly blasphemous and irreligious in such an interpretation of omnipotence as that of St. Thomas Aquinas, who explains it as a power of doing "omnia possibilia"; but such a position cannot be simply howled down by an outburst of philosophic rhetoric,—especially on the part of a writer who professes to

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appeal to and be in essential harmony with the ordinary religious consciousness. The popular religious consciousness has never accepted Professor Jones's notion of a deity who includes in himself good and bad men alike, to say nothing of devils and animals ("the name 'God' which is just our name for what we deem to be in itself all in all"), or his theory that what appears to be evil in the universe is really good. Professor Jones's argument ends in an explosion of wrath against his opponents, coupled with sundry imputations upon their personal character which remind us of controversial methods now almost abandoned by the professional theologians. "It is the ignorant and the capricious spirit that finds the universe unsatisfactory" (p. 273). Such men as Eduard von Hartmann may be capricious, but are they exactly ignorant? "In recent days, by the same confusion, philosophy, or rather ordinary opinion pretending to philosophize, has in like manner been depriving God of His beneficence and power, stultifying the very name in the process" (p. 276). Professor Jones is far too angry to notice that some at least of those who question, in the popular sense, the omnipotence of God, do so just because they want to maintain his beneficence. His argument is finally clinched by the suggestion that "the critics of idealism . . . employ the categories of natural upon spiritual things. Do the windows of their souls stand in need of being cleaned?" (p. 289).

I have read this brilliant book with sincere admiration, and with a larger measure of fundamental agreement than Professor Jones himself would perhaps admit to be possible between one who does and one who does not subscribe to all the shibboleths of "Absolute Idealism." But I am compelled to say that I have occasionally wished that I could discover in it a little less heat, and a little more light.

Oxford. H. RASHDALL.

THE HINDRANCES TO GOOD CITIZENSHIP. By James Bryce. New Haven: Yale University Press; London: Henry Frowde, 1909. Pp. 138.

The Dodge Lectures delivered at Yale by the British Ambassador to the United States form not only a useful manual of guidance for the citizen, but an acute criticism of democracy.

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Coming from a man who has touched life at every point,—jurist, historian, professor, cabinet minister, diplomatist,—the observations contained in this little volume deserve careful attention. Though addressed to an American audience, Mr. Bryce draws his illustrations from the old world as well as the new, and his warnings are equally applicable to both.

We are reminded at the outset that from about 1830 to 1870 the general attitude of the best and strongest minds was extremely optimistic, and immense gains to human progress and human happiness were expected from the establishment of free institutions. These expectations have not been wholly disappointed; but much less has been achieved than was expected. The reason is not far to seek. "The theory of democracy assumes a far higher level of good sense, judgment, honest purpose, devotion to the public welfare than is needed in a despotic oligarchy." Democratic government has proved disappointing because the average citizen is not good enough for it. The moral is not that democratic institutions must be abandoned, but that the level of citizenship must be raised. Such adequate performance of civic duty is prevented, according to Mr. Bryce, mainly by indolence, self-interest, and party spirit.

The basic fault of democracy is summed up in the terrible dictum, 'What is everybody's business is nobody's business.' This natural lethargy is encouraged by the size of modern States, which diminishes the feeling of responsibility in the individual for the fortunes of the community. Thus in one State men will be risking their lives to obtain the franchise, while in a neighboring country laws may be needed to compel voters to go to the poll.

The second great impediment to the full success of democracy is self-interest, a greater danger than indifference, as it implies an interest in public affairs for the wrong reasons. How to divert taxation from oneself and one's class, how to manipulate the tariff, how to secure expenditure of public money on local works, how to secure government contracts,—these are among the unhealthy interests of the selfish and disloyal democrat. "Money is for popular governments the most constant source of danger; worse than ignorance, worse than apathy, worse than faction." It is not a mere coincidence that the best democracies of our time, Switzerland and the Orange Free State, were those where there were fewest rich men.

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The third great danger is party spirit, the enemy of independent thought which is itself the salt of democracy. In political life nothing is more difficult for the party man than to oppose his party; but there is no more searching test of the worth of the citizen than his readiness to do so in case of need.

Mr. Bryce declares that of the three dangers, indolence, personal interest, and party spirit, the first is the most common, the second the most noxious, the third the most excusable. How are they to be overcome? Mechanical changes, such as proportional representation and the referendum, may be of assistance; but the central problem is ethical. Moral education combined with instruction in civic duty is an obvious beginning; but the task of the moral reformer is like that of the preacher of religion. He must appeal to the higher nature. "Every man," says Mr. Bryce in a fine passage, "can recall moments in his own life when the sky seemed to open above him and when his vision was so quickened that all things stood transfigured in a purer and brighter radiance, when duty and even toil done for the sake of duty, seemed beautiful and full of joy." With such spiritual resources we may draw nearer to, even if we can never reach, the ideal of good citizenship which beckons to us in this little volume.

G. P. GOOCH.

London.

SOURCE BOOK FOR SOCIAL ORIGINS. Ethnological Materials, Psychological Standpoint, Classified and Annotated Bibliographies for the Interpretation of Savage Society. By William I. Thomas. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; London: T. Fisher Unwin. Pp. xvi, 932.

This book is essentially a vast bibliography, classified, partially annotated and illustrated by selections from some of the works referred to. The classification proceeds upon two plans. The first is upon the basis of the questions treated, and includes seven parts: the geographic and economic environment; mental life and education; invention and technology; sex and marriage; art, ornament and decoration; magic, religion and myth; and, finally, social organization, morals, the State. Each of these parts contains from five to ten selections from different authors,

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followed by some brief critical comment and a bibliography relating to the topic under discussion. Under Sex and Marriage, for instance, are found selections from Westermarck, Spencer and Gillen, Rivers, Herbert Spencer, and Ernest Crawley, occupying in all eighty-three pages, followed by comment of five pages, and a bibliography of eighty-three titles. At the end of the book a second scheme of classification embraces six bibliographies in which titles are arranged according to the races and countries to which they relate. These two methods of arrangement enable one to find references or selections relating to problems, for instance, whether the savage mind can hold abstract ideas; or to some particular people, for instance, the Indian. Something like fifteen hundred titles are enumerated altogether, including general works on comparative ethnology, special works on descriptive ethnology, works on ethics and psychology, and especially government reports on ethnology and articles in anthropological reviews and magazines. The critical notes include advice as to where to begin, and in what sequence to read.

The editor holds in mind the limitations under which a small library may suffer, and so extends the bibliographies. He cherishes some hope of interesting the general reader, so includes selections designed to tempt him to seek the books from which they come, and suggests that he read slowly. He takes it for granted that students coming from different intellectual fields, or aspiring to different professional careers, will be interested in different aspects of the general subject, so makes it possible, for instance, for one interested in the mind of the child to follow his bent, while one interested in the origins and development of art can follow his. And almost any worker upon almost any problem ever raised in ethnology or cultural anthropology will be able to find selections, notes, or references relating to that problem. Scarcely any quest is belittled, and there is a charming absence of dogmatic attempts to settle everything.

Physical anthropology, however, is rather consistently excluded; and this is probably the chief respect in which the book may be said to have a 'psychological standpoint.' One need not expect to find here much attention given to anthropometry, craniology, or such matters. To look for suggestions having a positive psychological flavor will be well rewarded, and references to many parts of the wide forest of psychological literature

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will be found, so synthetic thinkers may be helped to construct a system of their own adequate to the interpretation of the material. This seems to be the notion which Professor Thomas entertains, for he presents the concepts of *control, attention, habit* and *crisis* in but a tentative way. To present a ready-made system is farthest from his aim. 'Control' is our old acquaintance, "control of the environment that the race may survive"; and to ask how this or that fact bears on control is said to be always pertinent; 'attention' is said to be always active at those points where the emergency, called here 'crisis,' calls for the formation of new 'habits,' so it is always in order to ask of any custom, for instance, what emergency called forth the habit in which it is manifest, and upon what substratum of habit already acquired it was built. A student may be helped to avoid utter confusion by following some such scheme as this, but of course it does not emancipate him from the necessity of keeping abreast of what is now being done in social psychology.

The merit of this book, as a source book, will grow upon one the oftener he consults it, especially if he has already been trained in the fundamental principles of the philosophy of history and has some acquaintance with the literature of ethnology. It is like having at hand for consultation a man who has read everything there is.

CARL E. PARRY.

University of Michigan.

THE WORKING FAITH OF THE SOCIAL REFORMER. By Henry Jones. London: Macmillan and Company, 1910. Pp. 305.

The preface of this book brings before us the imperative need, at this present time, for the convincing enunciation of a few principles that shall not merely systematize, but give meaning to the social facts with which the new circumstances of our time are flooding our lives. It is the sense of this need that has inspired the pages of this book, and the faith in which it is written is the faith that society being the product of man's rational nature is capable of rational interpretation. A few examples will illustrate Professor Henry Jones's standpoint. Character and environment are to him two names for the same thing: the growth of the self and the world are concurrent.

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It follows therefore that when the self has internalized its environment, when character is formed, attempts at reform will fail, because the vitiated character turns all opportunities into its own substance. The vitiated nature must therefore be placed where it cannot pervert or denaturalize its social medium, and in this lies the value of such therapeutic methods as labor colonies. The idea of "the twofold movement of the Spirit" is further applied to an examination of Socialism and Individualism. Social and individual evolution are two aspects of the same fact. Just as in family life individual rights are accorded to the full and are found not to clash, but to combine in a fuller life for each of its members, so under good social institutions State and citizen live and develop in and through each other. The limits of State or municipal activity are not to be fixed by any conception of the abstract antagonism of society and the individual. The criterion of the action of the State is the effective freedom of its citizens. From the side of the individual the power of the individual's will comes from its identification with a wider will; and therefore the individual can resist the extension of the functions of his city or State only when he has identified himself with a will that is yet more universal and the source of higher imperatives than either; in other words, when he resists the State for the good of the State.

The dependence of man on society and the dependence of society on man are themes to which the author returns again and again. At present the evolution of the individual's powers is hindered by the hard necessities of an imperfectly socialized system, and the evolution of the public good is baffled by the narrow views and the unsocialized wills of individuals. The reformer's task is dealt with in some detail, and especial emphasis is laid on the fact that we must moralize social situations as they stand. Indications of the means by which social service may be made more effective in a broad and permanent way are scattered throughout the book; and the last chapter, from a series of more popular lectures, deals with them in some detail.

The influence of the late Edward Caird is very marked in this work, and the book will be pleasing reading to those who have an affectionate memory of his teaching, although some readers may perhaps be a little suspicious of principles which seem sometimes to offer too facile solutions. The book shows

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some of the weaknesses natural to books made up of lectures and articles prompted by some temporary purpose. There is rather a lack of continuity: the chapter on "The Child and Heredity" is too commonplace; and the two chapters on "Idealism and Politics" could have been omitted without loss. Nevertheless, the book is instinct with earnestness and should serve its purpose of bringing the practical man to consider principles.

R. S. VARLEY.

Bristol, England.

PHILANTHROPY AND THE STATE OR SOCIAL POLITICS. By B. Kirkman Gray. Edited by Eleanor Kirkman Gray and B. L. Hutchins. London: P. S. King & Son, Orchard House, Westminster, 1908. Pp. x, 339.

This work was left unfinished by the author at his death; and its publication in a very readable and useful volume has evidently cost much labor to the two editors. The result fully justifies the labor expended upon it. Gaps here and there remind us of the loss which our knowledge and judgment of social movements have sustained, through the interruption of the work of a thinker so diligent and so well informed as the late Mr. Gray. We are told by Miss Hutchins in her preface, that Mr. Gray, who had already written "A History of English Philanthropy," had originally designed as the title of the present work "The Failure of Philanthropy," "his experience on a mission in one of the poorest slums of London having convinced him of the utter ineffectiveness of philanthropy as a cure for the social wastage of the present time." Further inquiry did not indeed make his judgment of the effectiveness of private charity, even of 'organized' charity, as the sufficient remedy for social ills, any less severe; but it led him to recognize the relative and limited utility of private philanthropic enterprise in discovering the existence of evil conditions, and in first setting in motion the forces which may in time remove them. In our country, social evils have usually been first exposed by the agitation of private individuals, and private beneficence has begun the task of remedying them. But in one sphere after another, as these pages very forcibly demonstrate, public authorities have been constrained to interfere, sometimes taking under their control the whole range of prevention

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and remedy, sometimes working side by side with voluntary agencies, and sometimes contenting themselves with exercising control and supervision over such agencies. Generally speaking, it is only public authority that is able to expose the full extent of the evil, and, above all, to deal at all effectively with its causes. The scientific analysis of social phenomena has led to the recognition that the State should exist for the good of its members, and that one generation cannot, without treachery to itself and the future of the race, abandon its failures to their fate, or to the sporadic good will of voluntary agencies.

We have in this book a rigorously condensed, but luminous and deeply instructive account of the beginnings and progress of philanthropic endeavor in our country, and of the gradual absorption of its business by the organized community. The spirit in which it is written is enlightened and generous, and the style is nowhere marred by catchwords and trite mannerisms. Miss Hutchins remarks very justly that "it is quite easy . . . to find competent students, who will turn out conscientious studies of social and economic questions, with careful research from original materials, and a collection of facts and statistics. . . . What is not so common, is the philosophic insight, that will find the connecting link, interpret the inner relations and bring the many facts and details together so that they may have a meaning and purpose for the souls of men."

Mr. Gray combined with a gift for research and narrative a humane and philosophic spirit; and this book should stimulate many of its readers to render themselves familiar with further details of the movements which it relates and to strive toward a deeper and more life-giving philosophy of society. We can only wish that Mr. Gray had lived to give even more impressive coherence and solidity to the fine observations which make this work so suggestive and inspiring a monument of his labors.

W. J. Roberts.

University College, Cardiff, Wales.

The Crisis of Liberalism: New Issues of Democracy. By J. A. Hobson. London: P. S. King & Son, 1909. Pp. xiv, 284.

This volume contains a collection of lectures and essays, some of which have previously appeared in periodicals, on current

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political events and problems. Taken together, the two parts of the title represent fairly adequately the range of topics, and the spirit in which the author approaches them. "The Crisis of Liberalism," in the narrower sense, by which we understand the issues raised between the liberal and labor parties in Great Britain and the House of Lords over the control of finance, is most explicitly dealt with in the first of the three parts into which the book is divided. Mr. Hobson recognizes the grave injustice involved in the powers invested by law and constitutional custom in an irresponsible assembly of hereditary plutocrats, not to speak of the more novel claims recently advanced. But he exhibits with equal clearness the weak points in the scheme of the professedly popular parties, so far as they have yet formulated it. While avoiding the more commonplace arguments for second chambers, which are usually unsound historically, and which admit of no fruitful application in practice, he points to the best reason of all why a democratic people should hesitate merely to curtail the powers of the House of Lords, while leaving our system of parliamentary government in other respects unchanged; namely, that the House of Commons is rapidly ceasing to be an independent organ of government, and becoming increasingly a puppet controlled by the Cabinet and the persons who work the administrative machine. Mr. Hobson argues for a reconstituted elective second chamber with limited powers; more especially, with the power, not of finally rejecting measures approved by the House of Commons, but of enforcing a referendum on the particular proposal in question. He gives us a full account of the establishment and working of the referendum in Switzerland, and brings forward powerful arguments in answer to the usual objections to this organ of popular government. I cannot, however, feel that Mr. Hobson has been completely successful, or that he has taken sufficient account of the political habits of the British people; and I am disposed to think that French, rather than Swiss experience, in respect of the particular weaknesses which our parliamentary government exhibits, would be found helpful. That the French Chambers really do control the course of legislation and government is the general opinion among students of French politics. The fourth chapter of this first part, "The Restatement of Democracy," offers an ingenious and highly suggestive justification of popular rights as consistent with and indeed

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arising out of the 'organic' nature of society; the recognition of difference and inequality, of diversity of function, which the facts force upon us, it is argued, provide a sure and adequate basis for the genuine participation of all citizens in the government of the state. It is, of course, easy to err in the application of this many-edged analogy to human society, and some of Mr. Hobson's conclusions here will appear to many who sympathize with his main tendency, open to dispute. But Mr. Hobson's attempt is full of close thought and stimulating suggestion.

The second part, "Liberalism and Socialism," deals in a systematic way with the connection between democratic ideals and the tendencies known as socialistic, more especially in the form which these tendencies assume in the proposals of liberal reformers at the present day. Mr. Hobson endeavors to show that the realization of even political liberty and equality requires the suppression of the great industrial monopolies, and the recognition of the right of the State so to control the means of production as to secure equality of opportunity for its members. This endeavor to exhibit socialism as the legitimate descendant of liberalism deserves the highest praise: the argument is throughout masterly, and represents with a force which few exponents of reform programs can command, the direction in which the best thought of the age is moving. The reconciliation of the just claims of society and the individual, and the exhibition of their mutual implications, is the great task of the political thought and practice of the future; and to some of the problems involved only the spread of social thought and experience can provide the answer.

The third part of the work, "Applied Democracy," contains a number of discussions of a miscellaneous character, dealing with such topics as "Millionaire Endowments" (of universities), "The Morality of Nations," and "The Social Philosophy of Charity Organization." Never, I should think, have the Whiggish ideas, represented by the Charity Organization Society, been subjected to a criticism so ruinous. A social philosophy, which loftily proclaims its independence of the economic origin of riches and opportunities, is exhibited in all its shallowness and futility. In another essay of this part, "Poverty: Its Causes and Cure," Mr. Hobson writes: "To discover, to assert, and to achieve the claims of economic justice, this is the

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only radical cure for poverty;" and it is this unassailable truth that he opposes to the futile and at bottom insincere empiricism of the C. O. S. "They are simply not the scientific people that they claim to be, for they have not learned to think straight against the pressure of class interests and class prejudices. Let them apply the reasoning by which they condemn indiscriminate charity to all other modes of transfer of property. Let them accurately study the nature of economic bargains in the light afforded by the writings of economists. . . . The spurious antithesis of 'moral' and 'economic' in methods of reform they will [then] reject as a mere piece of rhetorical bluff, recognizing that every well-ordered reform of economic structure is an expression of the moral force of the community, the 'general will' finding embodiment in some stable and serviceable form of social support."

The final essay, "The Task of Reconstruction," deserves special mention in a philosophic journal, though it is difficult in a short space to convey an adequate notion of its contents. It deals with the tendency, which so strongly dominated the later nineteenth century, toward the dispersion, under the guise of 'specialization,' of intellectual pursuit; and points hopefully toward a revival of the synthetic spirit in recent years. Mr. Hobson characterizes this revival as 'realistic,' meaning that its dominant feature is the willingness to face facts and their consequences, in the hope of extracting from them "a practical philosophy of life, while leaving liberty for the uniqueness and waywardness of the individual." As a criticism of the interaction of social and more definitely intellectual forces this essay is of the utmost importance and value.

W. J. ROBERTS.

University College, Cardiff, Wales.

DARWINISM AND MODERN SOCIALISM. By F. W. Headley, F.Z.S. London: Methuen, 1909. Pp. xv, 342.

Mr. Headley has a whole-hearted contempt for socialism and makes no attempt to conceal it. His studies in history and natural science have convinced him that our civilization is the result of competition and natural selection, and he believes that the principles on which our society has been built up are essential

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to its continuance and further progress. Such apparently socialistic organizations as the village community in India or the Russian mir admitted a leaven of competition, and in any case the world is moving steadily away from them. In large and complex societies like our own, collectivism would be sheer madness, paralyzing initiative and discouraging foresight. The history of the human race has been the history of effort, of struggle against difficulties, hardships, and enemies. Socialism is the philosophy of failure. The struggle for existence is a stern, but kindly taskmaster, coercing us into vigor and happiness. The strength of socialism lies in the hardships which the competitive system allows; but these hardships can be removed without throwing individualism out of the window.

Such is the attitude of Mr. Headley. Much of what he says is true and many of his illustrations are sound enough. But one need not be a socialist to feel that the book is too cocksure, and that the treatment of very difficult questions, both of theory and practice, is somewhat superficial. Whether nature and history are such uncompromising champions of the competitive principle as he asserts is a matter of opinion, and the other side of the story has been told with power and learning in Prince Kropotkin's "Mutual Aid." The volume will be useful to beginners as a vigorous presentation of one side in a great controversy; to more advanced students it has little to offer.

G. P. Gooch.

London.

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OXFORD LAW SOCIETY

THE INTERNATIONAL
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JANUARY, 1911.

WILLIAM JAMES AS PHILOSOPHER.

ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY.

WHEN the memory of such a human being as William James is still vivid in the minds of all, and a sense of personal loss is strong in all who ever came under the spell of that large and ardent personality,—which means, in some degree, nearly all who ever read so much as a page of his writing,—the time is hardly suitable for a purely logical and impersonal analysis of his philosophical reasonings. It is not, at any rate, such an analysis that I shall attempt, in acceding to the Editor's request for a paper concerning Professor James and his work. On the other hand, the portrait of the man behind the philosophy, especially in the more intimate relations of colleague and neighbor and familiar friend, must be drawn by those who had the inestimable good fortune of knowing him in those relations. But besides the man and the philosophy, there is the philosopher, the man *in* the philosophy. And it is upon the relation between some of the distinguishing traits of William James's mind and the character of his doctrines that I should like to dwell. The first task which the ending of the work of so highly individual a thinker imposes upon the generation he taught is that of endeavoring to see clearly and justly what manner of man he was as he philosophized, to which of the many real aspects of the world his nature was peculiarly apt to respond, and how the content and the emphases, and also the limitations, of his teaching were

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affected by the special aptitudes of his intellect and by the characteristic temper of his personality.

"Any author," said James somewhere in "A Pluralistic Universe," "is easy if you can catch the centre of his vision." But, whatever the metaphor may imply, it is not to be assumed that the personal vision of a richly endowed mind, singularly sensitive to the variety and complexity of things, will be focused with such clearness and steadiness that its true centre must be at once apparent to casual observation; we need not expect to find such a mind's view of the world a perfectly simple and uncomplicated thing. It is certain that the distinctive traits of James's philosophic outlook are not to be apprehended without some effort of discrimination. There seem to be many who conceive that because he is always easy and delightful to read he must therefore be easy to understand. As a matter of fact, there have been few recent philosophical writers whose meaning it has been so easy to mistake. The qualities which gave to his writing its incomparable vivacity and charm also made it a somewhat uncertain medium for conveying what was, in reality, a tolerably complicated and many-sided, even a rather delicately-balanced, scheme of ideas. This is indicated, though not proven, by the frequency with which of late years James had occasion to complain of radical misunderstandings on the part of other philosophers not sharing his views. Some of this may have been due to the inherent elusiveness of philosophical conceptions as such, some of it to what James described as an innate "inability almost pathetic" of some of his critics to understand him; but some of it also must, it seems clear, be ascribed to certain difficulties in the exposition. There was, indeed, in James's philosophic teaching nothing that need remain a fathomless mystery to anyone who would consent to compare one part of that teaching with another, to reflect with a little patience upon the meaning of the whole,—and to refrain from a meticulous literalism in construing occasional detached passages in which

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the vehemence of the philosopher's temperament had led him to overstate his own case, or his generosity had led him to make too liberal concessions to his adversaries. But the concreteness of his mode of expression and the ardent and impetuous rush of his thought gave to many of his readers the impression that, with *this* philosopher, at least, all such precautions were unnecessary. He who ran, therefore, might—and did—read the author of "Pragmatism" abundantly; but he was not unlikely to read amiss, to suppose the doctrine to be a good deal simpler and more unambiguous than it was.

The needfulness of some circumspection in interpreting James is, again, illustrated by the diversity of types of philosopher which he has been supposed to be, and the corresponding diversity of tendencies of opinion to which, by his writings, he gave—or has been declared to give—aid and comfort. He has been taken for a hard-headed utilitarian, the embodiment of the supposed 'American spirit' of calculating practicality, who would reduce divine philosophy to a meager *Nützlichkeitskrämerei;* and he has been taken for the initiator of a new movement of religious mysticism, who would find a fresh basis for theology in the realities of inner spiritual experience. An influential English religious leader rejects pragmatism as inadequate because he has always "thought of it as the expression on the side of philosophy of the habit of mind engendered by the inductive method and the empiricism of modern science"; a French critic rejects pragmatism because "it means that we can at our leisure deny all science." And as James's doctrine repelled different men for opposite reasons, so it attracted different men for opposite reasons. Many 'naturalistic' men of science found satisfaction in his philosophy because it seemed to some of them simply a generalization of the method of scientific positivism, or to others simply an application of Darwinism to the definition of truth; and many troubled clergymen found satisfaction in his philosophy because it seemed to them to issue to

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everybody a general license to believe what he liked or found 'helpful' and to establish his belief upon whatever he might be pleased to call a judgment of value, without too much deference to either logical canons or physical facts. All this cannot, without analysis, be assumed to imply any internal inconsistency in James's own doctrine; but it at any rate implies, if not a many-sidedness, at least a several-sidedness, in his thought. And the problem remains of determining his characteristic personal position and real sympathies amid these diversities of tendency. It might, perhaps, appear sufficient to say that the personally distinctive thing was the catholicity which led him to unify—or to seek to unify—these diverse elements into a single philosophy. There would be some truth in such an observation; but there would also be something misleading. There have been a number of philosophers in the past who have been temperamental peace-makers, determined to make the lion and the lamb lie down together harmoniously in their systems, anxious somehow to find room there for all the tendencies of opinion that normally arise among men. Leibniz was such a philosopher, Hegel in a different way was another. And to such philosophers it not unnaturally happens that their systems, in the hands of their disciples, break up again into the original diversity and discord of their elements. But William James was by temperament no lover either of amiable compromises or of higher syntheses; in matters of belief, as in affairs,—so he wrote in a characteristic early paper,—we are ever confronted with "mutually exclusive alternatives, of which only one can be true at once. The wrench is absolute: 'Either—or!' "

The tendency of James's mode of self-expression to convey certain false impressions, not only about his opinions but about himself, *quâ* philosopher, is in nothing more strikingly shown than in a widely prevalent conception concerning his manner of arriving at his philosophy. He has, of course, done much to give currency

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to the idea that any philosopher's doctrines are wholly predetermined by the idiosyncrasies of his personal taste in universes. He has repeatedly observed that the really illuminating thing to ask about any philosophy is not on what professed 'grounds' its author believes it to be true, but why he wishes it to be true. In one of his latest volumes he declared that "the history of philosophy largely bears out" the saying of an eighteenth century writer, that reason was given to men chiefly "to enable them to find reasons for what they *want* to think and do." With such passages in mind, Mr. J. A. Hobson has dubbed pragmatism the "go-as-you-please philosophy." The natural inference has been drawn by many, from the same passages, that the inventor of pragmatism was a go-as-you-please philosopher, caring little how his conclusions were arrived at, if only they were in themselves 'satisfactory.' But the fact,—patent to everyone who will read James's last two volumes in their entirety,—is that there has probably been no philosopher in our time,—indeed, I can think of but few since Kant,—who reached his eventual doctrinal position through a longer or more patient struggle with purely logical difficulties, after a more honest submission to the leading of the argument as he understood it. The stages in James's approach to his final view,—which he reached only in his sixties, after at least thirty years of pretty steady philosophical reading and reflection,—are marked by the solution of definite problems or the elimination of specific false premises; the intervening periods seem to have been filled with painful but undiscouraged flounderings amid unresolved antinomies. James even seems (by his own account, which probably is, characteristically, a little too generous) to have owed the discovery of the way through, at each critical transition, to the insights of others. Thus his revulsion from absolute idealism is arrested for a time by an argument of a younger colleague which he sees no way of controverting; nine years later an article by a friend and former pupil shows him that

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this argument is not so cogent as it had seemed.[1] For many years, again, his principal objection to idealistic monism lay in a difficulty based upon grounds of purely 'intellectualist' logic: the difficulty of conceiving how "many consciousnesses can be at one and the same time one consciousness." "I had," he writes, "yielded to these objections against my 'will to believe' out of pure logical scrupulosity. The absolutists, professing to loathe the will to believe and to follow purest rationality, had simply ignored the objections. . . . My own conscience would permit me no such license." Yet the rationality gained by loyalty to this 'intellectualist' principle seemed to be at the cost of irrationality at other points. "Sincerely and patiently as I could, I struggled with the problem for years, covering hundreds of sheets of paper with notes and memoranda and discussions with myself over the difficulty." Finally Bergson, as James conceived, revealed to him the possibility of cutting the Gordian knot.

This tenacious and laborious (even if frequently confused) thinker it is who has been supposed to be the embodiment of intellectual self-pleasing and logical irresponsibility; an eminent English writer has said of him that "abstract argumentation appeared to him futile, and subjects which require it were therefore uncongenial to him. His mind worked by flashes of brilliant insight." In spite of all the hard sayings that may be quoted from him against "abstract argumentation," James in fact devoted much the greater part of his life to precisely that employment; and, on the more fundamental and technical philosophic questions, at least, his "brilliant flashes" were associated with arduous efforts of analytical reasoning. So far may a man's way of expressing his convictions give a false impression of the processes which he has gone through before arriving at those convictions. Whatever be thought of the actual consistency and ten-

[1] "The Meaning of Truth," p. 22.

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ability of James's opinions, it is the simple truth that few philosophers have ever tried to play the game more fairly, with less evasion of troublesome objections, with less haste to arrive at a 'system' by illicit short-cuts. His seriousness and good faith as a philosopher are, again, shown by his exceptionally wide reading in *contemporary* philosophy, by his readiness at all times to enter the lists of technical disputation in behalf of his opinions, and by his willingness to modify the details of his doctrines, to supplement or to qualify them, in response to criticism. At an age when he was entitled to enter upon the ease of the veteran, and after he had come to be in the eyes of the world the foremost intellectual figure in America, and the most widely read of English-speaking philosophers, he continued not merely to write philosophy but,—what is a very different thing,—to philosophize; he would cross lances on equal terms with the youngest dialectician of them all, and,—though often impatient and a little irritated at what he (perhaps too hastily) regarded as wanton miscomprehension,—he accepted correction, when he could see its pertinency, from any quarter, not only cheerfully, but with the handsomest acknowledgments. To some eminent philosophers a system, once shaped and polished, has served chiefly as a pedestal whereon they might mount, to stand there as their own monuments,—in dignified immobility, undisturbed by the current controversies of the philosophic forum round about them. James was incapable of enjoying the monumental posture; he bore his part in the *mêlée* to the last.

It is to be observed, moreover, that James's final philosophy on its practically most significant side,—his personal religious hypothesis,—was avowedly *not* perfectly satisfying to all the cravings of religious feeling; it was not arbitrarily put together so as to embrace all the propositions which it were congenial to human nature to believe, but was the product of a deliberate choice between alternatives recognized as logically exclusive of

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one another. A 'finite God' or gods exercising a restricted power,—a struggle of this Power, and of our hopes and ideals, against inexplicable obstructions,—but a fair fighting chance of victory, a working probability that they that be for us are stronger than they that be against us:—this dualistic religious philosophy is not the creed of one who would have scorned to let a little matter of logical consistency stand in the way of the gratification of his religious cravings. James, it is true, was one of those minds that care more that the fight be genuine and strenuous,—and therefore of not wholly predetermined outcome,—than that the triumph be assured; to whose spiritual taste a universe without the biting tang of real risk would seem flat and unpalatable. But he was not insusceptible to the other moods of religious feeling: to the pleasures of the "moral holiday" enjoyable at will by the healthy-minded optimist who believes that because God's in his heaven, *all's* well with the world; to the subtler ecstasy in the mystic's sense of utter oneness with the Infinite One. What is significant about James is that, with an exceptional sensitiveness to all these phases of religious emotion, his logical scrupulosity forbade his fashioning an ontology which should profess to justify them all. And in this he shows a degree of intellectual integrity extremely rare among those philosophers of the nineteenth century who have shown any sensitiveness at all to the religious emotions. The English Hegelians, in particular, ostensible and even ostentatious rationalists though they have been, have nearly always shown an insatiable determination to eat their cake and have it too; have insisted upon combining thorough-going optimism with moral seriousness (than which no two things are logically more incongruous), a sort of evolutionism with the assertion of the perfection and timelessness of ultimate reality, monism with the freedom and responsibility of the individual, a theistic backing for our moral preferences with a conception of the Absolute which makes that entity a mere unselective summary of all the

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empirical facts that have turned out or may turn out to exist. James's actual example as a philosopher,—whatever be said of some of his detached utterances,—so far from being an incitement to this sort of spiritual promiscuity, is a standing protest against it. He heard and obeyed, as few so many-sided and abundant natures have obeyed, the voice of that jealous god, the Understanding, with its constant demand for a choice between incompatible alternatives, its 'Choose ye this day whom ye will serve!'

To say, however, that James's philosophical conclusions were not reached without much persistent, open-minded, and intellectually scrupulous reasoning, is not to represent his philosophy as a mere impersonal product ground out by the automatic working of dialectical machinery upon a given mass of raw material. All philosophies,—and it is this that makes the study of the history of philosophy the richest and the most typically humane of the humanities,—are the result of the interaction of a temperament (itself partly moulded by a historic situation) with impersonal logical considerations arising out of the nature of the problems with which man's reason is confronted. Even the most rigorous reasoner must needs have premises; and not even the most conscientious reasoner is likely to see all the premises that there are which are pertinent to so large an argument as that concerning the general nature of things. What each sees will depend upon his personal vision. The impersonal 'necessities of thought,' or seeming necessities, by which epistemologies and ontologies are actuated, are not, as they at first present themselves to different minds, manifest parts of a single scheme; perhaps they may ultimately be harmonized, but primarily they are quite distinct; and one type of mind will seize first upon one, another upon another, for the motive power for its speculative machinery. The fact, then, that William James's philosophy was attained through 'objective' reflection upon the logical issues involved in the

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problems with which he dealt, does not imply that it was not also in large measure an expression of the traits of his personality. There were, in fact, two or three characteristics of his mind which gave to his reasonings their starting-point and their lines of direction, and thus went far to predetermine the character of his doctrine. These several tendencies, however, when reflectively developed, led to results not always harmonious with one another. A certain degree of inner discord must be recognized in the original predispositions of his thought, which accounts both for the nature of some of the logical difficulties with which he found occasion to grapple in the course of his reflection and for some residual incongruities which, as it seems to me, remained even in the outcome.

It is perhaps not altogether fanciful to see in that species of elusiveness which, as has been said, belongs to James's style as a writer, a manifestation of the same tendency of mind which constituted the most characteristic and remarkable trait in his endowment as a philosopher. His doctrine is sometimes easy to misapprehend from precisely the same cause which makes his writing easy to read,—and from just the contrary cause to that which often makes Kant's writing hard either to read or to apprehend. Kant, it has sometimes been said, tried to crowd his whole system into each sentence that he wrote, in fear lest the numerous considerations supplementing and qualifying the point which he was at the moment expounding should be even transiently forgotten by his readers. James, on the contrary, was himself prone, in his enthusiasm for the point which he was at the moment expounding, to forget the qualifying considerations which he elsewhere plainly enough acknowledged or even emphatically affirmed. It cannot, I suppose, be denied that he was likely sometimes to overstate the truth immediately before his mind, especially if it seemed to him a truth that had been shabbily treated, a deserving philosophical waif that had been arrogantly

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turned away from the doors of all the respectable and established doctrines. To adversaries who were disposed to make the most of his detached utterances he thus offered many an opening for plausible criticisms which yet were, in reality, beside the mark as criticisms of his real—and not unascertainable—meaning. But if this peculiarity of his manner of exposition sometimes aroused unjustified opposition to his doctrines, it also, probably, gave to his doctrines,—or, at any rate, to pragmatism,—a certain appearance of sensational novelty that was not wholly justified either. When the pragmatist formulas about the meaning of concepts or the criteria of truth were set down with all of their qualifying and explanatory clauses explicitly attached to them, they proved to be a good deal less startling and revolutionary than they at first looked; and pragmatism appeared to be not very much more than what its author frankly and modestly called it, "a new name for some old ways of thinking." The assertion, for example, that the true is "the satisfactory," or that which "gives the maximal combination of satisfactions," naturally seemed (according to one's temperament) a repellent or an engaging paradox; but when it turned out that there are certain "theoretic" satisfactions and "logical demands" which may, when we are bent upon truth, claim precedence of all others, the paradox seemed to have deflated almost to the shape of a platitude. Much of James's argumentation for pragmatism seems to me to have consisted in repeatedly moving back and forth from the one aspect of that doctrine to the other, first stating the formula *simpliciter,* in its paradoxical guise, then,—especially under the challenge of criticism,—indicating the qualifications and amplifications which he had meant to be tacitly understood from the start. This procedure, however, was certainly not a rhetorical artifice on his part; he always seemed, indeed, to be a little bewildered and vexed by the bewilderment which it caused in some other men's minds. It was, I cannot but think, one manifesta-

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tion (in itself a not wholly fortunate manifestation) of that quality of mind which fitted and predestined him to be the great spokesman of pluralism in philosophy. Just as the Kantian or Hegelian type of philosophic mind cannot bear to let the individual proposition stand by itself, but must ever modify and attenuate and sublate it through its relation to other propositions, so James could not quite bear to spoil the sharpness and distinctness, the actual individualness, of the individual proposition by immediately huddling it up in the qualifications and provisos and related considerations which he none the less was prepared to recognize on occasion. For though he was very far from blind to the relatedness and reciprocal implications of things, he was also, almost beyond any recorded philosopher, sensitive to the actual aspects of separateness and uniqueness in them; he was not one who believed that any real entity or real truth can be defined wholly in terms of the sum of its relations to other entities or other truths.

There is a quality of physical perception which painters, who much desiderate it, are, I believe, accustomed to call 'purity of eye.' To most of us red is red and blue is blue; and the brick wall yonder, once recognized as a red brick wall, shows to our perception thereafter pretty much the same unvarying shade. But (we are told) to the eye that has retained, or through systematic training has in some degree recaptured, the primitive responsiveness to the actual diversity of color stimuli, even a red wall is scarcely twice quite the same,—but all day long moves through an exquisitely graduated and astonishingly wide gamut of shifting hues. William James brought, not to the physical world, but to human nature and the world of ideas, the artist's freshness and purity of vision. He came to each concrete bit of existence with an unspoiled power of *seeing* the thing as it was, in its unique 'differentness' from other things. Man's ability to classify the objects of his experience is assuredly a convenient faculty; but it also makes for the blunting of

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his perceptions,—since, for most of us, to recognize an object as belonging to a familiar class is forthwith to become more or less inattentive to all the characteristics of the object beyond those few flat, hackneyed, generalized ones which enable us to identify the class; it is often, also, to assume that the similarity of the particular object to the rest of the class extends farther than it really does. James's genius lay chiefly in this, that he had by nature,—and retained undiminished to the end of his life, —an extraordinary immunity to the deadening influence of those intellectual processes of classification and generalization in which, in one form or another, scientific and philosophical reasoning largely consist. He kept an unweakened sense for the particularity of the particular, —a sense which the occupations of the philosophical system-builder ordinarily tend in a peculiar degree to atrophy. Thus he was always prepared to see in each individual person, each separate fact, each immediately present aspect of experience, even in each distinct logical category, something unique, unshared, irreducible, ineffably individuated. And toward each new, not-yet-fully-examined fact he always maintained an attitude of liberal expectancy; because it was enough like certain other facts to be classified with them was no reason for assuming that it might not, if given a fair chance, develop wholly novel and admirable qualities and potencies of its own. Uniformities were to be recognized so far as they actually exhibited themselves; but they were not to be allowed wholly to prejudice the case of "the unclassified residuum"; and it was in the unclassified residuum that James's greater interest lay. He was thus predestined by the possession of what may be called a particularistic mind to be a pluralistic philosopher.

Here, no doubt, more nearly than in any other single point of view, lies the centre of William James's personal vision. The temper of mind which I have tried to indicate appeared in his character as a social being as plainly as in his tendencies as a philosopher; as truly in

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his attitude toward his fellows as in his attitude toward the universe. The most large-hearted and tender-hearted of men, he showed the characteristic quality of his generosity not so much in his bestowal of material kindnesses,—large and constant and delicately considerate though those were,—as in his unquenchable *interest* in all sorts and conditions of individuals, his whole-hearted appreciation of other men's qualities, and his indefatigable encouragement of their work. This interest in others was not at all the generalized and regularized benevolence of the philosophical 'altruist,' loving mankind in the abstract upon principle; it was not the interest of the moralist, sedulous to edify and to improve; it was only in part the interest of the sympathetic hedonist, rejoicing in the spectacle of the happiness of others or pained at their griefs. It was essentially the interest of a lover of human nature in the concrete and of the richness of its individual manifestations,—especially of the diversity of its intellectual-emotional reactions upon the data of experience. James's capacity for admiration of the intellectual performances of others was astonishing in its range and in its heartiness; not only his old pupils, but utter strangers, neglected Spinozas of the ghetto or Hegels budding unobserved in provincial newspapers, were likely at any moment to receive a letter, or one of his characteristic post-cards, with a few, or sometimes many, words of heartening applause,—applause often too liberal, but not undiscriminating,—evoked by the reading of some piece of work that seemed to him to have in it something of freshness or individuality. The least sign of the emergence in American philosophy, or, indeed, anywhere, of a mind having a quality of its own, possessing novel or distinctive and strongly-marked powers, caused in him a joy like that of a man who had found the pearl of great price. I can even recall once hearing him exclaim with admiring wonder over some examination-papers of Harvard undergraduates which he had been reading. It was not that those productions as a rule

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betrayed any extraordinary familiarity on the part of their authors with the subjects with which they were supposed to deal. But the ready ingenuity of these American youth who could, upon so slender a basis of actual acquaintance with the matter in hand, fill so many pages of blue-book with stuff so plausible,—and often conveying such surprising novelties even of misapprehension,—that, to James, was after all a delightful and not altogether unadmirable manifestation of the possibilities of the human mind. All this generosity in appreciation, no doubt, sometimes led him into extravagances; originality was, to him, a mantle that sometimes covered completely a rather great multitude of sins. But this "characteristic excess" of James's was not only the excess characteristic of a singularly magnanimous mind; it was also the excess of a mind singularly alert to the real differences, the personal and unique traits of the reactions upon life of other minds. Even where he could not share or directly sympathize with those reactions, they had, if honest and serious and not illiberal, scarcely less value in his eyes.

It is, of course, a natural consequence of this that one of the two traits by which James's more directly ethical writings are chiefly distingushed is an exceptionally vivid feeling for the underived and intrinsic value of almost all distinctive and spontaneous manifestations of human nature, the indefeasible validity of each personal point of view not itself merely negative and destructive of others, the inner significance *for itself,* when lived simply and heartily, of every separate pulse of vital experience. This gospel had been, in a different fashion, powerfully preached before James preached it, by Whitman and by Stevenson,—two lay moralists who, by reason of natural affinity of mind, seem to have influenced him not a little. In the domain of practical ethics the most characteristic thing, as it seems to me, that James ever wrote is the essay "On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings," the kernel of which consists in certain very happily chosen

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passages from those writers. But to him, since he was not simply a lay moralist but a philosopher, the teachings of that essay were merely one practical application of a more general way of thinking. He himself took pains in the preface to the volume containing the essay to insist upon the larger implications of the ideas expressed in it:

> The address 'On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings' . . . is more than the mere piece of sentimentalism which it may seem to some readers. It connects itself with a definite view of the world and of our moral relations to the same, . . . I mean the pluralistic or individualistic philosophy. According to that philosophy, the truth is too great for any one actual mind, even though that mind be dubbed 'the Absolute,' to know the whole of it. . . . There is no point of view absolutely public and universal. Private and incommunicable perceptions always remain over, and the worst of it is that those who look at them only from the outside never know *where*.

In this passage is manifest the very process of transition in James's thought from the intense feeling for the individual and the particular characteristic of the innermost temper of his mind to the generalization and formulation of that feeling in a metaphysical doctrine. On the practical side,—to dwell for a moment longer upon that aspect of the pluralistic spirit,—the outcome of this characteristic of James's was that, whenever occasion arose, he always stood as the champion of a "democratic respect for the sacredness of individuality" and of "the outward tolerance of whatever is not itself intolerant." To these phrases, now become somewhat empty and ineffective through much vain repetition, he sought to restore "a passionate inner meaning." It was almost inevitable that one of this temper, in facing the especially difficult contemporary casuistical problem of the treatment of the backward by the 'civilized' races, should be a stout anti-imperialist. He once exclaimed in a certain amazed impatience over the inability of most 'Anglo-Saxons' to see that these 'new-caught, sullen peoples' "really had insides of their own." The consideration from which he could himself never escape was that all manner of individuated entities,—races, persons, ideas,

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types of religious experience,—have "insides of their own" never wholly to be identified with any aspect which they may present on the outside; that "no one elementary bit of reality is eclipsed from the next bit's point of view, if only we take reality sensibly and in small enough pulses."

There are, however, it is worth while to note, certain tendencies in modern thought, two or three different phases of individualism, to which these pluralistic preconceptions of James's might seem to point, but into which they did not in fact carry him. The special *differentiæ* of his own sort of "individualistic philosophy" ought not to be overlooked. One familiar type of pluralism in recent philosophy, for example, has been the monadism, or "multi-personal idealism," represented by such writers as Renouvier, Thomas Davidson, Mr. Sturt, Professor Howison, and, in his earlier phase, Mr. E. D. Fawcett. These men, too, may be said to have developed the spirit of democracy into a metaphysics; for them also there is no single centre of reality that is "absolutely public and universal," and "the facts and truths of life need many cognizers to take them in." But the metaphysics of James can hardly be described as a monadology. The motives which lead to that sort of pluralism he did not, for the most part, strongly feel; and the pluralistic inclinations which he did feel did not seem to him to lead to just that sort of pluralism. The independence of the action of each human self from all external causation,—its 'cut-off' character and its consequent personal responsibility,—and idea which has, for example, presented itself to Professor Howison very forcibly, was to James hardly a congenial idea. This was partly because his pluralism was combined in his mind with another tendency yet to be mentioned,—his 'temporalism.' He was,—if I may so put it,—more essentially a 'length-wise' than a 'cross-wise' pluralist; it was primarily and more frequently the uniqueness and the creative efficacy of the passing phases in each flowing

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stream of consciousness that he had in mind, rather than the timeless discreteness and inaccessibility to external influences of any windowless monads.[2] Discreteness, indeed, was not a category under which it was easy for his mind to represent any concrete entity; though he was, as has been said, peculiarly ready to recognize qualitative diversity and a certain incommensurability in things, it was also highly characteristic of him to think of them as imperceptibly passing into one another and in constant interplay with one another, as somehow immersed, though never dissolved, in a larger stream of being, from which a constant endosmosis takes place. How far this combination of a special sensitiveness to the unique individuating differences of things with a strong disposition (shown in a predilection for metaphors drawn from the properties of fluids) to think in terms of a continuum, led to actual contradiction in James's philosophy, I do not here wish to discuss; but it was, I think, the combination distinctive of his personal type of pluralism, especially in its later manifestations.

Just this combination, however, might perhaps have been expected to produce certain other tendencies of thought in James, to which, once more, he did not in any exceptional degree incline. On the side of his appreciative attitudes, for example,—his moral and æsthetic likings and dislikings,—it might have led to that exaggeration of catholicity in sympathy and admiration which, as it showed itself in a Whitman, amounted to virtual indifferentism, to the professed feeling that each aspect and fragment of reality, as it happens to turn up, is as good as any other—and a bit better; or that, if any choice at all is to be made, the preference must always go to mere bigness or mere intensity of emotion. This 'democratic' spirit towards the diverse elements of human life, as they are manifested in one's self or in others, this doctrine of

[2] It is perhaps proper to mention that, in a letter to the writer, Professor James himself once adopted this antithesis: "I would also call myself a length-wise pluralist."

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the intrinsic equality of all the phases of existence, is, unless off-set by other tendencies, hardly likely to promote the fighter's temper or the reformer's zeal. But from this large, loose, and sprawling attitude of unselective acceptance of things, James was delivered by certain complementary features of his temperament. He had, indeed, as has been sufficiently remarked, an extraordinarily wide capacity for appreciation and sympathy; his first impulse, in the presence of a novel type of fact or person, was to seek to understand and to admire. But he had also a somewhat choleric nature. He had not many, but he had a few strong, temperamental aversions and disgusts; Plato's "spirited part of the soul" was highly developed in him. His tolerance,—as a phrase I have already quoted from him intimates,—did not extend to the toleration of intolerance; anything that savored of cruelty, overbearance, narrowness, awoke in him a hot indignation; for soft and relaxed ways of thinking and ways of living he had a keen dislike; and for overblown intellectual pretense and the spiritual emptiness of a great part of the world's respectabilities he had a penetrating vision and a humorous contempt. Various and intense as was his response to the manifold interestingness of existence, great as was his power to find value in things commonly unconsidered or despised, life presented itself to him, in the last analysis, in a dualistic, a Manichæan, guise,—as a field of combat rather than as merely a source for the promiscuous enrichment of experience or an object of undiscriminating æsthetic appreciation. With all the exceptional breadth and geniality of his nature, there remained a touch of Puritan austerity in him. He had a temperamental need of a certain hardness and opposition in his environment. The world he found a place in which a man is imperatively called upon to take sides.

Nor is there in this any real incongruity with that catholic sense for the distinctive quality of each particular phase of reality, which was his dominant character-

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istic. The dualistic aspect, the fighting edge, in James's view of life, was rather an evidence of his power of recognizing real differences. For the very essence of the inwardness of certain items of existence is their antagonism to certain other items. To accept and affirm all reality and call it good, is after all to deny some parts of it; for the inner meaning of some parts lies in their negations. To sympathize equally with powers bent upon the destruction of one another, to be on the side of both Ormuzd and Ahriman, to be one with the red slayer and the slain—is in reality to fail to understand the "inside" aspect of either. The attempt to harmonize such opposites can commend itself only to minds whose vision for the inner distinctiveness of other individual existences has become at least a little blurred through the habit of thinking of things in lumps, who rise so easily to 'higher points of view' that they quite forget that the higher point never truly reveals the observed object's situation as it appears at the object's own level. James's position with respect to the problem of evil was thus a manifestation of that same trait of his nature which was also the source of his pluralistic tendencies. At least some evils,—the sufferings of animals, for example, or certain monstrosities of moral perversion,—seemed to him simply intrinsically and irreducibly bad. They may be triumphed over, they may even be made instrumental to good; but the badness that was in them can never be *aufgehoben*, nullified, or even perfectly compensated. Readers of "The Varieties of Religious Experience" must recall the nightmare-like horror of a passage in which James's extraordinary sense for the reality of the individual is turned upon this aspect of the world:

> Our civilization is founded upon the shambles, and every individual existence goes out in a lonely spasm of helpless agony. If you protest, my friend, wait until you arrive there yourself! To believe in the carnivorous reptiles of geologic time is hard for our imaginations,—they seem too much like mere museum specimens. Yet there is no tooth in any one of those museum-skulls that did not daily through long years of the foretime hold fast to the body struggling in despair of some fated living victim. Forms

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of horror just as dreadful to their victims, if on a smaller spatial scale, fill the world about us to-day. Here on our very hearths and in our gardens the infernal cat plays with the panting mouse, or holds the hot bird fluttering in her jaws. Crocodiles and rattlesnakes and pythons are at this moment vessels of life as real as we are; their loathsome existence fills every minute of every day that drags its length along; and whenever they or other wild beasts clutch their living prey, the deadly horror which an agitated melancholiac feels is the literally right reaction on the situation.

This, as a reading of animal psychology, is perhaps somewhat overdrawn; but the passage is singularly typical of the vividness in James of what a psychologist might call the ejective imagination. When things of this sort are once seen as palpitating individuated facts there is nothing to be done, James wrote in one of his early essays, but to cry out against all such aspects of reality Carlyle's "Everlasting No." James has sometimes been compared to Emerson,—chiefly for the reason that the two have been the most influential American writers on philosophical themes, and the only two who have had a wide international hearing. But in one important respect James is the antithesis to Emerson. That bland disregard for "those unconcerning things, matters of fact," which has been said to be the root of Emerson's optimism, was impossible to a man with James's type of vision. And since this pleasant Emersonian near-sightedness has become, in certain quarters, a contagious and a noxious spiritual disease, it is fortunate that from the original centre of that infection so potent a corrective has of late been dispensed. James was, to be sure, no pessimist; and the sort of utterance that I have last quoted was never the last word with him. But it expressed a side of the real world which he was convinced was not to be denied nor rationalized away. And the universe could therefore never appear to him, in any final reckoning, as wholly good or as rational through-and-through, but rather as of a mixed character; and above all, of a character largely yet to be formed. That process of formation involved, to his mind, purgation and elimination as well as enlargement and enrich-

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ment. And both results depended for their realization in great, perhaps in a decisive, measure upon the present and future loyalty of human agents to the not-yet-attained ideals which they mysteriously find within themselves,—to "the demands which the self of one day makes on the self of another," to the "imperative goods" whose "nature it is to be cruel to their rivals."

These last considerations, however, already bring to mind a second (not wholly separate) characteristic trait of James's personal mode of apprehension of reality,—the only other such characteristic which it will be possible to consider here.[3] He was one of those in our day who have most fully and clearly realized that the primary peculiarity of conscious experience is its flowing, temporally successive character; that this 'time of inner experience' is a unique *quality* of existence, not to be re-

[3] It would have been worth while, if space had permitted, to note the influence of James's 'particularistic' sort of intellectual vision in some of his more special and technical metaphysical doctrines,—especially in his earlier view (which, for reasons briefly indicated later in this paper, he eventually abandoned) of the impossibility of 'compounding' states of consciousness, and in his logical theory of the 'externality of relations' which seems to have had an important part in the development of the 'new realism.' But these matters, in any case, lie somewhat aside from the special province of this journal. There was a third strain in James's thought,—less potent, yet significant,—which should at least be mentioned: the nominalistic and simplifying temper, the desire to translate abstractions into "concrete particulars of somebody's experience," the demand for the rigorous elimination of all obscure and redundant notions. On one side of him, James continued the succession of the great British nominalistic empiricists, the prophets of the law of intellectual parsimony, such as William of Ockham, Berkeley, Hume. In certain moods of his reflection he became, incongruously, very much what the French call an *esprit simpliste*. Thus he seeks to reduce the concepts of 'God,' 'freedom,' and 'immortality' to their "positive experienceable operation" and so finds that "they all mean the same thing, *viz.*, the presence of 'promise' in the world." This trait is not strictly contradictory to James's dominant characteristic; it is rather the negative side of the same sense for concrete, particularized reality. Yet it tended, unquestionably, to work against the pluralistic spirit; for it naturally predisposes to the nullification of real differences and the too speedy reduction of multiplicity to unity. James's 'particularism' gave birth to two children, the pluralistic and the nominalistic tendency; and these two sometimes came to be at variance in his mind.

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duced to anything else nor described in terms of anything else; and that no philosophy can be adequate which virtually ignores (as most of the historic philosophies have ignored) the primacy of the temporal quality of experience as a starting-point for the interpretation of the nature of reality and the meaning of truth. Readers of James's earliest philosophical essays must already have seen what aspect of human existence, what sort of moment in life, presented itself to him as the central and illuminating fact, the point at which we have reason to suppose that the inner nature of reality is most directly revealed to us. This is the moment in which a man looks before and after, faces the future *as* future, and knows that that future, as yet a field of alternative possibilities, is to be defined and shaped, that certain of those alternatives are to be forever shut out from real existence, by the decision now in process of forming itself in his mind. Now, just as the methods and preoccupations of both science and philosophy have tended to lead thought away from the particular to the generalized, so they have tended to lead thought away from the truly temporal,—from the uniqueness of the unprecedented and unrepeatable single moment in the time-flow,—to fix it upon the eternal or the immutable or the identically recurrent. Logic has been interested in changeless concepts, metaphysics in the absolute and eternal, science in unvarying laws, in qualitatively immutable 'primary' properties of bodies, in quantitatively constant sums of matter and energy, in 'causes' conceived as capable of presenting themselves as the 'same' over and over again in perfect indifference to mere diversities of date as such. Except by certain idealistic metaphysicians, the reality of time has not been denied; but most that makes up the actual temporality of time and its significance in our inner experience has been commonly disregarded, not only by philosophy and science, but even by theology and religion. James's vision of the distinctiveness and the validity of the 'particular' point of view was complemented by an equally

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keen sense of the validity and the distinctiveness of the temporal point of view. And his task as a philosopher was that of stirring up his contemporaries to do justice to these two primary yet neglected aspects of existence.

This 'temporalism' showed itself in a number of items of James's philosophy, though, until he became interested in the work of Bergson, he hardly seems to have been so explicitly conscious of the decisive part it played in his own thinking as he was of that played by his pluralistic preconceptions. It was already apparent, however, in the "Psychology," and in some of his early untechnical essays of more than twenty-five years ago. The core of the "Psychology," and the part of it having the most general theoretical significance, lay in the chapter on "the stream of consciousness"; and that chapter (which contains the germ of a very considerable part of James's subsequent philosophy), together with the chapter on "the sense of time," was primarily an attempt to penetrate by means of an introspective analysis,—as Bergson in his earliest work was at the same time seeking to penetrate,—to the essential *differentia* of our time-experience. James's chief originality as an empirical psychologist lay in his emphasis upon the transitive character of mental states and his abandonment of all 'static' psychological elements. In him, again, as in Bergson, the predominance of the temporal point of view led at once to the affirmation of a somewhat new form of indeterminism and to more or less new arguments for it. The "Dilemma of Determinism," for example, expresses primarily these contentions (though they are, perhaps, not wholly disentangled from other considerations): that, if two alternatives present themselves as equally possible before a choice is made, it is pure dogmatism to say that this beforehand view of the facts is any less valid than the *post factum* view which regards all save the *fait accompli* as *having been* impossible,—since the two views are merely the natural products of two different temporal

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situations; that, further, if we are to ask which view is the truer, the one which exhibits to us more correctly the nature of things, we have reason to give the preference to the beforehand view, since not only the whole meaning of our active life, but also the one legitimate escape from a pessimistic despair of the universe, depend upon the maintenance of the absolute distinction between the possible and the necessary and of the reality of possibilities which are yet *mere* possibilities. In the same essay James vigorously attacked the neo-Hegelian conception of a timeless, all-knowing mind, and made the pregnant remark that "to say that time is an illusory appearance is only a round-about manner of saying that there is no real plurality, and that the frame of things is an absolute unit. *Admit plurality, and time may be its form.*"

Pragmatism itself, though it was many other things also, was primarily epistemological temporalism. It proposed to define 'meaning' and 'truth' in terms of intertemporal relations between successive phases of experience. They had usually been defined in terms which either ignored temporal distinctions of before and after or expressly professed to transcend all such distinctions. Some sort of 'cross-wise' relation had been taken to constitute the nature of truth,—some correspondence of a judgment with its object or with the eternal knowledge of an absolute intelligence; James undertook to make the whole matter one of 'length-wise' relations. A judgment made by a human being, he insisted, is always and essentially an act of a creature standing at a specific moment in the time-flow, facing the future, preparing in some way for that future by means of the activity of judging, and himself moving forward into the future even while he judges. So greatly, indeed, was James impressed by this aspect of the judging-process, that he occasionally seemed to forget the fact that the past and the simultaneous are also phases of the temporal, and that it obviously will not do to define the import of a

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judgment or the nature of truth in a way which prevents judgments from truly referring to these phases,—which tries to metamorphose the whole meaning of pastness and contemporaneity into pure futurity. The passages in which James expresses himself to this effect must, I think, be regarded as exaggerations and partial misapprehensions of his own insight into the significance for epistemology of the temporal and mainly forward-facing and anticipatory character of our thinking. But it does not belong to the purpose of this paper to enter into a discussion of pragmatism. As illustrations of James's temporalistic way of envisaging things his over-statements of his insight are even more pertinent than any more qualified expression of it.

It was, finally, through his own and through Bergson's reflections upon the paradoxes involved in the nature of temporal process that James was chiefly led to that extreme form of 'anti-intellectualism' which characterized his final phase,—to the doctrine of the radical incongruity between 'conceptual thought' and the nature of reality as immediately apprehended in our time-consciousness. This outcome of his temporalism seems to me to imply a rather striking departure from one of the earliest manifestations of his pluralism. At the beginning of his career he was the most vigorous of representatives of the good old eighteenth-century respect for the principle of contradiction, which Hegelianism seemed to be undermining. The categories and fundamental notions of our mind were each distinct and unsublated; they did *not* become "their own others." Again, states of consciousness of two finite centres could not be metaphysically compounded so as to make one unified consciousness. But in the later chapters of "A Pluralistic Universe" James seemed to recant the logical doctrine of the essay "On Some Hegelisms" and to imply that reality may be, not merely opaque to the intellect, but even self-contradictory. It should be said, however, that this

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matter James seems to have regarded as not definitively clarified and formulated in his own mind.[4]

It is time to conclude. In the light of this consideration of James's characteristic traits as a philosopher, it is perhaps possible to determine in some degree the significance and the historic place of his contribution to philosophy. Doubtless the chief service which be rendered to those of his contemporaries, especially in England and America, to whom philosophy was a serious concern, was of a sort so general and pervasive that it is not easy to define. It lay in the bracing, stimulating, and mind-enlarging influence of his personality, in the contagion of openness of view and simplicity of utterance, of intellectual courage and intellectual candor, that proceeded from him; in the example of his constitutional inability to wear any bandages of either scientific or philosophic dogmatism over that vision turned straight to the face of immediate experience, of "raw, unverbalized life" in all its manifoldness and concreteness and richness of unexcluded possibilities. He touched nothing which he did not vitalize; and more than one ancient discipline and age-withered problem, upon contact with the robust and hearty piece of human nature that he was, took on new life, as by a transfusion of blood. But the more specific and perhaps the more permanent significance of his contribution to philosophy consists,—as it seems to me,—chiefly in this, that he brought to the vo-

[4] This seems to be shown by some sentences of his own on the point, written scarcely more than a year ago, in reply to some comments of the sort that have been set down above: "I think you take an extravagantly exaggerated view of my anti-logicality. . . . I imagine that much war will be waged by many combatants in print before Bergson's thesis gets settled to general satisfaction. All that I contend for is that things *are* as continuous as they seem to be and that the intellectualist arraignment of experience as self-contradictory and impossible won't pass. If continuity and flow mean logical self-contradiction, then logic must go." Some of the recent mathematical logicians, James added, consider that they have "saved logic by the 'new' infinite. Perhaps they have, and if so, the better. But I wait to be convinced."

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cation of the philosopher an almost unequaled power of *seeing* these two generic aspects of reality: the uniqueness and inwardly self-authenticating character of concrete individual existences, the irreducibility of their being and their natures to any mere external relations to the wholes with which they may be connected; and the uniqueness and the primacy of the temporal quality of experience, the impossibility of translating this *quale* into any non-temporal categories, or of ever truly describing the innermost nature of reality as we know it by means of such categories. Now, philosophy begins with things seen, with *aperçus,* not with things inferred; I do not mean, of course, with physical observation, but with the direct *noticing* of some general and logically pregnant trait of the conditions of experience or the data of thought. It does not, indeed, end with *aperçus*; nor did James's activity as a philosopher so end. He devoted himself, as I have already said, conscientiously and laboriously for many years to the work of focusing his vision more sharply upon these aspects of reality, of following out their implications, of correlating them in a logically definite manner with one another and with older and more familiar philosophical ideas which he recognized as considerations not to be neglected. The success of this attempt at precise formulation and elaboration could be suitably discussed only after a lengthy technical examination. However great or small its success, it is not in it that James's more notable service as a philosopher has been rendered. The growing points in the history of thought come when a man arrives upon the scene with a new or a neglected *aperçu*— and the power to tell about it. James belongs among these philosophers of fresh vision, of distinctive personal insight into fundamentally significant aspects of the facts of our experience. His work may very well prove to have opened a highly important new chapter in the history of philosophy, at least among people of English speech. For,—as he himself said, speaking in praise of another,—"originality

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in men dates from nothing previous, other things date from it, rather."

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THE PLACE OF LEISURE IN LIFE.*

B. BOSANQUET.

I PROPOSE to throw my remarks into a form which may not quite correspond with what was expected from my choice of a subject. But I do believe my treatment will touch the essence of the matter, and it will attempt to bring home to us the inner meaning of a great book, to which it seems to me that even expert scholars hardly as a rule do justice.

I want, then, to lay before you a popular account of the unity, or what I love to call the plot, of Aristotle's "Ethics"; the great work in which he studied, not individual morality as contrasted with politics,—but the nature of the true aim of life for man, as contrasted with the methods of statesmanship, by which it might be impressed upon and embodied in the civic organism. To me the subject is fascinating. The gradual development of the great teacher's thought, the depth of meaning which reveals itself in formulæ which taken unintelligently by themselves seem the very type of abstractions and emptiness, and are so considered by critics of repute,—all this is to me a never-ceasing delight. Whether I can in any degree impart my feeling of the matter remains to be seen. Of course, I omit technicality and tell you things as I understand them. I owe my leading conception to Professor Burnet's edition of the "Ethics" and certain points also to that of Professor Stewart; and the former has himself stated an idea of the same type in his book on "Aristotle's Theory of Education."

* An address to the Cardiff Educational Society.

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1. Every soul of every creature, such is Aristotle's starting point, has a form, or possible perfection, which the universe is striving in it to bring to completion through its life.

In the human soul every stage toward this completion may be called an excellence or virtue; and of these excellences or virtues there are two general divisions. There are first the excellences of man's compound nature, in which feeling and desire are learning submission to the law of reason. These he calls the 'ethical' virtues; a term which we, somewhat unfortunately, have taken up and rendered as if equivalent to all that we understand by moral excellence. They derive their name, for him, from their connection with habit; they are qualities or rather attitudes of soul which we acquire in society, and in the main through assimilating the social tradition. Temperance, courage, gentleness, generosity, with many like them, are Aristotle's excellences of man's compound nature, or excellences of habituation, *ethical* excellences.

The other set of excellences are the excellences of the intellectual part, the so-called intellectual virtues. But I will say at once that we commit a mere misconstruction if we take them to be excellences of intellectual capacity; as we might say, memory, or mathematical talent, or the power of learning languages. The dominant ones at least are nothing of this kind; they are clearly, as we shall see, the excellences of good life and habit, exalted, reinforced and reinterpreted by passing into the region of principle and of great ideas. Intelligence is not an exclusive part, but is the form of the whole.

Now let us begin to sketch the nature of a single act of duty, as Aristotle conceives it, and trace from that point the expansion of the moral horizon, till time and place fall away or rather are rounded into a whole and morality passes into religion.

2. The simplest moral duty has for Aristotle a double aspect. The motive of the citizen who gives his life for his country, for example, is described in a curious two-

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fold language, the significance of which is not difficult to see. He does the act of duty for its own sake. There is in it something absolute. If it were done for the sake of something beyond, of praise or gain, it would no longer be the act it seemed to be. This we can see at once. But again; this and every act of duty is performed for the sake of the beautiful,—for in all virtue this is the motive. And here again we have no doubt what is meant. The duty is done for its own sake, for the sake of what it is. But the conception of what it is is capable of expansion. "For the sake of the beautiful"—a widening horizon is set before us by this description of the moral motive. What is the moral beautiful? If we fully understood the simplest act of duty, what is it that according to Aristotle we should see there?

Let me illustrate further by the famous doctrine of the mean, the definition of an ethical excellence. An ethical virtue or excellence of man's compound nature is an attitude of will, "being in a relative mean defined by a ratio, and by whatever the man of practical wisdom would define it by."

I will not trouble you with negative criticism, I shall say at once what I think it signifies, having just pointed out that once more it refers us to something on ahead,—to the man of practical wisdom.

We must have observed in any such form of conduct as an act of beneficence, or munificence, how infallibly the churl in spirit betrays himself, to use Aristotle's phrase, in the quantity or degree or time or place or manner or personal relations of his action. Only the true motive gives you the perfect act. The brave man again; how hard it is to be brave, and gentle, and modest, and calm, and wise. The brave and noble soul, and it alone, will ring true in every side and aspect of its act; time, place, manner, degree, behavior to persons; all the characters which make up an act whose quality takes form in quantity, and is adapted to the situation with a beautiful adequateness, in every detail just right, neither

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too little nor yet too much, like the petals of a rose. Such an action is a manifestation of an excellence, a soul rightly tempered and attuned, a disposition or attitude of mind that is the 'mean' or adjusted condition relative to or demanded by the situation.

So far, then, the horizon has expanded. The excellent action, done for its own sake, which is for the sake of the beautiful, is now understood to be an act expressive of a state of soul rightly attuned so that in every detail and quantitative particular its utterance hits what is appropriate and adequate.

But there is something more; this temper or attitude does not explain itself, and the phrase which described it, at the same moment beckoned us forward to a further standard. The mean adjustment or ratio which was the characteristic of the excellent attitude of soul was not yet, we saw, thoroughly defined. It is an adjustment to circumstances; but an adjustment in the interests of what? The answer was given by a reference to something not yet stated. The mean is determined by a further standard; and the standard is the right ratio, and whatever the man of practical wisdom would determine.

3. This is a reference forward from the first half of the treatise to the second half. Let us recapitulate. Every act of the compound nature of man,—his combined reason and desire,—which is excellent, or an act of virtue, is done, we saw, at once for its own sake, and for the sake of the beautiful. That is to say, its own nature, being more fully understood, is one with the nature of the beautiful. Wishing to know to what this points us forward, we found that such an act, as an expression of virtue, is something perfectly adequate and adjusted to the situation, right in every particular, in every detail. If the motive or attitude of soul were in any way wrong or imperfect, the act would betray it at once by passing over into exaggeration or deficiency at some one of its innumerable aspects and peculiarities. What should be courage, for example, would be vulgar or ostentatious,

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or rash, or false, or wanting to itself in resolution or in tranquillity or in gentleness.

> The churl in spirit, howe'er he veil
> His want in forms for fashion's sake,
> Will let his coltish nature break
> At seasons through the gilded pale,
> For who can always act?

We can understand that a moral perfection which results in a reliably perfect expression may be called beautiful, but still we have not learned in the interest of what central principle our adjustments are to be determined, and we have been referred to something that lies ahead.

The standard, we are told, lies in what is determined by the man of practical wisdom. What is practical wisdom, and where does it obtain its standard?

We said that besides the excellences of man's compound nature, Aristotle ascribes to him what he calls the intellectual excellences; not, we said, such capacities as memory, or scientific acumen, or creative genius, but rather the content of good life, when raised to a level of principle and systematic insight, as opposed to mere habituation and customary self-control.

According to Aristotle, the two intellectual excellences are practical and theoretical wisdom. About theoretical wisdom we will speak later. It is practical wisdom to which we have been referred; and which, in approaching its discussion, Aristotle implies to possess "the standard of the means or adjustments."

Practical wisdom for Aristotle is one with something which is present in all the animal creation and different for every kind of creature. It is the group-instinct, or the group-intelligence, or the consciousness of kind. In humanity it is the statesman's knowledge and perception; the gift and ability of the man who, having trained insight into the distinctively human good or evil of life, based on his own excellence of character in which it is up to a certain point realized, is able to guide the organization, habituation and education of the group (for the

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statesman's business is more especially education) in the direction which will lead them to it.

But here once more the horizon expands. The statesman knows what is the end of human life, and has skill and insight to govern society and direct the educational habituation which instills the ethical or current social virtues in the right direction and to the right adjustments and adaptations—the ratios or means in conduct.

But still our quest is not ended. *What* is the end of human life in view of which the statesman organizes both politics and education? The answer is to be found in the relation of practical wisdom to theoretical wisdom. Practical wisdom, we have seen, is different for every organic group, and in a measure may be said to be distributed throughout creation. Theoretical wisdom is always one and the same, and strictly speaking, it is divine; it studies no production of instruments for the good of mankind; it cannot strictly be said to aim at the special good of mankind; it does not specially concern itself with man, or at all with one group of creatures rather than with another. Its object of study or contemplation is rather what is above and beyond man; there are many things in the universe more divine than man, Aristotle emphatically observes; more especially, it occupies itself with the nature of God. But though it is not an *efficient* cause of attaining the end of man, the name for which in Aristotle is happiness, it is the formal cause, or at least a part of the formal cause; that is to say, it does not produce human happiness as a cause may produce an effect other than itself; but it *is* human happiness or the end of man, or at least a considerable constituent of that end.

Now the precise relation of practical to theoretical wisdom according to Aristotle is an interesting point. Practical wisdom, we said, is the wisdom of the statesman, and so far must be assumed to be supreme in society. On the other hand, theoretical wisdom is the higher activity, and is identical, or identical so far as human nature can attain it, with that activity of the soul which is hap-

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piness and the end of human life. Now how can the lower activity of practical wisdom be supreme over the higher, which is theoretical wisdom? Which of the two is really superior and the guide of life? Aristotle puts the contradiction plainly, and his answer is clear. Practical wisdom rules society in the interests of theoretical wisdom, but does not rule over theoretical wisdom itself. Expanding the answer, a follower of Aristotle compares the statesman's art to the house-steward or head of the servants, and theoretical wisdom to the master of the house. The house-steward rules the house with a view to the master's leisure, his σχολή. The master has his duties of magistrate or thinker or soldier to perform; the household is organized to give him leisure for them. Just such is the statesman's duty, let us say, toward art, or the life of thought or religion.

The relation is expanded by an Aristotelian writer: "So whatever choice or distribution of worldly resources, whether of bodily qualities or of wealth or of friends or of other goods, will be most helpful toward the contemplation of God, that is the best, and that is the most beautiful standard or organization; and whatever arrangement, whether by defect or by excess, hinders men from glorifying God and enjoying him, that arrangement is bad." (Stewart, II, 4, E. E. θ., 3, 1249 a21-b25.) The final standard of the means or adjustments of conduct, then, is the highest life of the soul. The habituation of the young and the moral education of society are to be so guided and framed by the statesman that art and learning and religion shall always hold the highest place and so far as humanly possible shall have the lead in, and form the inspiration of, his country. The simplest act of duty, we may say, in its twofold scope, points forward to the knowledge of God. The act of duty, we saw, in being for its own sake, is for the sake of the beautiful; and in being for the sake of the beautiful it is a perfecting of the soul by a fine and delicate adjustment and adaptation to the social order; and further, in being an

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adaptation to the social order, it is finally instrumental to that which inspires and justifies and resumes the meaning of the social order, namely, to the activity in which the soul finds its perfection in laying hold of the divine. You do not, in the view of Plato and Aristotle, in aspiring to intellectual excellence and to religious contemplation, tread a separate and diverging path from that of the ordinary good citizen. You follow his path, but pursue it further, and what the saint or the poet or the thinker may attain at the end is only the quintessence of what all of you have been practicing from the beginning.

4. The true relation of theoretical wisdom to moral development receives a remarkable illumination from the theory of friendship, which shows how practical wisdom must in its highest form actually pass into that which is theoretical.

Practical wisdom, we saw, is the human form of the group instinct or consciousness of kind. In Aristotle's view there is, all through creation, a certain feeling of affection corresponding to every form of this consciousness of kind. He illustrates it by the different levels of parental care which attend upon the different levels of intelligence in the animal world. This is so in man as in other species. Every form of human association has its characteristic type of group-sentiment or liking, or 'friendship,' as he terms it, corresponding to the form of group-intelligence which it implies.

This being so, you have only to consider the case of the highest form of human association to see how the group-intelligence or sense of group—welfare (practical wisdom) must transform itself into theoretical wisdom. For the highest form of human association is that in which human beings have come to care for that in each other which is the best and consequently the most real thing in them, namely, the highest goodness and intelligence. When this is so, the group-consciousness has become the consciousness of a response in the other person to what is highest and best in the self. This response

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is a heightening of life, by the extension of the awareness of our life to the life of the friend who shares our consciousness of the best things. We feel our life intensified in his. Therefore the consciousness which we share with him is *ipso facto* the consciousness of the highest activity of the soul. Any other common consciousness would be comparatively external and accidental, and would not give us the same community of feeling.

Therefore practical wisdom or the instinct toward group-welfare, not only, in directing human society, aims at adjusting it to the presence of the highest activities; but, in so far as men become all they might become, actually passes into those activities.

Thus we have followed the expanding horizon of the great moralist's account of the end of human life, or of the activity of the soul, which is the provisional definition of that end, also called by the name of happiness.

What we have found is that the simplest act of social duty taught by habituation to the growing citizen, say courage or soberness, has in it a motive, or we may say really implies an awakening and a yearning of the soul, which first expresses itself in loyalty to society and in good citizenship, but which can find no final satisfaction till it completes itself in the knowledge and thought of God, in union with whom alone the individual comes to be that which he really is.

5. How, we may ask, can these ideas be translated into characteristics of any actual society? Are we to draw a picture of a social life sharply divided between pleasure and industry on the one hand and a monastic quietism on the other? Or again, are we to think of a futile and pedantic effort to make philosophy and theology the common occupation of men, in place of the healthy activities of living? What the Greek idea of the social mind suggests to us is neither of these things.

We have to remember that the social mind is to be thought of as a single spirit, though pouring itself into different channels according to the differences involved

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in social organization. The form of the individual soul is perfected in this way. The importance of this is that every individual mind, while attending especially to its private functions, is at the same time a microcosm which lends to, and borrows from, every other mind, or factor of the social spirit. The ruler learns from the workman, the scholar from the soldier, just as the workman is guided by the ruler, or the soldier can only apply himself rightly to his profession by borrowing the spirit of the scholar. What Aristotle wishes, then, is to see states so organized that the lamp of religion and fine art and high thinking may always be kept burning, and that this fact may have its fair and proper influence on the spirit and ideals of the people as a whole. "I assume," says Miss Kingsley, in one of her delightful books on West African experiences, "that the whole desire of every man is to know God." This is one of those sayings that fill us with delight. But it is, of course, a matter of implication and not of conscious wish. Yet it illustrates the point that all persons are capable of religion and knowledge, and that the tone and worthiness of their life is very different according as they are or are not, in their degree, conscious of an inspiration and an ideal pervading their society. The servant who sweeps a minister's study, having respect for his office, shares in his spiritual work, and is the better even for that amount of sharing in it. The minister, of course, as Plato's "Republic" should imply to us, has also to learn from the servant. We have to think of the tone of a society in which saintliness and intelligence and science or, again, fine art and poetry are respected, compared with one in which all things of that kind go to the wall. The two are different, not merely in including a few individuals of different types, but in the whole mind and spirit of every person, right down to the simplest and the least fortunate citizens. The contrast of Scotland and probably Wales with some other countries might illustrate what is meant. Or take, with all their defects, the case of Athens under

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Pericles, or of Geneva under Calvin. Such societies are the salt of the earth. That is a general example of what Aristotle meant, as we can see to-day; though it is possible that local and national feeling and a severe political judgment prevented him from entertaining an unmingled respect for the Athens which we admire.

6. How is this glorification of *theoria* to be reconciled with what we take to be the needs of practical life, and the necessity that education should prepare us for it? In the first place, let us understand distinctly of what we are speaking. Theoria for a Greek is not what we mean by theory; and the theoretic life is not what we call a theoretical pursuit. Theory for us comes near to an intellectual fiction; a way of grasping and comprehending a complex of observations. Theoria for a Greek meant the vision of what is most real; the mind of one who sees life steadily and sees it whole. Theoretical considerations for us mean mostly what is abstract and hypothetical; "if this change, then that consequence." Theoretic life for the Greek meant the life of insight, a man's hold and grasp of the central realities of what is most valuable and most divine, and therefore also most human.

I have ventured to suggest elsewhere that not only in conception, but in actual fact there is no inconsistency between the theoretic activity thus understood and the most practical activities in the ordinary sense of the term. Is it not a striking thing apart from all satire and from all jesting that among the world's leaders of business activity we should always find the Jew, the Quaker and the Scotsman? Is not, perhaps, a certain security and sagacity of judgment conferred by a habit of mind in which everything is referred to a center, and which is capable of a superior view permitting the details of life to drop into a subordinate place?

But as to the idea of theoria in the sense we have spoken of, in connection with the practical aim of life, we may hear Aristotle himself. "The practical life need not, as

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some think, be a life of action toward others; nor are those thoughts alone practical which are cherished for the sake of the results of the action. The name practical belongs much more truly to the thoughts of intrinsic value, thoughts which are ends in themselves; for to attain the end is necessarily a kind of action, and even in external action we give the title of agent *par excellence* to those to whom the constructive thought belongs."

7. There are three kindred ideas which for Aristotle express attainment of the end of human life: Theoretical Wisdom, Leisure, Happiness. (It is interesting that so strict is Aristotle in affirming his idea of happiness as the fullness of human life and capacity that he denies it to the child, as to the brute creation.) Leisure is especially to be distinguished from recreation and amusement. Both are alike, in that they appear to be chosen for their own sake only, but it is only an appearance. Recreation and amusement are in truth means, not ends. Their value is to make work possible, not in any worth of their own. Leisure is different; it is the expression or condition of the attainment of the end; or, as we might say, it is the satisfaction of a disinterested interest. We all know that 'school'='leisure'; to have leisure for a thing means to devote yourself to it as an interest. So much in earnest is Aristotle with this distinction that he modifies Plato's judgment upon music with a view to it, and says that the laborer must be allowed his music, oddly enough of an elaborate and artificial type, by way of amusement and recreation; while the educated man will require for the right use of leisure his own music of a more classical kind. And the main object of education is to teach the right use of leisure; the devotion of the mind to what it feels to fill its need.

All this comes to saying that the object of education for Aristotle was to communicate disinterested interests. But perhaps nothing could, to-day, be more practical or of a higher social importance. What could be more practical than to rescue some large proportion of the one hun-

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dred and sixty million pounds that in this country go every year in drink? And was not Dr. Johnson fundamentally right when he said, "Sir, the reason why a man drinks is that he is not interesting enough to himself to pass his leisure time without it"?

As we have seen, it is an error to suppose that these interests are only for a cloistered caste, distinct and divided from society at large. They are implied in and permeate all social life and are its quintessence. They are not artificial, or imposed upon the social whole *ab extra,* but spring out of its nature. Take the mere phrase, 'Learning to read.' How many meanings it may bear! I remember a severe critic once observing that our circulating libraries act as middlemen between writers who do not know how to write and readers who do not know how to read. What a thing it would be if the children who pass through our schools had 'learned *to read,*' in the sense in which the critic meant that our novel-reading public had not. To read, that is, for their own enjoyment, things worth reading. Grant, if we like, that Aristotle throws his *desideratum* too much into the form of philosophy and theology. Both of these exist, and Aristotle knew it well, in the more accessible forms of poetry and religion. And these at least are universal possessions, and no class in a modern state need be excluded from participating through them in the supreme spiritual activity.

LONDON. B. BOSANQUET.

CHARITY ORGANIZATION.

THOMAS JONES.

DR. BOSANQUET does not "at all recognize the portrait of the Charity Organization movement in its relation to the Poor Law" which I outlined in the January (1910) number of the JOURNAL. It was not my purpose to draw a full-length portrait of the C. O. S., still

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less of the Charity Organization movement. That I am not quite blind to the good features of the C. O. S. I can perhaps best prove by quoting from an article which I wrote on the appearance of the Majority Report:

> For forty years the C. O. S.,—to use the familiar letters,—has stood for a worthy if austere ideal of coöperative help. It has said that treatment should follow investigation; that both should be thorough, and that the aim of building up character should ever be kept in view. It has faithfully proclaimed the evils of overlapping, and exposed imposture. And it is not true to say that it has been content with mere negation. It has held a long series of inquiries into housing, vagrancy, emigration, exceptional distress, and unskilled labor, and published valuable reports thereon. It has thrown off from the parent stock societies like the Invalid Children's Aid Society and the Association for the Care of the Feeble-Minded. Quite recently it has founded a School of Sociology. Nor is it a valid criticism to say that the relief it dispenses is relatively small. If it never had spent a penny on relief, its existence would still have been fully justified. It was not intended to be an additional relieving agency, but the organizer of those already existing. So long as we admit it to be desirable to distribute charity to the poor, it follows that there should be method in our benevolence. Much of the abuse leveled at the C. O. S. is therefore beside the mark. Of course, kind souls like Charles Lamb, who give and ask no questions, and who find in the fluttering tatters of mendicity the graceful insignia of a picturesque profession, are naturally incensed by a society "which rakes the bowels of unwelcome truth to save a half-penny." Those, however, who believe in social order and denounce the anarchy of competition should be the first to recognize the value of organization in this as in other spheres.

Secondly, Dr. Bosanquet maintains that there is "a wholly unwarranted suggestion" in my remark that "the Majority have traveled far from the position of past years." This seems to be a misreading of the following sentence: "It is highly satisfactory to find that in their proposals for dealing with children the Majority have traveled far from the practice of past years" (p. 193). With this Dr. Bosanquet would, perhaps, agree. But, apart from this special point, he holds that, generally, I exaggerate the advance which the Majority Report shows on the position taken up by the C. O. S. This is admittedly a question of degree. To me the advance seems considerable in several directions. The reader could realize its extent only by a perusal of the volumes of "Occa-

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sional Papers" and by personal contact with the average C. O. S. worker *before* the appearance of the Majority Report. As this is not practicable, a few illustrations will indicate the direction the advance has taken.

1. The analysis of the causes of pauperism contained in the Majority Report, while never failing to emphasize 'moral causes,' in the proper C. O. S. manner, grants to economic influences a more prominent place than has been customary in C. O. S. literature. Among the general principles acknowledged in both reports is "the necessity of recognizing industrial conditions as responsible for a large, perhaps the largest, part of modern poverty." I do not know whether the Majority would accept this summary of their views by Professor Muirhead,[2] but, at any rate, the new accent is unmistakable. We shall hear less in future of 'the expansion of trade' as a cure for unemployment, less of the 'burden of rates and taxes' as a cause of unemployment, and instead of casual labor appearing at the end of a list of causes, it will appear near the beginning. Despite an obvious desire to lean to virtue's side, the Majority put forward 'Administration' as a cause with at least a show of hesitation and caution to which the orthodox charity organizer is a complete stranger. Here are a few characteristic utterances of the latter:

> Out-relief is the chief cause of pauperism, and accounts for four-fifths of the pauperism of this country, drunkenness and crime contributing very little to it. (T. Bland Garland.)
>
> Nine-tenths of the poor law applicants are created by the system, and if it was not for the system, those people would not have existed in their present condition at all. (W. Vallance.)
>
> But the great and moving causes of pauperism are, after all said, bad administration of public relief and indiscriminate charity. (Sir William Chance.)

2. The view of the Poor Law as having a positive function with curative and restorative powers is more conspicuous in the pages of the Majority Report than in

[2] "By What Authority."

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C. O. S. publications. One can easily imagine the amazement of some leading charity organizers when they found the Majority declaring that "what is wanted is not to abolish the Poor Law, but to widen, strengthen, and humanize the Poor Law, so as to make it respond to a demand for a more considerate, elastic, and so far as possible, curative treatment of the able-bodied" (Part VI, Sec. 337). This is certainly a departure from the doctrine of some leading charity organizers whose favorite maxim has been "The Poor Law should be machine-like," or "The administration of the Poor Law is a matter of police," and who have sometimes wished "that the English law could be assimilated to the Scotch law in the matter of relief to the able-bodied, at any rate for times of exceptional distress."[3] In what I called the traditional text-books even the boarding-out system for children was regarded as contrary to "any sound principles of Poor Law" and its adoption denounced as "striking evidence that there is a danger of the country at any moment returning to some of the worst evils of the old Poor Law.[4] Again, Mr. Mackay once described medical relief as "the first step in the descent to the Avernus of pauperism." Now we have the Majority recommending what in the opinion of Dr. Downes "amounts to a large measure of free medical relief."

3. But we need not go beyond the quite recent history of the C. O. S. itself to find abundant proof that leading charity organizers themselves think the Majority Report a considerable and even dangerous advance on orthodox principles. In December last at a meeting of the C. O. S. Council there was a full-dress debate on the Poor Law Report and Voluntary Charity at which Dr. Bosanquet defended the position taken up by the Majority against the attack of several redoubtable charity organizers. It was, *e. g.*, Sir Arthur Clay's firm conviction that if the

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[3] "Occasional Papers," 1905, p. 167.

[4] Fawcett, "Pauperism," p. 79; Fowle, "Poor Law," p. 144.

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recommendations of the Majority *re* voluntary aid were carried into effect "the C. O. S. would perish, stifled and strangled by official regulations." Mr. Crowder, the Nestor of the strict school, declared that the "scheme before them was utterly unworkable; it confused hopelessly the functions of Poor Law and charity; public assistance was to be made far easier to obtain, and the people of this country were to be rapidly demoralized."[5] Similarly another well-known charity organizer, the Rev. P. S. G. Propert, fulminates as follows:

> The proposals of the majority, if carried out in their entirety, would convert the State into a vast organizer of charity, and would, I believe, lead to the wasteful expenditure of millions of money, and the impoverishment not only of the treasury but of the national character.[6]

Whether these fears are justified or not is not here relevant. What is plain, and to me gratifying, is that the C. O. S. members of the Commission have signed a report which goes some distance toward municipalizing the movement, and that there are signs that, given ample time, the society may travel still further in the direction of the Minority Report. Colonel Bethell, at the Council meeting referred to, could not see any vital distinction between the Public Assistance Authority and the Voluntary Aid Councils. What need, he asked, was made out for the latter at all? Why not give the former enough public money to do thoroughly all that it found necessary? In a similar sense the South West House Committee reported to the Council that in its opinion voluntary agencies should be gradually subordinated to official ones. Most astonishing sentiments these to be promulgated in Denison House!

But I need not go on multiplying illustrations, for Dr. Bosanquet will doubtless brush them all aside as merely "incidental views on matters of current policy" in no way inconsistent with his theory of pauperism, pure and

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[5] "C. O. S. Review," December, 1909, and January, 1910.
[6] "Via Tertia," p. 84.

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undefiled. But at least these 'incidental views' do in fact imply a criticism of the way in which that theory has been held in the past and a measure of the departure of the Majority from what that theory was supposed to be. The truth is there are welcome signs,—more signs than I have indicated,—within the society itself and its immediate sphere of influence, of impatience with its analysis of social dependence. And this dissatisfaction has shown itself not only in the founding of offshoots like the Councils of Public Welfare (not too eager to avow their parentage), but in that failure of the society to attract new workers bewailed by a charity organizer in the *Quarterly Review:*

> A few years ago most young men who came up from the universities to social work in London joined charity organization committees almost as a matter of course in order to learn their work. Now it would be hardly unfair to say that they come up from Oxford or Cambridge with their minds made up upon social questions, and that they consider the teaching of the Society as antiquated and obsolete. . . . The late Duke of Westminster, a constant friend, and at one time an active worker for the Society, spoke many years ago at a meeting over which he presided of the "noble work done for the Society by the young officers of the Guards." There are no young officers of the Guards now working for the Society.[1]

Dr. Bosanquet has given us an admirable statement of the theory of pauperism animating the C. O. S. for which your readers will be grateful, and I am glad I provoked him into writing it. Attired in its philosophical garb I imagine many supporters of the Minority Report could almost accept it as their own. But cross-examination would soon reveal that though the words used were the same, the meaning would be different. The objects of the Minority, as of the charity organization movement, is "the prevention of pauperism by every possible arrangement, adjustment, and contrivance, positive and negative, which can be shown to make for the strengthening of the citizen mind, and the improvement of the condition of the poor, which it counts as the material

[1] *Quarterly Review*, January, 1907, p. 76.

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equivalent of the former." There is, however, a broad difference of emphasis on state and private action. If in certain provinces the minority prefer legal regulation and compulsion to information and suggestion, it is because they believe that a far greater preventive force is generated by this method. Let me indicate briefly some of the main changes in interpretation, in stress, and in practical application which the theory of pauperism as set out by Dr. Bosanquet would undergo at the hands of one who approached the problem from the Minority's standpoint.

1. The theory starts with the idea of democratic citizenship. Citizens are equal and independent. "There is no presumption of special dependence between class and class or person and person, except within the family." The independent citizen, like the economic man, is doubtless a useful hypothesis, but the wholesome thing to do when one hears of him is to make a bee-line to reality through the pages, say, of Mr. Wallas's "Human Nature in Politics," or Miss Rathbone's "How the Casual Labourer Lives." As things are to-day in the lives of most casual laborers, for example, there is a presumption of special dependence upon the pawnbroker or the money lender or charity or all three. For many of those born of inferior stocks at the casual level, ill-housed, ill-nourished, and ill-trained, the presumption is that they will grow up into economic and political parasites, and so long as the conditions surrounding the birth of this not inconsiderable class continue, neither coöperative societies nor trade unions, neither friendly societies nor savings banks, will flourish in their midst, and charity organizers will never be unemployed. "Modern practice recognizes the right of every man to life and liberty. Socially it refuses to tolerate slavery; politically, it refuses to exclude the laborer from a vote. One thing it does not do,—while recognizing the right of every man to life and liberty, it does not make it real. . . . We do not attempt to see to it that each man *shall* have the func-

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tion, the work, which is the positive side of his freedom. 'While we say that he shall not be used as a means, we often leave him without the chance of using himself for any social end at all.' "[8] So with women. As things are there is a presumption that a large number of women, and especially widows, of the wage-earning class, will become dependent upon the state or upon persons outside the family, or upon wages which are barely adequate for the decent maintenance of one person and inadequate for the maintenance of more than one. "Marriage," Miss Hutchins tells us, "may be supposed at best (granting that all wives are supported by their husbands) to provide for about three-fourths of women, but for twenty years only, between thirty-five and fifty-five. Before thirty-five and after fifty-five a very large proportion are not thus provided for. Some are, of course, maintained by brother, parent or other relation; but whatever theories we may hold about 'economic independence,' it is evident that for a large number of women 'economic self-dependence' is nothing but a stern necessity."[9] Of the children receiving poor relief over ninety thousand are children of able-bodied widows relieved.

The word 'independent' deserves a paragraph all to itself. It is used in quite misleading ways by several charity organizers. Sometimes it means, as with Dr. Bosanquet, ability 'to face the situation'; at other times it simply means non-dependence on the Poor Law and frequently there is an illegitimate suggestion that the two senses are identical.

During the last twenty-five years the people of England have year by year become more independent. Those who in the judgment of the guardians require necessary relief from the rates are become fewer. (C. S. Loch, 1894.)

Now, if it can be proved possible to dispauperize, *i. e.*, diminish pauperism, and thereby render a larger section of the people independent, this dereliction of duty is of the gravest moment, for it concerns not this generation alone, but successive generations yet unborn; it is, in fact, a

[8] Barker, "Plato and Aristotle," p. 372.

[9] *Journal of the Statistical Society*, June, 1909.

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standing hindrance to the economic progress of the people. (T. Mackay, 1903.)

It is quite possible that a decrease in technical pauperism may coincide with a decrease in pauperism in the bad sense of being 'unequal to the situation,' but it by no means follows. On behalf of the recent commission Miss G. Harlock visited forty-nine cases,—chiefly in carefully administered unions,—in which out-relief had been refused. She summarizes the result as follows.

1. In no case was the support by relatives increased through the refusal of out-relief.

2. In no case has any charitable agency effectively dealt with the destitution.

3. There was no evidence to show that the applicants themselves had been stimulated by the refusal of relief to greater personal efforts.

4. Two of the cases found work.

5. In more than half of the cases the refusal of out-relief led to a gradual dispersal of the household furniture and wearing apparel, often not even excepting the most necessary clothing. There were also unmistakable signs of a marked physical deterioration of the members of the families, owing to lack of food, warmth and proper clothing. If eventually the applicants are forced to enter the workhouse, they will do so with health gone, home gone, and spirit and courage shattered. The deterioration is, from the national standpoint, probably most serious in the case of the children. The homes which were being broken up were of two classes: firstly, respectable homes, which have been in the past thoroughly comfortable; secondly, homes which possibly have never reached a high standard of comfort.

6. Six of the applicants accepted the order for the workhouse.[10]

With the exception of the six who entered the workhouse, the remainder, in the euphemistic phrase of the strict administrator, "floated off and became independent." Repression alters the statistics, but it does not alter the facts. Distress is redistributed rather than removed, at any rate in large urban centers.[11] Protesting against

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[10] Report on Refusal of Out-relief, by Miss G. Harlock. Vol. XXI, p. 37. *Cf.* Vol. XVII, pp. 505-517, for other examples.

[11] Mr. Martley's "Statement of Evidence," Vol. VIII, p. 194. *Cf.* Dr. Cannan's protest in the *Clare Market Review* (October, 1906) against Dr. Loch's handling of pauper statistics: "Pauperism in the technical sense is the antidote, homœopathic if you will, but still the antidote, against

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the Majority's account of the out-relief cases, Dr. Downes naïvely maintains that "the conditions of life of the out-door paupers described are certainly no worse than those of the neighboring independent people of the poorest class."

2. "What I want to know," writes Dr. Bosanquet, "is how he, being now obviously weak in the citizen or social mind (it is the same thing) may be made strong, and how others may be prevented from weakening." I agree; we all want to support or to restore the citizen mind. But some of us think that English charity organizers [12] underestimate the power of economic conditions to manufacture and perpetuate civic weakness just as their opponents are apt to belittle the power of mind to shape adverse circumstances to advantage. "It is a conservative statement to say," writes Professor Devine, of the New York C. O. S., that there are "hundreds of thousands whose industrial inefficiency is due to the fact that from infancy to manhood their lives have been cast in unwholesome, physically destructive conditions." If you confront an English charity organizer with that statement he will probably reply, "A man's circumstances depend upon what he himself is," which is a half or some other fractional truth. Why is he what he is? The case expert, rightly careful of detail, suffers from myopia when he deals with the adult applicant and does not allow for the operation of predisposing causes of social failure,—heredity, poverty, ignorance,—back of the immediately exciting causes like drink or laziness. Hence the natural suggestion that sobriety and industry would remove our social ills. "Patience, labor, sobriety, frugality and religion should be recommended to them; all the rest is

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pauperism in the bad sense. To rejoice over a decrease of legal poor relief without considering the magnitude of pauperism in the bad sense is wrong, and it is annoying to find Mr. Loch speaking as if the transference of population from the country, where poor relief is large, to the towns where it is less so, necessarily meant an increase in all the virtues."

[12] Unlike their American cousins.

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downright fraud."[13] Take the question of remedies for unemployment. No economist would for an instant minimize the influence of personal inefficiency, but, as Mr. Beveridge argued before the Commission, personal character, while it largely decides the fate of individuals, is only a secondary factor in the problem of unemployment. "No physical or mental improvement would do away with the industrial forces which at present produce unemployment" (Q., 77844).

Connected with this belittling of the influence of the economic environment is the distrust of state action. So fierce is this distrust at times that one wonders whether the charity organizers are not anarchists in disguise. This reluctance to use the citizen mind in collective ways to redress wrongs and remove hindrances to the good life is, as I said, of a piece with the view that finds the origin of poverty in the inefficiency of the poor individual, which denies that it is also rooted in inequality of opportunity, in privileges vested by law in certain citizens or groups of citizens, and which therefore condemns the effort of those who would use Parliament to undo evils which Parliament has created or permitted to grow up.[14] But here again it is satisfactory to note that the dominant school of charity organization is being undermined *within* Denison House itself. The most striking suggestions for state interference made by the Minority are (1) the decasualization of specific trades through the compulsory use of the labor exchanges, and (2) the smoothing out of cyclical fluctuations by the compensatory action of the Government giving out saved-up contracts on the approach of

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[13] Burke. Motto of a chapter on "The Working Man," in "Chalmers on Charity," by N. Masterman, p. 164.

[14] "But to transfer the wealth of one class to another by taxation or otherwise is no solution of social difficulty. The transfer is, and must be, in the nature of an alms, an *annona;* and it cannot but weaken effort instead of strengthening it. The evidence that it can have an opposite effect, it is not too much to say, is *nil.*" Loch, "Charity and Social Life," p. 387.

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trade depression. "This," if I may borrow Dr. Bosanquet's words, "is what needs all the resources of civilization; all its powers of adjustment, of contrivance, of *self-restraint.*" It is an immensely difficult enterprise, but if successful is there any one project to be compared with it in its potency for preventing degradation? The Majority are lukewarm about it, and Dr. Loch seems to have confused it with the creation of relief works and therefore dismissed it as a palliative. One is unfeignedly glad to find Mr. C. J. Hamilton, the C. O. S. Lecturer in Economics, "inclined to disagree with the argument that the regularization in the demand for labor, through the device of a Government program in regard to its own work, was artificial and a mere palliative. In his opinion such a demand could take place quite naturally and without evil effect, so long as the work was not dealt with except upon ordinary economic principles."[15]

3. I commenced this prolonged rejoinder with a recognition of the good works of the C. O. S. I am inclined to conclude it with a suggestion for extending its influence. "The spirit of pauperism," Dr. Bosanquet tells us, "may be found in all social classes, and means a weakness of the citizen mind which prevents it from being equal to the situation. In other words, it is a defective participation in the social mind, on which the adjustment of life to social standards depends." For the last forty years the C. O. S. has addressed itself to the pauperism of the poor. It has invented the case paper and a technique of personal help. May I suggest that it should now devote itself to improving the condition of these pauper-employers who are guilty of 'habitual social misjudgment' and who are not 'equal to the situation'? Let there be begun a new series of "Occasional Papers" directed to the heads of jam, tea, match, rope and rag factories in the metropolis and to the ship-owners and stevedores of our seaports who have failed to control circumstances in the degree

[15] C. O. S. Review, July, 1909, pp. 83, 96.

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which the social standard demands. Let them be bidden to exercise thrift and foresight in the use of boys and girls. Let there be drafted a new case paper for the inefficient manager and full particulars be taken down of the factory hours of work, regularity of employment, rates of pay, sanitary conditions, system of training youth, degree of coöperation with the labor exchange, and employer's use of his leisure time. Let the trade unions be invited to subscribe funds wherewith to send the hopeful cases to a model factory for training. The 'unhelpables' should be committed to a detention colony or they might be profitably emigrated at the expense of the state.

The C. O. S. preaches a gospel of ordered and responsible charity. It summons the young officers of the Guards to visit the poor and teach them the right use of wages and thus bring them into a happy state of 'chronic thrift.' 'Not alms, but a friend' is its motto, and preached with the fine fervor of Dr. Loch it has its attractions as a field of service to the common good. It provides a clearing house for the vicarious benevolence of the rich. *Non olet.* It "may be considered a defensive policy of the middle classes, though it is far from a purely selfish policy."[16] At its best it heals the broken-hearted and sets free the captives of evil habit. But its preventive measures come when men and women are on the verge of legal pauperism. It does not challenge boldly the mischievous politico-economic forces which are beyond the control of the poor *because* they are poor and ignorant and inefficient. It denounces 'the poverty line,' but it substitutes a charity line with visitors on the one side, and the visited on the other. We venture to suggest that an organized attack upon disease, unemployment, and bad housing will issue in more genuine neighborliness and helpful spontaneous friendships among the people themselves than will all the 'vagrant knight-errantry' of young officers of the Guards however humble, judicious, and devoted.

[16] Dr. James Bonar, P. L. C., Appendix, Vol. III, p. 211.

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What the poor need most from the well-to-do and cultured classes is not more neighborliness, but better citizenship; not so much an altruism of volunteer personal service, as an income altruism that will create more favorable conditions of living.[17].

One came sooner or later to the time when one had to take down one's own case,—one's own shortcomings and failures. . . . These poorer neighbors might be partly of our own making.[18]

There is much in the proposals of the Minority about which I cannot be sanguine. I do not hope much, for example, from 'training and maintenance' for adult men and women. But the Minority do appeal to us in our collective capacity to strain ourselves to the utmost in the great enterprises of fighting disease at its source and of regularizing employment. If this part of its program could, in any substantial degree, be realized, I believe we should liberate resources of character and intelligence greater beyond all question than the encroachment it involves upon the liberty of the patient and the employer.

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GOETHE'S INFLUENCE ON CARLYLE.

F. MELIAN STAWELL.

I.

OF all the friendships between great men none has a more peculiar and touching beauty than the friendship between Goethe and Carlyle, between the old, serene philosopher and poet, the honored genius of the gracious little Court at Weimar, and the young, unknown, stormy-hearted prophet of the North, sprung from peasants and a Puritan to the core.

That Goethe's influence upon Carlyle was deep and abiding there can be no doubt: but it is not altogether

[17] Professor Patten.

[18] W. G. Martley.

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easy to grasp exactly what it was. Neither of the men expressed his views in anything approaching a definitely articulated system, Carlyle perhaps even less than Goethe, and the obvious differences between the two seem to block our way with paradoxes. Yet, on Carlyle's own confession, Goethe was the teacher who brought him from darkness to light; a confession most believable by all those readers,—and they are many,—who, as they study Goethe, feel, as Arnold felt, "This man understood all the sicknesses of the modern world and had the secret of their cure." "Werter," "Faust,"—the Second Part as much as the First,—and the two parts of "Wilhelm Meister," are perhaps the three works in which this secret is most to be sought; and we know from Carlyle himself that it was in these, especially in "Wilhelm Meister," that he found the nourishment he was hungering for.

"Werter" is very easy to misunderstand; on a first reading it seems, at best, no more than a pathological study of craving, and indeed its significance is really bound up with the fact that it is a diagnosis of the disease. But "Werter" is not only a record of the wail over the unsatisfied thirst for infinite,—that is, unlimited,—happiness: its greatness lies in going deeper, in discerning that this boundless thirst itself proceeds essentially from a soul which demands the infinite in quite another sense, demands, that is to say, to employ itself upon a work which can be seen to be of absolute value. To Goethe, as to Carlyle, nothing that man did or experienced could be satisfactory unless he were assured that it was *good,* over and above the pleasure that it afforded him. It is the thirst for an absolute standard, for objective values, that is really at the bottom of Werter's misery, as it was at the bottom of all Goethe's struggles and of all Carlyle's. The trouble with Werter is not just that he cannot, under the iron laws of human existence, obtain unlimited stores of passive enjoyment: that trouble, of course, is there, but there is something

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more behind; there is the obscure sense that mere enjoyment would never satisfy him, even if he could get it all, and in looking for it he is looking for what his soul would reject did he find it. A whole universe of such 'pleasure' could not make a single shoeblack happy, simply because enjoyment *as such* depends solely on the temperament of the enjoyer, and is thus, *as such,* nothing but the subjective fancy, nothing but appearance, and man's thirst is for something more.

Now to Goethe and to Carlyle, the conceptions of the Whole, the Good, the True, and the Beautiful, were on an entirely different footing from the conception of Pleasure. Bound up in those lay the reference to an objective standard, to something that in some sense always *was,* whether man perceived it or not. In what sense it *was* is a question to which we shall return in the second part of this essay. The first step for Carlyle, in thought as in life, was to fix "on some unchangeable basis, to discover what the Germans call the *Urwahr,* the Primitive Truth, the necessarily, absolutely, and eternally *True.*" ("State of German Literature," 1827. Critical Essays, Vol. I, p. 67.)

Without some such basis as this, man found that

"where the Tree of Life once bloomed and brought fruit of goodliest savour, there was only barrenness and desolation. To such as could find sufficient interest in the day-labour and day-wages of earthly existence; in the resources of the five bodily Senses and of Vanity, . . . matters were still not so bad. Such men helped themselves forward, as they will generally do; and found the world, if not an altogether proper sphere (for every man, disguise it as he may, has a *soul* in him), at least a tolerable enough place. . . . But to men afflicted with the 'malady of Thought' some devoutness of temper was an inevitable heritage: to such the noisy forum of the world could appear but an empty, altogether insufficient concern, and the whole scene of life had become hopeless enough. . . . That state of unbelief from which the Germans do seem to be in some measure delivered, still presses with incubus force on the larger part of Europe; and nation after nation, each in its own way, feels that the first of all moral problems is how to cast if off, or how to rise above it. Governments naturally attempt the first expedient; Philosophers in general the second." (*Goethe,* 1828, C. E., Vol. I, p. 188.)

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Now this passage immediately precedes what Carlyle has to say about "Werter," and, however great the superficial differences between the love-lorn Werter and the struggling Sartor of the "Everlasting No," Carlyle himself recognized the essential community in "that nameless Unrest, the blind struggle of a soul in bondage, that high, sad, longing Discontent," which "had driven Goethe almost to despair."

"Werter" indeed "prescribes no remedy," but the remedy was given later, Carlyle believed, and from the same hand; though it was years later, and after "a far different, far harder enterprise." And in that remedy one essential element was what Carlyle loved to call Belief, the conviction that man could discern eternal values over and above his own mere pleasure. This belief in the Eternal was indispensable for any action worth the doing, and this belief was possible. There was that in man which could discern between the higher and the lower, between the joy of heroes, and the joy of hogswash, that could see a brave man die and say: *So stirbt ein Held, anbetungsvoll,* and choose a heroic death with rapture, rather than a "whole Lubberland of Apostasy." Carlyle's hatred of Utilitarianism rose from the conviction that, according to its current formulas, there was no scale of absolute worth at all. Mere amount of individual pleasure being the standard, whatever the kind, man was shut up to what pleased him, and him alone. Hence there was nothing left but vanity, the feeding of the limited self, and the canker of vanity was that it imprisoned the soul in its mere identity, whereas the very essence of the true self was to rejoice in something worthy to be worshiped over and above itself. Devoutness of temper, on the other hand, the breath of life to Carlyle, meant the respect for something which, however closely the self might be united with it, was more than the self: respect for a law which, however willingly it might be followed, was more than the will.[1]

[1] The last phrase is borrowed from an unpublished lecture of Professor Gwatkin's.

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Carlyle was not concerned to demonstrate that this must be so; it was not for nothing that he chose the words 'Faith' and 'Belief' for his watchwords. His was not a metaphysical mind, and it was enough for him that he caught fire from Goethe's own life-long conviction that man was in direct touch with truths that were vaster than his perception of them. It was enough for him to nourish his soul on the passion of Faust's *Wer darf ihn nennen?* "Who dare name Him? Who dare name Him *not?* The All-embracer, the All-sustainer," imaged forth in the living visible garment of God *(der Gottheit lebendiges Kleid),* in the eternal 'open secret,' open in the light of day, and yet wrapped about with mystery *(geheimnisvoll am lichten Tag),* floating round every man, seen and unseen at once, entering into heart and head with irresistible might and unavoidable love.

And it was from Goethe of all men that Carlyle won courage to trust his own intuitive belief that the eternal laws of right and wrong were somehow reflected in Nature. From first to last Goethe scorned any other conception of the natural world. The eyes of the eternal stars that the young Faust saw looking down on man in kindness are seen watching over the march of humanity in the Mason's hymn, the hymn that succored Carlyle from youth to age, the marching music of mankind, as he called it in his Rectorial Address to the lads of Edinburgh University in 1866. That there was no sympathy between Man and Nature, that the inner spirit of Nature was closed to the spirit of Man,—the old Goethe, so he tells us himself, had listened to that whine for sixty years, but never ceased to curse it under his breath. Nature was no stepmother in his eyes, her soul lay in the soul of Man, to him she gave gladly and in full measure, pressed down and running over.[2] "And he felt as if Death and Life were one, as if the Earth were not dead, as if the Spirit of the Earth had its throne in that splen-

[2] From the poem *Allerdings* in *Gott und Welt.*

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dour, and his own spirit were therewith holding communion" ("Sartor," II, 6). It is Wordsworth's teaching, but it was also Goethe's, and it was from Goethe that Carlyle learned it.

The 'Poetic Vision' which could discern this union and perceive these values was, as it were, the courier which kept the path between the finite and the infinite always open, and it dwelt in every man whatsoever. It was free and awake in the heroes, fettered and slumbering in the mass, but it could no more perish in any heart than Faust could really sell his soul to the Devil, try as he would. "In all his dark wanderings, man remembers the right way still." Mephistopheles thinks he can satisfy a man with dust, but "God knows better" (Faust, "Prolog im Himmel"). "It is not to taste sweet things; but to do noble and true things and vindicate himself under God's Heaven as a God-made Man, that the poorest son of Adam dimly longs. Show him the way of doing that, the dullest day-drudge kindles into a hero." ("Heroes," Lect. II.)

For such insight into the way and the goal Carlyle, as I have said, would use the term Belief. This, no doubt, was partly because he held that man could have an effective hold on something he had not yet fully grasped with his intellect,—though grasp it the intellect could,—but it was also because he felt very strongly the direct, 'immediate' character of the perception involved. A perception of ultimate value, just because it is ultimate, cannot be deduced from anything else, cannot be transferred from man to man by any process of logic-chopping; can only be evoked in the soul, or grow up in it, cannot be given to it, or forced upon it. "This is Belief; all else is Opinion,—for which latter whoso will, let him worry and be worried" ("Sartor," II, ix).

But it could grow up in every man through action itself, and be evoked through the confident appeal of him in whom it was free. To make that appeal was, perhaps, the greatest service one man could render another.

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Greater still than the destruction of Superstition was the building of the new Temple. The man who discerned another side of the *valore infinito,* he above all deserved well of his fellows. "I will listen to any man's beliefs: bring me no doubts, I have plenty of my own" (Goethe). "Cease, my much-respected Herr von Voltaire, shut thy sweet voice; for the task appointed thee seems finished. . . . Wilt thou help us to embody the divine Spirit of that Religion in a new Mythus? . . . What! Thou hast no faculty in that kind? Only a torch for burning, no hammer for building? Take our thanks then, and—thyself away" ("Sartor," II, ix).

This belief could be nourished by action, because it was essentially a perception of value, and values could only become definite to us through definite embodiment in act. They must be clothed in order for us to see them. Neither Carlyle nor Goethe was afraid of the apparent circle in this conviction that belief was at once the basis of action and the reward of it. "Doubt of all kinds can only be removed by action," was written in "Wilhelm Meister," and Carlyle more than forty years after translating that, wrote thus in his "Journal" (June, 1870):

> He that still doubts whether his sense of right and wrong is a revelation from the Most High, I would recommend him . . . to do silently, with more and more of pious earnestness, what said sense *dictates* to him as right. . . . By pious heroic climbing of your own, . . . do you at length reach the sanctuary,—the victorious summit,—and see with your own eyes. The prize of heroic labour, suffering, and performance this.

But Goethe's work and Carlyle's lesson by no means end here. So far, as it would seem, they both lie open to the charge of entire vagueness, the charge so often brought against Carlyle, and if it were so, they would not help us much.[3] Unless we could discern, here and now, *some* definite character in the infinite goal of desire,

[3] In one sense it is true that a margin of vagueness,—let us rather say, a wide, dim horizon,—was really involved in their conception of the Infinite, but of this later. Rightly understood, I believe it to be one of the factors that make their teaching so inspiring.

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the standard we had hoped for would be for us illusory. Such a character Carlyle and Goethe did believe themselves to discern. Man could never be satisfied, they held, with anything short of spiritual activity in the service of other men. Activity of the spirit, that, so far as one phrase can express it, is the dominating conception of Goethe and Carlyle.[4] *Thätig zu sein ist der Menschen erste Bestimmung* ("Wilhelm Meister," Part II, Bk. vi). The conception recalls Aristotle's, and it may be that both Carlyle and Goethe were aware of this, though I do not know that there is anything decisive in their writings. Goethe uses Aristotelian language, though language that goes far beyond Aristotle, when he bases his hope of immortality on his consciousness of activity (an argument which of itself shows how central this consciousness was). "The conviction that our life continues springs for me from the conception of activity; for, if I work without ceasing to the end, nature is bound to assign me another form of existence when the present one no longer suffices for my spirit."[5] Carlyle deliberately cites Aristotle for the dictum that "the end of man is an action, not a thought" ("Journal," Dec., 7, 1826. Froude's Life.)

Of course this would be absurd misrepresentation of

[4] See "Goethe Reviewed After Sixty Years," by Seeley, ch. viii. Much of what follows is based on that splendid essay.

[5] J. Bode, "Meine Religion, von J. W. v. Goethe," translated by G. Lowes Dickinson, Ingersoll Lecture on Immortality. There is a pathetic echo of this joyous confidence in Carlyle's Journal near the end, October 14, 1869. There too we see how it is the active spirit seeking the Absolute that at once demands and seems to promise immortality. Carlyle is writing of how he had been looking at the stars, and "it struck me with a strange new kind of feeling. Hah! in a little while I shall have seen you also for the last time. God Almighty's own Theatre of Immensity, the Infinite made palpable and visible to me, that also will be closed, flung to in my face, and I shall never behold that either any more. And I know so little of it, real as was my effort and desire to know. . . . And then a second feeling rose in me, 'What if Omnipotence should actually have said, "Yes, poor mortals, such of you as have gone so far shall be permitted to go farther. Hope, despair not!" *Wir heissen euch hoffen.*'" The old great line of the Maurer-Loge rang in his head once more.

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Aristotle if 'action' were restricted, as the vulgar might restrict it, to crass material doings, but Carlyle means what Aristotle meant, that the goal is not to leave an ideal unrealized, but to embody it in an active consciousness. And the activity was to be of a certain kind: it was to aim at the true, the beautiful, the loving.

Neither Carlyle nor Goethe goes about to establish these beliefs by ordinary argument. If Carlyle were confronted by a rival judgment of value,—by the assertion, say, that right perception declared universal pleasure, whatever its further quality, to be the only rational goal of effort,—he would meet it, as the scornful laughter of his "Pig Philosophy" shows, simply by taking the ideal proposed, vivifying it, setting it before the consciousness of man, and asking: "Is that what you, in your heart of hearts, really think *ought* to be?" And it is hard to see what other procedure is possible, when it comes to a question of ultimate values. Goethe's method is at bottom the same. In "Faust," as in "Wilhelm Meister," he exhibits the soul wandering through a long "Odyssey of the spirit," trying every life, unsatisfied with any that does not involve work.

Compared with work both Goethe and Carlyle scouted enjoyment and emotion. "The only happiness a brave man ever troubled himself with asking much about was happiness enough to get his work done. . . . Happiness, unhappiness, all that was but the *wages* thou hadst; . . . and now thy work, where is thy work? Swift, out with it; let us see thy work!" ("Past and Present," Bk III, ch. 4.) It is in the same spirit that Goethe turned on Eckermann when he told him some one had said of his portrait, "That is the face of a man who has suffered much." "Say rather," answered Goethe, and with some indignation, "of a man who has struggled hard." It is true that Carlyle in his stern enthusiasm sometimes wrote,—and here he may seem in sharp opposition to Goethe,—as though enjoyment in itself were to be scouted utterly, but this is not really involved in his position, and

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to show that he did not always slip into the puritanic fallacy, even at the end of his life, I may quote a serene passage from his "Rectorial Address": "You should always look at the *heilig,* which means 'holy' as well as 'healthy.' And that old etymology,—what a lesson it is against certain gloomy, austere, ascetic people, who have gone about as if this world were all a dismal prison-house! . . . Piety does not mean that a man should make a sour face about things, and refuse to enjoy wisely what his Maker has given " ("C. E.," Vol. VII).

For Goethe, indeed, such refusal was actually a sin, and when it led to stagnation, one of the worst of sins. But it was only the abstinence "which leads to nothing and aims at nothing" that Goethe hated, as Seeley shows in his fine treatment of this point (*op. cit.,* ch. 7), and such abstinence is always "contrasted with a life not of luxury, but of strenuous energy." Like Carlyle, Goethe invariably scouted the purely passive enjoyment that enervates the soul, makes man into "a stomach and not a soul," enjoyment against which the stifled spirit protests vainly, "the expense of spirit in a waste of shame." The essence of the old Faust legend lies in the conception that man risks his very soul by the ravenous grasp at enjoyment of any and every kind, and it was this conception that attracted Goethe.[6]

Goethe, it may be answered here, thought lightly of sins of the flesh, and perhaps that is true: but it is much truer,—and much more important to realize,—that he thought anything but lightly of the fundamental sin of craving for enjoyment at any price. That is the sin of magic, as it is the sin of lust, the sin that Faust sinned at the beginning and that pursues him to the end: he

[6] In the old story this element of lust is typified, in its most glorious and attractive form, by this union of Faust with Helen. In Goethe's drama that episode takes on a different character; there it is transformed into a symbol of union with the Spirit of Beauty in Life and Art; but its old place is filled by the pitiless devouring element in Faust's passion for Gretchen.

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does not win his release until with a last desperate effort he struggles to unlearn once and forever the magic spell, *die Zaubersprüche ganz und gar verlernen.* Not to escape by magic is the essence of the warning he gives to his own soul at the approach of Care, that insidious spirit of life-weariness which can drive a man to any drug. It comes to the old Faust, as it came to the youthful (and as no doubt it came to the old Goethe), but he escapes from it by work, and not by enjoyment. And as he braces himself for the struggle he looks back on his past life and sees it wasted in the emptiness of craving:

> Ich bin nur durch die Welt gerannt:
> Ein jed' Gelüst ergriff ich bei den Haaren,
> Was nicht genügte liess ich fahren,—
> Ich habe nur begehrt und nur vollbracht.

Thus, seeing that one form of enjoyment, and one only, and that the spiritual, can satisfy man, while many allure him, he has to recognize that he must refrain, renounce, deny himself, and Carlyle did well to insist that renunciation was really the keystone in Goethe's structure. Strange that the man who took the Christian name of *die Entsagenden,* "Those who renounce," as the motto for his Meister's *Wanderjahre,* should have been decried as a mere pagan and nothing more!

At the same time, it must be remembered that in a sense Goethe did think lightly of all sins, simply because he held that the soul of man could rise above them all. It is of set purpose that he makes the soul of his Faust be carried up to heaven by angels immediately after it has stained itself once more by a black deed against an innocent neighbor. Carlyle, old Puritan though he was, had the same large toleration. He also knew how often sin is only mistake, as Socrates thought it always was. Let a man once clearly see his true good, he *must* follow it. Carlyle, like Goethe, had faith in Byron that he would come to see that "his Corsairs and Harolds were not true" ("State of German Lit," C. E., I, p. 59);

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"not true," that is, because they did not correspond with the eternal standard of right that man was seeking for, even when he did not know it. The Corsairs and the Harolds may fancy that what they want is passion and success, but it is not: what they want is noble work. So in the song at the end of Faust, the angels call on the Vision of the Truth to heal the man who was damned himself. This it can do, because, after all, the man has never ceased to struggle and to love. At bottom he himself is Truth, as Novalis might have said. And therefore the fiery roses of the eternal love, dropping thick and soft from the sky, while they only torture Mephistopheles with barren desire, turn into the clearness of truth for Faust:

Wendet zur Klarheit
Euch, liebende Flammen,
Die sich verdammen
Heile die Wahrheit!

But renunciation, when all is said, is only negative, and Carlyle was thirsting for something positive. How he found what he wanted in the writings of Goethe must be set out in the second part of this essay.

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IDEALISM AND THE CONCEPTION OF FORGIVENESS.*

J. W. SCOTT.

ONE of the supreme tests of a *Weltanschauung* is the light it is able to throw upon the regulating conceptions of the moral life, especially at a moment when advancing experience threatens to entangle them in fresh difficulties. The difficulties which I wish now to bring

* The substance of a paper read to the mid-winter meeting of the Scots Philosophical Club.

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under the light of philosophical idealism are those which surround the conception of forgiveness. The general notion that forgiveness of sin is possible, or that there is such a thing as genuine acquittal for wrong, plays a large and regulating part in ordinary conduct. I wish to raise the question whether this notion is a valid one; because, for reasons which there is not space to specify, much of our recent culture seems to be antagonistic to it.

The difficulty which surrounds the question lies in the first place in this: that the idea of forgiveness in its simple form appears to belong to a general version of the universe which no longer anywhere satisfies us. It presupposes a law prescribing duties,—duties which from time to time we are supposed to have failed to fulfill. Our performances, in other words, have often in the past fallen short of what was required of us. These failures are past; and therefore they are facts, fixed and totally immovable. Forgiveness does not mean changing them; if it did, it were out of reach finally. Forgiveness is to be compassed, then, in another way. The future is before us. In it, we may either do more than the law requires,—and thus, by works of supererogation, make up for past delinquencies and make it all the same as though we had not committed them; or else we may avail ourselves of a specially provided means of escaping the reward due to our bad life, and reap the fruition of a good one in its stead; so that, in the next life, we enter upon the inheritance of the just in spite of our sin.

It were needless to deny that, on this view, forgiveness of some sort is rendered possible. In some sense there is acquittal or restoration. In some sense things are made the same to the sinner as though he had not sinned. But it all implies a version of things of which we are becoming more and more distrustful. A relation of externality is presupposed between every pair of factors in the case. It appears between the doer and his deed. It appears again between the deed and the reward or punishment which follows upon it. Consider for a mo-

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ment the doer. He has failed in what was required of him. The failure can be made good. The thing which was not done can be done at another time. How is this kind of reparation possible? When, ultimately, the omitted act is done, it is done under different conditions of time and place and circumstance. It expresses another phase of the agent's character, perhaps, or another mood of his mind. How, then, can it take the place of what was omitted? Simply because of the externality. The act can be detached from the doer and his circumstances and considered by itself. The conditions of the act do not count; it is the act itself which counts,—the thing which the law explicitly prescribes,—and its conditions do not enter into its constitution. The same externality is admitted between the deed and what follows upon it. It is supposed that the reward of a good life can be made to supervene upon a bad one; and that that is forgiveness. The thing is conceivable so long as we think of the life and the ultimate issues of it as externally connected; but on no other condition. It is all quite plain and possible so long as what I forfeit by my bad life is only some perquisite or advantage which was to have been externally attached to a good life by the decree of somebody's will. But if from any cause the life and its outcome should come to be inseparably welded together, the conception simply breaks down.

The whole idea, then, of making up for omissions and failures either by letting future good deeds counterbalance them or by letting the reward of good deeds miraculously follow upon them, rests on a mechanical basis. It presupposes a mechanical scheme of thought. It requires the detachment of deed from doer and of deed from consequence. And if, instead of speaking about omissions and failures, we speak about positive transgressions or 'sins of commission,' the case is exactly parallel.

Now, the same deep-going mental tendencies which make us reject this mechanical scheme of things and any conception of forgiveness which rests upon it, tend to

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make us feel supremely the difficulty of forgiving in any real sense. A brief consideration will show that the difficulty is especially acute at the very point where, on the traditional view, the duty of forgiveness is most plainly incumbent on us.

Tradition has familiarized us with the idea that we should hold a man responsible for what he does from deliberate choice, and that we should exonerate him if he can plead that he did not do it of his own free will. But suppose, as is likely, that those acts of the person for which we hold him accountable are not all *equally* the outcome of his unfettered and uninfluenced free will. Suppose that the will is always to a greater or less degree affected by certain propensities, feelings, desires, and so forth. In that case, to be consistent with the traditional view, we shall have to exonerate the individual *in proportion as* his acts spring from what is essential and unalterable in his nature. Actions which spring straight out of the depths of a man's character, if they are bad, will have to be forgiven him. If they are good, they will not be laid to his moral credit. Acts, on the other hand, which are not a necessity of his spiritual constitution, acts which, as the phrase goes, he 'could have helped,' are to be regarded as really his,—laid to his charge if they are bad, and accounted to him for righteousness if they are good. Now, however august the authority for such a view, or however accredited the systems of ethics in which it still appears, it is obvious that the whole scheme shrivels up under the fierce demands of the awakened moral consciousness. Default is to be forgiven when the agent 'couldn't help it.' Formally, the thing is conceivable enough. We may give a man his share of bread and wine and lucre, equally whether he is a knave and a fool or a knight of the Holy Ghost. But can we *be* to the knave or the rascal what we *are* to an honest man? Can we be to him what we are even to one a little more honest than he? And is it not in what we are to him afterwards that our forgiveness consists?

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The question, to a mind morally awake, is not whether we will restore to the offender some external thing which we had decided to take away. It is a question of whether we *can* restore in all its integrity that delicate intercourse with ourselves which is all he really lost, and all that is worth restoring. And we know the nuances of our own inner life far too well to think the answer easy. For the same reason, to profess to forgive on the old plea that the fault has sprung from character and was inevitable, may be mockery of the bitterest sting. "You have committed this thing," so meditates the forgiving mind; "nobody who is honest, or nobody with the instincts of a gentleman would have done it, but you did it. Only, now that I remember, you could not help it. You always act so. The thing is in you, rooted in your character. I forgive you." A verdict like this may possibly mean that the deed is passed over and ignored, and the doer with it. But no moral consciousness of any delicacy could ever take that for forgiveness.

There seems to me to be but one promising standpoint from which to regard this question, if we are to attain a view of forgiveness at once valid and morally satisfactory. The trouble is that we are not, and cannot feel as if we were sufficiently external to each other to put the simple conception of forgiveness into practice. In view of this fact, the only hope seems to lie in frankly accepting the conditions as the refined moral consciousness presents them. Acknowledge boldly that the things for which we cannot forgive a man are just the things which spring straight out of his human nature. The reason we hesitate to do this is that it seems to imply a divorce between responsibility and freedom. It seems to imply that we hold a person to be accountable, and deserving of full punishment for the very acts in which he has least choice. But this is only because we have not taken in full earnest the idealistic doctrine that

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a man's will is his concrete character. For then we should see that the act which springs most spontaneously and inevitably from that character is just the act in which the individual is most really free. It is this spontaneous utterance of his whole being which is most inalienably identified with him, and from which he can least of all be exonerated until he has borne its full consequences.

If we accept the conditions in this way we throw into relief the real *sine qua non* of forgiveness. Forgiveness is possible if it can be seen that the bad act did not spring from the whole, true, complete character of the agent. This assumption seems to be true to our actual experience. The only forgiveness which we really practice is of this kind. We forgive things which do not fully express character. When we apologize, for instance, we 'explain.' We endeavor to show that an act apparently characteristic was not really so, that it came by accident out of a character which, when it utters itself spontaneously, utters other things.

To bring out the consequences of accepting this position we must make a closer inspection than we have yet done of the phenomenon we are studying. What *is* forgiveness, as we know and meet it in everyday life? It is in the first place an experience, and one which implicates two minds. One of the two may be divine, but there must be two,—a forgiver and a forgiven. Further, forgiveness is the restoration of something; and what is restored is some sort of spiritual communion. Moreover, before it could be restored it must have been interrupted; and what interrupted it was the sin,—the offending act. Now if that offending act which makes communion of spirit no longer possible was the real and genuine expression of the offender's character,—and in so far as it was so,—it could not be forgiven however much the offender might wish it. It would then represent all that the character was capable of,—what it really was, and what it really did. It could not be forgiven because it could not be changed.

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It would always be itself and always be done again. It would remain there, as long as the individual was there, a solid rock of habit against which the current of forgiving love might beat and break in vain. Or, to change the metaphor, the forgiving mind might stand at the door of that sinning soul and knock long and lovingly; but he would never enter. And the mere will of the inmate would be as impotent to open to him as his mere will to force an entrance. The facts all seem to throw us back on the severer conditions. Nothing less will do for forgiveness than that the old act which gave the offense be changed. It must have the light of a new context shed upon it, and in such a way as to change its color and its character. The bad act must be got out of the context in which anyone who looked straight at it would naturally take it to stand. It must be released from this its obvious setting and placed in the ampler context of the real character. We must be able to show that the act as it naturally appears is not the real act. We must show that the judgment which makes forgiveness impossible,—the judgment "this is the type of thing he does,"—is untrue; and to do so we must show that the judgment "this is what he did" is untrue. We must prove that he who passes such a judgment is not really seeing the thing; that the act which he sees was, strictly speaking, not done. In a word, the past deed must not be a hard, fixed, immovable fact; it must be alterable. This is the indispensable condition if things are to be 'made the same again,' where the restoration of them means not restoring a forfeited reward, or granting a formal pardon, but reëstablishing a suspended spiritual intercourse.

Sin is forgivable, then, when that which gave offense can be shown not to be typical of the character. So far as it can be shown central to the character and native to it, it cannot be forgiven. Does this fact, now, throw any light on the crucial question whether human action is ever by its very nature beyond the reach of forgive-

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ness? Is action ever such that the character cannot possibly be exonerated from it? I speak throughout, of course, of character. The question has no application to any merely natural being. Character is the only thing we ever forgive. We do not forgive a stone for breaking a window; nor do we forgive our dog for thieving except in so far as we read a rational character into him. The question is, granted rationality in the agent, is there anything in his deeds which is inalienably part of him and for which, therefore, he can never by any possibility be exculpated or excused?

The answer is: Yes, there undoubtedly is something which a reasonable and moral being absolutely cannot help doing. Every act he performs has one aspect which is bound to him inseparably,—which he repeats every time he does anything. Every time a person acts at all, he does what his character, in the circumstances in which it was placed at the moment, determines he should do; if we take 'character' and 'circumstances' in the full extent of their meaning. This is always inevitable. Any alternative, if we take it rigidly, cannot be so much as distinctly imagined.[1] To conceive precisely the same self, in precisely the same circumstances, doing a different thing, is as impossible as to conceive how two and two should make five. No line can be drawn between the self with its circumstances on the one hand, and the act which issues from them on the other. The very fact that the issue was different would *mean* that the self was different. To bring another act out of the self, however little different from the first one the act might be, would inevitably imply a change in some of the infinitely delicate threads which weave the texture of the self at any moment. It is necessary, then, to man to do at any moment what character and circumstances, taken in all their completeness, determine. That, therefore, cannot be forgiven him. That is fairly in his character.

[1] See an article on "Idealism and the Question of Moral Responsibility," INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, Vol. XX, No. 3, p. 329.

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But what *is* this ugly fact?—this responding to circumstances, which is the necessary feature of all the acts which the self performs? In the first place, there is no need to let our minds be obsessed by the mere word 'necessary.' We are speaking throughout of the self, a being of rational character. Further, let it not be forgotten that when we choose to express necessity by saying: "Such and such a being could not have done any other act than the one he did," our statement has only one possible meaning, namely, "This is the being who really did the act." Such a statement, applied to rational character is not an assertion of necessity at all, but of the opposite. To say "he is the being who really acted" means "he is free." And to any being except a rational character the statement has no application whatsoever. In fact the self's moral response to its circumstances, if we think the matter out, is nothing more or less than the activity of rational synthesis. It is but the practical aspect of the same synthetic activity which Kant exhibited as the core and essence of human knowledge. But being so it does not need forgiveness. It is never wrong. It is the one thing in the world of which we can say that, so far as it is at all, it is right. Wrong action (or rather *the wrong of* wrong action,—for no action is merely wrong) is just the privation of it.

We may now put our point shortly. We have detected the one activity which is absolutely inseparable from character and therefore cannot be forgiven. That activity is synthesis. This is an operation to which the rational self is finally committed. Character can never cease to 'solve' its moral situations. Reason can never cease to 'construct' its world. Just in so far, then, as an act expresses synthesis, it is, on our former admission, unforgivable. But of synthesis we can say what we can say of nothing else,—that *just in so far as it is at all, it is good.* The more there is of it,—*i. e.,* the deeper and wider it is,—it is the nearer to the ideal. It is the one thing therefore which, so far as it is present

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in an act, places the act beyond the need for forgiveness. The completely unforgivable sin, to put it paradoxically, would be just that which can never be a sin,—synthesis in its completeness.

And here we have a negative, but, I think, a valid argument for the essential forgivableness of human wrongdoing. We have accepted the finding of the refined moral consciousness that it "cannot forgive a person for what is really in him"; and we have found the one thing which, if idealism be true, is really and fatally 'in' a human being. What makes him a rational character at all is his power and tendency to synthesize. So far as that is present, then, it is unforgivable. But the unforgivableness of that is not a thing which need give us any apprehension; because just in so far as it is present it is good—completeness of synthesis or system in experience being the idealistic conception of goodness. Consequently, so far as true synthesis is absent,—so far as the synthesis which the act expresses is incomplete or distorted,—the act is forgivable. And defective synthesis, again, is the idealistic meaning of badness. Hence we have the result: the bad act is forgivable, and it is so in virtue of the very perversity by which it is bad. By that defect it escapes the one condition which would make forgiveness inapplicable to it. Of course, it is not always forgiven when it ought to be. Doubtless we, with all our weaknesses and limitations as human beings, are not always able to forgive when we should. But that is not the present question. What we have tried to show here is that there is no *essential impossibility* about the thing. There is no prohibitive barrier anywhere which would justify us in ceasing to regard forgiveness as a valid human duty. We fail in it, as in all our duties. But the fault, if our argument is correct, is in us and not in the nature of things.

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CONFESSIONS OF AN INDETERMINIST.

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FROM Hume's time down indeterminists seem to have been regarded by their 'soft' opponents with a certain disapproval, as displaying a kind of intellectual coltishness, a disposition to shy foolishly at a harmless form of words. Determinism, it is pointed out to us, is but the scientific term for the universal causal system of relations. In the field of conscious activity it means merely that your actions are the expression of your character. What would you have them? Expressions of something that is not your character? It means merely that the various dynamic strains which make up your being function always and inevitably,—allowance being made for the conditions of the moment,—in their natural way. How would you have them function? In an unnatural way, the beginning (impulse or thought) one thing, the outcome another? Is a hiatus in a process a desideratum?

To return an affirmative answer to this query has an irrational sound, for it appears to be a deliberate preference of a defective adjustment to a perfect one; yet substantially that is the answer I must make. I *would* have *some* measure of laxness, or incomplete connection, between the past and the present, old events and the new one. It may not be the truest insight to locate this hiatus, this (mechanical) imperfection, at the moment of choice. It may be truer to say that existence is subject to change, not only through determinate interactions, but from its own inherent incapacity, at least in its newer and younger types, of maintaining a function in absolute uniformity; and that it is the character rather than the particular act that is to some degree undetermined and subject to unpredictable change. *Somewhere,* however, I would have a measure of inexpugnable indetermination, believing that, in a universe so richly potential but so imper-

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fectly dominated by intelligence as ours, better conceptual results lie in the direction of regarding absolute perfection of mechanism as, not an eternal condition, but an only partially realized principle, the limit of an endless though waxing series.

This, of course, is a value judgment, and doubtless will seem to many a wanton one. My defense is that, determinism's claims being so sweeping, the choice is necessarily between two world views, and that the one which apotheosizes mechanism is to me unattractive. It is essentially, as I view it, the product of the reaction of the sixteenth and seventeenth century physics from the scholastic Aristotle, a reaction which was wholesome methodologically, but questionable metaphysically. It was essentially a return to Eleaticism, though, of course, of the Democritan type; and Eleaticism, whether ancient, when it was *preached* and *sung,* or modern, when it is taken for granted, also roots in a value judgment, in the imperious emotional[1] demand that all explanations of change shall be found in agencies external to the individual (that is, the concrete, organized bit of existence which seems to be the agent), and that existence in itself shall be accounted eternally changeless, inviolably virgin. Now, this world-view is to me (1) unacceptable logically and (2) distasteful emotionally.

I. From the logical point of view I experience much discontent with the average determinist's treatment of the question. Not only is he prone to assume the point at issue by insisting that all explanation must be in mechanical terms, but, like Hume,[2] he is not above arguing from logical contraries instead of contradictories. If, his argument runs, it be not true that every part of existence is determined, then it must be that no part of it is determined; and into what a bottomless bog of uncertainty and horrid chaos are we forthwith plunged!

[1] Emotional, because it is the outcome of a craving for simplicity and cognitive ease.

[2] *Cf. e. g.,* "Enquiry," Section VIII, Part 2.

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Another common, but more subtle fallacy, is the turning of a methodological postulate into a true induction. The postulate that there is order and continuity in the world, and that it reaches far beyond present knowledge, is a necessary one to science, since otherwise she would have no field for her interpretative constructions; and one also which is, of course, amply justified by its actual services. The determinist, however, construes it as an established induction, wide as existence itself, and proceeds to transfer to the induction honors which belong only to the working postulate. As a matter of fact, universal determination, or uniformity, as an inductive conclusion, is a mere enumerative generalization, and one, too, resting in part on hypothesis or assumption, since the uniformities established are never absolute. Because, within the limits of our observation, inanimate nature reveals only determinate activities, why must we conclude that nothing more would be revealed anywhere, if our knowledge were complete? Verification of such a wholesale conclusion is, of course, out of the question; and an induction which cannot be verified can claim to be more than an enumerative generalization only when it *furnishes a better explanation than any other* of the phenomena involved. Now, determinism, having taken the whole, the universe, for its field, signally fails to meet this requirement. As a world scheme I find it altogether lacking in true genetic quality. According to its account, there has been no genuine evolution at all, only an age-long shifting of unchanging elements. All the characteristics of the real units of the world, and therefore virtually,—that is, in sure prophecy, as for example that of the "Laplacean calculator,"—all the seemingly acquired characteristics of the complex forms of existence, have always been present in the world, the latter awaiting only the moment when the permutations eternally predetermined,—the proper cosmic shuffle,—should bring them into their present aspect. The universe is a kaleidoscope, eternally determined units of existence are the bits of

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glass, natural law the controlling framework, and indestructible motion the revolving and shifting agent. The appearance of progress in the combinations which have come under human observation is due merely to the brief time-span of that observation, and to the fact that the relatively continued occurrence of highly complex combinations was the necessary condition of the very existence of observing organisms.

To the present confessor this scheme has the look of an evasion of the real logical problem, a mere pushing back of its more refractory elements to a remoter stage, where they are less obtrusive, indeed, but quite as intractable as ever. It is no explanation of the world's wondrous complexity, no slightest hint as to the genesis of that complexity, to say that if we could see into the heart of things we should discover that that complexity had always existed, changeless in amount, changeful only in arrangement. It is doubtless true that the statement makes a plausible answer to the ancient question how a *changeless* existence can wear a *changeful* aspect; but that is merely to find a hypothetical solution for a hypothetical difficulty, to knock down an obstacle the inquirer himself has set up.

II. Nor is the determinist world scheme more acceptable to me emotionally. It requires of me the impeachment of my own faculties by its reduction of our feeling of freedom (in the sense of contrary choice) to "inveterate illusion."[3] This favorite resource of the hard-pushed theorist awakes antagonism in me. I feel that somehow, as Carlyle maintained, nature is true and no lie. It impresses me as something faithless in thought to open its gates to this wooden horse of skepticism. Who is to set the limit to "inveterate illusions," if they are to be admitted to the citadel of immediate perception?

Objectively, too, determinism's resolution of the world's seeming advance toward greater complexity and higher

[3] Spencer's characterization.

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values into a mere meaningless change is offensive to me. It being really a value judgment, a matter of interest and not of coercion, I confess that I see only folly and not virtue in thus going behind the returns and fixing upon the emptiest and harshest interpretation.[4]

When, impressed by the weighty names of some of its adherents, I entertain that interpretation tentatively, forthwith I find myself spiritually divorced from nature. The old kindly fellowship is gone, and I get glimpses of an alien existence which has a certain appalling aspect; of a universe which, for the instant that the insight lasts, looks to me as the death's head in Moore's "Lalla Rookh" may be supposed to have looked to its dismayed followers, or as the rising tide doubtless looked in former days to many a victim bound to a stake below high-water mark. This is an instinctive reaction,—abnormal possibly, but not at all artificial. The secret of it doubtless lies largely in the sense of individual impotence which comes over one, the feeling of the futility of all personal interests which are not guaranteed in the eternally determined scheme. For the moment, at least, the fact that the world-plan may include many agreeable experiences for myself is shut out by the forbidding aspect with which this modern destiny confronts my individual preferences and aspirations.

Oh, but all that, interposes my determinist reader, is an illusion, a mere bogey raised by the false point of view you have chosen. It is the point of view of the external spectator, of a discrete existence apart from the universe. That is a thoroughly discredited mode of thinking. The universe does not forbid your aspirations; quite the contrary; the universe is their real source. In

[4] Space is lacking for the discussion of the optimistic claim of the absolute idealist to the effect that complete determination is but the means by which the Absolute realizes its eternal ideals. I can only say that for me his system has such a partial, and withal gingerly, connection with recognized reality that it remains a bare possibility, a remote heir of faith not a serious suitor at the bar of reason.

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so far as you have aspirations, in just so far the universe is necessarily favorable to them, since they are its product, parts of its own functionings. In other words, determinism does not mean in the least that one is constrained by a system of things apart from himself, but only that he and all his activities are expressions of and constituents in a larger whole, which, of course, in the last analysis is the actual agent.

To this I reply by accepting unreservedly the point of view prescribed, that of the observer and critic who is a constituent part of the world he examines. This is for me the true and also the habitual standpoint. The significant thing, however, for this discussion is that the world as constructed by the determinist *itself separates me from that point of view.* His world is so different from reality as I know it in my ordinary experience that I find myself instinctively and as a matter of intuitive and immediate reaction looking upon it as an alien. It is true that reflection modifies this reaction. By carefully localizing myself in the alleged cause-bound system, and by identifying myself with it as one of its myriad functionings, I find it possible to change my feelings toward it. We cannot view ourselves just the same as we do the alien. I do not find, however, that the underlying sense of futility is greatly changed. Still the question arises whether personal striving is worth while in such a world. Not that I get lost in the old foreordination pragmatic bog, and argue that since the outcome is predetermined anyway, it is useless for me to take pains toward either achieving it or averting it. The man who should act thus would only show that he had not escaped the cosmic decree which destined him to play the fool. In the determinist scheme decrees are too well hidden for any such personal argument. Nevertheless that scheme, when accepted and realized, induces in me a feeling of the essential hollowness of experience, of acting a part in a dubious show, which leads to a distaste with life. Then indeed, with our futile illusions, "what fools" we "mortals be"!

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Perhaps I shall be recommended to read Spinoza, and learn from him the secret of the intellectual love of the cosmos, the æsthetic satisfaction of contemplating eternal process absolutely determined. Now, I confess that the universe *as a mechanism* does wear an aspect of charm to me. I find pleasure in contemplating the (empirically established) orderliness of the world. Scientifically construed nature has for me a new and different beauty from that which she displays to me as an everyday beholder; but that charm, that new and different beauty, vanishes when the determinist interpreter insists upon the *apotheosis* of the mechanism. Admirable servant that it is, it is not fitted to be a god.

My position will no doubt seem foolish to some men, and certainly many seem not to share it. Most persons, of course, do not theorize at all as to the nature of their freedom. Some who have read more or less upon the subject appear to have little interest in it. Their interests are sensational, not reflective. On the other hand, an important class of thinking men do find interest in determinism, and accept it with more or less willingness when they find that it meets most readily certain proximate, if not superficial, ends of thought. These are generally the intellectually and economically favored. Being strong individually and well placed in the competitive world,—a kind of psychic aristocracy,—the concept of destiny turns its fairest aspect to them. An order of things, however rigidly constituted by antecedents and supported by determinate interactions, probably does not easily seem an undesirable one to men to whom it has hitherto furnished, on the whole, the best that experience has to offer. Why should it not do equally well by them in the future?

To those who encounter largely the rough edges of the world it wears another aspect. There are such men, men who share with the myriads of earth's 'non-elect' (also mostly non-vocal) in human denial and struggle, and at the same time in the metaphysical interests of the educated. To them life is a striving against odds, and con-

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sciously so, with the issue often in the balance; and to them the news that their strain and perhaps pain, their steadfast purpose and persistent battle, are but passing incidents in cosmic processes, is calculated, if believed, to raise the very practical inquiry, *"Cui bono?"* and to dry up the springs of action. The universe, if it would have its work done by men of this type, had better, it would seem, keep the secret of its rigorously cause-bound organization to itself.

Now, it appears to me that it is precisely to this class that the true significance of that secret should disclose itself. It is in the balanced situations, the cases of unstable equilibrium, where the more familiar agencies largely offset each other, that the subtler forces are best recognized and gauged. Says Goethe:

> Wer nie sein Brod mit Thränen ass,
> Wer nie die kummervollen Nächte
> Auf seinem Bette weinend sass,
> Der kennt euch nicht, ihr himmlischen Mächte!

So it seems to this confessor; it is to the thinker who is in the thick of a life struggle of very uncertain issue that the forbidding lineaments of an absolutely determined world look forth with least disguise.

It may be urged that this contention is disproved, or at least offset, by the fact that religion is so often deterministic in outlook, and yet it does not generally regard the universe as forbidding; rather is its attitude toward the universe one of faith and trust. My reply is that religion proper is not deterministic, but the contrary. Like common life, however, it does not criticise its postulate of freedom. It is theology which is prone to be deterministic, and ordinary 'systematic' theology is but a branch of speculative philosophy, a more or less optimistic absolutism.

A more cogent objection will probably be that my analysis is self-destructive, in that it shows that what men are really concerned about is not theoretical constructions, but empirical values. A rigorously deter-

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mined world, it will be urged, is not necessarily an offense to a man, so long as it yields him the satisfaction he craves. It is only when he encounters frustration and denial that he rails against cosmic causation. His real grievance, then, is, not that the world is determined, but that it is determined in a way not to his liking. Now, on the formal side I acknowledge the pertinency of this criticism. One who holds that appreciation of value is a fundamental characteristic of existence cannot well question its sway on the human plane. On the material side, however, I find it by no means sufficient; for in my experience, and I doubt not in that of most reflective men, at least in middle life, the consciousness of self as an original agent, an ultimate center or seat of productive activity, is itself a satisfaction of first rank. Indeed, as sensory satisfactions wane, this often becomes the only one of dominating force. In other words, individuality is not a mere means to conscious values; it is itself a conscious value of primary importance, as Carlyle has preached to us with sufficient variety of emphasis and trope.[5]

This brings me to what is doubtless another main root of my antipathy to determinism: it has no place for genuine individuality. However 'soft,' it is a fatal solvent of individual being. Professor Thorndike tells us "that the *natural constitution* of the world makes meliorism possible and in fact *necessary,*" and adds that "no one needs . . . to swap the logic of science [?] for that of hope in order to justify the faith that *we* make the world better."[6] But is not such a faith due rather to one-eyed logic, a logic which looks at only one side of the situation? If the amelioration is "in fact necessary," "owing to the natural constitution of the world," it is not *we* who

[5] *Cf.* "On Heroes," Lec. II: "It is not to taste sweet things, but to . . . vindicate himself under God's heaven as a God-made man, that the poorest son of Adam dimly longs."

[6] "A Pragmatic Substitute for Free Will," in "Essays Philosophical and Psychological in Honor of William James," p. 587; italics mine.

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make the world better,—such a faith is mere futile delusion,—but the world, which, in slow, blundering fashion, makes itself better. *We* have ceased to be in the ordinary empirical sense; 'I' have become a general term for the perpetually succeeding combinations in a certain diminutive stream of cosmic process, and 'my' feeling of efficient individuality with personal interests is another inveterate illusion. Now, it is a property of existence as it is present in me, a property quite immediately and instinctively manifested, to resent and oppose this living dissolution. There is evidently some principle of self-maintenance about every real individual,—organic or inorganic,—a principle which not improbably, as it seems to me, is the root of the instinctive repugnance of most minds to the necessitarian theory on its first presentation. All this will doubtless be to the 'tough-minded' philosopher but another illustration of humanity's foolish fondness for illusions; but I confess my inability to discover why an instinctive reaction of repugnance of this sort is not as genuine a natural phenomenon, and as significant a one, as the repulsions of a magnet or the affinities of a chemical element.

The one individual immediately known to us,—ourselves,—is known (possibly illusively) as a seat of causal agency and of final values, values which call for no explanation beyond themselves. Determinism, however, bids us regard that individual as, not a seat, but a kind of sluiceway, through which pour mingled streamlets of determinate energy from a thousand different sources in the past. Curiously enough the sluiceway has taken to itself airs, and come to identify itself with the streams that pass through it, and even to dream that results effected within its limits (values) are in an ultimate sense its own property,—a clever device on the part of nature for securing proper care of the dynamic gate, which we must admire, but can by no means understand,—whereas those results, if they exist for anything at all, exist for the universe. The universe, then, the All, as Spinoza

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held, is the only true individual; for in that there is immanent and not merely transitional efficiency, and whatever of final as distinguished from instrumental values may exist. Now, I must own that the mental satisfaction,—or is it psychic repose?—which some thinkers derive from this conception quite escapes me. Why is it easier to think of the universe, which as such shows little enough of individual characteristics either in unitary organization or persistence of type,—why is it easier to think of it as an originating agent than to think in that way of the individual of experience? Is it because the ineluctable mystery of efficiency, when it is pushed far enough from the inquirer, subtends a smaller retinal arc in his mental vision? One thing appears to be evident to-day: it is not because the vaguer cosmic conception has worked better in the field of physics, where it has had most vogue; for now we see that science finding its centers and stores of energy in the atom, not in the All; that is, turning from the shrine of Democritus to the long-contemned cathedra of Aristotle.

I must further confess my discontent with the well-meant efforts of would-be reconcilers between necessity and freedom, the closed and the open universe. My interest in freedom is not confined, as Professor Thorndike evidently thinks it rationally should be,[7] to finding a place in the world for consciousness as a factor affecting results, nor to showing "that the natural constitution of the world makes meliorism possible, and in fact necessary." By a very possible hypothesis as to cerebral arrangement and function, Professor Thorndike seeks to indicate how man's conscious processes may well be integral links in the chain of causal activities, and, without any indeterminate postulate, may be effective for melioristic results. Now, this hypothesis seems most pertinent as against the epiphenomenalist,

[7] *L. c.*, p. 587.

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but as against the indeterminist it quite misses the point, at least in my case. To discover the mechanism by which my thoughts and feelings, desires and struggles constitute mere trifling, albeit integral, incidents in cosmic processes, is not to remove my emotional antagonisms to such a situation. When once the sometime illusion is dissipated, as well be a halo as a mere cog.

Nor can I accept Mr. Schiller's irenic mediatorship,[8] as he seeks to make the libertarian position more acceptable to the determinist by construing indeterminate situations as temporary gaps in a perfecting universe, gaps left that the misdeveloped, especially bad men, may have opportunity to come to a better mind and under the sway of righteousness. When this saving process is completely effected for all, and the world is 'wholly harmonized,' then, we are told, indetermination will cease to be, man's 'freedom' will be wholly calculable, and law will be all in all; for when an individual has attained to and enjoyed perfection, why should he ever descend to imperfection? Why, indeed? But what if perfection, both in the individual and in a world 'wholly harmonized' be an illicit conception as applied to actual existence? A state of perfection would seem to transcend all feelings of need, at least in any coercive sense; and if, as seems to be the case, consciousness is ultimately a function of a sense of need more or less coercive, then when the world becomes wholly harmonized, consciousness along with indeterminateness will cease to be, and, pragmatically, perfection will be indistinguishable from the void.

Moreover, what is perfection? Is it a fixed Platonic idea, which all conscious beings are bound to recognize and agree about when once they are sufficiently developed? The hypnotic force of these ancient static conceptions from Elea and Athens was perhaps never better exemplified than in the fact that in ethics they seem

[8] Studies in Humanism, pp. 399f.

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to have thrown their spell even over Mr. Schiller.[9] For myself I can only confess that moral distinctions have no absolute character, but appear to be dependent upon personal values,—factors varying with the individual and his experience,—and that therefore a 'wholly harmonized' universe is an impossible ideal. Perfection for me is a kind of mathematical limit, or 'retreating vision,' to use a phrase of Philips Brooks,—an ideal to be reached after and approached but never attained in any final sense. Nor as an ultimate condition has it any charm for my thought, unless it be occasionally in hours of fatigue or disappointment. Such hours do indeed enable me to understand how strenuous souls like Augustine could picture a changeful militant earthly life as leading to an Eleatic heaven; but normally I think of the one "far off divine event, to which [we hope] the whole creation moves," as quite sufficiently provided with the seeds of new issues and new needs.

I must even confess that indeterminism has for me a metaphysical, even more than an ethical, interest. It is an essential factor logically and æsthetically in my conceptual construction of existence. The evolutionary world-process I look upon as a veritable progress from original relative homogeneity in the direction of value-realizing organization,—an actual acquirement of character, and not a mere recollocation of elements with characters eternally fixed. Existence I think of as originally inchoate and undetermined,[10] but characterized by a quasi-consciousness, a rudimentary sense of value. Its history consists of *experiences,* that is, events which have left their mark upon it, either in the way of acquired character (change of nature) or in that of confirmations of previous acquirements. In either case past experiences are registered in individual existence as inner de-

[9] And to have won what seems a sympathetic consideration from Professor James. *Cf.* "Pragmatism," p. 120.

[10] Undetermined, that is, in the sense of the opposite theory,—undetermination,—not in the sense of complete absence of character.

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terminations through that principle of the maintenance of satisfactory function which we call habit. In this scheme indetermination is evidently a primordial genetic postulate; it is, also, an essential working principle, since without it there could have been no variation in the original undifferentiated existence, and so those manifold determinate types which are now the elementary materials of the world could not have arisen. Indeterminate and determinate thus become but correlative adjective distinctions of earlier and later stages in a process essentially one, the former characterizing the fluent, formative stage, the latter the established, stereotyped, habitual one. With the multiplication of determinate forms in the evolutionary process, variation can, of course, be accounted for more and more through differences of external condition; but I see no reason to think that variations due to the original, internal, that is, indeterminate causes have ceased to be. Rather do the problems of organic variation suggest that this primordial cause is still at work. Indeed, I cannot conceive how the principle of determination, valuable and indispensable as it is, could possibly come to dominate the whole field of existence, unless that existence has an essential shallowness which the progress of discovery is far from indicating. To affirm universal determination seems to me to declare that the world has ceased to develop, and is now engaged in the senile process of shifting and reshifting its past gains. But why should any one affirm it; that is, why, aside from the despotism of a conventional concept? On every side we look in vain for the realized ideal; why, in the absence of proof, should the mechanician insist that his ideal at least must have been attained? The world under criticism proves defective in every direction; the final completed and henceforth immutable result is nowhere in evidence; why then posit such a result in the principle of mechanism?

And what if the highest values in mechanism appear

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only when it is instrumental, not the end of the series? What if the cardinal service of the determinate is to be building material for the use of more fluent, free, and variable forms of existence? And what if an Eleatic-Platonic insistence that in this changeful world *something* must be absolutely changeless,—if not matter then law,—what if that dogmatic demand be a Procrustean bed for actual impulsive existence, which even under the most iron bonds of habit still has something living about it, which in its higher forms is always groping its way toward betterment, and which at its highest is essentially an aspiration, a progressive agency gladly holding fast to its past gains by means of the principle of determination, but at the same time able and eager to turn in any direction that promises enlargement and enrichment of being?

Such is in fact the aspect which existence bears to this confessor, and to him indetermination seems to have as integral a place in the developed world condition of to-day as at the dawn of time. It appears in the first place to be still needful, though not *so* needful as once, for producing new types of function and of corresponding value, and thereby furnishing materials for the working of selection, whether natural or conscious. This may be called its objective function, and I see no reason to suppose that it will ever pass into desuetude. Whatever the *amount* of variation introduced by determinate interactions in the secondary and later stages of the development, it would seem that these must always be less radical, less novel and surprising than the variations of indeterminate origin, and so,—even when possibly more valuable structurally,—of a *different* character, and the doers of a different kind of service.

In the second place, on the subjective side, the side of the present process and the immediate agent, a certain inexpugnable indeterminateness,—a species of free psychic kobold,—is an indispensable factor in that constructive existential flexibility without which genuine

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progressive development seems inconceivable. Passive flexibility, mere capacity of submitting to changed conditions,—if such there be,—offers, at least in the absence of an external constructor, no promise of new and higher types. Were an improved form to occur fortuitously through mere change of conditions, why should it endure when the coercive conditions cease or change? Any accommodation that is fraught with promise of real progress must be an active and formative one, and involve constructiveness, a constructiveness evidenced by the subsequent persistence under changed conditions of the resulting type. Now, this constructive adaptiveness has an intelligible meaning if it is the appreciative susceptibility to new values brought within its experience of an existential form more or less determined in various ways, but not fatally so, at least in its highest functionings. On the other hand, it becomes a baffling conception, one involving something like an infinite regress, if it is interpreted as the mere resultant of a congeries of absolutely determinate and eternal factors under equally determinate conditions; for development seems to characterize existence intensively to a limitless extent, and at each stage of intensive analysis the same problem of flexible accommodation and progressive construction arises afresh. Doubtless one may, on this scheme, posit an absolutely elementary form of existence,—electrons, for example,—but the imagination is appalled by the task of endowing these elements with a sufficient opulence of function to account for all the activities they are supposed to display under suitable conditions.

To this should be added that probably the highest example of constructive flexibility is that fore-seeing, deliberating, and judging habit which characterizes voluntary action as such and makes man a moral being. In this high function existence attains to vision, and no longer *feels* its way. Construe this as a multiform, but essential, susceptibility to values, a susceptibility not rigidly fixed but subject to change apart from circum-

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stances, and we have what, in the view of the present writer, is properly meant by free-will. In this sense for him free-will is essential to individuality, since only it locates the central, ultimate conditions of choice in deliberative situations in the individual rather than in antecedents and circumstances beyond him. When, also, we query as to the genesis of this function, a certain indeterminateness of nature is called for, not only at the beginning and the end, but in the process likewise, since it would seem to furnish,—both through the alternative ends which it presents and the defects and failures in action to which it often leads,—the most admirable discipline for extending and strengthening this high individual function of choice.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

MARCUS AURELIUS AND THE LATER STOICS. By F. W. Bussell, D.D. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1910. Pp. xi, 302.

Dr. Bussell's learned and brilliantly able work, closely as it follows the text (all along with exact citations) both of Marcus Aurelius and (on a smaller scale) of his predecessors, Seneca and Epictetus, gives in the end an estimate from a rather special and individual point of view. In the general history both of the Roman Empire and of ethical philosophy, the Stoics are usually treated as marking a stage in the process by which European law and morals were constructed; not, of course, a final stage, but still one that meant positive advance and contributed substantial elements to later codes. Dr. Bussell's aim is to bring out, not these (though he cannot entirely ignore them), but another element which undoubtedly existed, though it was not, as readers might be inclined to think from some of his pages, the whole or almost the whole. This is what he himself occasionally calls the 'Buddhism' of the Stoic Emperor; his stress on abstention, detachment, the worthlessness of life considered in its details, though the world according to his creed is perfect as a whole. And similar positions are brought out in his predecessors. As in Buddhism, the practical result is the duty of universal forgiveness, or more exactly, of passing no judgment on transgressors, who are parts of the whole determined from their own equally valid point of view. Each for himself, if he seeks to live 'according to nature,' as they said in the school, must limit himself to keeping pure the portion of divine spirit within. If by persuasion he can reform others, good; but if he cannot, it must rest there, and is doubtless right in the rational order of the whole. How incompatible this was, if taken by itself and logically carried out, with the duties of a Roman emperor, Dr. Bussell shows; but, of course, he is obliged to admit that Marcus devoted himself conscientiously to the performance of those duties. It is really to the credit of the emperor's sincerity, he observes, that so many incompatible positions are to be found in his "Thoughts," noted down without any attempt at consistency or symmetry; but

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the author himself clearly holds that this Buddhistic teaching was the genuine outcome of Greek philosophy, and the final expression of its 'intellectualist' attitude to the world.

One special position, I think, he has distinctly made out; and that is, the close approximation of Marcus to the idealism and mysticism of the Neo-Platonists. Yet here, though he recognizes, in a general way, the logical superiority of the later school, he never points out precisely where the difference lay. In reality, the idealism which with the Platonizing Stoics was only a sentiment, was by Plotinus scientifically founded. The last of the Stoics is still compelled to speak of the soul as a 'vital spark,' a portion of the elemental 'fire' or 'breath.' In the Neo-Platonic system, it is strictly defined as unextended being, and no longer confused with some finer kind of matter.

The general question, however, arises, in relation not only to the latest schools, but to all: Was the outcome always essentially 'quietism'? Dr. Bussell holds that it was so from the first. The philosophy of Ionia, because it sprang up at the point of contact between the Hellenic and the Eastern worlds, "cannot be called a native product of Greek soil" (pp. 18-19). To be this, we are tempted to ask, ought it to have sprung up in Laconia or Arcadia? Could the Greeks bring out their distinctive thought only in the absence of contact with foreigners? Are we to have Protectionism in history? "Philosophy," he goes on, "in its birth is essentially Romantic; and subjective impressions take the place of exterior law." How curious then that it should have anticipated the fundamental principle of objective science, which is still *Ex nihilo nihil.* And, in fact, when we come to consider it, we can see that Dr. Bussell's generalization here is explicitly wrong, if he takes Greek philosophy to have either begun or ended in the passivity which we call 'Oriental,' because this has been the character of some Asiatic thought. If 'activity' is the character of the West, then Greek philosophy was preëminently Western. At its beginning in Ionia, it was closely connected with active scientific research. At Athens its association was at first equally close with the activities of politics and the law courts. Its abstention from concrete business was only part of the rational division of labor required if theorizing was to be done at all. The greater detachment, brought on compulsorily by the decline of the city state, was compatible in the Epicureans with warfare on pop-

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ular superstition, and in the Stoics with a profound influence on something so practical as Roman law. The Cynic, who has been compared to the Christian monk, really made it his social function to be a sort of Socratic 'gad-fly.' And the Neo-Platonists, mystics as they were, succeeded in overcoming a certain emptiness which (I quite agree with Dr. Bussell) gave a tinge of melancholy to the life of the Stoic sage. This emptiness was in part due to the depreciation of intellectual culture in an exclusively ethical interest. Moral law, when it is conceived as a law concerning no content at all, ceases to have a real meaning. One thing that the Neo-Platonists did was to restore the ideal of the theoretic life as a source of happiness. And this life did not mean barren contemplation of the perpetual flux of things as to a certain extent it does in the more speculative passages of Aurelius; but, as in Aristotle, implied a whole structure of social life and systematized scientific investigation. And when the school had worked out to exhaustion its distinctive metaphysical ideas, its last teachers, turning back to Aristotle, passed on the tradition of the sciences of nature through the Arabians to the Christian Scholastics and thence to modern Europe. Even the Pyrrhonic Skeptics, it is worth noting, bear the impress which we agree to call that of the West. Dr. Bussell no doubt remembers how Sextus Empiricus argues that the Skeptic will act, though there is no scientific demonstration that one mode of action is better than another, because not to do anything would be tedious. In his actions, having no rational criterion, he will take as his standard the customs followed by sensible men of the world.

This may be taken as a general correction of Dr. Bussell's somewhat special point of view; but there is something more to say. The undoubtedly pessimistic tone of thought in the earlier Empire was not wholly the result of a one-sided philosophy, but was in part the expression of a sense, sometimes clearer and sometimes obscurer, that the world of ancient culture was in decadence at the centers of its life, and that the practical problem of the statesman was in the main to check a decline of which the end was inevitable. This raises the question of Dr. Bussell's political presuppositions, which are indicated in his very lively first two chapters. With these I propose to deal in the remainder of this notice; referring only for illustration to the latter part of the book.

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Dr. Bussell does justice to the Roman Empire as a system worked out with high intelligence and conscience to provide for the ordered life and material good of the mass of mankind. With genuine impartiality he remarks that "Rome, unfairly weighted with the odium of the Ten Persecutions of the Christians, is yet the first state that discovered and practised religious tolerance" (p. 9). He also insists on a certain fundamentally republican character that always remained in the ancient polity. There is, no doubt, some exaggeration when he says that Augustus could not have foreseen that his own Empire would become an ideal; and that the modern monarch's titles of honor were utterly lacking. Augustus did much to direct the idealization of his monarchy by the poets of his age; and among his titles of honor found in Greek inscriptions are those of Autocrat, High Priest, and God. Nevertheless, the contrast drawn by Dr. Bussell is broadly true. "'The King can do no wrong'; *'Le roi est mort! Vive le roi'!* are two ideas which lie [? not long since lay] at the background of the stability of Europe, and are by no means mere sentiments or convenient fictions of the law. Yet they involve ideas which a Roman in the most servile period would have repudiated with scorn" (p. 3). Compare page 126, note: "For the ideal was still republican, impersonal, abstract; whereas to-day our interest frankly centers round our First Family, by right of immemorial lineage." Again, page 5: "From one brief but pregnant sentence of Tacitus we gather the remarkable difference between the aristocratic modern world of to-day and the democracy of the classical peoples: *'Reges ex nobilitate, duces ex virtute sumunt'* ("Germania," 7). "It is not too much to say," he continues, "that to the acute observer, who refuses to be deceived by the harmless and necessary turmoil of democratic legislation and reform, European Society, [mark the capital!] in its firm loyalty to monarchs who are 'born not made,' to a governing class that is never a bureaucracy, and to the laws of succession and property, relies for its surest foundations on the hereditary principle. And this, just because the people are free, and with their instinctive good sense prefer to place power in those whose past traditions are a guarantee of confidence and good faith, and who breathe a purer air of patriotism and disinterestedness, apart from the narrow conservatism of officialdom and the intrigues of professional politicians."

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It seems extraordinary, and in reading some passages I am tempted to think it is 'only his fun,' that a writer with the impersonal insight to see and describe the features of a higher type should, apparently from some personal prejudice, be attached to the lower, and thus collapse into what is, on the whole, merely a eulogistic account of the politics of the snob. Compare another passage, where he dwells with complacency on the quiescence to-day of "anything approaching educated republicanism" (pp. 25, 26). From a broadly historical point of view, the reason of the contrast so far as it exists is plain. On 'the way down' (from the Athens of Pericles and from republican Rome) the old forms and modes of thought long survived, till at last they became a shell, while kingship was returning from the East. On 'the way up' (from the consummation of the Roman decadence) the reverence for the king by divine right, the *deus in terris* of the consecrated barbarian monarchies, survives as a type of sentiment both in higher and lower social strata, though the effective political interests (as I venture to think) have gone elsewhere.

As little as he allows it in Epictetus or Marcus Aurelius can the claim to consistency be allowed in Dr. Bussell himself. With the line so far taken it is quite consistent that he should display ostentatious respect for the government of Russia and contempt for that of France (p. 8), though both are admitted to rest on popular consent. To speak of "countries essentially democratic, such as France, Russia, China, the United States" (p. 125) is deliberate paradox with a grain of truth in it. When, however, he remarks incidentally, as if accepting the antithesis, on "the subservience of a once aristocratic world to democratic Christianity" (p. 164), and on the opposition between "Secular Science and Christian Democracy" (p. 165), he seems to be approaching sheer contradiction of what he said before on the relatively democratic character of the classical world. And while Epictetus and Aurelius are usually treated as culminating instances of the tendency of "Philosophy, that dangerous and seductive foe of the Common Life" (p. 16) to Oriental quietism, they are, on the other hand, in their occasional reflections on the futility of political action as compared with the prior task of correcting one's own character, made to point a sneer against all active attempts to reform our modern world. "What would our liberals say to the de-

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thronement of their noble Discontent?" (p 180.) Finally the attempt to fuse contradictions runs into an incoherence like this: "Louis XVI, if not an incapable, was a 'philosopher-king'; yet the success of that unaccountable movement, the French Revolution, was due to his (unconscious) following Marcus's rules" (pp. 183-186).

In this instance the usual brilliancy and point of the writing fail through straining; but in general the contradictions and overstatements of the book are merely the faults that accompany these qualities. It has been written in close contact with the facts; and the somewhat eccentric point of view (for a philosopher) gives it suggestiveness. Not to fail on my side in candor, I will state my own taste or perhaps counter-prejudice on the merits of the political contrast drawn between the ancient and the modern worlds. Here I think Dr. Bussell's distinctive paradox is sounder than the commonplace he perhaps inadvertently accepts elsewhere. "The Roman Empire, in spite of the plutocratic basis of society and taxation, was far more democratic in its temper and its possibility than we shall see Europe in our lifetime" (p. 126). This was, of course, consistent with a kind of aristocracy, as it was called by ancient philosophers, though modern usage often calls it democracy, namely, selection by merit. Another idea of aristocracy formulated by the ancients was the notion of a natural superiority of race. Aristotle said, for example, that a superiority in physical beauty not greater than that of the gods, as compared with ordinary mortals, would be thought to confer on the race that possessed it a right to rule. This too, from its resemblance to the idea of merit, seems to have a kinship with rational democracy as contrasted with the aristocracy of mere institution which Dr. Bussell, no doubt rightly in the main, takes to be that of the Middle Ages, continued into modern times. Whatever kind of natural selection may have produced the actual ruling classes, the theory of their authority became one of delegation in theocratic form. They were not God-descended, like the ancient ruling races; but the anointed king, 'the deputy elected by the Lord,' conveyed, as the 'fountain of honor' the descending degrees of nobility. Now this idea was easily applied to consecrate what Renan calls the naïve Teutonic acceptance of the rights of birth, which he expressly contrasts with the idea of selection predominant in the time of

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the Antonines. How naïve this notion of birth was we may see in Tacitus, from whom we learn that, among the German tribes, nobles, ordinary freemen, and slaves were indistinguishable as regards culture. The result of the theocratic idea superimposed on this may be seen in a monarch like the Tsar Alexander III, who, while recognizing that he had only the intellect of a peasant, could yet resolve to 'do his duty' (as tyrant and persecutor) because his position as autocrat was conferred by God. Compared with this, the "*Qualis artifex pereo*" of Nero seems to me relatively noble. And I immeasurably prefer Philip II and Alexander III of Macedon to Philip II of Spain and Alexander III of Russia. Yet may we not add that the best ancient and modern thought agrees in making socially supreme an ideal of equal impersonal justice as a norm under which even the highest natural powers are to be exercised? If Dr. Bussell had cared, he might have found this, and not merely the struggle to remain personally uncontaminated, in Marcus Aurelius.

T. WHITTAKER.

London, England.

THE STORY OF THE BIBLE. From the Standpoint of Modern Scholarship. By Walter L. Sheldon. Second Edition. S. Burns Weston, 1415 Locust Street, Philadelphia, Pa., 1909. Pp. 187.

Mr. Sheldon had a rare capacity for making things plain. As lecturer of the Ethical Society of St. Louis for more than twenty years, he covered an astonishingly wide range of topics. But whether he dealt with the Bible or Dante, with Aristotle or Spencer, he always knew how to extract the meat and to give, in a simple and effective manner, what he felt that men were most in need of. He had little taste for subtle distinctions, minutiæ of criticism, chronological details, or elaborated elegancies of style. He saw things in the large and took his hearers to the heart of every subject he treated. Everywhere he searched for the moral value; and when he found it, he set it forth interestingly and impressively. Mr. Sheldon had a great love for the Bible. His "Bible Stories for Children" is an admirable book; and his "Life of Jesus for Children" tells the wondrous tale with sympathy and insight.

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In the book of which a second edition is now offered to the public, he sought to present the modern critical estimate of the Bible. He realized that, even in circles otherwise distinguished by general culture and a keen interest in literature, there is in our country a deplorable lack of information concerning the Jewish and Christian Scriptures, and that this applies not only to the results of critical study, but also to the contents and character of these books. Being too straightforward and anxious to supply what he knew was needed to assume an acquaintance with even the most elementary facts, he told the story 'as to a little child.' In this he was right. By so doing, he has performed a real service. At the same time the maturest and best informed mind will find in the book much that is suggestive and stimulating, especially in his treatment of the God-conception and the spiritual value of the biblical books.

In publishing the new edition, Mrs. Sheldon desired to have it revised by some eminent scholars and was able to secure the services of Prof. Morris Jastrow, Jr., of the University of Pennsylvania, and Prof. James A. Montgomery, of the Episcopal Divinity School of Philadelphia. Professor Jastrow has written a helpful and appreciative introduction and added a few footnotes to the sections dealing with the Old Testament; and Professor Montgomery has indicated, in a few footnotes, the somewhat earlier dates and different views as to the genuineness of New Testament books prevalent among more conservative scholars. Some misprints and minor inaccuracies should have been corrected. In the chronological table 'Hadrian' is, of course, a *lapsus pennæ* for Vespasian; on page 57 'Cornhill' is a misprint for 'Cornill'; on page 124 'The Blessing of Enoch' should have been changed to 'The Book of Enoch'; the statement that Judas Maccabaeus set up independently a kingdom lasting only for a few months, should have been removed, and attention should have been called in footnotes to the facts that Genesis 3 is regarded by scholars as earlier, and not later, than the great prophets; that the ten tribes of Israel were not wiped out of existence in 722, and that the long prayer ascribed to Solomon in I Kings, 8, with the exception of one verse, is held to be of Deuteronomistic origin. Professor Jastrow wisely remarks that "the problem of the Sabbath is a particularly difficult and complicated one," but he would have laid the readers

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of this book under greater obligations if out of the generous fund of his special knowledge of this problem he had offered some useful hint as to the probable solution. The present writer cannot agree with Professor Montgomery (p. 154) that "the admission of the genuineness of Philippians brings in also Colossians and Ephesians (at least as a working over of a Pauline original)" and that the authenticity of the Fourth Gospel is recognized by a perceptibly growing number of independent investigators (p. 159). Though admitting the genuineness of Philippians, after the necessary criticism of the text he considers Mr. Sheldon's statements on these points nearer to the probable truth than the suggestions in the footnotes. But these are after all minor matters on which scholars may disagree, however important they may seem to some students; and though one might wish that the revision had been more thorough, and be convinced that Mr. Sheldon would have welcomed it, had he lived to see this edition, it is very easy to understand the hesitancy, on the part of the scholars who kindly undertook the work, to retouch these sketches that are so admirably suited to their purpose.

The value of the book lies in the rational method of dealing with the questions discussed, and in the moral enthusiasm and truly religious spirit characteristic of the treatment throughout. Mr. Sheldon's avowed purpose was to persuade men to "search the Scriptures." To the end of his life, in the midst of the manifold duties of the ethical ministry, he found time for the study of the Bible. No orthodox minister could have shown more zeal for the spread of biblical knowledge or wisdom in planning for the instruction of the young in the great saving truths of the Bible, though he no doubt would have defined these truths somewhat differently. Mr. Sheldon's Sunday school was a real school. It was a place of earnest study, carefully laid out, wisely conducted, and fruitful in true knowledge of the Bible and other morally valuable literature. Eminently a practical man, a skillful organizer, one who knew how to make things go, he was humble as a learner, constant in his search for truth, independent in his judgment, and apt to teach. These qualities are reflected in the book, and it may therefore be heartily recommended. Let no reader omit the chapter on the God of the Bible. Its opening paragraph is wonderful. The great simplicity, the deep sincerity, the absolute reverence char-

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acterizing this confession produce an effect that cannot easily be effaced.

NATHANIEL SCHMIDT.

Cornell University.

CHRISTIAN IDEAS AND IDEALS: An Outline of Christian Ethical Theory. By R. L. Otley, Canon of Christ Church, Regius Professor of Pastoral Theology and Honorable Fellow of Pembroke College, Oxford. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1909. Pp. 400.

"Fullness of life (περισσὸν ζωῆς) is the Christian ideal. This does not mean simply 'an equal, all round, harmonious development,' which can only be dismissed as a sheer impossibility considering the actual limitations of human nature, but rather 'the realization of man's highest capacities by the sacrifice of the lower'; the cultivation of moral and spiritual power by self-limitation, by careful concentration of energy on what is best worth seeking. . . . The Gospel encourages man to contemplate life in its totality; to consider what are its essential elements, what its primary purpose, and how that purpose may be best fulfilled by each individual. This is the real importance of Christ's example. He claims to be *the Way, the Truth, and the Life.* He reveals the true meaning of life, the greatness of its possibilities, and the discipline by which alone it can be raised to its perfection" (pp. 215, 216). "Christianity does not introduce a new law, but substitutes for it a life, a personality, in which the law of righteousness is perfectly embodied and represented. In his relationship to God and to mankind, in his attitude toward life and its problems, in his submission to the common lot of humanity, in his antagonism to evil, in his testimony to truth, in his acceptance of suffering and death, the Redeemer exhibited a certain type of character, which the New Testament describes as the 'mind of Christ.' All growth in character thus depends upon the effort to imitate a living person and to study a living mind" (p. 151). But it depends also on the indwelling presence of Christ. The power to realize the ideal is Christ 'formed' in man, the central principle of thought, emotion, and will. "The doctrine of our mystical union with Christ is a fundamental element in the Christian system of ethics" (p. 15). "The gift of power is the end of all God's

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dealings with man, the climax of his self-manifestation" (p. 382).

These quotations give a fair idea of the character of the book. The standpoint is that of pastoral theology, which means "the application of the revealed truths of religion to the actual and present needs of mankind." Most of the substance of the book, Professor Otley tells us, was delivered in the form of lectures to candidates for the ministry; and, if one may venture to express an opinion, it seems, on the whole, admirably adapted to its purpose. The student of the *science* of ethics will perhaps find it unsatisfactory. For the author does not critically discuss his authorities, nor does his work appear to be based on such a critical examination. He quotes indifferently, *e. g.*, from every part of the New Testament which bears on the subject in hand. And he seems to do this deliberately, with the express "aim of exhibiting the point of view from which Christian thinkers of every period have approached ethical questions, and so illustrating the vital connection that subsists between the moral *ideals* of Christianity and its characteristic *ideas*" (Preface). Consequently, he quotes abundantly also from other writers, both ancient and modern. A special feature of the book is the extent to which sermons are quoted from and referred to. Non-Christian writers as well are used for comparison and illustration. For, in the author's opinion, Christian ethics is inclusive of all the results of independent ethical inquiry. Its ideal is capable of expansion and development, and the particular duties it commands vary with time and circumstances. But Professor Otley conceives his work throughout in the spirit of the New Testament, whose "primary aim is to produce, not so much a habit of correct thinking about morality, as a certain type of life,—the godward life, the Christ life" (p. 19). There is no serious attempt at a systematic treatment of ethical questions. The solutions of difficulties are, usually, practical rather than theoretical. For example: "What is the relation of the duty of self-development to that of self-sacrifice? Attempts have frequently been made to find some point of reconciliation between ideals which are roughly (and inaccurately) contrasted as the 'Hellenic' ideal of self-culture and the 'Hebraic' ideal of self-sacrifice. It is not difficult to see that these two conceptions of life are not necessarily at variance. The simple truth is that, in view of the all-pervading fact of

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sin, and the presence in human nature of lawless tendencies and impulses, the true self can only be developed aright with the aid of a certain measure of discipline and restraint. Conversely, the aim of all self-repression is the development of personality, the enlargement of capacities for service. Accordingly we are prepared to find an ascetic element in Christianity, a call to self-denial and sacrifice" (pp. 214, 215; also p. 183). The inadequacy of this explanation as a theoretical solution becomes apparent when we contemplate the possibility of a man more or less free from 'lawless tendencies and impulses,' called upon to sacrifice his life for others,—a real possibility illustrated once for all in the case of Jesus Christ.

One feels, however, that the absence of strict systematic treatment has its advantages. It enables a writer to keep more closely to the facts of life as a rule, and to illustrate the ideal more concretely. Our author's treatment profits in this respect by his method. It is eminently practical and sane. It avoids extreme theories. Moreover, it succeeds in presenting Christian morality in an attractive form, owing largely to the fact that particular duties are shown in the light of the ideal of a full life, a life which the author seems convinced Christ is able to produce in all who surrender to him.

Of special interest at the present time is Part IV, containing a discussion of Christian ideals in relation to the Family, the State, and the Church. Such questions as the problem of divorce, prohibited degrees, restriction of births, disestablishment and disendowment, religious conformity, 'interpretation' of the creed, etc., are frankly faced. We cannot do more than refer to them within the limits of this review. Professor Otley's views are important as representing the moderate opinion of the Anglican Church on these subjects.

David Phillips.

Bala, North Wales.

Personality and the Christian Ideal. By John Wright Buckham. Boston: The Pilgrim Press, 1909. Pp. vii, 263.

The general idea of this book is a fruitful one; it is that of concentrating on a single problem light from as many sources as possible. This method has produced some of the great books of the past, and from it are sure to come other great books in

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the future. Thus it has recently been pointed out that James's "Psychology" is a work of art, in which physiological psychology, experimental psychology, and pathology have been drawn upon and their results made to converge upon particular problems. Ordinarily, we have to unite and compare the conclusions of specialists for ourselves, but when a competent author undertakes to help us in this way his service is welcome. This is one reason for the great hold of the "Republic" on the world. It contains poetry, philosophy, preaching, a psychological interpretation of society, and an ideal social construction in one concrete, organic whole. And this author writes because he believes that "the paths of philosophy, psychology, ethics, and theology which have been diverging more and more since the middle of the nineteenth century are once more converging,—at the point of personality," and because he desires "to help to a further understanding of personality, especially in the wealth of its meaning in and for Christianity."

To the performance of his task the writer brings a comprehensive mind, a generous spirit, great moral insight, and a clear literary style. He holds the sympathy of his reader, even when his logic is unsatisfactory. Indeed, this is no book for a pedant to review. Certain chapters glow with earnestness and are marked by great nobility of thought. Chapter XII, *e. g.*, is really an inspiring sermon on Kant's great text: "Always treat humanity, whether in yourself or another, as an end, never merely as a means." In reading this appeal, so fine and clear and true, the critic forgets his criticism and asks himself if he has sinned. To criticise such passages is ungracious and inhuman, for they are not the mere expression of an idea that may be examined in cold blood, but rather the upholding of a noble ideal which our hearts will not let us reject. Chapter XIII, on "The Personalizing of Life," is of the same order. In general, the preaching of the book is splendid, far better, in the opinion of the reviewer, than its psychology and philosophy. Much of it is a restatement of some of the noblest ideas of the New Testament and of historic Christianity in the technical terms of modern thought, and in this part of his work the author is singularly interesting and suggestive. Again and again, famous passages in the Christian Scriptures are made to appear like a window of heaven through which shines a light irradiating and beautifying human life.

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The philosophical position of the book has been concisely put in a few sentences in the chapter on "Personality and Individuality." "Individuality thus differentiates itself from personality as belonging to the natural order, a distinctively racial product, while personality belongs to the eternal order and is an intrinsic reality. Individuality is the concentration of racial, indeed of cosmic life and acquisition in a single race unit." It is "only the product of a nature process, the final link in a chain of cosmic succession, . . . the segregated unit of a common racial life. . . . The human individual is thus the crown and summit of the natural series, the consummation of the evolutionary process of individuation. As such he is most express and admirable, but this does not make him a person." What, then, does? Since he cannot attain to personality by continued evolution, something has to be added on, something from a world of other dimensions. "Individuality is a time product, a 'life phenomenon'; personality is a supertemporal noumenon. The person is not susceptible to organic decay and disintegration. It is only as he admits disabling and destructive forces of his own spiritual order that he degenerates. Physical forces cannot directly affect the person. . . . The evolutionary cycle does not take place in the realm of the personal."

In the light of the last sentence, the reader wonders what to make of the statement that frequently occurs, that personality develops, that it is a matter of degree, etc. The chasm between the empirical personality and the real is made so steep and deep and wide that it seems impossible to bridge it, and an organic view of human nature is in danger of being lost. The passage in which it is stated that "that which relates the True Self and the empirical self to one another, determining which shall be dominant and controlling, is the *Will,*" I do not find intelligible.

As to the origin of this True Self, we have nothing more definite than the statement that it comes "from above." "That higher selfhood is not an evolution from below; it is an impartation from above." But this, we are warned, does not mean pre-existence of our diviner part. This is "supertemporal," "and that which is above time, though it may be intimately related to the time order, cannot be simply a time product." If our finite personalities are created at all, it must be by "*Eternal creation,*" which, it is explained, "*means, a Perfect*

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Self so timelessly imparting itself to an imperfect self, and thus so constituting it, that the relation is at least not less than that of Creator and created."

To such straits is one reduced when he dichotomizes human nature and attributes the origin of one part to a natural and of the other to a supernatural world! Can anybody but a sophisticated Kantian even suppose himself able to think such thoughts? After "eternal generation," the reader is not surprised to find the Logos idea of the Fourth Gospel, the Trinity, and other characteristic doctrines of evangelical Christianity rehabilitated and defended by similar arguments. Not only is ordinary human nature dislocated, but we are told that Christ, as the True Self, must be distinguished from Jesus of Nazareth. The former is the Light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world, the latter being an empirical personality. Between God and nature much the same relation exists. For those who already hold the Christian faith in this form, this may be very helpful and illuminating, but for those who do not, the discussion is obviously not profitable. It may be true, as the author says, that "each of us belongs to two orders of existence,—the eternal order and the time order," but it does not seem legitimate to use the former as a refuge into which one may escape when hard pressed by difficulties of explanation in the latter. The physicist does not carry his solution as far as possible, and then attribute effects of unknown causes to divine agency. For the modern mind generally it is "all God or none." So, the importation of an incomprehensible noumenon adds nothing to our understanding of the empirical or natural, but rather deprives it of all significance. And it is rather strange that this writer does not discuss the view toward which the logic of modern thought tends, namely, that the difference between individuality and personality is really a difference of degree, the latter being the highest product of evolution.

It would be an injustice, however, to dwell too much on the philosophical difficulties presented by this book, seeing that it is not merely a work on philosophy. Ethically, it is of great value, for it lays the stress where it ought to be laid, on personality. The victorious tone of many of its pages is the tone we need to take and keep. The majestic ideal of a self-ruling spirit is admirably presented, and the spirit of the writer is contagious, so that the reader finds himself desiring to be more of a person

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than he has been before and to attain to the state in which "there is no more cowering before fate, no more surrender of self-respect to escape the hand of abuse. The soul has awakened to the fact that it is stronger than all its enemies and is at rest."

GEORGE R. DODSON.

St. Louis.

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL: A Criticism of the Augustinian Point of View. By Marion LeRoy Burton, B.D., Ph.D., President of Smith College. Open Court Publishing Co., 1909. Pp. 234.

This is a weighty and important treatment of an ever-interesting theme. The book has eight chapters of careful and condensed review and appreciation, as well as criticism, of Augustine's theory of evil. It starts with a clear statement of the questions by which Augustine was confronted in his apology for Christianity. In opposition to Manichæism he had to maintain the unity and the all-controlling sovereignty of God. Dr. Burton points out the uncompromising attitude Augustine took on the subject of whether God was the source of all things, and shows that in Augustine's theory nature was God's creation, and therefore must be inherently good. Augustine, however, also taught, as Dr. Burton shows, that nature was created *ex nihilo,* and thus opens the way for his doctrine of sin as privative, and a *deficiens.* He also confuses *malum* and *peccatum,* and in his discussion of what is *malum* declares it to be a *privatio boni,* a corruption or negation, and hence not a created nature. Then in the third and fourth chapters the author gathers together Augustine's answer to the question: Whence comes the evil? Quite justly it is pointed out that Augustine definitely tried to reject the Manichæism and its dualism in which he had lived for nine years; and in a rapid but most admirable survey of the important passages Dr. Burton shows how Augustine rejected the evil principle theory; the theory of its source in nature; the preëxistence theory; the "flesh" theory, and the theory of contrast. Then he goes on to show how firmly Augustine held and defended the theory that sin was in the will, and that whether in the preëxistent world of angels or in the world of human life the seat of evil was with Augustine always regarded as being found in the will.

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In the fifth chapter the freedom of the will is discussed, and the controversy with Pelagius is entered upon, and the various kinds of freedom are given. We are admirably and clearly introduced to Augustine's distinction between *causa efficiens* and *causa deficiens*. In the sixth chapter the conception of sin as original and actual, is briefly treated, and in the closing two chapters we have the final outcome pointed out, and then a very cool, calm, and searching criticism of the whole position with an exceedingly sympathetic attempt to retain the elements of permanent value, while rejecting the faulty metaphysics, and the false conceptions of a non-evolutionary world of thought.

The wealth of reference to Augustine, and the fine frankness with which passages are fully quoted, which make difficulties for the commentator, mark the scientific and candid spirit in which a most admirable piece of work is done.

At the same time the present writer is not convinced that even the searching criticism of Dr. Burton's last chapter quite fully sets forth the real weakness of the teaching of Augustine. In spite of all Augustine's endeavors to free himself from the errors of Manichæism, he simply did not do it. The very doctrine of metaphysical imperfection in the created nature which leads to his treating corruption as possible, and in some passages as in the "Enchiridion," Chapters IX to XIV, as a self-destroying element, leaves the door open for the establishment of a permanent dualism in a corrupted mass of humanity eternally doomed to sin and *evil existence* out of which only a number are saved. And the inevitable result of this was to weaken the force of Augustine's otherwise clear teaching of sin as rising in the will, and to a transference of sin to the corrupted flesh. So that in passage after passage Augustine talks of the corruption of the flesh as the sinful taint, and not simply now as a penalty for *peccatum*, but as a source of *peccatum*. Some of these passages Dr. Burton himself quotes.

In fact, Dr. Burton treats Augustine as altogether too self-consistent. Augustine in dealing with the Pelagians uses language thoroughly dualistic. And for popular purposes the Devil becomes the principle of evil, and God's grace the principle of good. And even while claiming all created things as good, so far as they are from God, he admits the eternal existence of corrupted nature apart from God. As over against

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the Manichæans, Augustine maintained a certain freedom of the will, and as over against the Pelagians, he maintained the entire inability of man save only as a grace that is irresistible lays hold of him. Dr. Burton has not, we think, sufficiently remembered that Augustine was a furious apologist for a system he took over on authority. He was aiming far more at crushing his opponents than at establishing a self-consistent theology or philosophy. An exceedingly crass realism jostles in Augustine with idealism, and even while treating of corruption as self-consuming, he postulates its eternal character. Indeed, his conception of God as the only unchanging good leaves all created things unstable and only relatively good, so that the fall becomes inevitable, and once man has fallen we have established an evil in nature of which their nature eternally partakes. Here all the religious defects of Manichæism reappear. His treatment of baptism is most vulgarly dualistic, and he drops back into the mechanical corruption of Manichæism, and proclaims baptism as the magic freedom-giving rite.

An ever-present churchly interest dominates the thought of Augustine, and hence logic is never in complete control of the field. This organization interest shines out most in Augustine's controversy with the Donatists, where he makes baptism ordinarily essential to salvation, and treats it in the grossest way as a magic for the purification of the flesh. And this purification goes on without any exercise of the will in the case of infants.

Nor can we think that Augustine's defense of marriage can be taken as seriously representing the New Testament point of view. Only an ideal marriage, impossible since the fall, is really pure, and even in the marriage relationship of Christian parents the children are polluted in the very inception. Here it cannot be a case of sin in the will, but is a pollution transferred to the flesh, and it becomes in the flesh a *causa efficiens* of evil, which only baptism can wash away. We may readily explain Augustine's position, but we cannot defend it, and he became the father of a Catholic theology with a crude dualism corrupting the thought of God at its very source, with a sacramental magic made necessary by the external pollution of the corporeal life.

Dr. Burton's criticisms in the last chapter are exceedingly just and clear, but do not seem to the present writer to deal

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thoroughly enough with the actual dualism that underlies all Augustine's thought.

The book has a useful bibliography, although not professing to be complete, and the clearness of style and constant insistence upon the points made, make the work a most valuable apology for Augustine's theology.

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HABIT-FORMATION AND THE SCIENCE OF TEACHING. By Stuart H. Rowe, Ph.D. New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1909. Pp. xvii, 308.

The object of this volume is to emphasize the fundamental place of habit in our mental economy, to indicate the more important habits to be developed during the school years, to analyze the mechanism of habit-formation, and to instruct teachers and parents in the methods to be followed in making good, and in breaking bad, habits.

In a way, it would be correct to say that Rowe has used nothing but the stock concepts with which we are all familiar in the classic chapter of James on habit, but it must be admitted that he has done a valuable service in exploiting these concepts more fully and more carefully than James or any other previous writer in this field. Instructors who have used James as a classroom text cannot fail to have noted that, while the average student is attracted and even fascinated by the literary qualities of his treatment, he often does not, as a matter of fact, carry away from his reading systematized, serviceable, and permanent information about the substance of the text. This criticism cannot be directed against Rowe's book, for his treatment is detailed and systematic,—perhaps at times so over-systematic as to impress one with a sense of Kantian formality,—and yet at the same time enriched by analyses of concrete habits of so much value that we would gladly see more of them worked out for the prospective teacher.

The fundamental topics of which the volume treats are the distinction between habits and ideas, the selection of habits, methods of evoking initiative, methods of securing practice in habit-forming, methods of preventing exceptions and methods

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of breaking habits. The place of habit in moral training is developed in a special section (Chapter XII) on habit-forming as applied to school discipline. Discipline is the process of forming valuable habits. Of these the most important (from the standpoint of the school, which the author has always in mind) are "order, obedience, respect, reliability, independence, diligence, accuracy, quickness, carefulness, punctuality, kindness, courtesy, neatness, and erect posture." For moral training there must be added to these, "temperance in eating and drinking, cheerfulness, economy, prudence, clean-mindedness, kindness to animals, justice, devotion, loyalty, patriotism, coöperation, conscientiousness, appreciation of the beauty and marvel of nature, and an optimistic confidence in the Supreme One which will carry with it an habitual tone of responsive, willing service." It will thus be seen that, for Rowe, the greater part of the virtues, which to others might seem essentially ideals and hence lying outside the field of habit, are, at least in their basis, instances of habit.

The root concept of all these moral habits is service, so that "any habit included in the realization of service appropriate to the child's age would be worthy of a place," and the positive task of the teacher and the parent, so far as moral training is concerned, is primarily to arouse initiative of service and to ensure practice in habits of service, while on the negative side, moral training is primarily training in self-control.

In this discussion, as indeed elsewhere throughout the book, Rowe lays stress, and very wisely, upon the necessity of a systematic and comprehensive plan of work, *i. e.*, in the inculcation of habits, just as in the imparting of information, both teacher and parent should appreciate the fact that they are confronted with a definite problem, should consider carefully all the possibilities of the situation, and should proceed systematically, persistently, and intelligently to secure the desired result. This insistence upon habit-formation as a definite and extremely important problem in mental and moral development constitutes the chief feature of Rowe's treatment of the subject, and renders the book, in our opinion, of unquestioned value as a contribution to applied psychology.

GUY MONTROSE WHIPPLE.

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PHILOSOPHIE DE L'ÉDUCATION: Essai de Pédagogie Générale. Par Édouard Roehrich. [Bibliothèque de Philosophie Contemporaine.] Paris: Félix Alcan, 1910. Pp. 288.

The present work is an essay to which a prize was awarded by the Academy of the Moral and Political Sciences. Both in conception and execution the book is well deserving of grateful recognition. A detailed explanation of the carefully chosen title helps us to understand the exact scope of the work and the place in the science of education it is intended to fill. M. Roehrich has undertaken to carry on the work of the great classical writers on education, principally, I think we may say, Rousseau and Herbart, and to give an outline of the general aims and principles of education, abstracting from the special exigencies of particular epochs and societies, and from the idiosyncrasies of particular pupils and classes of pupils. He seeks to vindicate both by express argument and by the example which he gives by following it, the method of Rousseau: he shows that Rousseau's isolation of his imaginary pupil from the influences of home and school and society was, methodically, a brilliantly conceived device to give prominence to the general, the permanent, the typical elements in education, as opposed to the detailed and the transitory. M. Roehrich does not pursue Rousseau's method in detail, but he does in general confine himself to a discussion of the individual human being, and the common aim which his preceptors should at all times and in all circumstances keep in view. Thus he may claim that his work may justly claim the title Philosophy of Education; for it aims at exhibiting the fundamental and typical problems of all education, and not at discussing subordinate problems of school organization and the art of teaching. Again, it is an essay in General Pedagogy, because it discusses the problems of all and any education, and not the special problems of a particular period or stage of society. This distinction is certainly useful, and M. Roehrich complains that French manuals of pedagogy suffer grievously from not recognizing it; it may at all times be difficult to adhere to it rigidly in practice; but much good should result from bearing it in mind.

The author also gives great prominence to another distinction, which he has derived in this form at least from the French mathematician and philosopher, Cournot. To judge from the

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quotations which M. Roehrich gives from this great author's contributions to the educational controversies of his day, his insight and breadth of judgment must have been extraordinary; and M. Roehrich has performed a great service in giving such prominence to Cournot's views. The distinction in question is that between 'educative instruction,' and 'professional instruction.' The second is the kind of instruction given 'in special schools and professional institutions': "These schools do not at all aim at effecting the moral education of the pupils intrusted to them. They receive them usually at an age at which they are supposed to have a will sufficiently determined, an intelligence sufficiently mature, to study and work toward a very practical aim, such as the entrance into a career or the preparation for public work" (p. 88). "The other kind of instruction pursues an educative end. The subjects taught in these schools should contribute toward forming the sentiment, the intelligence, the will, and in the last resort to train men for a virtuous life" (p. 89). This distinction might not prove itself wholly impervious to a ruthless criticism, but few educators would deny its great practical importance, and the light which it can throw on many fiercely disputed questions as to the precedence of one branch of learning over others.

As will have been seen from the above quotation, M. Roehrich adopts the now very prevalent view of the aim of education: that is, that its aim should be the training of character. M. Roehrich's very comprehensive view of 'The Good' and the moral end (pp. 249-262) might seem to turn the edge of a criticism which would insist on the 'communication of information' as one at least of the aims of education. In fact, it might not be impossible to exhibit education as consisting wholly in the 'imparting of knowledge,' without prejudice to any of M. Roehrich's *media axiomata.* In either case, harm would be done rather by the perverse application of the fundamental principle than by its adoption in the sense in which our author wishes it to be understood. It is interesting to note that M. Roehrich's account of the Good is mainly derived from the fusion of intellectual and moral elements found in Plato and Schleiermacher.

Our author's discussion of the psychology of interest and attention is extremely lucid, and it marks a real advance on the views current in the most widely read text-books. A very good

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chapter is devoted to the subjects of instruction, special prominence being given to the utility of the story of action and the fable ("the epic poetry of the animal world") in kindling intellectual attention and evoking wholesome moral reactions. The claims of ballads and folk-songs, of national epics are enforced at what would be disproportionate length were it not for their undeserved neglect. A very interesting defense of the 'classics' is based on the view that they represent a relatively unsubtle and unsophisticated age of the world. The treatment of natural science is somewhat perfunctory, showing little advance on the generalities of Rousseau: it is lacking in the fine luminous distinctions which the author shows himself able to draw in discussing literary and grammatical questions. His treatment of discipline, of the training of the body, and of direct moral instruction is admirable, showing insight no less than experience. Many of his remarks on these subjects might be pondered over with great advantage by many English educators, who are so apt to lapse into facile laudation of 'discipline' and of 'sport.' The following passage may not contain the whole truth of the matter, but it contains a good deal (pp. 226, 227): "Physical exercises, the purpose of which is to make the body robust and supple, are not at all identical with the exercises comprised under sport. These latter are not intended solely to cultivate vigor and address, but also and principally to deserve the applause of the crowd, or at least of a public of connoisseurs. Sports excite vanity excessively, and substitute artificial for conscientious duties. The [true] ideal is to become vigorous, and not at all to have covered one's self with glory in this or that memorable match."

In an excellent "Conclusion" the author defends his method and the limitations which he has imposed upon himself, showing very successfully that many of the actual problems of education cannot be solved by the mere consideration of general principles,—and that the school cannot in any case perform the task of moral and social regeneration which high-flying enthusiasts would impose upon it. "Sometimes," he writes (p. 277), "it really appears as though pedagogy were still at the stage in which men are seeking the philosopher's stone. The Prussian schoolmaster has boasted of having won the battle of Sadowa. And many people imagine for the French schoolmaster a social and political office, a mission almost supernatural, wholly out

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of proportion to his actual function. The science of pedagogy will above all teach the educator that there are things which he cannot do, that we must follow nature and not even attempt to do her violence, that it is society that guides the school, not the school that transforms society."

"Yes," was the retort of another Prussian upon the schoolmaster of the story, "and that schoolmaster was Clausewitz." M. Roehrich deserves the thanks of all interested in education, not only for the single-minded zeal with which he has pursued the less immediately popular and exciting aspects of the problem of education, but also for the emphasis with which he has protested against exaggerated and ill-founded claims. We may hope that the field in which M. Roehrich has shown himself so competent a worker will attract the attention of many who have the welfare of children at heart.

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Studies in the Teaching of History. By M. W. Keatinge, M.A., Reader in Education in the University of Oxford. London: Adam and Charles Black, 1910. Pp. 232.

These studies are interesting and informal essays upon history teaching in the middle forms of a secondary school. The pupils are beyond the 'thing' stage, where the method is largely one of presentation, and Mr. Keatinge argues that if history is to be a real mental training, worthy of a prominent place in the curriculum, a very different method must be adopted here. There are two all-important powers which are now to be developed,—imagination and judgment of human affairs. It is in his concrete and interesting account of the way in which history may help a boy to form true ideas of character and motive, just and balanced inferences from the words and actions of diverse people, that the author makes his most valuable contribution to the subject. He urges that the narrative lecture must be abandoned; the pupils are to be confronted with documents and forced to exercise their minds upon them. In his own words: "We must lead them in the history lesson to apply the more simple criteria of accuracy and of sincerity, we must train them to read closely and to extract from a document all the internal evidence that is to be found there, to compare and

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to rationalize conflicting accounts of characters and of events; and more important than all, though less showy, to summarize and extract the salient points from a series of loose, verbose, or involved statements." Mr. Keatinge gives abundant illustrations of the exercises he recommends, and not only specimens of the type of answer required, but also of actual answers given by both bright and dull boys. In so doing he departs widely from, and improves immeasurably upon, the general practice of educational writers. Not only students, but educational experts invariably combine eloquence concerning general principles of method with painful reticence concerning their practical application.

Very scant justice is done to the moral value of history teaching, but the reader is inclined to forgive this in view of a most amusing illustration of the optimism created by postponing the critical stage too long. The author is somewhat unfair when he suggests that the falsely idealistic is the type of teaching required by the advocate of direct moral instruction. History need not be made ridiculous in order to teach such great virtues as sympathy, tolerance, or true patriotism. Instead of false idealism history will teach its students that no man or country has ever been absolutely right or hopelessly wrong, that the best men have always been those who were able to respect their opponents, who were at the same time in deep and deadly earnest themselves. True history will thus teach true idealism, and in so doing it need not irreparably destroy the boy's belief in human nature. In the words of the late Dr. Edward Caird: "The production of a great character, the development of a great national life, the gradual penetration of humanity by the image and ideal of Christ, . . . these are things we can discern, if we look with an open eye upon the history of the individual or the race. And, imperfect as such progress may be in comparison with the ideal to which it points, it is enough to support a faith in the divine destiny of man, to deliver us from the feeling of the futility of life, and to make sure that it is not for naught we are striving, when we seek to serve some good cause with which the welfare of our nation or our race is identified."

At this point, as elsewhere, our author diverges into psychology and refers somewhat tenderly to those contrariant ideas which were so ably treated by him in "Suggestion in Education." Nevertheless, we venture to maintain that the danger of arous-

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ing these in the history lesson is relatively slight since the moral ideas need never be introduced directly or insistently to the adolescent mind.

The chapter on concrete illustration is interesting, but does not suggest any new treatment of the subject. The emphasis by such an authority as Mr. Keatinge upon the genealogical table is very depressing. He says that, "no pressure should be put upon the pupils to commit it to memory until the examination is approaching." What a mournful picture the last five words suggest!

The account of the organization of history teaching will be most valuable to the teacher. The author very rightly rejects Professor Tout's absurdly unpsychological view that we must rigidly limit ourselves to outlines and set our face against any detailed study, which, in being more detailed, is more wearisome. Mr. Keatinge's view resembles that of Professor Ramsey Muir, who says: "The history lesson ought to enable the child to realize the conditions of ages widely different from his own, the characters and motives of men such as he is never likely to meet in his own experience. These should be as real to him as the character and events of Robinson Crusoe or Cinderella—otherwise the end will not be obtained. . . . It is clearly impossible to get these results out of a bald outline of general history. . . . Historical narratives for children should not be less detailed, but should be, in a sense, more detailed than narratives for older students; only the detail should be of the concrete and pictorial kind which appeals to the child mind." In this spirit Mr. Keatinge urges that small portions of a subject must be taught intensively so that they stand out with vividness against the outline sequence of events in universal history. Such portions are to be selected on the ground of their peculiar appeal to the adolescent mind. For the ages twelve to fourteen there could hardly be a finer theme than the grand story of England's colonizing activity. The author proceeds to work out several schemes which combine the general and the special period in the manner suggested and which should be most useful to history teachers.

The book, like almost all works on method in education, contains certain platitudinous and unnecessary discussions. In spite of this we recommend it most heartily to all interested in the subject because it is the first work which shows, how even in the

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history lesson, the pupil may and *must* always be contributing to the development of the subject, instead of the teacher always doing the maximum and the pupil the minumum of work.

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ARISTOTE ET L'IDÉALISME PLATONICIEN. By Charles Werner, Docteur ès lettres. Paris: Alcan, 1910. Pp. xii, 370.

This book, which is based on a close study of Aristotle and a wide knowledge of the modern literature of the subject, should be read by everyone who is interested in the fascinating problem of the relation between Aristotle's thought and that of his master. Put shortly, Dr. Werner's account of that relation is that Aristotle was much more deeply influenced by Plato's idealism than he realized; that he was anxious to correct Plato and improve on him, and to that end strenuously attacked the doctrine of ideas; but that, nevertheless, various important Platonic elements remain which he failed to eliminate in working out his system, although in his treatment of the main problems of philosophy he was able to open up many fertile veins of thought from which Plato, by the narrowness of his idealistic position, was debarred. The book is divided into four parts, dealing respectively with what may be roughly described as Logic and Metaphysics, Psychology, Ethics, and Theology.

Of these parts the first seems to me much the best. As a piece of exposition it is a good guide through the tangles of Aristotelian doctrine, and it brings out clearly the essential point which, according to Dr. Werner, marks the divergence of Aristotle from Plato. That point consists, he thinks, in Aristotle's refusal (accounted for by his preoccupation with such sciences as physics and zoölogy) to accept the fundamental Platonic assumption of a separation between the sensible world and the invisible world of true reality. For Aristotle, the sensible world is the real world, and is the proper subject of philosophy; and it is to explain how it can be real that he sets up his theories of matter, form, and essence. Dr. Werner argues, however, that Aristotle's attempt to identify form and essence breaks down,—a breakdown which is characteristic of his whole position, as it is caused by an attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable, —to maintain on the one hand his own doctrine of the reality of

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the sensible, and to retain on the other hand the reality of the Platonic idea. "Aristotle's essence is Plato's idea; but the idea brought down from heaven to earth, the idea existing in sensibles. Transcendental realism has become an immanent realism." And this, we are told, involves a fundamental contradiction. Dr. Werner ends this section by discussing the Aristotelian theory that, side by side with the action of final causes (which is identified with 'nature'), we must admit the action of 'material necessity' or chance; a theory for which he claims the merit that it recognizes, along with the rational, an irrational element in reality.

The chief criticism which suggests itself as to Dr. Werner's method is that, while he is at pains to decide exactly what Aristotle's views were, he gives us little or no discussion about Plato's views; yet a parallel examination of Platonism was surely necessary, if we are to be convinced that Aristotle unconsciously included in his system a mass of ill-assimilated idealism. And this defect is more marked in the remaining three parts of the book. In the sphere of psychology Aristotle's theories are elaborately set forth, and Dr. Werner's conclusion is that Plato and Aristotle both reached, by different roads, the same result,—*viz.*, that thought is a complex of the elements of which reality is made, Plato reducing it to the elements composing the idea, while Aristotle reduces it to form realized in matter. But this conclusion must remain rather in the air in the absence of any analysis of Plato's theories on the subject. In the sphere of ethics, Dr. Werner takes the view that Aristotle's main position as to the nature of the good is, like Plato's, through and through intellectualistic and idealistic; but that, in his doctrine of pleasure, as a good which is indefinable in terms of 'the intellectual,' he advances to a new position which is purely empirical and incompatible with the former. In this Aristotelian theory of pleasure, moreover, Dr. Werner (in accordance, it seems, with the teaching of the late M. Gourd) finds the germ of the Kantian view that the conception of value presupposes that of freedom; but the connection of ideas here is not very clearly made out. Finally, Dr. Werner argues that Aristotle's God corresponds to Plato's ideal world, and he indicates rather vaguely various respects in which he thinks the Aristotelian conception to be superior to the Platonic.

The book would, as I have suggested, be more convincing if

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it gave more information as to that Platonism with which Aristotle's theories are contrasted. What stage of the theory of ideas has Dr. Werner in mind, for instance? It would also, I think, have been better (at least for the reader who is not a specialist in the history of philosophy) if some attempt had been made to sift out what is valid from what is confused in Aristotle's thought. Dr. Werner does not try to give any coherent explanation of what Aristotle meant by such terms as matter, form, and essence, his object being not so much to discuss the notions themselves as to state the way in which Aristotle actually connected them; much less does he make any serious effort to decide whether, and to what extent, what Aristotle meant is true.

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF BRÁHMAISM, EXPOUNDED WITH REFERENCE TO ITS HISTORY. Lectures delivered before the Theological Society, Calcutta, in 1906-1907. By Síttánáth Tattvabhúshan. Madras: Higginbotham & Co., 1909. Pp. xiv, 388.

This is a book of great interest. It is an attempt to trace the historical development of Bráhmaism and to connect it with modern philosophical conceptions, both Eastern and Western. The general philosophical position of the author is that of Hegelianism, as interpreted by Green and Caird, to the former of whom in particular he pays a warm tribute of gratitude. A distinctive feature of his teaching is the importance which he attaches to the idea of immortality. On this point he connects himself with William James, being apparently unaware of the way in which the same idea has been emphasized by Dr. McTaggart and other Hegelian writers. The last two lectures of the course deal with some practical applications of the writer's general doctrines to some of the most pressing problems of social reform in India, with special reference to the caste system and to the position of women. The chief interest of the book lies in the striking evidence which it affords of the approximation of Eastern and Western ideas to one another. It would seem that there is not much difference between the 'New Theology' of India and that of our Western peoples; and it is pleasant to think that they have arrived at the same results by different

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paths and without any sacrifice of their own distinctive ideals. Few things could be of more happy augury for the future of the world's thought and life than such a coming together of the East and the West.

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FIRST UNIVERSAL RACES CONGRESS.

President: The Right Hon. Lord Weardale.
Hon. Secretary: Mr. G. Spiller, 63 South Hall Park, Hampstead, London.

A Congress, which promises to be one of the most influential of our time, is to be held in London July 26-29, 1911, in the central building of the University of London. The list of those who have extended to it their moral support is most imposing; while the list of the writers of papers includes eminent representatives of over twenty civilizations, and every paper referring to a particular people is prepared by some one of high standing belonging to it. The object of the Congress will be to discuss, in the light of modern knowledge and the modern conscience, the general relations subsisting between the peoples of the West and those of the East, between so-called white and so-called colored peoples, with a view to encouraging between them a fuller understanding, the most friendly feelings, and a heartier coöperation. Political issues of the hour will be subordinated to this comprehensive end, in the firm belief that when once mutual respect is established, difficulties of every type will be sympathetically approached and readily solved.

The following is the program for the eight half-day sessions: 1. Fundamental Consideration: Meaning of Race and Nation. 2-3. General Conditions of Progress. 3a. Peaceful Contact Between Civilizations. 4. Special Problems in Inter-Racial Economics. 5-6. The Modern Conscience in Relation to Racial Questions. 7-8. Positive Suggestions for Promoting Inter-Racial Friendliness. [To assist adequate discussion the papers are to be sent to members of the Congress a month before the gathering, and will be taken as read; abstracts of the papers will also be provided.]

It is proposed also to hold in connection with the Congress an exhibition of books, documents, portraits, skulls, diagrams, etc.

Attendance at the meetings of the Congress will not be restricted to any particular class of persons. *Fee for Active Membership (including attendance, volume of papers of about 500 pages in English or French with valuable bibliographies, and other publications) will be 21s.; fee for Passive Membership (excluding attendance, but including volume of papers and other publications) will be 7s. 6d.*

Further information may be obtained from the Hon. Organizer, Mr. G. Spiller, 63 South Hill Park, Hampstead, London; from Rev. Ramsden Balmforth, Daisy Bank, Upper Camp Street, Cape Town; from Prof. W. E. B. DuBois, Atlanta University, Georgia; from Prof. F. Tönnies, Eutin, Holstein, Germany, and from Dr. Abendanon, Jan van Nassaustraat 43, the Hague.

The Congress invites answers to the following questions. Replies should reach the Hon. Secretary, Mr. G. Spiller, by June 15, 1911:

QUESTIONNAIRE.

1. (a) To what extent is it legitimate to argue from differences in physical characteristics to differences in mental characteristics? (b) Do

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you consider that the physical characteristics observable in a particular race are (1) permanent, (2) modifiable only through ages of environmental pressure, or (3) do you consider that differences in climate, in upbringing, in habits, in economic comfort, and in environment generally, leaving aside intermarriage, have a marked influence in changing physical characteristics?

2. (a) To what extent does the status of a race at any particular moment of time offer an index to its innate or inherited capacities? (b) Of what importance is it in this respect that civilizations are meteoric in nature, bursting out of obscurity only to plunge back into it, and how would you explain this?

3. (a) How would you combat the irreconcilable contentions prevalent among all the more important races of mankind that *their* customs, *their* civilization, and *their* race, are superior to those of other races? (b) Would you, in explanation of existing differences, refer to special needs arising from peculiar geographical and economic conditions and to related divergences in national history, and, in explanation of the attitude assumed, would you refer to familiarity with one's own customs leading psychologically to a love of them and unfamiliarity with others' customs tending to lead psychologically to dislike and contempt of these latter? (c) Or what other explanation and arguments would you offer?

4. (a) What part do differences in economic, hygienic, moral and educational standards play in estranging races which come in contact with each other? (b) Is the ordinary observer to be informed that these differences, like social differences generally, are in substance almost certainly due to passing social conditions and not to innate racial characteristics, and that the aim should be, as in social differences, to remove these rather than to accentuate them by regarding them as fixed?

5. (a) Is perhaps the deepest cause of race misunderstandings the naïve assumption that the present characteristics of a race are the expression of fixed and permanent racial characteristics? (b) If so, could not anthoropologists, sociologists, and scientific thinkers as a class, powerfully assist the movement for a juster appreciation of races by persistently pointing out in their lectures and in their works the fundamental fallacy involved in taking a static instead of a dynamic, a momentary instead of a historic, a local instead of a general point of view of race characteristics? (c) And could such dynamic teaching be conveniently introduced into schools, more especially in the geography and history lessons; also into colleges for the training of teachers, diplomats, colonial administrators, and missionaries?

6. (a) If you consider that the belief in racial superiority is not largely due, as is suggested in some of the above questions, to unenlightened psychological repulsion and underestimation of the dynamic or environmental factors, please state what, in your opinion, the chief factors are. (b) Do you consider that there is fair proof, and if so, what proof of some races being substantially superior to others in innate capacity, and in such cases is the moral standard to be modified?

7. (a) Do you think that each race might with advantage study the customs and civilizations of other races, even those you think the lowliest

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ones, for the definite purpose of improving its own customs and civilization? (b) Do you think that unostentatious conduct generally and respect for the customs of other races, provided these are not morally objectionable, should be recommended to all who come in passing or permanent contact with members of other races?

8. (a) Do you know of any experiments on a considerable scale, past or present, showing the successful uplifting of relatively backward races by the application of purely humane methods? (b) Do you know of any cases of colonization or opening of a country achieved by the same methods? (c) If so, how far do you think such methods could be applied universally in our dealings with other races?

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THE INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OF ETHICS

APRIL, 1911.

THE MEANING OF GOOD AND EVIL.*

J. S. MACKENZIE.

THE object of this paper is to determine, as far as possible, the true significance of those ultimate conceptions that underlie the study of ethics. The importance of such an attempt can hardly be disputed: the probability of its success may be more open to question. In ethics, as in other subjects, a great deal of valuable work may be done without any precise determination of its ultimate conceptions. Concrete historical studies, like those of Westermarck and others, though perhaps belonging more properly to sociology than to ethics, are at any rate extremely enlightening, whatever may be our views, or whether we have any views, about the metaphysical issues that underlie them. Even Aristotle's Ethics,—in many respects still the greatest and most satisfying work on the subject that we possess,—is to a large extent descriptive, and may be said rather to evade than to solve the ultimate problems. But the weakness of such concrete studies is that the value of the thought contained in them is always liable to be brought into dispute by doubt with regard to the fundamental principles upon which our moral conceptions rest. Hence the constantly recurring need for those mining operations,—always toilsome and sometimes not a little discouraging,—which were

* Inaugural Lecture to the Philosophical Society at the Queen's University, Belfast.

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so brilliantly begun by Socrates and Plato. That such work was still needed in the time of Aristotle, is sufficiently evidenced by the way in which his system was superseded by those of the Stoics and Epicureans and afterwards submerged in a general skepticism. In our own time there are plentiful signs of the recurrence of similar doubts, especially in such proposals as that of Nietzsche for a 'transvaluation of all values,' and in many other recent suggestions of a more or less similar kind. Closely connected with such doubt,—though not necessarily so subversive of established systems of conduct,—is the question whether moral distinctions are to be regarded as of absolute, or only of relative, validity; whether we are ultimately to aim at an attitude of mind which may be described,—again in the language of Nietzsche,—as being 'Beyond Good and Evil.' The doctrine of the relativity of moral conceptions is by no means confined to the representatives of any one school of thought. In some form or other, it has had an important place in many types of ethical theory. One may find traces of it in the work of Aristotle himself, more definitely in Spinoza, and, in recent times, in writers so diverse as Herbert Spencer and Mr. Bradley. When questions of this kind are raised, they can only be answered by a consideration of what is ultimately meant by Good and Evil, and of what is the place of these conceptions in the structure of human life and in that of the Universe as a whole. This is no doubt a larger question than that which is directly involved in ethics; for when we speak of Good and Evil in this general way, it is not merely the morally good and evil to which we are referring. But it seems best to approach the subject, to begin with, in this larger way.[1]

Now, in dealing with these problems, we are met at the very outset by the doubt as to whether such conceptions as Good and Evil are capable of definition at all. This

[1] It is, of course, only the narrower sense that is usually implied in the conception of something that is 'Beyond Good and Evil.' Spinoza's form of the conception, however, seems to cover the larger view.

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doubt has been most clearly and systematically set forth by Mr. G. E. Moore in his very interesting and instructive book called "Principia Ethica"; and we may best commence our study by some examination of what I understand to be his main contention.

Mr. Moore urges that Good has to be accepted as an ultimate datum, analogous to a particular sensation of color, such as yellow. We know yellow when we see it. It is a particular kind of object or thing or concept or presentation (we need not here consider which of these terms is most fitting), which we do not confound with any other. In like manner, he contends, we recognize what is good when it is presented to us or conceived by us in a certain way; but we cannot further explain what good is any more than we can explain what yellow is. This comparison is not, I think, a very convincing one for several reasons; and yet it cannot be denied that there is a great deal of force in the general contention; and I want to try to bring out both what appears to me to be its strength and what appears to me to be its weakness. The first objection that occurs to the parallel that he has drawn is that, in a certain sense, yellow can be defined. We can say that it is an object that we sense, and we can say further that it is an object of the general class that we describe as colors. Further, when we say that it is the color that lies between green and orange in the continuous scale of color qualities, it seems to me that we are defining it in quite a satisfactory way.

In order to avoid this objection, it might be better to take color as a whole, rather than one particular color, as the basis of comparison. The argument would then run that we cannot give any definition of color, regarded simply as a kind of object that is sensed, except by saying that it is one of that class of objects, and that we are somehow able to distinguish it from all the other objects in that class. We cannot say how we distinguish it, except by reference to its physical antecedents; and these of course are irrelevant, when we are simply regarding it

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as a particular kind of experienced object. In this case at least it would seem that the old view, that in definition a species is brought under a wider genus from which it is marked by some differentia that can be definitely indicated, breaks down. Nor does it seem possible to define color by analyzing it into components that are not colors, except,—as before,—by referring, not to itself, but to its physical antecedents or concomitants. We cannot define it, as we can define a particular kind of mathematical figure, or even as we can define a particular species of plant or animal or a type of machine or a chemical compound. There seems to be a unique quality, in the case of color, which cannot be analyzed, and which cannot be described in any way that is not tautological. Can the same be said of Good? It certainly seems that, in a certain sense, it can; but again it must be noticed that there are certain respects in which the parallel is not a very satisfactory one.

We know that there are some human beings who are incapable of distinguishing colors; and when any one is thus innately deficient, no definition or description can be given to enable the subject to supply the lacking sense. This is probably not true, as Hume admitted, of particular shades of color; but it seems to be true of color as a whole. Now, in this respect at least, good does not appear to be in the same position as color. There are no doubt some people who have very imperfectly developed views of the difference between what is morally good and evil; but it does not appear to be possible for any one to think at all without regarding some things as preferable to others, and this seems to imply some sort of distinction between what is relatively good and relatively evil. Moreover, the very fact that good and evil are thus contrasted as opposite ends in a preferential scale, points to a difference between this case and that of color, which will probably be found, on reflection, to have real significance. Further reflection calls attention to the fact that, while color is an object of sense, good is an object of thought.

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Now, it seems to be true, in general, that no particular reason can be given why we have some senses and not others, and that no very definite relations can be traced between them. But this does not appear to be the case with forms of thought. Hence we are led to suspect that the analogy of color may be a misleading one. Good seems at least to be something that is involved in our nature as thinking beings, and to have the kind of complexity that is implied in its definite opposition to evil. Hence it might be better to compare it with something that is more nearly of the same kind as itself.

Instead of asking, then, whether good may be compared, in this respect, to color, let us rather ask whether it may be compared with number. Here the objections just referred to would not apply. There are no thinking beings who lack the possibility of distinguishing between one and two in the way in which the color-blind lack the possibility of distinguishing between red and green, or as those born totally blind lack the possibility of distinguishing between scarlet and the sound of a trumpet. Again, it seems to be true of number, as it is also true of good, that it is not simply a particular kind of experience, but one of the ultimate conceptions involved in our treatment of experience in general, and not capable of being reduced to anything else that does not really contain it. On the other hand, it would seem to be misleading to say that number is incapable of definition. We can at least say that it is a species of quantity, and that we can distinguish it from other forms of more and less, such as intensity and spatial voluminousness. We can, moreover, go on to indicate certain general presuppositions upon which it depends, especially that of the equivalence or 'fungibility' of units.[2] In thus marking out the special features of

[2] It may be worth while to note here that, when such fundamental presuppositions have been made, all arithmetical judgments seem to me (in opposition to what appears to be maintained by Kant) to be purely analytical. I think Sidgwick was right on this point.

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number, we are, I think, in a true sense, defining it. We are defining it by reference to the more ultimate conception of more and less. Hence the analogy of number would hardly serve to support the contention of the indefinability of good. Let us ask, then, whether the more ultimate conception of more and less would give us a more satisfactory parallel.

It certainly seems to be true that the relation expressed by the terms more and less is not, in any ordinary sense of the word, definable. We cannot get behind this difference, nor can we resolve it into anything more simple. It involves, moreover, like good and evil, a contrast between two directions,—a 'Way up' and a 'Way down,' in Heraclitean phrase. Indeed, none of the difficulties that suggested themselves in reference to the analogies previously considered would appear to be present here. Thus, it may be pretty safely urged that we cannot conceive the consciousness of any thinking being in which this distinction is not explicitly or implicitly present. It is certainly very different from color in this respect. There is also a further point of view from which this final analogy holds; and it is one that seems to be the most fruitful in suggestion concerning the true significance of good. It is connected with the fact that the relation of more and less can be made more definite by pointing to the different ways in which it is involved in our experience, such as number, degree, and volume (which is perhaps resolvable either into number or degree). To unfold its significance in this way is, I think, in a true sense, to define it.[3] It is not, indeed, to define it by reference to something outside itself; but it is to define it, if we may so characterize the process, from within. It is to make its internal content or application clear. When we say that two are more than one, and that a bright

[3] It would, of course, be beyond the scope of this paper to discuss in detail how this can be done. Hegel is, I suppose, the writer who has done most in this direction; but I do not wish to urge here that his method of treatment is the only one or the best one.

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illumination is more than a dim one, the two statements have a somewhat different meaning, and yet they are both cases of more. In both cases we are advancing gradually from zero to a positive content, though in the one case we are doing it discretely, step by step, and in the other case continuously. It hardly seems to me that we could know what is meant by more and less except by seeing, though it may be only dimly, that it is found in processes of that kind. When we thus see the way in which a conception is generated, the way in which it fits into the constructive activity by which we build up our thought of the world, we may, I think, be properly said to be defining the conception. Now, it may be necessary to admit that it is only in a similar way that good can be defined; but if it can be defined in this way,—*i. e.*, if we can see exactly where it stands within the system of our experience of a world,—we ought really to be perfectly satisfied.

How, then, are we to proceed to define good in this way? Following the analogy that has just been indicated, we may best begin by noticing that there are different ways of speaking of good and evil, just as there are different ways of speaking of more and less; but they are not all equally ultimate. When Eve, according to the Bible story, looked at the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, she saw 'that the tree was good for food, and that it was pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make one wise.' Here the conception of good is involved in many ways. What is good for food is in some sense good. What is pleasant to the eyes is in some sense good. What is to be desired to make one wise is in some sense good. Yet it was only by eating the fruit that any knowledge of good and evil was to be reached. There is, moreover, the further question suggested, whether her action in eating it was good or evil. Does good mean the same thing in all these cases? Now, one thing at least seems evident, *viz.*, that in some cases the term good is not able to stand by itself, but needs the addition 'for.' We have 'good for food,' 'good for pleasure,' 'good for wisdom.' It seems

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clear also that, when it is used in this way, it is only intelligible in relation to the more general conception of means and end; and that it can be defined by reference to this conception. Thus, we may speak of a thing as being 'good for poison,' as well as 'good for food,' and in such cases good seems to mean nothing more than adaptation to an end. Herbert Spencer adopted, at least as a starting-point, the view that such adaptation is the essential meaning of good and bad in every instance,—a view which, in his usual manner, he illustrates by a great variety of instances, such as a knife, a gun, a stormy day, a sheep, as well as others taken from human action. He urges, further, that in every case the goodness or badness is not an intrinsic character, but rather one that results from the fact that the objects are well or ill adapted to achieve their prescribed ends. More or less complete adaptation to an end would thus seem to be the essential meaning of good and evil; and, if this is so, it would seem that we could define the conceptions by the help of those of more and less and means and end. Even Spencer, however, seems to recognize that we have to think of some ultimate end which is not a means to anything further, though it is not very easy to determine from his statements whether this ultimate end is life or pleasure.[4] Whatever it is, it is surely something that we regard as good; and, if so, good in this sense would not mean adaptation to an end, but would rather refer to an end that is chosen for itself. In the instances already given, it is perhaps self-evident that food is not such an end. It is not so evident, however, that pleasure, wisdom, and rightness of action are not such ends.

In pursuing this inquiry, then, it seems clear that we may omit cases in which good is spoken of merely as a means, because in all these cases we may either resolve the conception into a different one,—*viz.*, that of adapta-

[4] He *says* that it is pleasure; but, for practical purposes, it appears to be quantity of life.

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tion to an end,—or else say that it is used in a derivative sense, as indicating something that is a means to what is good. It may be correct to say that, when an end is recognized as good, the necessary means may also be described as good; but, at any rate, it seems clear that the true significance of good will in such cases be most apparent in its application to the end. Thus, when we say that fruit is good, we may at once ask, Why is it good? And the obvious answer would be either that it is good for food, *i. e.,* for the preservation of life, or that it is good for its taste, *i. e.,* for pleasure. It would then remain for us to ask whether life or pleasure is a means to anything beyond itself. In cases of this kind, therefore, it seems that the ultimate justification for the application of the term good can only be found by reference to some conception of good which cannot be defined in terms of means, though perhaps it may be brought under the conception of end.

We may now go on to ask whether any similar question and answer are possible in the other instances that were previously mentioned. The knowledge of good and evil might be brought under the general head of wisdom or insight; so that we need not further consider it at present. The only other case that has been specially referred to is that of action; and here it certainly does seem that a similar question is both possible and almost inevitably suggested. If we say, for instance, that Eve's action in eating the fruit was not good, we may certainly ask, Why was it not good? Its goodness or badness is not self-evident. Now, we might answer such a question in more ways than one. Perhaps the most obvious answer in that particular instance would be, Because it was contrary to divine commandment. We may then ask further, Why is that which is contrary to divine commandment not good? The answer might be, Because it leads to punishment or other evil consequences. If so, we have once more a case of means and end. But the answer might rather be, Because the divine commandments are expressions of

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modes of behavior that are intrinsically good, or, Because the attitude of obedience is good. In either of these events it would seem that we have an instance, not of means and end, but rather of a particular case being an illustration of a general principle. We are then referred back to the general class to which this particular action belongs. The question would then be, Why is the general principle good? Why is the kind of action summed up in divine commandments good? Or, Why is the attitude of obedience good? It would probably be generally conceded that in this last case the answer would have to be, that the attitude of obedience is not always good, but is only good when it is obedience to some command that is itself good or to some person whose relation of authority over us is good. If we allow this and follow it out in similar cases, we seem to be led to the conclusion that actions are called good only when they are means to something that is intrinsically good, or when they express an attitude of will directed to the realization of some general principle that is intrinsically good. It would seem, that is to say, that good, as applied to an action, expresses its adaptation either to its end or to its law; and that one or other of these has to be regarded as intrinsically good.

The question still remains, whether we can really speak intelligibly of good in any sense that is not capable of such analysis. Now, it certainly seems that the sense in which good is applied either to instruments or to actions would have no ultimate significance unless the term could also be applied to some end or to some underlying principle. It is on this account that the saying of Kant, that nothing can be called good without qualification except a Good Will, is felt to be unsatisfactory. The activity of will could not be good unless the end to which it is directed or the principle by which it is governed could be regarded as intrinsically good. Hence it seems clear that, if the simple act of will is to be called good without qualification, something else that is involved in it must also be good without qualification. Green, who presses Kant's point much

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further than Kant does himself, seeks to avoid the difficulty by contending that the Good Will is simply directed to its own production and extension; but he admits that this view seems to carry us round in a circle. At the same time, the fact that a good will does present itself as having a very special claim to be regarded as intrinsically good, may help us to see more clearly what we ultimately mean by good.

A good will means, as Kant and others have explained, a rational will, or, in other words, an act of rational choice. We may distinguish three things in this fact: (1) An Attitude, the attitude which we describe as rational; (2) an Act, the act which we describe as choosing; and (3) an End, the end that is aimed at when we choose rationally. Now, the third of these is the most difficult to deal with. The act which we describe by the term choice seems incapable of further analysis. The fact of choice or selection or preference seems to be an ultimate fact in all conscious life. If some things did not interest us more than others, we should simply be receptive to any impression that happened to come to us. But it is the constant characteristic of our consciousness that we not only receive, but select; and it is in this fact, I think, that we may find the first germ of what we understand by good,—but only the first germ. Everything that we choose or select or prefer may be said, in a wide sense of the word, to be regarded by us as good. But choice, in its early beginnings, is quite irrational. When we choose the sweet and reject the bitter, we choose we know not why. A little reflection soon raises the question Why? and we then say that we choose the sweet because it is pleasant or because it is wholesome or for some other reason. Thus our choice gradually becomes rational; and the meaning of this does not present any serious difficulty. The real difficulty arises when we inquire, What is it that in the end we choose when we choose in a completely rational way? and this is, I think, essentially the same as the questiton, What do we mean by that which is ultimately good? Now, the question—a

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very difficult question,—as to the exact content of this choice may, for the present, be set aside. What I wish to urge at this point is that, by regarding the problem in this way, we seem to arrive at what may fairly be described as a definition of good. Good, we may say, in the only sense in which it has any ultimate significance, is the object of Rational Choice.

The objection will no doubt at once occur, that this is not, in any true sense, a definition, and that it would inevitably carry us round in a circle. For if we ask, What is the object of rational choice? it would seem that the answer must be that, when we choose rationally, we choose what is intrinsically good. We must assume, therefore, that something *is* intrinsically good, quite apart from the fact of its being chosen. Now this is, I think, in one sense, true, but, in another sense, false. When Hamlet says, "There is nothing either good or bad but thinking makes it so," I take him to mean that choosing makes it so; and, if so, I think his statement is erroneous. Anything that we choose may be said to be good *for us,* good from the point of view of our particular attitude in choosing it;[5] but when we say that it is intrinsically good, we mean that it is good from the point of view of rational choice. To say this, however, is not to say that it is independent of choice. Let us suppose, for instance, that beauty is good. If so, it would be good even if we were to suppose that every existing conscious being chose ugliness instead. So also, if truth is good, it would be really good even on the supposition that every existent conscious being preferred fiction. But it still remains true that, when we say that anything is intrinsically good, we mean that, from a certain point of view, it would be chosen. If that point of view is not one that is adopted by any conscious being, the conception of good is only a hypothesis or ideal, but it may still be a significant hypothesis. But I think it

[5] I suppose this is what is implied in Aristotle's statement at the beginning of the "Nicomachean Ethics," that "the Good has been well characterized as that at which all things aim."

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ceases to be even that if we omit the conception of choice altogether. A world in which there was no choice would truly be a world 'beyond good and evil'; and a world in which rational choice had no real significance would be a world in which intrinsic good had no real significance. Good would in that case only be a name for those objects that conscious beings choose, and would vary with the point of view of the beings who choose. I understand this to be the doctrine that Spinoza adopted. If, on the other hand, we say that there is such a thing as an attitude of rational choice (even if that attitude is not actually adopted by any conscious being, but is only a significant hypothesis or ideal), then there is also such a thing as intrinsic good; for a choice that chooses nothing would not be significant. In this sense, therefore, it seems to me that good, in its ultimate significance, may be properly defined as the object of rational choice; and that this definition does not carry us round in a circle.

But it may be objected that we are making a rather large assumption in supposing that there is such a thing as rational choice. May it not be the case that, if we were completely rational, we should cease to choose? Well, this, I take it, is what is meant by those who maintain that the attitude of mind from which the truth about the universe is fully seen would be an attitude that is 'Beyond Good and Evil.' It is also possible to urge that an attitude of complete rationality is in itself unintelligible. According to either of these views, all choice is more or less irrational, and intrinsic good is illusory. It seems to me, however, that these views are not really tenable. The mere fact that we are able to discriminate degrees of approximation to a rational attitude seems to me to show that it is at least an intelligible ideal. It seems to me, further, that it is not possible to conceive of a rational attitude in which rationality would not be preferred to irrationality. Rationality would, consequently, from that point of view be chosen, and, being chosen from that point of view, it would be intrinsically good.

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If these contentions are valid, it seems to follow, not only that we can define good, but that we can determine some part at least of its content. We can not only say that good is the object of rational choice, but we can also say that rationality is one of those things that are good. This naturally raises the further question, whether there is any other part of the content of ultimate good that it is possible to determine. Now, I cannot hope in this paper to go very far in the way of answering this question; but it would be extremely unsatisfactory to leave it without any attempt at an answer.

I think we may find some sort of answer by proceeding from the point that has been already reached. I have urged that rational choice would choose rationality. It seems to me that we may go a step farther by saying that it would choose rational choice. If good is unintelligible apart from rational choice, then in choosing good we must also choose rational choice itself. It is this fact, I think, that justifies the saying of Kant that the Good Will—by which I understand him to mean the attitude of rational choice—is an unqualified good. But if we stopped there, we should be carried round in a hopeless circle. The choice that we choose must be the choice of something distinguishable from itself. What can we say of that something? Surely we may at least say that it is an intelligible universe, apprehended as existent and as intelligible. Observe that I am not arguing here that the universe *is* intelligible. I am only saying that a rational being would prefer that it should be so. But what do we mean by an intelligible universe? To answer that question, even in the most meager outline, would carry us far beyond the limits of such a paper as this. The conditions of intelligibility cannot easily be determined. It is the business of the metaphysician to try to determine the place of such conceptions as quantity, substance, causation, and the like, in an intelligible system; and I have no wish to minimize the difficulties involved in such a task. I only urge, as Plato and many others have done, that the search for the

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good would inevitably lead us on into that further search; and there I must for the present leave it.

Is there anything else that is necessarily involved in an object of rational choice? I feel doubtful whether there is; but it may be well to mention some other things that have been regarded by careful writers as ultimately good, and to indicate very briefly my reasons for doubting whether they ought to be so regarded. There are only three such objects that appear to me to call for special consideration, *viz.*, Pleasure, Love, and Beauty.

With regard to Pleasure, it seems to me that this is already involved in the fact of choice of an object apprehended as existent. In choice we may ideally distinguish between the mere fact of choosing, the object that is chosen, and the pleasantness of it; but these aspects have, I think, no meaning apart. Hence, when we say that we choose rational choice and the apprehension of an intelligible universe, recognized as real, we are also saying that we choose rational satisfaction. But it would not, I think, be correct to say that *any* kind of pleasure is intrinsically good. It is ultimately good only when it is the subjective aspect of rational choice in touch with its object. We might, however, add, if it is necessary, to our account of the content of ultimate good, that we choose that the choice of a real and intelligible universe should have this pleasurable aspect.

Love has perhaps a better claim than pleasure to be regarded as something distinct; and I certainly think that this also would be included in the object of rational choice. Here again, however, I am inclined to think that the choice of the good is the love of the good; and that to say that we choose choice is in the end equivalent to saying that we love love. But, if there is any doubt about this, I should be disposed to say that love also is intrinsically good,—at least when it is the love of that which is truly lovely.

Beauty, in like manner, can make a very strong claim for inclusion. But here also I am doubtful whether, in

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saying that we choose an intelligible object, and that the choice of that object is pleasant, we have not already said all that is meant by calling it beautiful.

My view, therefore, is that, while Pleasure, Love, and Beauty would be included in what is ultimately meant by Good, I am not sure that we add anything by mentioning them separately. And I am still more doubtful whether anything else could be added that would be found to be intrinsically good. But of course the conception of an intelligible universe contains a great deal that I am not here making any effort to unfold. What is intrinsically good would certainly be something rather extensive and complex. But it seems to me that the *definition* of it is comparatively simple, and is not really circular.

There is just one further point that I wish to make. I hope it is clear that I have not been urging that the universe *is* good, *i. e.*, that the object of rational choice can be realized as an experienced fact. I have only been trying to indicate that we can describe the general character of what we would ultimately like. It may still be asked, Is the universe actually what in the end we would like it to be? I am doubtful whether this can be proved. Certainly it would not be easy to prove it. Some have thought, however, that it can very easily be disproved; and on that point it may be worth while to make some remarks. It is sometimes said that the fact that we experience anything as being evil,—*e. g.*, pain or a perverse choice,—shows that the universe cannot be interpreted as being intrinsically good. Now, it seems evident at least that there is such a thing as perverse choice, and hence the universe as a whole cannot be completely good.

It does not appear to me that this argument is cogent, if the view that I have been trying to set before you is correct. It could only be made cogent if it could be shown that an intelligible universe could be constructed in which there would be no aspect of evil. I am not prepared at present to argue that this could not be shown; but, even

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if it could, there is another point that may be brought forward, in connection with my contention.

I have urged that the object of rational choice would include choice. Now, choice seems to contain what we call action. It is the selection of one thing as against another. In other words, good has to be thought of in relation to evil. The one is selected as against the other. Now, it is sometimes urged that the evil might only be thought of as possible, and the good as actual. To discuss this thoroughly would involve the consideration of what is meant by possibility; and that is a subject upon which I cannot at present enter. I must content myself with urging that even the thought of a possible evil would be, so far, an evil thought. A world in which there was no aspect of evil at all would in truth be a world 'Beyond Good and Evil'; and such a world would, at any rate, not be a good world. It seems clear, therefore, that the world that is selected by rational choice is a world that contains some aspect of evil. If this is true, it is so far from being obvious that an optimistic view of the world requires the absence of evil, that the reverse rather appears to be the case. Complete optimism, I should think, would be the view that evil exists just far enough to enable the full content of good to be finally brought out. Complete pessimism, in like manner, would be the view that good exists just far enough to enable the full content of evil to be finally brought out. The one would be made bright through the strength of its darkness; the other dark through the strength of its brightness. A world 'beyond Good and Evil,' on the other hand, would be neither bright nor dark, but simply invisible. The world, as we actually apprehend it, tends naturally to present itself to us as containing a conflict between the two, in which the victory is as yet undecided. We know pretty well, however, which of them we on the whole *want* to win; and, as we seem to have some share in the struggle, that may not be an altogether insignificant factor. At any rate, the question why we cannot have good without evil seems in the end as

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unmeaning as the question why we cannot have more without less. Why any of these determinations should enter into the structure of the universe is perhaps a question that may be asked; but at least it is not one that we are here called upon to answer. I have only been trying to indicate that there is a real sense in which we can understand the meaning of good, and that, in that sense, it is at least not inconceivable that the universe may be good.

By way, however, of giving a little more flesh and blood to these dry bones, I may conclude by a reference to the well-known passage in which Carlyle sums up the nature of the rational Choice of the Shoeblack: "Will the whole Finance Ministers and Upholsterers and Confectioners of Modern Europe undertake in joint-stock company to make one Shoeblack happy? They cannot accomplish it above an hour or two: for the Shoeblack also has a Soul quite other than his Stomach; and would require, if you consider it, for his permanent satisfaction and saturation, simply this allotment, no more, and no less; *God's infinite universe altogether to himself,* therein to enjoy infinitely, and fill every wish as fast as it rose." This is, of course, an illustration of what has been described as 'the bad infinite.' Rational choice is represented as simply aiming at the realization of the sum total of all the objects of irrational choice. The Shoeblack could in this way never find satisfaction. What would really satisfy him is not 'God's infinite universe,' regarded as a collection of discrete objects of choice, a world that is simply, in Stevenson's phrase, 'full of a number of things'; but rather, if we may so put it, God Himself,—*i. e.,* an underlying unity in the nature of things, by which what is ultimately beautiful is eternally chosen and eternally achieved. It is some such conception as this that seems to me to be required to give significance to what I have described as rational choice. But I am very well aware that I have only been touching on the surface of tremendous problems.

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GOETHE'S INFLUENCE ON CARLYLE.

F. MELIAN STAWELL.

II.

FOR Goethe then, and for Carlyle after him, it was a fundamental belief that man was here to perform a work of greater value than his own mere enjoyment of it (or of anything else). But what was that work? Wherein did it lie? In nothing more nor less, according to Goethe, than in the positive development of his own dormant faculties. In simply working at that, a man could be embodying something of infinite value, incarnating a Divine Idea, clothing it in his way as nature clothed it in hers. And this eternal work could be, must be, set on foot here and now; for the web of accident and circumstance was woven by the same Force that was calling on men to actualize themselves in and through this apparently truceless war with its own appearance. Because of this underlying union Trouble could further the divine work, and because Trouble could do that, the 'Worship of Sorrow' became possible.

Doubtless this conception was, as we say, 'in the air' throughout Germany. Other writers, notably Fichte and Novalis, are full of it.[1] "The true Shekinah is Man," wrote Novalis, and Carlyle was never tired of quoting the saying.

But it was Goethe who worked out this conception in detail, at once in his own life, in his art, and in his didactic writings. He really believed it, and he really acted on it. It sounds all through the wild fire-music of Faust, it underlies the steady prose of Wilhelm Meister, it sings in the sweet lyrics of his own heart. The whole theory of education and life in Wilhelm Meister is based on the essential

[1] See Carlyle on Fichte: "State of German Literature." Critical Essays, I.

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community of Manhood and Godhead.[2] When Goethe is solemn, his faith turns the whole universe into a temple; when he laughs,—and he possesses laughter,—it comes home to us with a delicious freshness that makes it the more believable because so far away from all cant and priggishness. "If God had wanted me different," he can say with a smile, "no doubt he would have made me so. He gave me talent, and that means he lent me much. So I use it right and left, though what is to come of it, who can say? But He will nod, when I ought to stop."[3]

Carlyle, always singularly sensitive to personality (perhaps too sensitive for his own peace in the intercourse of daily life), was more than fascinated and thrilled, he was inspired for life by the vision in his own time and era of a man actually developing his powers in a harmony that the soul could recognize as divine. Our ordinary level of imagination and emotion is so low we find it hard to realize that Carlyle actually felt this about Goethe, but he did.

"And knowest thou no Prophet, even in the vesture, environment and dialect of this age? None to whom the Godlike had revealed itself, through all meanest and highest forms of the Common; . . . in whose inspired melody, even in these rag-gathering and rag-burning days, Man's Life again begins, were it but afar off, to be divine? Knowest thou none such? I know him, and name him—Goethe." ("Sartor," Bk. iii, c. vii.)

The extraordinary richness and diversity of Goethe's own nature in itself would have arrested Carlyle: 'the hunger for eternity' that was in him made him always

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[2] See, for instance, the words of the uncle to the *schöne Seele* in Part II, Bk. vi. And the whole of the passage about "the Three Reverences" in the "Wanderjahre."

[3] Hätte Gott mich anders gewollt,
So hätt' er mich anders gebaut;
Da er mir aber Talent gezollt,
Hat er mir viel vertraut.
Ich brauch' es zur Rechten and Linken,
Weiss nicht was daraus kommt;
Wenn's nicht mehr frommt
Wird er schon winken.—*Zahme Xenien.*

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revolt from the puny and shallow; and whatever anyone might think about Goethe, no one could consider him either little or thin. This personal richness had its counterpart in the vast conception that underlies "Wilhelm Meister." Goethe's width of view is shown in two ways: in the first place, the infinite worth is conceived as many-sided, full of aspects which cannot be reduced to one another, though they are all connected in the whole, so that it might be compared to a many-facetted crystal, but never to a mere straight line. Carlyle learnt his lesson from Goethe far too well to conceive duty as a little narrow code of good behavior, something that could be summed up once for all in any Ten Commandments. He, like Goethe, would have put the command, "Thou shalt make that which is beautiful," side by side with the bidding, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." There is a remarkable passage in "Wilhelm Meister," (Part II, Bk. viii, c. vii), where the Abbé, living the life of strenuous culture, tries to explain how a work of art should be judged for itself and not for any extraneous benefit. The whole drift of this passage, which contains the essence of what is true and avoids what is false in the gospel of art for art's sake, is faithfully reflected in Carlyle's account of the theory of beauty held in Germany, ("State of German Literature," C. E., Vol. I, p. 47). After speaking of poetic beauty as essentially "underived from anything external or of merely intellectual origin," he goes on:

> Art is to be loved, not because of its effects, but because of itself: not because it is useful for spiritual pleasure, or even for moral culture, but because it is Art, and the highest in man, and the soul of all Beauty. To inquire after its *utility* would be like inquiring after the *utility* of a God, or, what to the Germans would sound stranger than it does to us, the *utility* of Virtue and Religion.

In the next place, it is fundamental with Goethe that this many-sided divine idea must be embodied in many men; one individual alone cannot avail. A true incarnation needs not one man but mankind. The Absolute cannot spare one of them. This, of course, is really in-

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volved in the original conception of the infinite as dwelling in every soul; but Goethe's genius was of the kind, at once creative and critical, that could embody the conception in a whole gallery of characters, and at the same time comment on their significance, and so press home the idea for us with a steady weight that in the end is irresistible. He knew well how rare it was to find a conception as broad as his own. We agree to it with our lips, but for the life of us we cannot, at least not on our ordinary level, think there is much use in the 'unemployable.' But for Goethe no one was unemployable. He would have reversed the saying of Napoleon, and declared he knew no man who was *not* necessary. What is written in the roll? ("Wilhelm Meister," Part II, Bk. viii, c. 5.) "Nur alle Menschen machen die Menschheit aus, nur alle Kräfte zusammengenommen die Welt."

Mankind can only be made by all men, the world by all its powers together. Often enough they war among themselves, but even as they try to destroy each other, Nature holds them together and brings them forth again. From the first animal impulse toward construction up to the highest exercise of intellectual art, from the laughter and shouts of childhood up to the glorious utterance of the orator and the singer, from the first scuffles of boyhood up to the huge armaments by which nations are lost and won, from the faintest kindliness and the most transitory affection up to the most burning passion and the deepest bond; from the merest sensation of the tangible Present up to the most mysterious presentiments and hopes for the furthest spiritual Future, all this, and far more, lies in man, and must be brought out and unfolded: only not in one man, but in many. Every capacity is important, and all must be developed. One individual can only work for the Beautiful, another only for the Useful: but both are needed to make a man.[1]

There has never been a gospel more weighty and more inspiring than this. The studiously prosaic tone of "Meister" only makes its message the more impressive. That dull, stupid, frivolous setting, that "gute Gesellschaft" where there seemed not the faintest opportunity for poetry, it is there, after all, that poets are made. Goethe takes modern life at its meanest and most com-

[1] Slightly altered from Carlyle's translation.

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monplace, and shows how the great work of realizing the noblest capacities of every self, which is also the work of obeying the laws of God, goes forward there as much as anywhere. "Hier oder nirgend ist Amerika."

Moreover, he shows *how* it is to go forward. It is through work. This is where Carlyle's gospel of work joins into Goethe's gospel of self-expression and self-realization. The two things really coincide, both springing from the root-conception of spiritual activity as the goal of man. Anyone who is in earnest about self-culture knows that it is vanity of vanities, "vapor and feeding on wind," without incessant work. Now Goethe and Carlyle were both desperately in earnest; mere 'pious aspirations,' weak dilettanteism,—'playing with empty nuts' out of which the kernel had gone,—all this was anathema to them both. The capacities could only be realized by definite work. Till then they were only elements, only potentialities. Man's business was to determine himself, to stamp himself upon things, and how was this to be done?

> Life lies before us, like a great mass of stone before an architect, an architect who only deserves that name when out of this fortuitous mass he has produced a form sprung from his own soul. . . . Everything outside us is only our material; yes, I might even say, everything in us; but deep within us lies the creative force (*Kraft*) which out of these can produce what they were meant to be, and which leaves us neither sleep nor rest until we have produced it, outside us or within ourselves, in one way or the other. (W. M., Pt. II, Bk. vi, *ad fin.*)
>
> "The painfullest feeling," writes Sartor, "is that of your own Feebleness (*Unkraft*). . . . And yet of your Strength there is and can be no clear feeling, save by . . . what you have done. Between vague wavering Capability and fixed indubitable Performance, what a difference! A certain inarticulate Self-consciousness dwells dimly in us; which only our Works can render articulate and decisively discernible. Our Works are the mirror wherein the spirit first sees its natural lineaments. Hence, too, the folly of that impossible Precept, '*Know thyself*'; till it be translated into this partially possible one, '*Know what thou canst work at.*'" ("Sartor," Bk. ii, c. vii.)

This was Goethe's teaching through and through; no one was more averse than he to self-inspection, no one more determined on self-realization, no one more con-

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vinced that the self only became real through the work of production. Education should not stir desires, it should awaken capacities; and there was no such thing on earth as a capacity without a definite character. "Es giebt keine unbestimmte Fähigkeit." (W. M., Bk. viii, c. iii.)

So that there was a double side to all work: every man had some capacity that pushed him to some definite bit of production,—it might be the taming of horses, it might be the writing of poems,—but none could know what that capacity was until he had tried it in action. 'The born painter' could not tell what painting was until he had the brush in his hand. Nothing is more misleading than to take Goethe's precept, "Do what lies nearest to thee," as though it meant to keep to the station in which one is placed by accident.[5] His real meaning, as the whole of Wilhelm Meister shows, is to work without delay at what one believes oneself best fitted for. The belief may be mistaken, but the best remedy for such a mistake is "to drain it to the dregs" (W. M., Part II, Bk. vii, c. x). Experience is the only schoolmaster, and Wilhelm did quite right to try his hand at the stage, utterly unfitted for it though he was. It would have been as wrong for him not to try it when he honestly thought it his *métier* as it would have been absurd to go on with it when Jarno made him see the unpleasant truth. The work you are best fit for, that, small or great in itself, is always the greatest thing in the world for you. Both Goethe and Carlyle were bound to remember this.

It might be said that sometimes Carlyle forgot it, and was fiercely intolerant of work that lay outside his own province, but in fact it is extraordinary how catholic his sympathies really were. From Voltaire to Hodge, from Dante to Mirabeau, almost any genuine toil won his passionate welcome. The common sneer at the man who sang the praises of silence in forty volumes, is based on the

[5] Goethe himself, it should be granted, may have used it later in this sense when inveighing against revolutionaries. But his original meaning lay far deeper.

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most foolish misunderstanding of what was one of the greatest things about him. His own chosen work lay in the realm of written speech,—and never did any man more rightly choose his work,—but that did not make him forget that the men who could not talk at all or write a line were just as indispensable as he. It is the same type of cheap criticism that would have us dismiss as an egoist the man who could say at the end of his life that he knew no more delightful experience than to see some work that one had planned in youth for oneself carried out later by another. From this point of view at least, Goethe was quite justified in repelling the charge of egoism with scornful laughter:

> Ich, Egoist? Wenn ich's nicht besser wüsste!
> Der Neid, das ist der Egoiste.

No envy dwelt in that large nature of his. The beautiful signature of his letter to Carlyle, "treu teilnehmend und mitwirkend," is genuinely characteristic; and the serenity of his disposition made it possible for him actually to take part with, and work with, other men in a way that Carlyle could never have done.

Of course it must not be denied that the fiery impatience of Carlyle's temperament, acting on this gospel of self-realization through work, did lead him away from the calm tolerance of Goethe. If men would not work, they must be forced to. If it was right to save a man by force from drowning, much more was it right so to save him from idleness. So much has been said against Carlyle for his scorn of political freedom that it is not necessary to labor this point, but it is only fair to add that he did not and could not forget that the goal was spiritual freedom for all men. The born democrat can drink deeply of Carlyle and only find his democratic fervor strengthened. For the ideal of self-determination set before every man is really the root of the matter, and no one had a more tremendous vision of that ideal than Carlyle. Like lightning from heaven the unspeakable dignity of the

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Divine Idea flashes round every man, even the most ridiculous, "a forked straddling animal with bandy legs, yet also a Spirit, and unutterable Mystery of Mysteries." To Carlyle, a man could never be a machine for which we need only ask that it should be kept going right. Spirit could not be spirit till it was *free,* till it not only *went* right but *did* right, not because it was told, but because it saw for itself that right was right. Only we never find in Carlyle what we do find in Goethe, and what is necessary to complete the democratic faith, the insistence on freedom as a *means,* the conception that a man can find the right way best by being allowed to go wrong in looking for it himself.

At the same time it must be remembered that Goethe also had scant sympathy, if any, with the war-cries for political liberty in his day. Those 'apostles of freedom' seemed to him only to want the freedom of doing what they liked. Goethe's indifferentism to the great revolutions of his time is indeed much harder to explain than Carlyle's invective: for Goethe had not Carlyle's savage impatience and he did have the conception of freedom as a means. Moreover, Carlyle's attacks against democracy were, more than half the time, directed against the sheer individualism of the Manchester School: he saw, what they did not, that through the inveterate distrust of government, nominal political freedom might mean nothing but crushing economic slavery, whereas Goethe's distrust of revolution seems only based on his dislike to confusion and upheaval, on his sense that political institutions were only, after all, the scaffolding of life, and on his belief that government, as such, was a highly technical art.

Often enough the reader is fain to quote against Goethe as against Carlyle, the words that Carlyle himself translated from Novalis concerning Christianity. Of that Religion, so profoundly honored by all three, Novalis says roundly: "It is the root of *all Democracy,* the highest Facts in the Rights of man, (die höchste That-

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sache der Popularität); ("Novalis," C. E., Vol. II, p. 219.)

But, of course, it is not for us to teach these men, it is they who have taught us, that the highest of all the reverences is the reverence for oneself. Three stages there are in religion, so Wilhelm Meister is told, and the well-known passage may be summarized here: the reverence for the absolute standard above us, the perfect ideal after which we search; the reverence for the common hard facts below us, the medium through which, and through which alone, we are to realize it; and the third and greatest of all, the reverence for oneself, the self in which the ideal becomes real, and conscious that it is real. The only quarrel a democrat need have at bottom with Carlyle or Goethe is that they keep a man overlong in the posture of the first. It is the stress on the two last reverences, after all, that is of supreme importance, as Carlyle saw, and here one can no longer avoid the most difficult and the most alluring part of the whole subject.

The intimate union of the three reverences seems to imply that in a sense, perhaps in more senses than one, the ideal is not complete until it is actualized here on earth in space and time. If earth needs heaven, so also does heaven need earth. So universal, so indispensable to every action of ours is the perception, "It is better for a good thing to exist than not to exist," that we hardly ever realize it is a perception at all. Yet it is not only such, but one which, fundamental as it is, cannot, it would appear, even be stated in an imperfect world without paradox. For it would seem to follow that the perfect ideal is *not* perfect until it is actualized through time. Does there lie here, one is tempted to ask, that secret want in the infinite ideal itself, which drives it to create the world? But to speak like this may only be to escape from a mystery by a metaphor.

With a sense of the mystery, at any rate, both Goethe and Carlyle are penetrated through and through. To Carlyle that a thing should *happen* is always of unspeak-

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able moment. Take, out of a thousand possible illustrations, this passage from the Essay on Biography (C. E., Vol. IV, p. 61):

> Boswell relates this in itself smallest and poorest of occurrences: "As we walked along the Strand to-night, arm in arm, a woman of the town accosted us in the usual enticing manner. 'No, no, my girl,' said Johnson, 'it won't do.' He however did not treat her with harshness; we talked of the wretched life of such women." Strange power of *Reality!* Not even this poorest of occurrences but now, after seventy years have come and gone, has a meaning for us. Do but consider that it is *true;* that it did, in very deed, occur! That unhappy outcast with all her sins and woes,—*she* is no longer here, but far from us, in the bosom of Eternity,—whence we too came, whither we too are bound! . . . No high Calista, that ever issued from story-teller's brain, will impress us more deeply than this meanest of the mean; and for a good reason: That *she* issued from the Maker of Men.

How could the man who wrote this help becoming an historian? History to him was the record of the union between the natural and the supernatural; and that, take it how we will, is the supreme business of the universe. His worship of forceful personalities grew from the same root. Force of spirit, above all, must be needed to incarnate the Divine in fact. Such force could be turned to evil, but it was essential to good. Flame was flame, as Browning would have said, wherever found, and Carlyle, like Goethe, sprang to welcome it wherever he saw it. Napoleon had the same attraction for them both; and there is no more profound analysis of sheer elemental power in character than Goethe's account of what he meant by 'the daimonic' in man. No doubt this passion for personal force led Carlyle astray, and aided that idolatry of despotism noticed above. One might quote Novalis against him again (especially in view of modern developments): "The ideal of Morality has no more dangerous rival than the ideal of highest Strength, of the most powerful life." But here again, to understand Carlyle's fundamental position is to free oneself from his quite subordinate errors. What the ideal wants is the free coöperation of *all* men, not the

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dominance of a few. "Behind us, behind each one of us, lie Six Thousand Years of human effort, human conquest: before us is the boundless Time, with its as yet uncreated and unconquered Continents and Eldorados, which we, even we, have to conquer, to create; and from the bosom of Eternity there shine for us celestial guiding stars."[6]

We have to create that Eldorado, and yet in some sense it is already there, above us, and guiding us. The double conviction is essential to Carlyle and to Goethe. In *what* sense the unrealized ideal is already in the bosom of Eternity, complete and incomplete at once, they do not say, and I do not pretend to understand. But that they did hold the double conviction is clear. In the wonderful "Tale of Tales" Goethe outdoes himself in symbols for the separation and the union between the "two halves of one dissevered world," the natural and the supernatural: the unpossessed ideal, like a fair maiden sitting spell-bound, and lonely, across the mysterious river; and the practical will, the king's son, formed for action, wandering miserably on the hither side, both of them wretched apart, one perishing, the other unable to give life, until they are united in that temple of human religion which can only be built in the actual world, and only when the bridge is built that spans eternity and time.

So much, at least, we can gather from this most solemn and most delightful of all fairy-tales, as from the whole drift of Goethe, that we human beings cannot definitely know what the ideal is except through struggling step by step to actualize it in time and space. And yet, somehow, and most surely, in the structure of ourselves and in the universe definite principles are involved. The ideal is not sheer indefiniteness to which we could give any turn we liked. Thus the conception has everything that is inspiring in Pragmatism,—the sense of the undiscovered

[6] "Characteristics," C. E., Vol. IV, p. 38. There follow, significantly, two lines from Goethe:

My inheritance, how wide and fair!
Time is my fair seed-field, of Time I'm heir!

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land below the horizon, of "the dim splendor ever on before," of the need and worth of human effort,—and yet it escapes the deadly chill of a doctrine that would dissolve truth itself into whatever it pleased us to invent. The whole significance of the time-process would lie in this gradual conquest of Eldorados, in this gradual filling-up for us of the content that gave body to the ideal. So vast is the work that it takes not only all men but all time; and era must follow era before it is done. Kings succeed kings in the "Tale of Tales," and Carlyle cried out that the French Revolution was a new fact, not to be subsumed under any old formula.[7] The belief that the infinite ideal had a definite character, that it could only be realized along certain lines, gave both Carlyle and Goethe a steady scale of value. Important as it was that a thing should happen, not all happenings were of equal importance. Those that most fully realized the ideal, those alone at bottom were "worth remembering": the rest only "needed to be well forgotten." So that history never became for Carlyle, and never could become, an indifferent chronicle. His was not the 'philosophy' that thought Stupidity had the same rank, and claimed the same place, as Intellect in the world's history, like the theory at which Goethe laughed:

> Was kluges, dummes, je geschah,
> Sie nennt es Welt-Historia.

Most enthusiastically, one fancies, Carlyle must have welcomed Goethe's impatient, glorious cry:

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[7] "Fr. Rev.," Bk. v., c. l. "But what if History were to admit, for once, that all the Names and Theorems yet known to her fall short? That this grand Product of Nature was even grand, and new, in that it came not to range itself under old recorded Laws of Nature at all, but to disclose new ones?"

Compare the words on the passing of Puritanism in "Cromwell" (25 May, 1658): "My friend, Puritanism was *not* the Complete Theory of this immense Universe; no, only a part thereof." And see "Sartor," Bk. iii, c. vii: "Generations are as the Days of Toilsome Mankind: . . . Thus all things wax and roll onward, etc."

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Nichts vom Vergänglichen
Wie's auch geschah!
Uns zu verewigen
Sind wir ja da!—*Zahme Xenien, I.*

"To make ourselves immortal," that was what we were here for, in Goethe's eyes, as long ago in Aristotle's, and we can afford to let the transitory go its way without a word.

In this imperfect and temporal world, of course, everything might in a sense be called transitory (*das Vergängliche*), but then in every faithful attempt there was something of the eternal too. The deepest springs of humor and pathos draw from the sense of this double fact, inadequacy everywhere, and, underlying the inadequacy, essential union with the supremely adequate. Ludicrous, pitiful shred as our best attempts appear compared with the infinite, yet *we* are infinite too, and perhaps we never feel it more than when we laugh and sigh over our own failures.[8] There is no need to say that Carlyle, of all historians, was master of humor and pathos; but perhaps it is not always recognized that both issued from his religious faith. Both are always at his side, but with Goethe they are often lost in triumph, the positive, as it were, swallowing up the negative. Inadequacy disappears in its own promise of the adequate. Goethe does not smile or sigh over the man "who desires the impossible," he simply loves him: "Den lieb'ich, der Unmögliches begehrt." The whole of the last stanza in Faust is full of this overflowing confidence. Often as it has been quoted, one cannot do better than end with it. Its deep likeness to the thought of both Plato and Aristotle is striking. In those realms above the heaven, everything transitory is seen as a symbol of something more; in that world of fulfillment the inadequate itself becomes fulfilled, mere potentiality opens out into act: the inexpressible is expressed at last, and for the union between the two,

[8] This point was first made clear to me by A. C. Bradley. See his "Shakespearean Tragedy" and "Oxford Lectures on Poetry."

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between the desire and the desired, between the actual and the ideal, Goethe takes once more the metaphor that Aristotle had taken before him, the metaphor that has so often symbolized the deepest union hoped for between the Self and its Other,—a union so intense that identity seems a poor word,—the metaphor of love between man and woman. All this, and much more, is condensed into eight brief verses. Short and sharp, "like a thunder-peal," as Seeley says of the last words in the Maurer-Loge, the sudden lines roll out:

Alles Vergängliche
Ist nur ein Gleichniss;
Das Unzulängliche
Hier wird's Ereigniss;
Das Unbeschreibliche,
Hier ist es gethan;
Das Ewig-Weibliche
Zieht uns hinan.

F. Melian Stawell.

London.

THE QUESTION OF MORAL OBLIGATION.

RALPH BARTON PERRY.

ONE of the principal sources of embarrassment in philosophy is the asking of meaningless questions. Since philosophy is not, like science, permitted to enjoy a limited liability, it is supposed that a philosopher may rightly be called on to reply to any sentence beginning with an interrogative pronoun. But there are many such questions that do not define real problems, and that therefore have no place in rational discourse. This is true especially of sentences formed by introducing the adverb 'why' at the head of propositions already stated. No one who has had initimate acquaintance with small children can be ignorant of the facility with which such pseudo-questions are ejaculated by the vocal organs. It is true that a child can ask questions which the wise men

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cannot answer, but most of them are questions that only a child would ask. There is a further source of confusion in that several real questions may be hidden in a single verbal interrogation. And these different questions may not only be merged and obscured, but, through lack of method, the answer which rightly belongs to one may be attached to another to which it is wholly irrelevant.

Since the mouth so readily interrogates where the mind has not rationally inquired, it is an important matter both to distinguish intelligent from foolish questions, and also to distinguish intelligent questions from one another. And this is what in a very limited way I here undertake to do in connection with the topic of moral obligation. Such a topic exists because there is a specific group of experiences, vivid and familiar, concerning which questions may be asked. These experiences as a group are commonly designated 'conscience' or 'the moral sentiments.' While they are by no means the only, or even the most important, data of ethics, under these or other names they are receiving a notable amount of attention at the present time.[1] And this fact has served to demonstrate a confusion of problems that might otherwise have escaped notice. The moral sentiments are being studied psychologically, sociologically, anthropologically, historically, logically, epistemologically, metaphysically—and ethically, while at the same time the naïve mind is reiterating a perpetual 'Why?' to which it apparently never receives a satisfactory answer. It is this situation which I feel as a challenge, and which I hope I may somewhat relieve.

I shall confine myself to a particular variety of moral sentiment, which may be designated 'the feeling of moral obligation.' It is distinguished from some moral sentiments in that it is a species of self-consciousness. It is a sentiment of an agent with respect to his *own* action. It

[1] *Cf.* the writings of Simmel, Ehrenfels, Meinong, Lévy-Bruhl, Durckheim, Westermarck, Hobhouse, Rickert, Windelband, Münsterberg, and others.

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is distinguished also by the fact that it purports to contain an assertion, and thus to be virtually a form of judgment. This is indicated by the fact that it requires for its expression a clause beginning with 'that,' and assigning a predicate to an action. Thus one is said to feel '*that* one ought to do this,' or '*that* this is right,' etc. We here have to do with a very common phenomenon,—a sentimental judgment, or a passionate experience which when cooled precipitates a judgment.[2] The precipitation can be brought about by a change of mood on the part of the subject, or by the critical challenge of a second party. In either case, what was at first more or less inarticulately felt, is now avowed and defended in such manner as to invite attention to the nature of an *object*. To bring out more clearly the judicial character of the feeling of moral obligation, we may paraphrase it as 'the feeling that I ought or ought not to perform this act.' Such an experience differs from feeling angry or afraid or happy, in that it contains, embedded and overlaid though it be, an asserted proposition which is open to proof or disproof by comparison with an act to which it refers. Here, then, is the datum laid before us for examination. What questions shall we ask? Without attempting to be exhaustive, we may enumerate several questions which it is especially important to distinguish.

We may fairly ask, in the first place, just *how one feels, when one feels that one ought or ought not?* Here is a complex but stereotyped emotion that may be analyzed, as fear and anger have been analyzed; and it may, like these, be brought under some theory of emotion, and finally under those laws of consciousness which it is the task of psychology to discover.

Or we may ask *how one comes to feel that one ought or ought not,* in which case attention will be directed to primitive or social forms of the emotion, and to the forces

[2] Indeed, strictly speaking, every actual judgment is doubtless in some degree of this kind. For one rarely, if ever, judges without feeling.

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through which it is evolved and propagated. Through such an inquiry we should be brought in the end not only to psychological, but to biological and sociological principles as well.

Or we may ask *what acts men have felt that they ought or ought not to perform.* This is a fruitful question because of the agreement of moral sentiment within limited communities. And one may not only compile the moral sentiments of races, nations, and epochs, but one may so assemble the results as to mark the outlines of a general development of these sentiments with respect to the more important and recurrent forms of action. This inquiry will be affiliated in method and in the laws to which it leads, with anthropology, comparative religion, and history.

But there is a further question that is in danger of escaping notice through its very simplicity: the question, *What acts ought I to perform?* This question may be asked in either a connotative or denotative sense; but we shall confine ourselves to the former sense, in which one discovers *that property or relation of acts,* predicated by the words, 'I ought to perform.' First, it is to be observed that this is in fact a new question. Its novelty cannot be denied without contradicting the complexity attributed to the original datum. In answering the questions enumerated above, it is necessary constantly to employ two propositions: a proposition asserted *concerning* the sentiment of obligation, and a proposition asserted *by* the sentiment of obligation. And the truth of the former alone has so far been in question. Thus, supposing the Quaker conscience to have been the topic of study, one will so far have arrived at conclusions concerning its emotional form, its genesis, and its objects. One may have learned *that* the Quaker felt that he ought not to fight, as well as how he felt and how he came to feel so. And one has also referred to the proposition, *that* the Quaker ought not to fight, but without raising the question, or laying claim to any knowledge about it. I believe that this

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is sufficient to establish not only the novelty, but also the independence of the briefer and more strictly ethical question. Since it is a different question, or one that can be left doubtful at the same time that the others are answered, it must evidently receive a different answer, and one based on different evidence. But since this is a rather momentous matter in its bearing on present-day ethical theories, it will be worth while to amplify.

It has been very widely claimed that while our last question is a different question, it may nevertheless be answered in terms of the others. This is equivalent to the assertion that *what I ought to perform is what I feel that I ought to perform.* This assertion has been justified in one or the other of two ways. On the one hand, it has been argued that the feeling of obligation reflects the will of God, or the more solid and lasting interests of mankind, and that it is therefore a reliable guide of action. But this is clearly not a definition of obligation in terms of the feeling, but in terms of the will of God or the interests of man, the feeling being regarded merely a ready means of identification. The performance of such acts as the will of God or the interests of man prescribe, would be obligatory, even though the feeling were not present for the agent's guidance.

On the other hand, it has been maintained, more radically and on the whole more consistently, that the property or relation of 'oughtness' is essentially psychological. Thus, according to Simmel, 'das Sollen' like 'das Wollen' and 'das Hoffen,' is an ultimate 'Denkmodus,' that may attach to any content.[3] We meet here with a special case of a question of general epistemological importance. How far is it possible to define objects in terms of the consciousness of them? I believe that confusion has arisen from attempts to answer this question for all cases at once, when it can only be answered for each particular case by direct empirical examination. Thus all substantives such

[3] *Cf.* his "Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft," I, pp. 8, 9, *sq.*

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as 'willed,' 'hoped,' 'feared,' 'known,' etc., formed from the passive participle of verbs which in their active voice denote activities of mind, refer to classes of objects that are entirely indeterminate apart from such activities. In other words, anything whatsoever may be a desired thing, provided only it stands in relation to this specific variety of consciousness. But it sometimes happens that an object is definable partly in terms of consciousness, and partly otherwise. Currency, for example, must be standardized by a specific act of authorization, and must also possess such intrinsic physical characters as shall enable it to be handled and exchanged. Land, though it has a standard value, is not currency because it cannot readily be manipulated; and pebbles, though they are readily manipulated, are not currency because they have no standard value. Finally, there are other classes of objects, such, for example, as rivers and metals, that possess their generic character quite independently of consciousness; in other words, their definition involves no such reference.[4]

Let us now frame our question concerning moral obligation so as to connect it with these general considerations. The assertion that *one ought to do whatever one feels that one ought to do,* is equivalent to the assertion that the obligatory act is *any act provided only that it be felt about by the agent himself in a certain specific manner.* And the truth of this assertion is not, as it is often held to be, a matter of dialectical self-consistency, but a matter of fact. *Is* the subjectivity of the agent the one constant and necessary factor in obligation? This question of fact may be tested in either of the following ways. One may either inquire, as we have already done, whether the emotion of obligation does not predicate obligation *of its objects.* Does one not feel, in a specific way, *that* an act is obligatory? If so, then the acts so judged, *when truly so*

[4] Waiving, of course, the general postulate of idealism, which can scarcely be argued here. In any case, even the idealist must recognize the difference betwen these three kinds of things in respect of their relation to consciousness.

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judged, have a common character other than the feeling, a character connoted by the term 'obligatory.' The case does not essentially differ from other cases concerning which no doubt has ever arisen. Thus, "I fear that he is armed," implies that the person referred to has another distinguishing character other than my emotionally typical fear of him, the character, namely, of being armed. Otherwise I should say simply, 'I fear him.'

Or, one may simply make the attempt to define obligation as a character of acts in relation to agents, without making any reference to the feeling; precisely as I may seek to determine the number of the planets without making any reference to men's opinion in the matter. If the attempt is successful, it will show, in the one case as in the other, that there is some generic and constant character in the object. I can do no more within the limits of the present paper than barely to indicate the outlines of such an attempt. An obligation may, I submit, be said to exist wherever there is an interest operating in an environment. If one seeks an end, and is confronted with a situation, then there is *a right act in the premises.* Such an act is determined by the practical configuration, regardless of any feeling toward it, or opinion concerning it. It is the act which the circumstances require in view of the end. It is true that such an obligation is conditioned, or, as Kant would say, 'hypothetical.' But this is not properly to be regarded as prejudicial to its validity. My moral obligation to act in a certain manner is not more unreal for being conditioned by my desires and circumstances, than is the gravitation of the earth for being conditioned by the mass of the sun. Mechanical and moral necessity alike are varieties of determination, and determination is meaningless without a determining ground and coördinate conditions. Moral laws have to do with actions and their consequences for good or evil. They define certain actions as virtuous or vicious according to their bearing on the field of interests which they affect. He who acts inter-

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estedly puts himself under the control of these laws, as truly as he puts himself under the laws of mechanics if he moves his body. Here, then, is an 'obligatoriness' that attaches to actions without reference to any judgment in the matter; and when it *is* predicated of his action, even by the agent himself, such a predication is answerable to the facts as in the case of any other variety of judgment.

The confusion between the psychological and the strictly ethical question, or the attempt to answer the ethical question by means of psychological evidence, is chiefly owing, I think, to a failure to hold fast to distinctions. It is generally admitted that the typical moral experiences contain both a judicial and an affective component,—but there is a widespread failure to keep this complexity clearly in mind, and to deal with its two components discriminately. It is obscured and reduced to a pseudo-simplicity by such notions as 'appreciation,' and 'evaluation'; or by such notions as Westermarck's 'emotions of approval.' These hybrids are supposed at the same time to be judgments in form, and simply objective facts as respects their freedom from error. But this is simply to exploit the equivocation which their dual nature makes possible. Let us briefly consider the case of Westermarck. "To name an act good or bad," he says, "ultimately implies that it is apt to give rise to an emotion of approval or disapproval in him who pronounces the judgment." And again: "The moral concepts are essentially generalizations of tendencies in certain phenomena to call forth moral emotions." By such considerations Westermarck believes that he shows that "the presumed objectivity of moral judgments thus being a chimera, there can be no moral truth in the sense in which this term is generally understood.[5] Now the 'moral emotion' either does or does not contain a judgment. It is not so much a question of fact

[5] Westermarck, "Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas," Vol. I, pp. 4, 5, 17.

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as it is of consistency. If it does contain a judgment predicating goodness of an act, then *that* judgment is either true or false according as the act is or is not "apt to give rise to an emotion of approval" in the judge. If it does not contain a judgment, if it is simply an 'indignant' or 'kindly' emotion evoked by the act, then it is evidence for the truth or falsity of a judgment *about* the goodness of the act. In either case, there can be no doubt of the objectivity or truth of moral judgments. Suppose that one remorsefully condemns one's own action. If there be here an assertion to the effect that one's action is bad, then that assertion is liable to error, or capable of objective truth, *whatever the meaning of the predicate* 'bad'; and it must have some meaning if there is any assertion in question at all. Even the definition of bad as "whatever occasions any one remorse," would not render the judgment infallible; for one may be in error about one's self. If, on the other hand, remorse be regarded simply as a painful experience, then we have to do with the fact or event of the action's causing it, and this will constitute evidence, but not knowledge concerning the action's badness.

The confusion which vitiates all of Westermarck's generalizations and first principles, and which, more than any other single cause, is responsible for the chaotic state of contemporary ethics, is not a wholly unfavorable symptom. It would probably not have become so widespread and habitual, were it not for the general acceptance of an important truth. With a few exceptions,[6] moralists are now agreed that goodness or value in the most general sense, is relative to desire. That which is common to all good things whatsoever, like that which is common to all satellites and tangents, is a specific relationship; and in this case the relationship in question is a relationship to a desiring or interested organism. Now this is very easily

[6] Mr. G. E. Moore, for example. *Cf.* his "Principia Ethica," ch. iv, D. Mr. Moore evidently believes that his realism is at stake. That such is not the case, will, I think, appear in what follows.

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confounded with the view that the good is what is *judged to be good.* But there is a fundamental epistemological difference between the two. This difference has been brought out very clearly by Ehrenfels, [7] in his distinction between 'Wertung' or simple 'valuing,' and judgments concerning value. Value lies in the *desire relation.*[8] This relation is a fact prior to all judgments about it, and a fact by which all judgments about it are subject to correction.

Now if it is not permitted to define simple goodness or value in terms of an approving judgment, the prohibition is more positive and unmistakable in the case of moral value. For here it is not sufficient, as in the case of value in general, that there should be a simple and direct relation to a certain form of consciousness. What one ought to do is not simply what one wants to do; it must be proved to be the *right* or the *best,* as having a certain more elaborate determination. Thus a right act is an act which produces good, that is, fulfills an inciting interest, in a given situation. It is determined by such a configuration regardless of opinion, which may be either correct or incorrect. Similarly, what is best is a quantitave derivative of what is good. It must depend on the prior nature of goodness and whatever category of quantity is here applicable. It is not uncommonly supposed that if what is desired is good, then what is *preferred* is best. But the same vicious ambiguity is present here. If preference is regarded simply as a quantitative variation of desire,

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[7] Versteht man . . . unter Wertung ausschliesslich die einer Wertrelation zugrunde liegende Gefühlsdisposition, so ist es klar, dass die Wertung entweder existiren oder nicht existiren, nicht aber wahr oder falsch sein kann, da diese Attribute überhaupt nur Urteilen zukommen können.'' (Ehrenfels, ''System der Werttheorie,'' p. 102. *Cf.* pp. 102-107.) The readiness with which the difference is lost in confusion is illustrated by Mackenzie, in his ''Notes on the Theory of Value,'' *Mind,* N. S., Vol. IV, pp. 434 *sq.* It must be admitted, I think, that the substitution of the term 'Wertung' for 'Begehrung' is unfortunate; and that the writers of the Austrian school are not wholly guiltless of confusion.

[8] Ehrenfels, *op cit.,* p. 65.

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simply as more of desire, then it may possibly afford a means of defining quantitative variations of goodness. In this case, however, the fact would have to be ascertained by some method of measurement, and no authority could be attached to the agent's mere profession of preference. If, on the other hand, preference is taken to mean a judgment to the effect that one act is better than another, then reference is made to a predicate 'better'; which, since it stands in some objective relation to another predicate 'good,' can be used either correctly or incorrectly.

It would appear, then, that the definition of goodness in terms of relation to desire, while it may easily lead to confusion, does not in fact lend any support whatever to the attempt to reduce moral values or obligations to the judgments concerning them, and is not fundamentally either relativistic or idealistic. But before concluding this phase of the matter, I should like briefly to allude to the idealistic version of the matter. The view just criticized asserted that 'I ought to do whatever I feel that I ought to do.' The idealistic view would amend this, and assert that 'I ought to do whatever I feel that I ought to do, *when I feel truly.*' The qualifying phrase is added as a means of averting the sceptical consequences of the rest. Obligation is defined in terms of the judgment of obligation, but lest the conflicting judgments of mankind shall so annul one another as to make obligation a wholly individual and capricious matter, the validity of obligation is reserved for a standard or absolute judgment. The general theory of which this is a special application cannot be criticised here; but the ethical application affords a striking illustration of its futility. If obligation follows from the *true* judgment of obligation, then we are set to inquiring as to the distinguishing marks of this true judgment, so that we may know it from the false. The original question is thus simply asked over again. We are as much enlightened as an astronomer would be, were he informed that the weight of Neptune is what a true judgment would pronounce it to be. And if the term 'true' is replaced by

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such terms as 'eternal,' 'standard,' 'universal,' 'necessary,' 'objective' or 'consistent,' nothing is gained, for these are only figurative or synonymous expressions for the same thing. This redundancy is in fact only concealed by Kant's phraseology. To "act on a maxim that thou canst will to be law universal," cannot mean that you should expect others to *act* as you do, or that you should merely be practically able to will that they should *think* as you do. There is no act which can be exactly repeated, and there is no maxim which cannot as a matter of fact be willed to be law universal. Kant can only mean that you should so act as to be confirmed in your act by every impartial critical judgment that is in possession of the facts. In other words, you should act on a true maxim, or you ought to do what you truly ought to do. But to determine what you truly ought to do, or even what is meant by obligation, it is necessary to turn to the objective context of action.

We are justified, then, in concluding that there is a logical or strictly ethical question concerning moral obligation, a question concerning its meaning or objective structure, that cannot be answered by any account of the genesis, history, or psychological structure of the sentiment of moral obligation. If one means by the question, 'What acts ought I to perform?' simply, 'What acts are *believed* to be obligatory?' then such an account will suffice. But if one means to ask what acts *are* obligatory, what act or type of action *is such that* I ought to perform it, then one is confronted with a second question that must be judged by a reference to actions and their moral determination. It will then appear, I believe, that such actions are obligatory as bear a certain determinate relation to interests on the one hand, and their environment on the other; being the actions which modify circumstance beneficently.

We may now turn to the last question concerning moral obligation, the question 'Why?' As has been already observed, this question is peculiarly open to suspicion as

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respects its clearness and intelligence. Thus the question, 'Why ought I to do what I ought to do?' although it is easily phrased, and conveys a certain suggestion of profundity, means nothing, on account of its redundancy. Or, rather, it adds nothing to the question, 'Why ought I to perform this action?' And the latter question may now, in the light of the previous discussion, be divided. If it is taken to mean, 'Why does the feeling of obligation attach to this action?' then it is a matter of genetic psychology. If, on the other hand, it is taken to mean, 'Why is this act obligatory?' there are still two interpretations open to us. It may be supposed that the inquirer desires to be shown that the act in question does actually possess the predicate of obligatoriness. In this case the question is to be answered by such evidence concerning the action in question as shall establish its obligatory character, or prove it to be a case of a law already established. Or, it may be supposed that the inquirer is seeking to have the law itself established. In this case the last question is only a verbal variation of the earlier question, 'What actions ought I to perform?' In other words, the question ,'Why ought I?' means either, 'How do you know that this is a case of obligation?' or 'What is the meaning of obligation?'

Whoever feels that there is a question, 'Why?' still unanswered, must, I think, be convicted of a confusion that arises from one or the other of two sources. It may be, in the first place, that he remains *unwilling* to perform action urged upon him, and that his question 'Why?' expresses a demand that his disposition be altered. But such a demand is not an appeal to reason. It may be met by such a change in the practical configuration, through threats or promises, as shall introduce new motives. But this amounts to an abandonment of the original question, and the introduction of a new; neither question receiving any rational solution. Thus if the question, 'Why ought I to be just?' is met by the threat of a special punitive dispensation if I do not, one does not discover why I

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ought to be just, and one has raised and left unanswered the new question, 'Why ought I to avoid punishment?' My question will have been quieted, but not answered; I shall have been made willing to act justly, but without being intellectually convinced of its rightness. Or the demand may be met by means of eloquence, suggestion, or any other extra-rational means of personal influence. But in this case, as in the other, while the questioning mood is dispelled, the question is not answered.

The fact is that it is impossible to furnish reasons that can be guaranteed to affect anything but reason. Argument does not exercise any compulsion over either feeling or action. Thus egoism as a theory can be refuted by theoretical means, by exhibiting interests other than those which the egoist has thus far consented to acknowledge. But there is no logical means of forcing the egoist to *adopt* these interests, or abandon his practical and emotional bias. I trust that these considerations will be found to throw some light on the objections raised against my treatment of the matter in "The Moral Economy." I do not there contend, as I am charged with contending, that "to disregard others is to deny that their interests or desires are real;"[9] but that one could not *justify* such a disregard without such a denial. Regard and disregard as emotional states are beyond the scope of argument, and can be neither disproved or confirmed by evidence. Passions do not follow from premises. To accuse me of confusing "the judgment of fact with the judgment of worth" appears to me to betray on the reviewer's own part the very confusion which we have been at such pains to dispel. There can be no such thing as a judgment of worth which is not a judgment concerning the fact or being of the worth; and such a judgment gets itself distinguished from judgments of fact only in so far as its emotional form is taken in place of its deliverance. But when that is done no question of its truth or falsity can be raised; we have

[9] *Nation*, Dec. 2, 1909, p. 545. *Cf.* "Moral Economy, ch. ii.

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to do not with an assertion but with a state. It is just this confusion in which the egoist takes refuge, and through which he obtains for his position a semblance of rationality. It has been objected that I ignore "the fact that precisely what the 'Rational Egoist' denies is that the objective goodness of a thing affords, by itself, a rational ground to anyone for pursuing it." The egoist is held to insist that another character must be added, "namely, that the good in question shall be that of the agent."[10] Now it is here admitted that there is an 'objective goodness,' that is, a goodness that a judge is compelled on grounds of evidence to affirm without any reference to his own interests. It follows that there is a rightness in actions conducing to that good, and that this rightness is equally objective. It need not be related to the agent's own interests in order to be valid for his judgment. In this sense, there is an act that ought to be performed in every practical situation. But if the agent chooses to ignore this rightness, and to recognize for the purposes of action only that limited rightness which has reference to that limited goodness which he calls his own, no argument can prevent him. An agent is always at liberty to ignore truth. Nor is it possible to argue the merits of the question in terms suitable to the egoist's state of mind. The merits of a question are determined by the nature of the question itself; and if the grounds are shifted, a *new* question is raised. This is the reason for the futility of the effort which has so much occupied moralists, to translate justice and good will into terms of self-interest. There is no proof of these virtues which does not begin with a recognition of the general field of interests within which the agent's own interests are regarded as the rest. The ground of the proof is the existence of this field of interests, and in order that this ground and its implications shall furnish a solution of practical problems, it is necessary that the agent should for the purpose

[10] Professor F. C. Sharp, in *Philosophical Review*, January, 1910.

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of such a solution cease to be partisan and become judge.

I may be permitted one other reference to my reviewers. Professor Tufts has objected that this method of procedure does not provide for the "active, creative, compelling aspect of the moral self, which in crises becomes a categorical imperative." "The 'organization of interests,'" he continues, "interprets more readily the reflections of a cool hour than the sterner moments of duty when some son of man sets his face steadfastly toward Jerusalem."[11] Here, again, I think there would be no difficulty, were it not for a confusion between obligation as a character that may be predicated of action, and obligation as the total state of mind in which that character *is* predicated, and has become a motive of action. There are times when one desires to know, quite dispassionately, what one's duty may be. At such moments a question is raised, which, like all questions, requires a certain suspension of action for the sake of the wiser action that may follow. And when the theoretical moralist undertakes the solution of this question in general terms, he can scarcely be reproached with not solving another question which he has not undertaken at all. The question of the genesis or inculcation of the passionate conviction of duty, through which the moral insight may become effectual, is a fair question, and a profoundly important one; but it is a different question, and ethically a less fundamental one, than that question of the nature of duty which every enlightened man must ask in an occasional 'cool hour.'

The second source of confusion through which one may be left unsatisfied, is that source of confusion which has been alluded to at opening of our discussion. I refer to the habit of verbal interrogation. It is possible to give to any explanation an appearance of insufficiency by asking 'Why?' This is the 'last word' which an uncritical mind persists in having. And there is no way of pre-

[11] In the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, April, 1910.

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venting it. But the series of questions which can be phrased by this means soon ceases to have any meaning. They are unanswerable not because they formulate unsolved problems, but because they do not formulate any problems at all. The question 'Why?' is pertinent to whatever may be brought under a principle, and it is answered when that principle is discovered and the datum derived from it. Such a question, then, is not pertinent in the same sense with reference to the principle itself. When action is brought under the principles of goodness and rightness, there is the end so far as the ethical question itself is concerned. It is possible to discover the moral grounds or reasons of action, but it is no more possible to discover a moral explanation for these, than it is to discover a mechanical explanation for the laws of motion.

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THE SPENCERIAN FORMULA OF JUSTICE.

H. S. SHELTON.

IN a critical exposition of Spencer's ethical teaching, it is convenient to make a broad distinction between his derivation and explanation of fundamental ethical principles, which we have treated in a previous article, and the more controversial ground of his social ethics. Especially is this the case because, in the advocacy of some extreme applications of his idea of justice, he was, as he has himself remarked, sometimes left in a minority of one. At the present time, it is doubtful whether that minority has greatly increased. A few, a very few, may have accepted his position in its entirety, but no independent thinker has arrived at the same conclusions; and those few who have taken their views from him have as yet shown no particular originality in adding to or elucidating his arguments. Yet, though there is perhaps no individual who will defend every one of his special

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opinions, there is much to be said for his main position; and, even in extreme cases, work that originates from Herbert Spencer invariably merits careful consideration and criticism. It will therefore serve a useful purpose to examine in some detail the content and derivation of his social views, and the connection between them and the rest of his philosophy.

The foundation of Spencer's social ethics is not specially concerned with any one of his own peculiar philosophical principles. This part of his work, more than any other, seems to show the influence of the Darwinian conception of natural selection. Continually, through the first few chapters of "Justice," we find reference to the survival of the fittest, a phrase coined by him to avoid misunderstanding of the term natural selection, but which, in its turn, has often been misunderstood.

In order to secure that the evolutionary process should be uninterrupted by the conditions of modern civilization, it appeared to him essential that every adult individual should reap the consequences of his own actions, and that benefit should vary directly with worth.[1] This principle was to him the foundation of social action. In stating it, Spencer makes the qualification that care and nurture of the young, in proportion to youth and helplessness, are equally essential, and that under many conditions the interests of the individual must be subordinate to the defense of the group. The principle of natural selection among groups, of which Mr. Benjamin Kidd makes so much, is not ignored by Spencer. In the first few chapters of "Justice," as well as in other parts of his work, it is carefully discussed, and cogent reasons are given for believing that offensive war, though in the past it tended to survival of the fittest, is no longer of benefit to the nation which undertakes it, and that "only defensive war retains a quasi-ethical justification."

From the principle of benefits in proportion to merits,

[1] *Cf.* "Justice," pp. 4f.



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Spencer deduces his famous formula of justice, commonly known as the law of equal freedom: "Every man is free to do that which he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man."[2]

The close connection between this formula and the principle of benefits in proportion to merits is so clear as to require no prolonged explanation. So far the ground seems firm, the formula of justice, as expressed above, is one with which few political thinkers will be inclined to quarrel. In this form it will be accepted by many who may not altogether approve of the details of the argument by which it is derived. The unequivocal expression of liberty as a right instead of a favor will awaken a sympathetic response among a very large class. Those who oppose the formula from the standpoint of socialism do so more from profound disagreement with some of Spencer's deductions than because of objection to the principle as it stands. Among a large section of thinkers the main differences of opinion will not be found so much in relation to the main principle as in the uncertainty concerning the amount of speculative strain it is able to bear. On this principle Spencer raises a very imposing superstructure, and, in reasoning of an *a priori* kind on social matters, it will be generally agreed that the certainty of the deductions falls off very rapidly as the chain of reasoning increases in length. With each successive step, the number of those who will approve of the deductions decreases; and very few indeed will give their assent to the extreme individualism with which the argument concludes. The following brief summary will indicate the main line of the exposition.

[2] "Justice," p. 46. Spencer's formula has been criticised because of its similarity to an opinion expressed by Kant. It is very unlikely, however, that the principle was taken from him, directly or indirectly. The line of reasoning in the first few chapters of "Justice" is, whether right or wrong, so clear, original, and explicit, that there can be little doubt that Spencer reached his conclusion in the way there stated. The similarities and differences between his views and those of Kant are dealt with in "Justice," Appendix A.

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According to Spencer's view, "rights truly so called are corollaries from the law of equal freedom, and what are falsely called rights are not deducible from it." In other words, the only right a man possesses is the freedom to make the best or the worst of his opportunities, nothing else can truly be so described. Nevertheless, this conception of right will take us a long way. An adequate maintenance of this position will ensure to us "physical integrity," defense against murder, theft, and assault. It justifies all reasonable laws and regulations to insure the isolation of infectious disease. No one can be said to be free if enslaved, or if unable to move freely from place to place without burdensome restrictions. These latter can only be justified "if needful for national safety"; "provided also that the end in view is defensive and not offensive war."

Man also possesses a fundamental right to the "uses of natural media"; air, light, water, land, and other natural resources belong equally to all. "The earth's surface may not be appropriated absolutely by individuals, but may be occupied by them only in such manner as recognizes ultimate ownership by other men, that is, by society at large."[3] Although this principle appears to lead clearly to some form of land nationalization, it will be seen that Spencer accepts the inference only on the theoretical side. "All that can be claimed for the community is the surface of the country in its original unsubdued state."[4]

Even this admission is watered down from the practical standpoint, and the Spencer of later years rejects the position so eloquently maintained by the Spencer of "Social Statics" that, "after compensating existing holders, it (the land) should be reappropriated by the community," because he considered that he had overlooked certain considerations having reference to the poor law

[3] "Justice," ch. II.
[4] *Ib.*, Appendix B.

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and cognate matters, and also because he "did not see clearly all that would be implied by the compensation for all the value which the labor of ages has given to the land." For this reason, and because of "the inferiority of public administration to private administration," he was of opinion that "subject to state suzerainty individual ownership should be maintained"; "the vices of officialdom would inevitably entail immense evils."[5]

From the law of equal freedom there also follows the right to the undisturbed possession of property, both material and that more elusive form, expressed in just laws, of patent and copyright. As property earned by the individual belongs to him by absolute right, it can be disposed by him as he wills both during life and by bequest. Yet ownership stops at death. "The proposition that a man can own a thing when he is dead is absurd." For this reason, although a testator should be allowed to state in some detail how property should be disposed of for the benefit of immature children, and though certain other powers should be permitted subject to reasonable state restrictions, limitations of the power of bequest such as "are embodied in the laws of mortmain and the like, harmonize with ethical inferences."

Other important deductions from the law of equal freedom are the rights to free industry, free exchange, free contract, free trade, subject only to restrictions necessary for the preservation of the independence of the country. Protection and all other "interference with the liberty to buy and sell . . . is a trespass by whatever agency affected."

The rights of free belief, free worship, freedom of thought, of expression of opinion however unpopular, freedom of the press, and of publication generally, are other obvious inferences which very few will be inclined to question. Here, after a short reference to the rights

[5] "Justice," Appendix B.

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of women and children, the positive side of the law of equal freedom ends.

The negative side is still more striking, and expresses a point of view from which a much larger number will dissent. According to Spencer's argument, the suffrage is not a right strictly so called. "The giving of a vote considered in itself in no way furthers the voter's life, as does the exercise of those various liberties we properly call rights." The question of who shall or shall not exercise the franchise would thus become an empirical one to be decided by what constitution is most likely to serve the cause of freedom. As an interesting side issue, we find Spencer opposed to the granting of the suffrage to women.

On the more general question of the suffrage it is surprising to note how the protest against an undue extension of the franchise is maintained by thinkers of different schools of thought. On this matter, Spencer, the evolutionist, comes into agreement with Carlyle, the hero-worshiper; and, still more surprising, we find a certain similarity of view between Spencer, the extreme individualist, and the socialists of the type of Mr. Wells.[6] That thinkers so widely different should so be found in opposition to the main stream of opinion, on this most fundamental issue, shows how temperament may often rise superior to merely theoretical views.

Another inference, not altogether original, concerns the ethics of taxation. "State burdens, however proportioned among citizens should be borne by all, . . . and all should directly and not indirectly pay it [some share of the costs]." According to his view, indirect taxation by customs excise or other methods is a more or less dishonest method of taking "furtively sums which it would be difficult to take openly" and so evading "a wholesome resistance which would put a proper check on public expenditure."

[6] I am referring here to the views expressed in "Anticipations" and "A Modern Utopia." I believe in Mr. Wells's more recent volumes these are considerably modified.

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Most controversial of all is Spencer's view of the limitation of state duties. According to his opinion, all taxation, all laws, and all state action whatever, are, when regarded from the view of absolute ethics, limitations of freedom, and such can only be justified by relative ethics in so far as they are essential to maintain the freedom which remains. The only ones which pass this test are the defense of the country and the administration of justice. For these objects, especially for the latter, great efforts should be made.[7] Spencer continually condemned the system by which the protection of the law is made costly and difficult. Justice should be free to all and easily accessible.

Beyond this narrow sphere the duties of the state, imperial or local, are nil. According to the same view, which Spencer relentlessly carries to its extreme logical conclusions, the great majority of laws and all state action outside this narrow limit are categorically and unhesitatingly condemned. For this reason the following, amongst other institutions, have been, explicitly or implicitly, denounced by Spencer as breaches of the law of freedom: All municipal trading; management by the municipality of gas, water, and public parks (these should not be provided or kept at the expense of the community, *cf.*, "Justice," p. 249); state education of all kinds whatever; public libraries; picture galleries and museums; inspection of food, drink, and dwelling-houses; the post-office; factory legislation and inspection; regulation of money banks and coinage.

I am not aware that Spencer expressed a definite opinion as to whether road maintenance was a state duty; it is, at any rate, quite certain that the extreme Spencerian view emphatically condemns nine-tenths of modern laws and present-day state activity, and is as much opposed to what is known as social reform, as it

[7] On account of the emphasis he laid on this positive action, Spencer objected to the term "administrative nihilism" as an unfair description of his views.

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is to the most extreme socialistic views. The former and the latter are both examples of the "extreme absurdity of proposing to improve social life by breaking the fundamental law of social life." Spencer would not expect all these state activities to cease immediately; but he would have wished them to be dropped as quickly as was practically possible, in order to allow time for private activities to take the place of public rule.

Spencer's reasons for his position are not entirely *a priori*. He was both willing and able to support his views by observation of the facts around him. Neither this nor any other century has seen so relentless an exposure of the blunders and vices of officialdom and of state interference, as is to be found in some of his works,[8] and he has little difficulty in discovering many examples of harmful laws and of state blundering. In maintaining his position *a posteriori*, the philosopher passes by insensible gradations into the political pamphleteer. His political works contain many powerful arguments and have convinced many who object on principle to *a priori* reasoning, that some limitation of state functions is desirable.

Though Spencer considers that the strict rule of justice should be the one and only law of the state, he admits important exceptions from the personal and ethical point of view. In the divisions, "Negative Beneficence" and "Positive Beneficence," he mentions numerous instances in which a too strict adherence to the principle of benefits in proportion to merits would, in private life, defeat its own ends. An interesting example is found in his emphatic condemnation of the methods of traders by whom "the forms of competition are employed to destroy competition." This he denounces as commercial murder, which "were its flagitiousness to be measured by the pain inflicted, might be held worse than murder ordinarily so called." Undoubtedly many of the methods of trusts and

[8] *Cf.* particularly "The Man Versus the State."

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combines would come under the same ban. He does not, however, suggest any remedy for such evils but moral development and public opinion. He is quite as well aware as the most extreme of his opponents that the principle of competition at times places one party to a bargain in a position of great inferiority, so that for him the element of bargaining cannot be said to exist, and he clearly indicates that the one with the upper hand is morally bound not to press his advantage too far.[9]

Thus, although Spencer admits the existence of hardships, he does not think that the state, in its capacity as judge, ought to take cognizance of the hardness of the bargain. What should be done if social conditions place one class permanently in a position of inferiority in such bargaining is a question with which he does not deal. Whether such a condition is real, as many would maintain, or hypothetical, as others would think, the possibility should be considered before any system of social ethics is complete.

As Spencer indicates in "Positive Beneficence," the idea of justice does not exclude private and personal acts of kindness. The necessity for kindness and mutual help between parents and children has every ethical sanction, as has also kindness to those who have no clearly defined claims. The accidents and vicissitudes of life often bring ruin and disaster to many through no fault of their own, and in such cases there is every scope for those who are charitably inclined. So long as charities are not state enforced, supported by rates and taxes, so long, that is, as there is no element of compulsion, these often benefit both giver and receiver, and are in no way a breach of the law of equal freedom. Private charity, especially to those with whom we come personally in contact, is the kind that will do most good, "as this personal administration of the relief would be adjusted in kind and amount to their needs and their deserts." There is, how-

[9] "Principles of Ethics," Vol. II, p. 282.

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ever, some justification for the poor law, as "entire usurpation of the land by the landlord, and entire expropriation of the laborer were unjust"; on the other hand, "it has come in later years to be in large measure contributed by others than landowners, others on whom there is no such claim, hence nothing but empirical judgments concerning compulsory beneficence seem possible."[10]

Although many of the deductive conclusions of 'absolute ethics,' qualified by empirical judgments, are, as I have already mentioned, powerfully supported by induction, it is the deductive aspect with which we are particularly concerned. As an opponent of state muddling, and an exposer of the vices of officialdom, on grounds of observation and from the empirical standpoint, Spencer's conclusions are open to reply from those holding opposite views supported in the same manner. It is only when, by a chain of reasoning, true or false, such special political opinions are affiliated to a system of philosophy, many parts of which, even opponents will admit, are a great and enduring addition to human knowledge, that they demand careful criticism in a philosophical essay.

Few critical readers will be in doubt that the chain of reasoning, not, I think, unfairly epitomized in the last few pages, contains more than one weak link. The principle of freedom, valuable as a large number rank it, will hardly bear the speculative strain to which it is subjected. In many ways, and particularly in the sections on "Positive and Negative Beneficence," even the author admits that his deductive principles are subject to qualifications from the empirical point of view, where the doctrine of evolution gives very little help. Nor is that all. As I have shown above, even in the division on "Justice," the author found it necessary to descend into the region of empiricism to obtain his conclusions on such fundamental questions as those of the land and the poor law. In one

[10] "Principles of Ethics," Vol. II, p. 378.

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case, indeed, the empirical view has, with Spencer himself, proved too strong for the deductions from the law of equal freedom. The latter principle points directly to the public ownership of the land and natural resources, a conclusion which, as we have seen, Spencer rejects on various empirical grounds, the most important of which is fear of the evils of officialdom.

What Spencer did not appear to realize was the enormous break such a course of reasoning makes in the structure of deductive social ethics. If empirical reasonings can thus override deductions from the law of equal freedom in such fundamental aspects, it is of little use applying the principle to more special cases. It is as if a generalization which, in one application, will only give correct results (say) to one per cent., is expected elsewhere to supply conclusions of a much higher order of accuracy. The same subject suggests another criticism. The principle of public ownership of land, which is an undoubted inference from the law of equal freedom, and which, in this volume, Spencer waters down till it becomes unrecognizable, is of vital importance to the vast mass of the population. If, here, the balance is empirically tilted on the side of the rich and powerful, great compensation must elsewhere be sought for the poor. Certainly, a poor law is not likely to satisfy them. Here we find a justification, from his own point of view, for many of the state enactments which he so strongly condemned. If, by divorce from the land, a proletariat is forced to the town, there to be dependent upon casual employment, factory acts, children's acts, and other protective measures, are absolutely necessary.

Many other criticisms will occur to the thoughtful reader. Is road keeping a public function or a private one? I am not sure whether Spencer anywhere explicitly deals with this question; but, if it is not, what, in a country of private landownership, even if qualified by state suzerainty, becomes of the right of free motion and locomotion? Private companies will not build roads from

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the motive of philanthropy. If road making is the duty of the state, are private companies to be allowed to break up these public roads at their own will and pleasure, to lay and repair the apparatus of an unlimited number of competing gas, water, electric light, telegraph, telephone, and other services? If we do not permit competing companies, we must either farm out a monopoly or organize a state monopoly. Either alternative is objectionable according to Spencer's interpretation of the law of equal freedom. These instances, and many more could be given, are sufficient to show that, admitting the general validity of the principle, it is futile, in so involved and complicated a civilization as our own, to press it to minute details, and still more useless ruthlessly to apply it in one direction, if we admit huge breaches in another.

Both in the application and in the non-application of this main principle of Spencer's social ethics we can see the conservative tendency so often associated with advancing years. This tendency was, in Spencer's case, accentuated by the fact that he led the life of a recluse, and seldom came into direct personal contact with the facts of social life as it exists to-day. The philosopher, who had amassed and coördinated so much information concerning the conditions of many and varied types of society, did not appear to possess that intimate direct personal knowledge of his own necessary to apply the main principles of his philosophy to detailed and special conclusions. This is how I, for one, read an incursion into present-day practical politics such as "Parliamentary Georgites."[11] It would not have occurred to anyone else that the landowners and other wealthy organizations would be unable to defend their own just interests from the predatory designs of parish councils! If we take this view of Spencer's extreme individualism, and, ignoring such details, regard only main principles, we shall find that the law of equal freedom

[11] "Various Fragments," p. 122.

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will give much better results. Spencer's more extreme applications, in this case, tend to prejudice many against his main principles, for which much can be said.

As a clear-reasoned application of such principles there is little doubt that his earliest published work is greatly superior to his later writings. To illustrate my meaning, if anyone who has access to the first edition of "Social Statics" will compare Chapter IX of that work, dealing with the question of the land and natural resources, with Chapter II of "Justice," either from the point of view of philosophy, practical reasoning, or literary style, I shall be greatly surprised if he does not decide emphatically in favor of the earlier work. On the vexed question of political rights, Chapter XX of "Social Statics" and Chapter XXII of "Justice" supply another interesting contrast. The fundamental ideas are the same, but the practical applications are strikingly different. The earlier work may contain some crudities, but it is a more logical application of main principles. The contrast is interesting in showing how comparatively small differences in cast of thought and point of view will affect the application of philosophical principles to political conclusions, whenever these applications proceed beyond main outlines to more special detail.

These few criticisms will, I think, make it abundantly clear that here we can remove these extreme personal excrescences from Spencer's philosophy without detriment to the main principles even of his ethics. Certainly we need have no fear that such a treatment of this part of his work will greatly affect, either the value of his system in particular, or of evolutionary philosophy in general.

The break-down of this, the most striking social philosophy of the century, confronts us with the general question how far philosophical ethics can help us in deciding social and political questions. Are any certain and positive conclusions possible, or must all the attempts that have been made be thrown once more into the em-

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pirical melting pot? Toward the solution of this problem I think Spencer has contributed something. Among the schools of philosophy his method will best bear critical examination, in that his premises are so unexceptionable, and in that his line of reasoning is so clear and explicit. For methodological reasons it can readily be seen that a deductive process can easily be pressed too far. But if the deductive process can ever help us to the smallest extent, we must get somewhere near bedrock for our data. This, at least, Spencer has succeeded in doing. That he has, by a chain of reasoning, shown that it is possible to affiliate so ethical a principle as that of liberty to evolutionary philosophy, under the somewhat unattractive aspect of natural selection, is no small accomplishment. Such a theory gives us a true scientific basis for the conception of natural right without implying an unhistorical theory of social contract.

Again, Spencer's conclusion that the limitations of freedom are indissolubly bound up with military organization, especially that intended for offensive war, is one of vast importance in the coördination of the facts of social life. His powerful advocacy of the cause of peace, and the reasoning by which he has shown that warlike activities are no longer operative in ensuring survival of the most advanced types, but now only act as a drag on the wheel of progress, is a welcome addition to evolutionary theory, especially in that it controverts and disproves that crude application of the principle of natural selection, by which unnecessary war has been made to appear to receive evolutionary and ethical sanction. Nor, in estimating the value of Spencer's work, must we forget his explicit statement of the view that social ethics must have relation to the larger body of thought from which all true naturalistic ethics must ultimately take its origin. That there are main principles which should guide the conduct of social affairs, and that it is possible for us to discover and apply them, is a statement which few will deny in the abstract.

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At the same time, many of Spencer's warmest admirers will admit that his detailed application of his own principles, whether the latter were true or false, has been a failure. Powerful as were his reasonings, and his advocacy of the cause of liberty, yet the eccentricities of his special conclusions, and the way in which these appeared to be bound up with his main principles, render it unlikely that his arguments would carry conviction to those not previously inclined to favor his school of thought. So far as this part of his work is concerned, he appears to have left no successors. Indeed, his influence has, I fear, through the fact that his special political doctrines have been so obviously out of harmony with the needs of present-day life, tended to drive many who would be in sympathy with his main principles, either to an unqualified empiricism, or to a theory of state functions fundamentally and diametrically opposed to his own. After his abortive attempt to settle the question, What are the fundamental principles of state action? the question itself has tacitly been dropped, and succeeding sociological writers have usually invoked the aid of the state whenever it appeared to be of help in furthering their particular nostrums and ideas. Yet there must be some limit to state action; there are undoubted disadvantages in the rule of officials; and unnecessary interferences with personal liberty cannot too strongly be condemned.

How to harmonize these facts with the practical necessities of present-day social life, how to obtain the main principles of state action, and how, in their application, to qualify absolute ethics by a wise empiricism, how to keep a firm grip of the principle of liberty, and yet to secure the necessary subordination of private interests to the public welfare, how to find the judicious mean between the extreme anarchism, which regards all state control as unnecessary and injurious, and that extreme regimentarian socialism, which advocates indefinite extension of that control as the universal panacea for all social ills,—these are a few of the problems yet unsolved

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which, for their solution, will engross the patient study of many generations of statesmen and of social philosophers.

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THE FASCINATION OF PANTHEISM.

W. S. URQUHART.

THOUGH the wide and ever increasing fascination of pantheism is one of the most noticeable tendencies in our own day, its attractive influence is as old as the history of thought. Goethe declared that "all antiquity thought in this way." We may, *e. g.*, trace much of our pantheism back to the ancient philosophy of India, and discover it as the ruling conception of the sages of the Vedanta. Touched with a more exclusively religious spirit, pantheism became the foundation of much of the mysticism of the middle ages. In more modern times it reappears in the philosophy of Spinoza; and it is the world-view from which Hegel often struggles in vain to escape. In India it is still the most prevailing inspiration of thought and life. What is the secret of this fascinating power which the centuries unite in acknowledging, and which is felt to-day both in the East and in the West? How has pantheism been able to attract so many minds, and bring within the sweep of its influence men widely separated in their initial point of view, professing many different creeds, and belonging to many different races?

Our attempt to give some answer to this question is entirely analytic and preparatory. It implies at the outset, at least, no valuation of pantheism. If we can, however, to any extent, discover the secret of its fascinating power, we shall then be in a better position for deciding whether it ministers to mental and moral sanity, or leads rather to intellectual bankruptcy and moral despair;

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whether it is a defence of religion, or "floats in a cloudland between theism and atheism, confessing God and making him nothing under the pretence of making him everything."

We may consider the fascination of pantheism in its *intellectual, emotional,* and *moral* aspects. The intellectual man of to-day, whether metaphysically or scientifically inclined, prides himself on his open-mindedness. He desires to dispense with categories which tempt us to transcend their limitations or which savor of dogmatism. In regard to the deepest matters of thought, he is more negative than positive; or, where he is positive at all, the position reached must be non-exclusive, befitting an apostle of catholicity and an opponent of all definite theology. Pantheism seems to give him what he needs. It has been described as *Protean,* and is the most catholic of all systems of thought. It encourages a love of vagueness by representing such vagueness as a necessity of progressive thought, and this impression of its liberality has no doubt been deepened by the fact that it has in almost every age encountered the opposition of the most orthodox theologians of the Church. Even at the present day divergence from pantheistic theory is in some quarters taken as the measure of the almost culpable conservatism of a theological writer. Amongst the more educated people of India, with whom pantheism is a working creed, this theoretical catholicity is a constantly recurring claim. "One religion is as good as another," is one of their most favorite sayings, and the attitude on religious matters which it indicates is not unlike that of many anti-theological thinkers in western lands.

We are peculiarly sensitive to-day to the limitations of the conception of personality. "To depersonalize man," said Amiel in his "Journal Intime," "is the great tendency of our age;" and the tendency is not less strong now than it was when these words were written. There has been a reaction against the doctrine of the 'impervious self,' against Kant's excessive emphasis upon

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individual self-determination. This attitude to human personality has affected theological speculation and manifested itself in a growing horror of anthropomorphism. The depreciation of personality is probably due originally to crude ideas of personality,—ideas colored to a great extent by our consciousness of the limitations of our own organism. We may say that it is because the depths of the concept have not been sounded that its application is so restricted. But however this may be, the fact of its felt inadequacy remains, and we are told that we should not have the presumption to limit God by the use of it in reference to him. Such use, it is said, is a temptation to dogmatism. For, after all, personality is a concept with a certain amount of content; it is an assertion of knowledge, and we should not assert knowledge in a sphere where none is really possible. Or if we are unwilling to go so far as to say that no knowledge is possible, we should abandon ineffective and worn-out ways of thought, and make use of categories which have been already successfully applied in the region of physical science. At least, we should not block the way to the divine by the use of categories which have merely traditional value.

To those whose point of view thus reveals an "antagonism between the comparative limitation of the personal conception and the grand immensity of the impersonal," pantheism appeals. It fills up the void left by our consciousness of the limitations of our most cherished conceptions. Our sense of failure does not destroy our desire for contact with the divine immensity; and, having been baffled in one direction, we try other ways. The first satisfaction pantheism gives us is that it enables us to describe this immensity as a *unity*. We have escaped from the limitations which distressed us, but we have not lost ourselves in chaos. Our intellectual abhorrence of unresolved particularity is respected, and we are supplied with conceptions which allow us to include all details within a unitary system, or give us metaphysical justi-

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fication for disregarding such details. If, further, we have some lingering regrets for the loss of more personal conceptions, we are encouraged by being told that the elements of personality we have had to sacrifice are themselves worthless and hindrances to our highest good. And, if we should have doubts as to whether we have even, under the guidance of pantheism, reached the proper point of view, we may be comforted by its vagueness. We are not by it tied down to any hard and fast theory of the One and the Many. We may leave this and many problems like it in an attractive indefiniteness which we need not, at first, distinguish from a solution.

More positively, pantheism satisfies our desire for penetration into real being, our craving for the permanent elements in experience. The prevailing fashion of modern thought leads to a concentration of attention upon the change of the finite world; but it is not enough. The world passeth away and the lusts thereof, and in the intellectual sphere change is unintelligible except in relation to a permanent. We may at first attempt to find this permanent in the law of the process, but we soon find that we dislike universal evolution, and are not satisfied unless we can find a system within which, indeed, evolution takes place, but which is not itself evolved. From a more idealistic point of view, we may say that we desire to be assured that the Real towards which our intellectual search is directed does not merely come into existence with our knowledge of it, but eternally *is*.

Now pantheism seems to meet this tendency of thought. In one phase it offers us a totality within which there may be change, but which is not, as a whole, subject to change. Or, if we are still perplexed by the problem of change there are other phases of pantheism (especially Eastern) which invite us to disregard the reality of all variations and permutations of phenomena, and fall back upon the one and *only* Reality, an undifferentiated ultimate Being. All is God, we are told, and why should we be perplexed by the unreality which lies outside the Being of God. Why

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should we beat in vain against the doors that seem shut against us, when we may know that they are shadowy, and through them may take our shadowy way?

The assertion of unity at the expense of diversity may be made in various ways. The changing phases of the world may be crushed together like the parts of a telescope (as in the Vedantic doctrine of Karyakaranabveda). We emerge from the temporal into the eternal, and are able to face with greater confidence the problems of creation and final issues. Any doctrine of creation which is to be ultimately satisfactory, must be monistically conceived,—a demand which creates many difficulties. These difficulties, however, pantheism allows us to meet by the use of such phrases as 'eternal creation,' and by excusing us from further investigation into the particular character of creation, and the place left within it for human freedom and activity. When, again we turn to the other end of the process, and attempt to conceive the ultimate result in which nothing shall be left unrelated to, or unresolved in God, pantheism seems once more to help us, only demanding that we should be willing to concentrate our attention almost entirely upon God, and regard as of no account the place which the creature may finally have in regard to him. Even the most orthodox theologian is attracted by this apparent agreement of pantheistic theory with the Pauline doctrine of God "reconciling all things to himself."

Again, when a philosopher has to meet the suggestion that his system of thought is merely a subjective and arbitrary construction, he may base his defence upon a pantheistic theory of knowledge. How can the thought in question be merely *his* thought when all thought is the thought of God? The humble philosopher is merely the medium of truth. It is not conceivable that he should be in private possession of even a little bit of the illimitable truth of the world. In the words of Herbert Spencer, "he, like every other man, may properly consider himself as one of the myriad agencies through whom works the Un-

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known Cause, and when the Unknown Cause produces in him a certain belief, he is hereby authorized to proclaim and act out that belief." According to such a view as this, the individual is a stage in the development of the thought-activity of the universe and must give up the idea of making any individual contribution. At the same time, the thought-construction which *comes to him* will gain additional validity, for it will now be regarded, not as an arbitrary and individual invention, but as the product of a deeper and more universal life. Such an attitude is an echo of the reminiscence doctrine of Plato, and is the underlying thought of the Vedanta. The philosophy which makes use of it is rapidly approaching mysticism, and is met and helped on its way by pantheism.

It has been indicated above that pantheism has a special appeal to the scientific mind, and, indeed, the revival of pantheism at the present time is largely due to an action and reaction between religion and science. Science feels the need of religious conceptions while not definitely acknowledging the need even to itself. There are many thinkers who, attracted and somewhat misled by the developments of modern science, have departed altogether from their ancestral beliefs. The claim of facts,—or what they call facts,—is an exclusive one. The scientific method must everywhere be rigorously applied. But yet they are not satisfied. They cannot rest in bare isolated facts or even in the laws of their connection. The world they know is after all a small one, and they are conscious of the great disproportion between the known and the unknown. The sense of mystery still remains, and they would fain admit that "nature is not all dust, but a living portion of the spheres." And so the scientists look longingly back to the country from which they have come out, and desire that the divine may still be with them in the wider world upon which they have entered.

Not that the scientist would for a moment *explicitly* abate his claim to the all-sufficiency of science, or look forward to a time "when the sciences shall more and more

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cease and immediate knowledge take their place." All that he desires is that something may be added to science in as unobtrusive a way as possible, which, while not disturbing it, shall make it more religiously attractive, and enable him to see nature "with a divine glow upon it." It is an addition of this sort that he supposes pantheism allows him to make. It does not require him to be false to scientific method. It does not depend upon artificial relations to a dead past or problematical constructions of a shadowy future. It takes the universe as it is, and presents it as a God who may be worshiped,—a living God of yesterday and forever, but also of to-day, who "shines upon us more splendidly now than in the times of our ignorance, . . . because larger powers of contemplation have been evolved in man." Spencer's philosophy may be taken as one example of scientific pantheism. Even his reverence for the Unknowable is pantheism in more abstract form. In any case this Unknowable plays the part of a 'sleeping partner,' so that the reverence otherwise given to it may be transferred to the world in its concreteness and its totality,—the result being pantheism in its naturalistic form.

The whole tendency we have just been considering, might be described as the underpinning of empiricism by religion. Empiricism suffers normally from being irreligious and pluralistic. Pantheism covers over these defects, and thus widens the appeal of empiricism to human nature. The latter becomes more respectable and more orthodox by taking on a religious and mystical guise. It is of course a further question whether this religious dressing of mechanical conceptions may not make their paralyzing effect more deadly, and allow the practical application to life of theories which might otherwise have remained merely speculative and so comparatively harmless.

We must now turn to the more emotional element in the fascination of pantheism. It must be admitted that the form of thought which most easily kindles the de-

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votion of the saint and stimulates the rapture of the poet is pantheism in one or other of its forms. It is specially the religion of the dreamy and unpractical mood, and when such moods affect a mind possessed also of intellectual strength, it becomes the faith of the poet and the mystic. The mystic of mediæval Europe joins with his Eastern brother in despising the rights of the individual and craving absorption in deity, and both are supported by pantheism of an abstract type. Immediate contact with God which is desired by the mystic, implies a conception of God as the All, and an effort to transcend the limits of the merely finite. The Neo-Platonic consciousness of being 'saved' finds here a metaphysical basis. The aim of Julian of Norwich is to "noughten all else that is made for to know and have God that is unmade." Everywhere the aim of the devoted saint is just to be able to negate everything but God, and to possess his own soul alone, and yet not alone,—to possess it as a phase of God. If the mystic can say with sincerity, 'God is All,' he feels that he has reached the highest level of religion, and in becoming conscious of the identity between himself and God, he has a foretaste of the bliss of the eternal life. If, again, we take the more naturalistic phase of pantheism, and, instead of saying 'God is All,' prefer to say, 'All is God,' we find that by the immensity of this conception the deepest emotions of the poet and artist may be stirred. An immediate contact with the beauty of the world seems to be offered which shall also be an intimate communion with a divine spirit. It is essentially an emotional attraction which we are here considering, for the appeal of the whole of nature is always more emotional than intellectual.

The poetry of Wordsworth would seem to depend for its religious effect very largely on pantheistic emphasis. In his efforts to get away from unhealthy and even morbid subjectivity, he relies mainly on the conception of nature as divine. It is true that he never becomes entirely a pantheist, but his personal God is always tending to

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"shade off into the impersonal." Generally, it may be said that for him the whole intricate and vast movement of nature becomes the complex working of God. Nature, breathing life and joy, is full of God, and coalesces with him into one 'mighty Being.' Every one of the minute processes of the universe, as the poet watches them with loving attention and almost religious devotion, seems to him to speak

> Of Life continuous, Being unimpaired
> That has been, is, and where it was, and is,
> There shall endure.

Nature, conceived of as a divine unity, and regarded through the medium of intense poetic feeling, becomes, for Wordsworth, an object of religious adoration, giving elevation and value to his whole life-attitude. He can speak of the "bliss ineffable" with which he felt

> The sentiment of Being
> Spread o'er all that moves and all that seemeth still.

It is true, of course, and, in view of any subsequent critical estimation of the influence of pantheism, should be carefully kept in mind, that this rapturous mood had its intervals of dejection. He could speak of himself sometimes as more like a man

> Flying from something which he dreads
> Than one who sought the thing he loves.

Still these passing moods of depression do not alter the general conclusion that pantheism was to a large extent the philosophical basis of Wordsworth's poetry, that he may, therefore, be regarded as an illustration of its appeal to the poetic mind.

And the fact that pantheism is the philosophical creed not only of Wordsworth, but of many other poets as well, would seem to some to be a presumption in its favor. At least this would be the case if we were to agree with the dictum of Mr. W. B. Yeats that only those ideas in which

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philosophy has become poetry, are likely to be permanent. There is no other system of thought which has influenced so widely and so deeply the poetic mind. It consecrates the beauty of the particular, and at the same time enables us to transfuse with emotion even the most abstract conceptions. It seems the natural basis of the æsthetic attitude.

Finally, we may consider the influence of pantheism in the sphere of ethics, and its appeal to men of a practical turn of mind. The desire for what, from the intellectual point of view we called permanent elements of experience, reappears here in the practical moral life. When a man is striving after the good, he is nerved to the struggle by the feeling that the good is not something which he has now to bring into existence for the first time by his own individual effort. It must be something which has been in existence from all time, and unless it is now, in principle, at least, a reality, it cannot effectively summon him to service, to whatever extent it may still await a special detailed setting in his particular moral experience. Here becomes apparent the value of an ideal of which we frequently find traces in Eastern pantheism,—the idea that progress consists, not in moral change, but in the recognition of that which is already real. It is also an emphasis of the Platonic doctrine of reminiscence in the moral sphere, and an ethicizing of the more modern saying that "the Absolute has no seasons, but all at once bears its leaves, fruit, and blossoms."

A danger of course lies very near. The idea just referred to may be so emphasized as to withdraw our attention from the necessity of progress. That such a consequence *may* follow is not however our present concern. We are simply noting the presence in pantheism of an idea which fascinates because it seems at first sight to give us assurance of the permanence of moral values. Our belief in the everlasting reality of goodness has an apparently firmer basis when it can rest on the pantheistic doctrines of the permanence of the whole, and the ultimate

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illusoriness of everything that lies distinct from the nature of God. It is of course a further question how far in pantheism the nature of the whole or of God is indeed ethically conceived, but it is a question which belongs to criticism rather than to analysis. Again, the discipline which mystical pantheism inculcates appeals strongly to the man who is in earnest about the perfecting of his own character. He is summoned to rise through the various grades of Being, to pass through the 'purgative life,' the 'illuminative life' to the 'unitive life,' and the very description of these stages, or of others like them, inspires him with the idea of progress being slowly but surely made.

The pantheistic emphasis upon the whole of things, when applied to the world of human society, calls us further to the surrender of merely individual and selfish aims, and the annihilation of desires connected with the continuance of a separate personality. It offers us a mode of thought which awakens some of the noblest impulses of our nature, and seems to stand in attractive contrast to the sickly other-worldliness which would make salvation consist only in the saving of one's own soul. It encourages a man to look beyond the narrow confines of his own family, his own community, his own race. Because God is All, and All is God, therefore all men are divine and all men become proper objects of service. "Humanity is incarnated in each man, but each man is only realized so far as he passes out of himself into the wider life of humanity."

While one phase of pantheism might thus conceivably be used in support of ideals of mutual service, we should notice on the other hand its connection with social life of an entirely different character. In certain of its phases, it has been used as a refuge when inequalities were most glaring, political life most unpromising, and moral effort, generally, despairing and weak. These conditions may be noted in connection with the Vedanta philosophy and with Stoicism. Mediæval mysticism, also, which is an-

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other form of pantheism, seems to have arisen in circumstances of gloom. Amalric of Bena, one of the earlier mystics, lived at a time when all the vigor of individual life was crushed out under the double despotism of the Church and the Empire, and a period of revival in mysticism set in during the fourteenth century when Europe was still suffering from the effects of the devastation wrought by the Holy Wars.

The explanation is that pantheism, in one of its *Protean* variety of forms, offers most of all an *escape* from present troubles. It seems to promise a relief from the calamities of life, however great they may be. Its popularity increases therefore with the severity of the calamities. Its world-view enables us to negate or at least to forget the worry of detail, and the vexations of ordinary life. It affords a metaphysical justification for withdrawing from the responsibilities of society, and sometimes in the hurry of our escape we may not distinguish between flight and victory. If we are passively inclined, temporary relief may wear the guise of permanent conquest, and pantheism at least promises us this temporary relief. We may, like the ostrich, be simply burying our heads in the sand, but at least the sand is provided, and occasionally even human beings may be grateful for it.

Whatever our further critical estimation of the value of pantheism may be, the analysis of its fascination, undertaken in the foregoing pages, will leave us with the impression that it is a force to be reckoned with. It has always been regarded as such a force, but the attitude towards it in the Christian centuries has been curiously varied, and might be described as one of mingled distrust and welcome. A writer of forty years ago could say, "Christianity and Pantheism must be reconciled, otherwise it will be the worse for Christianity." And this complex attitude was further illustrated a year or two ago in the extraordinary interest and opposition aroused by an attempt to interpret Christianity from an entirely pantheistic point of view,—an attempt which proceeded on

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the assumption that the truth of pantheism was indisputable, and its promises altogether trustworthy. This assumption, however, was not received with so great a degree of unanimity as to warrant us in thinking that, after all the warring of the creeds, we had reached a new era of pantheistic peace. Rather is the controversy still with us, and at the present time we seem again called upon to examine the claims of pantheism, and to inquire whether it can honestly and permanently satisfy the various needs of our human nature, whether it increases or decreases our sense of the value of life. We have analyzed its fascination and indicated some of its promises, but, before we surrender ourselves to its influence, we have to ask whether we are here dealing with the apparent or the real, with trustworthy or untrustworthy promises.

In conclusion, I would ask, Is it not at least possible that the vagueness, by which pantheism attracts those who are unwilling to hold to any fixed form of faith, may become so predominant as to involve almost intellectual bankruptcy? May it not be the case that the unity by which it attempts to hold together the diversity of the world, falls apart from the unity, disappears into the region of abstractionism, and leaves the diversity to degenerate into mere naturalism, determinism, and fatalism? Is there here permanent satisfaction for the emotional rapture of the poet or the mystical devotion of the saint, or may there not be danger of repeated reaction, having effect in helplessness before the actual problems of the world? Finally, is it not a question worthy of consideration whether the expansion of sympathy which pantheism produces in the sphere of ethics, may not be more than counterbalanced by its failure to give an adequate explanation of suffering, its depreciation of moral distinctions, its rigid determinism and denial of progress, its disregard of both the present and future worth of the individual? Under its influence may we not put contemplation before conflict, and care more for flight than for victory?

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Such inquiries are, however, beyond the scope of this article, which will have fulfilled its purpose if it to any extent prepares the way for them.

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THE SEX PROBLEM.

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AT the first International Moral Education Congress held in London a year or two ago, a well-known co-educationist said that the sex evil was England's greatest curse, that little was being done to check it, and that the remedy lay in the rehabilitation of sex.

As a large part of the gladness and goodness of life is an expression of thought and feeling that are connected with the recognition of sex differences and relations, this reinstatement ought not to be a formidable task. The sex impulses in themselves involve no guilt, and the miseries to which they give rise are to a great extent imaginary, that is to say, they are "thought's own substance made a cage for thought," or, in scientific instead of poetic language, they are the product of hypnotism and suggestion. But they are not the less fearful on that account, for the passions upon which imaginations are founded are real forces, like electricity or heat or radiation. Like these, however, they can be studied and controlled for the benefit of mankind, and herein is the redemption of society from the slavery of sex to be sought. Man will never be made master of his world through physical science alone. The psychologist will have to work with the doctor of medicine if the sex problem is ever to receive scientific treatment, and be rescued from the thriving class of social teachers whose activities constitute the *raison d'être* of the Pure Literature Society. The physician generally takes a static view of the question. Judging by the prodigious

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number of 'oversexed' men and women who consult him, he forms the conclusion that human appetites are, and always will be distressingly tyrannous, and forgets that the very functions of the body change even from generation to generation, while the modes of the mind are infinitely various and are influential in the physical sphere.

From the psychological standpoint, the sex trouble is due to suggestive, or crowd morality. Under certain circumstances, which until quite recently have been beyond the control of intelligence, the sex passions work a prodigious amount of the worst kind of harm, with which they have become so firmly associated in people's minds that they give rise to extreme diffidence, merging, almost, into insane fear. The very words which express the common facts of reproduction are enough to set most people ablaze with emotion. Perceiving the blush and stammer with which his first question about the matter is greeted, the child ponders long and profoundly on what this terrible, kindling, criminal experience can be which must not be revealed to him. Fixed and burned into his mind by its naturally strong emotional interest, which makes so powerful an appeal to the imagination, the subject charms yet haunts him, somewhat in the same way as the lustrous, twirling contrivances manipulated by Mesmer paralyzed the wits of his patients and intensified their consciousness on the one particular thought which he wanted to set in relief. The child whose thoughts, in spite of himself, have become centered on this danger spot, helplessly magnifies it in his heated fancy until every lively companion, every dictionary, and every vicissitude of the sex life that comes under his observation is a peril to him; and the simple delights and homely virtues of that life, so deep-rooted in human sympathies and primal necessities, are lost for him in perplexity and vain questioning. Thus much of the strength and beauty of youth, which might regenerate the world, are wasted on ground "overgrown with foul and noxious fungoids and haunted by all the evil spirits that curse human life." Accurate

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information would cool the fever down in a moment, and confine the thoughts which keep it up to their own extremely narrow channels. But everyone around him is hypnotized with a similar fear, as if there were some weird evil, some hateful witchery, some indefinite imposture in the sex impulses. The whole subject is taboo and must not be approached without halting excuses and expiative unction.

In all this timidity and shame, the reality on which they are founded is forgotten. The fear sentiment has a groundwork of truth, the Spencerian truth that whatever does harm and brings about unhappiness is evil, and whatever does the opposite is good. When the sex passion brutalizes men and enslaves women, it is evil; and when it reproduces the best stocks and promotes happy family life, it is good. The block morality which makes no distinction between these two cases is both cruel and unprogressive; and now it is a real danger to society. It is often remarked that the unprecedented material progress that has been made during the nineteenth century has perilously outgrown the moral progress that has been achieved within that period. A less traditional and more intellectual type of morality is badly wanted. All the systems of conduct which make a sharp dividing line between good and evil, tend to set up rules which hypnotize people and degenerate into fetiches and shibboleths. They are lazily accepted as infallible guides, and all who, for whatever reason, do not conform to them are branded with infamy. The injustice of stereotyped moral laws, especially in regard to marriage, is being felt very keenly today. The problem is, how to substitute an adaptive system for cast-iron formulæ indiscriminately adminstered, without creating a base casuistry. A considerable amount of both intellect and education is requisite to determine the nature of the consequences of any particular act, and the process leaves room for a good deal of caprice and laxity. But social sympathy, which is largely intellectual, is now growing both broad and keen; and this will make a more

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humane morality possible and will finally bring about the one-law morality taught by Jesus of Nazareth.

That law has already prevailed so far that even narrow-minded and ungenerous people can guide themselves thereby to a right settlement of the simpler perplexities of the moral life. No one would hesitate, now, to say that Casabianca's obedience was stupid rather than courageous; and few would excuse a man for such an act as taking off his hat at a funeral, putatively by way of expressing reverence, and thus catching a cold which kept his family in anxiety on his behalf for weeks. Similarly, it is now easy to see that the machine life prescribed by etiquette, and by all sorts of parochialism and convention, is really heartless and unneighborly. A more difficult problem is presented by such a case as George Eliot's first marriage, which, tried by the Spencerian test, fulfills every requirement of a consecrated union. The good which it wrought is incalculable. "Heart to heart and mind to mind" George Eliot and George Lewes were in perfect harmony; and what the former calls "the dual solitude" of her married life was no doubt the indispensable condition of the production of the works by which she conferred such ample benefits on humanity.

The suggestive sex morality appears in its lowest forms in the phallic rites of old and the several symbolisms derived therefrom, which inculcated the worship in one tribe of the bull, in another of the serpent or cock or scarabæus or dove, or the cross or globe [1]; and occasionally reappears as a survival, at the present time, in the atavistic emotions of those unfortunate people who involuntarily attach a sexual significance to some particular object, such as a woman's hair or shoes, and think the display thereof indecent. More frequently it assumes the shape which Tolstoi has made so life-like in the altogether horrible but perhaps necessary "Kreutzer Sonata." It

[1] "Sex and Art," by Dr. Colin Scott, *American Journal of Psychology*, Vol. VII, p. 209.

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would not have occurred to the youth of that story to indulge in sensuality had he not been told by his companions that all young men did so. The suggested evil harassed his imagination; and he succumbed to it because, in the society to which he belonged, the lazy, hypnotic belief prevailed that sufficient reason for doing any particular deed is furnished by the fact that others do it. Could he have proceeded on his own initiative and been able to reason out and imagine the conditions and consequences of his actions, he would have discovered in time that his passions were not uncontrollable, that he could use them indifferently for good or ill just as he liked, and that there was no inherent, fateful power in them which compelled him constantly to be the author of discord and suffering.

Suppose the social atmosphere in which he lived had been such as to furnish the contrary suggestion, the situation would still have been jeopardous, for "sin comes by the law," which invariably calls attention to evil as well as good. It is for this reason that the 'purity' campaign makes but little headway. It is prudish and ascetic, and makes a sin and a secret of the sexual passions instead of consecrating them to a good use. It is as easy to make a fetich of a virtue as a vice, and in laying down a stern rule about either there is considerable danger of inviting contemplation of the latter and intensifying this by dread and horror. George Borrow's Peter Williams, who was besieged for years by the notion that he had committed 'the unpardonable sin,' is a case in point.

Nothing in the training of a child should suggest unavoidable evil in connection with sex. Making the subject esoteric is the worst policy, for it is exactly the unusual and the mysterious which excite attention. That is one of the chief reasons why near relatives never wish to marry one another. It is contrast and novelty that is impressive to the sexual imagination. From this viewpoint, nothing is more harmful than the anxious covering of the body to which our civilization has accustomed us.

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An absolute rule which is acted on out of conviction and never modified by intelligence, makes no distinction between cases in which clothes are useful and those in which they are not useful. The latter cases do not often occur, but they are important because if the child sees clothing used in circumstances in which it is positively inconvenient, or special parts of the body made conspicuous by preferential covering, sooner or later he suspects the existence of mysteries into which he must inquire. A bathing garment is indelicately suggestive because it is obviously unnecessary, not to say obstructive. A similar mental effect is produced, at any rate in the subconsciousness, by a low-cut gown, or, in a picture or statue, by a robe half slipping off, or a prudish ribbon flung across an undraped figure, though of course these compromises between revelation and concealment seldom convey extraneous reflections to vigorous minds. It is because the sight of the body and the knowledge of its functions are made a luxury and a wonder, that young men will flock to the shore to watch bands of carefully gowned girls bathing, and that the public bursts out every now and then into a rage for 'living statues,' or reads with avidity such a poem as Walt Whitman's "Children of Adam," which is essentially commonplace. No such reactions would occur if, without special instruction, everyone knew from infancy what the human body was like in all stages of its growth.

Social fevers of the 'living-statue' description manifest the existence of many thoughts and feelings that are subjected, in countries peopled by the British, to a good deal of hypocritical suppression. But of late years, healthier sentiments have declared themselves. A concrete evidence of the improvement was furnished, a year or two ago, by the decoration of the new building of the British Medical Association in the Strand, London, with statues unspoilt by fig-leaves. They form one of the common features of the street that no one particularly notices, though mercenary journalists and unwise moralists made them very conspicuous at first. The only fault which the figures

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present is that they are too far from the ground to be seen easily. Such things ought to be plainly visible without having to be looked at.

Possibly, however, visual modes of demonstrating the dignity of sex are needlessly realistic. Moreover, they lend themselves to that kind of artistic talent which, in the continental countries, makes vaunting displays of sex realities and puts an even stronger accent on all that is unlovely in these than hypocrisy does. Verbal teaching is indispensable, not in set lessons or by means of special, private 'purity' books, which make the subject obtrusive, but by way of correct answers to children's inevitable questions, which give prominence to the truth interest and are neither prosaic nor poetic. The latter style of presentation is a very subtle danger, for it leads either to a disingenuous habit of calling ugly things beautiful, or to an artificial superiority to natural desires and wants. As the best popular exponent of the sex life observes, "When a human being exalts himself in the search for pure-mindedness and sanctity, thus denying his true nature, he is always in danger of falling unconsciously into the most gross sensuality, and at the same time of sanctifying that sensuality." Dealt with in a scientific spirit, the facts arouse no more emotion than other facts in nature, and the manner of approaching them need never be 'frank' or 'delicate' or 'skillful.' When once a fact is known scientifically, it can be used for the best purposes man is capable of conceiving, and the will element thus brought into the knowledge redeems bare natural truths from all baseness.

It must, however, be recognized that the shame and secrecy of sex, which is a grievous burden to men and women and a veritable crucifixion to the young, has a sound basis in the prodigal sexuality of nature, which is now understood so well that men could govern it in their own interests, only that they are ashamed to use the knowledge. In this department of her operations, as in many another, the natural and necessary is opposed to the

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humane, and it is impossible to follow out the former rule without severe moral struggles and the infliction of terrible suffering on society. Evolutionists read into nature a solicitude for life and perfection, if not for the individual at any rate for the race, which the facts utterly contradict. For example, as Professor Metchnikoff has pointed out, no machine devised by man was ever so ill fitted together and so full of impeditive, antiquated structures as the human body; and as Dr. Lester Ward has demonstrated, there are many trees the bark of which embraces the growing inner tissues with a well-nigh deadly grasp. The pressure has to be overcome, by main force, at great vital expense to the tree which might have been saved by a very simple arrangement of the corky layer into narrow vertical strips. The plan of slitting the bark to assist the growth has readily occurred to arborists, he informs us, and has been most successful. Hundreds of such examples will occur to every reader who thinks and observes.

In the social order similar maladaptations are matters of daily observation. To mention a few of them, parents have tempers utterly at variance with those of their children; the distribution of acquisitive power is altogether out of proportion to needs and merits; men fall in love with and marry, in the utmost confidence, women whom afterwards they detest; and the sex instincts become alert, as a rule, in early childhood.[2] Production lavish and spendthrift beyond all human imagination, production at any price, appears to be nature's only care, insomuch that one birth is balanced by a million deaths, and one well-developed being by myriads of ill-developed ones. But since man has dared to defy nature by adopting an economy of his own, the birth and the death rate have both progressively decreased, while food supplies and the amount of wealth per head have increased proportionately, and popular education has made enormous advances. All over

[2] 'Études sur la nature humaine,' par Élie Metchnikoff, p. 121.

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Europe advancing medical science and improved sanitation have steadily brought both rates down from 1875 to the present time. The following table shows the differences that this movement has effected in them:

	1875		1909	
	Birth Rate Per Thousand.	Death Rate Per Thousand.	Birth Rate Per Thousand.	Death Rate Per Thousand.
England and Wales..	35.4	22.7	25.6	14.5
Scotland	32.5	23.3	26.4	15.3
Ireland	26.1	18.5	23.5	17.2
Denmark	31.9	21.0	28.0	13.1
Norway	31.2	18.8	26.1	13.5
Sweden	31.2	20.3	25.6	13.7
Austria	39.9	30.0	(1908) 33.5	(1908) 22.3
Hungary	45.0	37.0	37.0	25.1
Switzerland	32.0	24.2	(1908) 27.1	(1908) 16.2
German Empire	40.6	27.6	(1908) 32.1	(1908) 18.1
Prussia	40.7	26.6	31.8	17.0
Netherlands	36.6	25.6	29.1	13.7
Belgium	35.2	22.7	(1908) 24.9	(1908) 16.5
France	25.9	23.0	19.6	19.3
Spain (1888)	36.6	(1888) 30.3	32.6	23.4
Russia (1881)	47.8		('96-1900) 49.3	('96-1900) 31.9

It will be remarked, and indeed every slum invites the same observation, that birth and death rate alike are lowest where mental, moral, and physical vigor together are greatest, and good government prevails. In Australia and New Zealand, mainly by non-natural means, the birth and the death rate have been reduced, within the last thirty years, by 8.7 and 5.6 per thousand respectively. The average birth rate, in these highly favored regions, is now 26.9, the average death rate 9.8.

But in spite of health authorities and social economy, the fact remains that man is endowed with sexual passions immeasurably beyond the requirements of race-perpetuation. Far from being creative, the sex instinct is essentially destructive, and its effective action takes place at a katabolic crisis that has no direct or conscious relation to the upbuilding process which it initiates. Its

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distinctive character is most clearly seen in its aberrations. Thus it is always the strongest in soldiers on active service, and in drunkards and criminals who delight in cruelty; and it has had striking manifestations in the rites of worshipers like the Bacchantes, the crimes of despots like Nero and Catherine de Medici, and the recent 'Ripper' and maiming outrages at Horley, Liverpool, and Berlin, which were doubtless due to sexual depravity.

But however great the brutalities to which the law of nature has given rise in domestic life, and however many unwelcome children it has brought into the family circle, there have always been men and women who regard such troubles as a dispensation of providence, and even glorify them into supreme blessings. Few people realize that this creed belongs to quite primitive and savage times, when fecundity was all-important because famine, disease, and war both inflamed the passions and abnormally thinned the population. As Professor Metchnikoff and Professor Westermarck have shown by such ample evidence, in all the cruder civilizations procreation has been a religious duty to the non-fulfillment of which dire punishments attached, and which was enforced by laws that were sanctified, as a rule, by the fantastic belief in the ministry of the living to the dead. If unmarried adults existed at all, they were outcasts. In many cases, children were betrothed in babyhood; and the revolting practice obtained of putting little girls to uses for which their bodies were not mature. As a consequence, teeming populations sprang up in which infanticide, natural selection, and other forms of murder were unavoidable. In the light of these facts, the laws for promoting growth of population that are now being proposed in France do not appear feasible, neither does the frantic propaganda by proclamation, preaching, and placard, through which the otherwise eminently sane M. Guyau would compel French women to be anxious to have large families.

The conception that every human being must be preserved, attain complete self-realization, and enjoy a free

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and happy life, is quite modern and is incompatible with the prevalent approval of indiscriminate multiplication. It has never been proved that numbers constitute national greatness and strength. Germany, with a population of fifty-six millions, is as powerful a nation as Russia with one hundred and thirty millions, and Japan with forty-five millions as China with four hundred millions. Defectives are three times more prolific than healthy men and women, the relative decrease of whom is to-day an alarming symptom of degeneration in all civilized countries. The indefinite multiplication even of the fit is undesirable, as it undoubtedly creates unemployment, retards art and science, and reduces work to the mere repetitionary and instinctive activities of earning daily bread.

Moreover, women, if they are truly free, seldom desire to have a large family, and it is the maternal instinct itself which dictates the desire. To entrust the social future to this, the strongest constructive force in all nature, is absolutely safe, despite the almost ludicrous fears which are now being propagated with regard to it. The modern woman wishes to have but a few children because she can be a good mother only if she has a wide and sympathetic knowledge of the world in which they will be citizens, develops her own individuality, and so helps other people's children as to ensure them a happy and complete life also.

The feminine craving for mere display and amusement is for the most part a responsive attitude taken up in deference to masculine tastes. The treatment of this topic, especially by suffragettes, is frequently marked by lack of humor, kindliness, and historical imagination. Here is a characteristic outburst:

> Man, prompted by his distempered bodily passion, or jealous for the adjuncts of petty power, forbade woman the education, the freedom and the self-development which would have rendered her less physically servile to himself, would have elevated her own individuality and character,—and would have had a transmitted ennobling effect upon her progeny. He might, indeed, be willing craftily to ascribe to her all honied qualities, and thus to flatter and beguile a complaisant submissiveness on her part, but he was

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loath, very loath, to make possible to her aught of equality or of strength, physical or mental, in any point adverse to his own endarkened selfishness.

If men are brutes, it is heredity, in great measure, which has made them so, and their sufferings from this cause are almost as great as those of the women. The sexual hyperæsthesia of men is to be traced, to a yet larger extent, to the hypnotizing notion that they cannot, need not, and must not restrain their appetites, and to the offensive and untruthful cynicism, now so common, according to which real puritans are non-existent. That of women can also be traced to psychic influences. Its characteristic physical effect, in their case, bears all the marks of hypnotic phenomena, appearing, as it does, at expected, not to say dreaded, intervals, but with considerable irregularities. Moreover, it has social sanctions of great solemnity and secrecy. The fact that in some cases it is debilitating and that very naturally its absence is associated with disease, generally of the fear type—though not, certainly not, with sterility—furnishes the anti-suffragette with a cogent, though by no means unanswerable argument against the enfranchisement, and indeed the higher education, of women. But, undoubtedly, this recurrent trouble is occasioned by undue sexual excitement, which amongst savage women is mainly physical, and amongst civilized women mainly psychic and therefore more drastic and irradiative in proportion as the imagination has more potency than direct stimulation. It is because women find that intense interest in their work, a varied experience, and athletic exercise weaken suggestibility and rid them of their natural disabilities that, especially in England, they are not so anxious to marry as they were in the days of their subjection. This reluctance is alarming to the 'increase and multiply' theorists, even if they see no immediate prospect of the necessity of reproduction by artificial means, or by the manufacture of the homunculus to whom M. Finot has introduced us in his fantastic treatise on old age.

But the deep sympathy of women for men will pre-

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vent even the check of the hyperæsthesia, as long as it exists in the latter. The hope of both lies in the fellowship in business interests, and in the pursuit of truth and the creation of beauty which is now growing up between them. The too-solemn American professor who, without laughing, can actually oppose sex to intellect in women, and condemns the feminine lover of science to an 'agamic school' and her incurious-minded sister to an 'emotional' education, is making the worst possible mistake if he would promote the hygiene of the race. Moreover, it is precisely the undemonstrative men and women who have the strongest passions, which dreaming does not burn out, and who need marriage the most. The delight in truth-seeking makes meaner satisfactions unnecessary, and, as Dr. Colin Scott writes, "the little ecstasy of art is, it seems, an equivalent of and an inoculation against the larger ecstasy of sex."

It is not true that conjugal infidelity is on the increase. There never was a time when love between husband and wife was so strong, comprehensive, and intelligent as it is now; and many a marital partnership of heart and mind is now possible which could not exist when the pathetically humble wife knew nothing but matters of the house, while her lord knew a thousand things. Monogamy is counteractive of sex fetichisms and seasonal heats, but strictly speaking it is almost impossible as long as the woman is expected to play a merely reproductive part, physically and mentally, and has no intellectual interests and no real originality; for men like change, and there is a sameness in emotional experience with one woman that palls after a time. It is the intellect which is the differentiating factor of the mind, and its pleasures are continuous and are even more intense, though calmer, than the physical ones. Now that women are capable of development, it is therefore possible for a man "in one woman to marry the changing variety of the race."

This kind of conjugal union is useful to society in the highest degree, but unfortunately it can hardly be main-

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tained without the practice of Neo-Malthusianism, which, however, unpleasant though it be, is far preferable to thinking about sex, or the mastery of women by men, or the production of miserable children. But the very use of this method will eventually make it unnecessary and bring about the perfect adaptation of sex desire, and even, perhaps, of sexual power and fertility, to the social need for the renewal of population. Diminishing fecundity and mortality, as Herbert Spencer has demonstrated, will increase parental and social goodwill, and thus the brotherhood of man will become possible.

Both boys and girls, by the time they reach physical maturity, should understand the whole mechanism of sex; and adults ought to know something of its chief abnormalities, because without this knowledge it is impossible to sympathize with contemporaries or to read history aright. The story of man has been made largely by sexual perverts, an understanding of whom would modify hero-worship and herd morals in favor of rationality and social individualism. Then sexual excitants, *e. g.,* war, brutal sport, alcohol, and possibly animal food, would be avoided; sentimental poetry and novels, with the spread of scientific knowledge of the sex world, would be replaced by a livelier and less academic sociological literature: and society would be more governed by women as mothers.

It is not too much to say that two-thirds of the sufferings of the world have a sexual origin. The worst of them could be remedied by the sterilization of criminals and lunatics, trial marriages without children, and the enforcement of parental responsibility. But until the veil of shame is removed from the facts out of which they arise, the selection of stocks and regulation of population which would eradicate them from the body politic will be impossible. Therefore, in the words of Dr. August Forel, for whose clear exposition of the sex life many unprofessional readers are deeply grateful, "Let us not abandon our race to the fatalism of Allah; let us create it ourselves."

London. M. E. Robinson.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

FOLKWAYS: A Study of the Sociological Importance of Usages, Manners, Customs, *Mores*, and Morals. By William Graham Sumner. Boston: Ginn & Co., 1907. Pp. 692.

The recent death of William Graham Sumner, Professor of Political and Social Science in Yale University, evokes the tribute of honor due to the memory of one of the most independent thinkers and profound scholars America has produced. His breadth of view and impartiality of judgment were the manifest outcome of earnest researches into very many phases of human experience and endeavor. A mere survey of the titles of the twenty treatises comprising his voluminous book entitled "Folkways" may well serve as an index to the intellectual labors of a lifetime and indicate the wide scope of his thinking upon the deepest concerns of mankind. The list of authorities cited by him in this comprehensive work, all devoted to one theme and written in many languages, includes some seven or eight hundred volumes. His citations reveal a thoroughness and accuracy of research which command our sincerest homage. He has produced an eclectic work which may well serve as a standard reference book on the habits, customs, and usages of all races and classes in all ages and lands.

The sociologist studies the actions of men and their fixation into habits. He observes the aggregation of these habits into the customs of groups, tribes, races, and nations. He shows how social usages crystallize and form the family, the home, the state, the school, the church, the army, the industries, and all their coördinate and attendant organizations with their various modes of conduct, administration, rituals, and systems.

The beginnings of all these social institutions are lost in the cloudlands of mystery because at the beginning men are never conscious of historical action. By the time this consciousness awakes, the origin is already far behind. Professor Sumner declares himself to be of the opinion that all habits sprang from repeated actions beginning in the interest aroused by hunger and thirst, love, hate, fear, vanity, or other animal instincts. To satisfy these needs repeated actions were necessary, which, being

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constantly renewed, became fixed habits. Individuals forming like habits under similar conditions grouped themselves together for common advantages. Thus by slow and tedious efforts came into being those customs and usages which constitute what the author graphically calls the 'folkways' of a people. The life of society consists in making 'folkways' and applying them. There were 'folkways' for stage-coach days and there are 'folkways' for these days of steam and electricity.

Professor Sumner frankly declares his antagonism to that school of thought which has created the modern branch of learning called "Völkerpsychologie,"—the Psychology of Peoples,—that science which has found its clearest pronouncements in the publications of Professors Lazarus and Steinthal. According to this school, we are to seek the explanation of folkways, not merely in the physical, but in the psychical impulses which control the race. Sumner's contention lightly overrules all the higher creative and determining forces in society and history. He levels down all philosophy and ethics to the position of a mere outcome of folkways,—secondary and derived. He maintains that there are no directive and regulative influences moulding the social life, apart from the experiences of pleasure and pain.

When the folkways become objects of reflection, when they are regarded from the viewpoint of the welfare of society, they are raised to a higher plane: they become *mores*. He uses this Latin word for lack of an English equivalent. It corresponds more nearly to the German *Sitten*. The word 'moral' means what belongs to or appertains to the *mores* (p. 37). The author thus dissents from the modern view of morals and morality as constituting a separate category by the side of religion, philosophy, and politics. He seems to level down 'morals' to the plane of 'manners,' which have their sanctions merely in the tastes and traditions of the people and are as various and as contradictory as are the races and classes of men. Ethics, as an attempt to systematize the ideas of right and wrong on some basic principle, with the purpose of establishing morals as an absolute doctrine, universal and everlasting,—he discards as an attempt to keep the social sciences under the dominion of metaphysics.

Such an interpretation is not surprising in a system which contains no more serious appreciation of religion than is sug-

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gested by the terms: "Goblinism" and "Demonism." Religious customs, institutions, rites, and ceremonies are presented in overflowing richness of detail; but for the author, apparently, they contain no deeper connotation than the crude mysticism which envelopes primitive conceptions of good and ill luck as controlled by the whimsical goblins, sprites, demons, or gods of the unseen world. Religion, the supreme force creating and controlling the motives of human conduct, is reduced to a mere product of the *mores*. "It is not the religion that makes ritual, but ritual that makes religion" (p. 61).

These amazing deductions are due, in the opinion of the writer, to Professor Sumner's unaccountable and seemingly wanton denial of the whole evolutionary philosophy in its application to sociology. According to his presentation, the folkways come out of the cloudlands and pass into the mists. They spring from mere instincts, pass through unregulated courses often revolving upon themselves, but tend toward no clearly defined goal whatsoever. They have no fixed standard; they are characterized by no progression; they are affected by no ultimate idealism. He says: "There is no development of the mores along any lines of logical or other sequences. The mores shift in endless readjustment of the modes of behavior, effort, and thinking so as to reach the greatest advantage under the conditions." For example, he avers that "nothing can prevent the reintroduction of slavery should economic conditions demand it" (p. 266); and this despite his declaration that "slavery is the only case in the history of the mores where the so-called moral motive has been made controlling" (p. 306). To confess that there has been one such case is to destroy the validity of his whole argument.

Professor Sumner has given us a most interesting array of facts, but in his attempt to explain their significance he has disdained to use the method approved by the highest thought of our age. He has failed to coördinate his data. He detests the word 'progress' because he confuses it with the cant which has come to be associated with that word. He ignores the truth which is the supreme discovery of the thought-life of modern times, *viz.*, that every germ has been endowed by the Creator with the potency and the promise of its development. That truth applies universally to every germ, be it the seed-corn in the earth or the primitive material out of which shall come the complex organism of a civilized human society. Folkways are the steps,

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—the slow and halting, often stumbling, yet always the forward steps,—in the progress of social development. The conflicts of the mores are the struggles of men, through many errors and blunders, to advance from mere manners to fixed 'morals.' Men are goaded and impelled sometimes by a mere vague consciousness, again by the mighty constraints of clearly conceived ideals, toward absolute and eternal standards of right. The crowning result of the comparative studies of our days in the domain of ethics is the recognition of the fact that morality is absolute, identical, and universal. There are no contradictions in the revelations of morality which have been apprehended by the rare geniuses of the human race, however these may differ in statement. There is essential identity in the doctrine, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself;" "What is hateful unto thee, thou shalt not do to others;" and "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you." Truth is axiomatic, consistent, and inflexible. Only the efforts of men to realize it are feeble, vacillating, and conflicting. Sumner acknowledges the existence of genius, but ignores its message. Conscience, honor, and common sense, the gifts by which we test the genuineness of these messages of truth, are considered by him mere "phenomena of the folkways"; and therefore, he concludes: "The notions of eternal truths of philosophy or ethics derived from somewhere outside of men must be abandoned as myths" (p. 464).

Religion, as has been already indicated, is dismissed no less lightly by our author, despite the fact that the natural history of the moral development of every people demonstrates that religion, as an independent spiritual force, has always been active in creating and moulding the ideas and the conduct which find expression in their customs and usages. This is true, though religion itself is never static, but always developing new dynamic power in the process of its unfoldment, from the first crude gropings of men in the darkness of superstition to their highest vision of the Infinite.

In reference to this ultimate and significant fact, the inconsistency of our author becomes most apparent when (pp. 557-59) he acknowledges that the present-day traditions which control the civilized world come directly from the people of Israel. What the Jewish prophets taught concerning the purity of social relations constitutes the most important part of the mores and of religion for the welfare of mankind. The prophets opposed to

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their traditional ritual religion, a doctrine of righteousness by which religion was made ethical. "They conceived Jehovah as not only the single God of the Hebrews, but the sole God of all the earth." What is still more important, they rose to the sublime apprehension of God as the embodiment of moral perfection, and therefore "in eternal opposition to and condemnation of all idolatry, licentiousness, and bestiality."

It is astounding that our author, seeing and declaring all this, should attribute the extraordinary moral energy of those most unique and powerful geniuses of the human race to nothing but "the antagonism of the archaic mores of a rustic population with a primitive mode of life, against the luxury of Tyre and Sidon, wealthy cities of commerce and industry." It seems almost trivial to account in this way for those world-redeeming principles which by the author's own confession have been the impulse, the guide, the originator of influences by which the social life of mankind has made and is making its advances.

HENRY BERKOWITZ.

Philadelphia.

NATURAL AND SOCIAL MORALS. By Carveth Read. London: A. & C. Black, 1909. Pp. xxv, 309.

Professor Read's present book is the outcome of his dissatisfaction with abstract ethics. If morals are to be rendered scientific, they must be treated of by the usual scientific methods. Instead of the scholastic method and the mere worrying of traditionary abstract ideas, we need the Baconian method: we must study morals as matter of fact and experience. The purpose of the book is to revise the old philosophical ethics in the light of inductive biology, psychology, and anthropology. The work falls into two parts, "Morality Natural to Man," and "Morality and Institutions." The first part deals with such matters as Conceptions of the Chief Good, Social Character of Morals, Physical and Biological Conditions of Morality. The second part is made up of chapters on such subjects as The Influence of Custom, The Family, Influence of the State on Morals. The book has the fault of attempting to cover too much ground and provides an excellent example of two of the dangers of such an attempt. The analysis of other views is often not sufficiently detailed to be altogether fair, and space compels wide subjects

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to be treated so shortly that the treatment becomes thin and commonplace. This second fault is seen most markedly in the second part of the book, where much of the material is of such stock character that we are in danger of missing various remarks of real value which lie imbedded in the commonplace. Several of the topics in this book have already received at other hands, especially in America, such excellent treatment that we have a right to expect from a person of Professor Read's reputation something better than we have in this book.

With regard to one other point, we cannot help thinking that it is inadvisable for the layman to attempt too premature an application of scientific theories for the purpose of supporting or illustrating reflections on history or social affairs. In the Introduction, Professor Read admits that certain reflections, influenced by the Galtonian theory, would now in the light of Mendelism have been differently expressed by him. When so little Mendelian work has been attempted in the complex question of human character, when so many things are still indefinite, it is well to wait in matters where the scientist himself suspends judgment.

R. S. VARLEY.

Bristol, England.

DIE STETIGKEIT IM KULTURWANDEL. Eine soziologische Studie von Alfred Vierkandt, Privatdozent an der Universität Berlin. Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1908. Pp. xiv, 209.

The tendencies of present-day social and political thought commonly called 'realism' and 'pessimism' have not had least effect in Germany, where indeed both first received their names. Strangely, it might seem, they have been intensified by general acceptance of the doctrine of evolution. Yet, on consideration, this is not surprising; for as applied to society that doctrine was elaborated not in opposition to a creed of fixation, but to the belief in progress by catastrophic change under the impulsion of ideals. With the decline of this belief there has associated itself still another tendency now permeating European thought, which Dr. Vierkandt calls 'irrationalism,' and which he himself regards as a true expression of the historian's point of view. This, of course, does not mean repudiation of reason as the necessary instrument of historical investigation. What

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it means is disbelief in the predominant influence of intellectual preconceptions as a factor of social change; the really predominant factors being held to be the emotional and volitional ones. Working consciously under the sway of all these drifts in contemporary thought, Dr. Vierkandt naturally takes a sober view as to the possibilities of rapid improvement in the type of European or of any civilization. The fundamental thought of his book is, he says, the "want of spontaneity" in human progress. The help of all sorts of trivial factors is needed for any effective advance. Necessary conditions are these three: the society must be ripe for a change; there must be a felt need for it; and finally there must be either a powerful individual initiative or a sufficiently determinate 'culture-contact' with some other society *(Akkulturation)*. One or more of these conditions may fail. In particular, a leader may not appear when he is wanted. Also, changes when introduced are apt to be disappointing; for the all-pervading social continuity described involves reactions from the old upon the new, and these have the effect of lowering the type under which the new order was conceived by the great innovators. And, even when these do not fail to appear, their ideas may be ineffective because not conceived in emotional sympathy with the general mind. To carry through his reform, the innovator must have fought his own way with difficulty out of the traditional ideas, and these must still retain a hold on him. This the author illustrates in an interesting way in philosophy by the contrast between Hume and Kant. Hume, the more radical thinker, could not effectively overthrow the old structure of metaphysics till his thought had passed through the half-scholastic medium of Kant, to whom the inherited type of thought had meant far more and who retained some of it to the end.

This being the line taken, it is gratifying to find in the result so much encouragement on the whole for the reformer. Neither the fact of catastrophic change nor the efficacy of individual initiative is denied. What is insisted on is merely that all apparently revolutionary advances have a long 'pre-history'; every initiator being dependent on this pre-history both in his own mind and in the society within which it is his lot to work. Genius is as much receptive as creative; and nowhere is there "creation out of nothing." If social change, in accordance with historical 'irrationalism,' often seems to be without law, in the

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sense of an intellectual construction showing its necessity in relation to an end, this is after all true rather of the more external kinds of good that constitute our civilization than of the most intrinsic and deeply founded "goods of culture." For these last, laws of progress are discoverable. And the sum of the small changes due to all causes taken together is really something great. If this is not the result simply of the motives we call 'ideal,' these motives still exist and have their effect. In the great initiators they predominate, though even in those they do not act alone.

All this is illustrated throughout the book from a rich knowledge which lays under contribution the most various kinds of improvement in culture, from emergence of new philosophies and new literary forms to technical modifications in material civilization. Of one somewhat despondent conviction it is impossible not to recognize the justification for the present. The rationalizing spirit of modern civilization, the author finds, has shown itself almost impotent except in the realms of science and economic direction. Ideal motives are too weak to apply it to the reorganization of personal and social life generally; and the drastic impetus needed to make these effective by association is so far wanting.

Yet there is perhaps ground of hope in the very 'irrationality' of the apparent process. The requisite conflux may arrive in a way that no one can predict. Dr. Vierkandt himself notes the apparently 'accidental' way in which, by the most singular combination of factors, the mediæval type of social order passed into its opposite. No innovator willed this; and yet by convergence of factors precisely at the time when the Western world was ready, the change came.

Having said so much about the generalizations of the book, I can only add, by way of more definite indication to the reader, that it is especially valuable for its details and its method. Of these I do not attempt to give any adequate notion. Dr. Vierkandt's work may be commended to students as one of the most sound and circumspect on the general subject of sociology, and at the same time as full of enlightening suggestions on all sorts of particular points.

T. WHITTAKER.

London.

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PRINCIPLES OF SECONDARY EDUCATION. Vol. III: Ethical Training. By Charles De Garmo. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1910. Pp. x, 211.

Moral education is an educational issue to-day: among the nations, if we take seriously the voluminous Report of the International Congress on Moral Education; throughout our own country, if we but note the directness of the projects proposed for its accomplishment. Superintendents' reports, notably Maxwell's of New York and Greenwood's of Kansas City; programs for State Teachers' Associations; special commissions on moral education in different states appointed to study and report findings; the recent action of the N. E. A., the specific recommendations authorized, as well as the continuance of work of its committee; the social ethics wave in the school community; the rapid appearance of elementary text-books on principles and applications of morals in modern life; the widespread interest in and discussion of the peace movement in the school; and the general recognition of the moral failure of the present-day curriculum, together with the popularized citizenship morals of Hughes, Roosevelt, Gaynor, etc., attest the school's conviction and the general conviction of society that education must somehow more effectively bring in its train moral enlightenment.

Together with these popular and actual movements in the direction of moralizing education, one notes also the reappearance of a sort of Neo-Protagorean ethics among those who would put on a rational basis the direct teaching of morals. Morals can be taught, we are told, partly by the Socratic, partly by the laboratory method. (Illustrated acts of honor, square deal, etc., by stereopticon from athletics, school life, and specific professions.) The newness, unexpectedness, and complexity of modern industrial life has forced this urgent issue of moral education to the front with the unusual and even seeming preposterous methods now finding promulgators.

Schoolmen, as a rule, now do not ask for assurance that devices for moral education be anchored in some respectable ethical system. They ask for results. Looking at things from this angle, Ambassador Bryce in a recent book says that moral education, including instruction in civic duty, is an obvious beginning, but he does not fail to suggest that it is by some subtler method we

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must approach the inner springs of action which make for the highest type of citizenship.

Professor De Garmo writes for the prospective teacher, and his discussion seeks to put in proper perspective the above aspect of the present-day educational situation. One of the purposes of the book is "to bring into clearer light the moral functions of knowledge"; another "to make clear the great existing differences in ideals and conditions between the ancient static and socialistic organizations . . . and the modern dynamic and democratic order. . . ." Professor De Garmo speaks very confidently of "certain regulative principles of moral conduct" which "may be made clear and unmistakable to the young." With this intellectualistic conviction in mind, he formally devotes the first two chapters to blazing a "trail through ethical theory."

The following seven chapters are concerned with a discussion of the bases for and the best means of utilizing those agencies, except religious, which are available to the American high school. The problems of the adolescent, moral habits, cardinal moral ideals, old and new, knowledge and conduct, are the somewhat general topics which the author elaborates before he goes into the question of the distinctive and realizable moral values of the high school studies and of physical training. The volume closes with Chapter X, which is a brief *résumé* of Sadler's "Moral Instruction and Training in Schools." The discussion throughout is safe, sane, clear, mechanically simplified, academic although not particularly doctrinaire, and pedagogical in the sense of having a scheme which is adhered to, a set of little tasks to be performed on each clearly defined topic at the completion of such section of the reading.

The reviewer can think of members of the teaching profession who would be pleased with this text-book simplification and devitalizing of living motives and principles which must figure in our moral activities. But for college teachers to teach college students, intending teachers, from this book would seem to endanger that much-to-be-desired success in making the subtler approach to the inner springs of action urged above by Bryce. The book to another type of reader will seem uninteresting, unworldly, smacking of academic ethics even while quoting Dewey and advocating another kind of ethical tenet. Greek and Kantian conceptions are so clearly and easily translated into modern moral terms, and find moral applications so unquestionable to-

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day, that one wonders whether a more extended ethical training would not tend to discredit this over-simplification and shake one's security in this intellectualized platform. The rather long discussion of the distinctive disciplines of the different subjects, such as history, science, art, literature, etc., is an example of how one may use almost anything for illustrative purposes, but it also suggests the improbability that one person can see in correct and persuasive perspective the relatively important functions of so many particular subjects in the hierarchy of ends of instruction.

As neither specific moral instruction nor indirect moral training through other subjects has yet proved a satisfactory school policy, it was to have been expected that Professor De Garmo would have discussed more broadly the merits and demerits of each moral plan. The author, however, is committed to the latter policy. The book may serve as a text for normal school students who require some introduction to the moral problems of the high school; but university students should be prepared for a different general type of treatment.

The appearance of a text in the ethical principles of education aimed to furnish ethical, as for years educational departments have sought to furnish psychological, background and perspective for intending teachers, is significant. Embryo teachers, and full-grown, need wieldy ethical conceptions quite as urgently perhaps as they do historical or psychological or sociological ones. This Professor De Garmo feels strongly and defends consistently.

CHARLES HUGHES JOHNSTON.

University of Kansas.

TIME AND FREE WILL: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness. By Henri Bergson. Authorized translation by F. L. Pogson. (The Library of Philosophy.) London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1910. Pp. xxiii, 252.

Professor Bergson's work, "L'Évolution Créatrice," has been so widely read in this country that there is sure to be a large demand for the present volume, a translation of the first work by which his reputation was made with the educated reading public at large. Much credit is due to Mr. Pogson for the spirited way in which he has discharged what looks like one of the easiest, but is in reality one of the most difficult, of literary

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tasks, the translation of idiomatic French into idiomatic and natural English. Thanks are also due to Messrs. Swan Sonnenschein & Co. for the inclusion of the volume in their well-known *Library of Philosophy,* though one's sense of gratitude is a little impaired by the exceeding badness of the binding. I do not propose in the present notice to examine M. Bergson's well-known views on the limitations of logical thinking, and the contrast between the hard and fast schemata of the understanding and the plastic flow of real life. Many of M. Bergson's most characteristic positions seem to me false, and I should say that he goes wrong at the very outset for lack of sufficient analysis of the fundamental logical notions on which the discussion of the problem of liberty turns. Thus I should be prepared to maintain, against the well-known theses of his first chapter, that all so-called 'qualities' are intensities and consequently magnitudes, that most of them can be measured, though there are some magnitudes which are not measurable, and that there is no special connection of any kind between *spatial* character and measurability. Accordingly I do not myself believe in the existence of the supposed fallacy of confusion between 'real' time and an 'abstract time' which is an illegitimate phantasm obtained by the unwarrantable imagination of a lapse of time as a stretch on a straight line. I believe that 'real time' is a linear manifold just as much as a straight line is, and that if both are measurable it is because both exhibit the same identical characteristics of the linear manifold. They differ, indeed, in some of their characters, but not in those upon which the possibility of measurement depends. Hence, while I heartily agree with M. Bergson, or any other philosopher who insists upon the reality of spontaneity and the delusive character of the determinist scheme, I feel that I cannot adopt the view which follows from his initial assumption that extension is the only magnitude. On this view, since it leads to the conclusion that the time of our scientific thinking is an illusion, it must follow that the mechanical and determinist conception is strictly unmeaning. I should myself contend rather that the conception has a meaning, but that it is certainly false. And hence I should not feel called on to plunge into sheer irrationalism in order to defend human reason. The alleged fatalistic results of scientific thought are, in my opinion, due not to thought, but to the lack of it. What we need to deliver us from the pseudo-logical night-

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mare of a world in which there are only causal laws, but no spontaneity, (*i. e.*, no genuine individuality,) is not less or laxer logic, but more logic and more insistence on absolutely rigid logic. Instead of shutting our eyes to the determinist logic, let us look straight at it, and I shall be surprised if we do not find that we can see through it. There are positions, however, which it would require at least a substantive essay to defend. In the present notice, I would only urge all readers of M. Bergson to make acquaintance with the recent brilliant work of Professor Varisco, "I Massimi Problemi," where they will find a remarkable, and, in my own judgment, successful attempt to show how the conception of spontaneity, or indetermination, so far from being opposed to logic and requiring to be won by a plunge into Charybdis, is absolutely postulated in all our rational thought about nature and life. I could most earnestly wish that the admirable step of including the present volume in the *Philosophical Library* might be followed by the inclusion of a translation of Professor Varisco's work, which is the more necessary as the number of English-speaking students who can avail themselves of the original Italian is unfortunately much fewer than it ought to be.

A. E. TAYLOR.

St. Andrews.

A BEGINNER'S HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY: VOL. I. ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY. By Herbert Ernest Cushman. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1910. Pp. xxii, 406.

It would be superfluous to criticise seriously the historical content of this text-book; for the book is in no real sense a new piece of work. In 1899 Professor Cushman published a translation of Windelband's "History of Ancient Philosophy." On most subjects the present volume faithfully and uncritically reproduces the exegeses, estimates, and generalizations of the earlier work; and a considerable part of it is merely an abridged paraphrase of Windelband's book. The author makes a general acknowledgment of his indebtedness in the preface: "I am overwhelmingly indebted to every good authority to whom I have had access, but in the main I have followed the inspiring direction of the great Windelband." Yet this hardly prepares one to find that, on page after page, the phrasing as well as the matter

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is borrowed from a single source, that the inspiration is literally verbal. Here, for example, is the greater part of Windelband's account of the Cynic ethics, in Professor Cushman's translation of twelve years ago (pp. 143-44):

> Virtue is not only the highest but the only good,—the only certain means of being happy. Over against this spiritual and therefore sure possession . . . the Cynics despised all that men otherwise held dear. Virtue alone is of worth; wickedness alone is to be shunned; all else is indifferent. From this principle they taught the contempt of riches and luxury, of fame and honor, of sense-pleasure and sense-pain. But with this radical consistency, which ever grew sharper with them, they also despised all the joy and beauty of life, all shame and conventionality, family and country. . . . The fundamental purpose of Cynicism . . . is to make man entirely independent. The wise man, to whom virtue, once gained, is a permanent possession, stands in his complete self-sufficiency over against the great mass of fools. His reward is the perfect independence in which he is equal to the undesiring gods. In order to be as independent of external goods as possible, he reduces his needs to those most external [apparently a misprint for "essential"]. The less one needs, the happier one is. The Cynic Wise Man feels himself free from society also; . . . its laws and its conventions do not bind him. The independent lordship of the virtuous Wise Man does not need civilization and casts it aside.

And here is Professor Cushman's own account of the same matter (pp. 95-96):

> Virtue in the eudaemonistic sense is the only end, and this school agreed with Socrates that this end is to be attained by knowledge. That is to say, virtue or knowledge is only a means of attaining happiness, and all other possessions the Cynics affected to despise. Virtue as knowledge is therefore to be sought; ignorance is to be shunned; all else is a matter of indifference. Riches, luxury, fame, honor, sense-pleasure and pain, and later with logical consistency all shame, convention, family and country were objects of contempt. Man must make himself independent by cutting off all the desires which he cannot satisfy or the desires which seem superfluous. He should keep alive only such desires as are necessary to existence. In independence of all outward circumstance, the Cynic conceives himself to be the Wise Man in contrast to whom the mass of men are fools. The Cynic is therefore the equal of the undesiring gods. He has independent lordship and does not need the artificialities of civilization.

Surely a few quotation-marks would not have come amiss here. Some scruple, it is true, has led the author occasionally to substitute synonyms or to alter the order of words, usually to the detriment of the sense. To say, for example, that "virtue is the only certain means of being happy" was to express precisely

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the Cynic contention on the point; to say that "virtue is only a means of attaining happiness" is to express much less than their contention. The passage is not typical of the entire book; but there are many others of an equally reminiscent character. Thus, the summary of the Cyrenaic doctrine, pp. 96-97, is similarly paraphrased from Windelband; much of pp. 153-58 (Plato's ethics and politics) is verbally identical with pp. 208-11 of the earlier publication; most of the exposition of Plotinus and of Iamblichus, and all of that of Proclus, are in like manner 'lifted'; and the entire section on patristic theology, from p. 307 to p. 318, is taken over practically *verbatim,* save for a few omissions, from Windelband's pp. 352-65. Here, again, the original suffers damage in transcription, chiefly in consequence of an unintelligent abridgment. Thus Windelband, referring to Origen's ascription of a measure of divine inspiration even to the pagan moralists, writes that, according to that theologian, souls never have had

> to act without the help of grace, which was always active in man as a revelation from heaven, and is revealed perfectly in the person of Jesus. One recognizes that a propœdeutic value was given by Origen here, after the manner of the Apologists, to the heathen philosophy, especially to Platonism and Stoicism. The eternal λόγος has connected itself with the blameless ψυχή of Jesus in a divine-human unity.

Professor Cushman converts this into the following, in which much of the sense, and of the connection between the sentences, disappears and a gratuitous anachronism is interpolated by the addition of the prefix "neo-" (italics mine):

> [Spirits] always have the help of divine grace, which is always active within man and has also been perfectly revealed in Jesus Christ. After the manner of the Apologists, Origen *makes use of the Stoic and neo-Platonic conceptions, for* the eternal Logos takes form in the divine-human unity of Jesus.

As a history, then, the book has no legitimate *raison d'être;* its only excuse for being consists in certain pedagogic novelties in the presentation. It makes use, to a degree unusual in histories of philosophy, of the typographic and other devices common in high-school text-books: display type, tabular views, frequent recapitulations, summaries at the ends of chapters, maps, and 'memory-hooks' of various kinds; and it is written in short,

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plain, highly categorical sentences. There is doubtless a certain utility in these accommodations to the intellectual infirmity and immaturity of the American undergraduate. The author also endeavors to render the approach to philosophy more attractive by introducing more geography than usual (which is a rather amusing idea), and by connecting the history of doctrines with political and literary history. The latter part of the program, however, does not come to much more than a thundering in the index. The book displays a certain amount of pedagogical ingenuity; but this does not compensate for the fact that its content, save in a few passages, seems purely a product of mechanical compilation or transcription, which gives small evidence of having really passed through the author's own mind and of having been thoroughly reflected upon and revitalized there. The great pedagogic problem, in relation to the history of philosophy, is to make these ancient doctrines and reasonings seem plausible, inevitable, and alive. In the present text-book that problem still remains far from a solution.

A. O. Lovejoy.

Johns Hopkins University.

A Commentary on Hegel's Logic. By J. M. E. McTaggart, D.Litt. Cambridge: University Press, 1910. Pp. xv, 311.

This latest book of Dr. McTaggart's supplements his previous works, "Studies in Hegelian Dialectic" and "Studies in Hegelian Cosmology"; for it contains a detailed exposition of the logical framework underlying the views advocated in those books. We here have, expressed with great lucidity and adorned by a style of admirable conciseness, the principal links in a chain of reasoning which, Dr. McTaggart thinks, is capable of proving "that all that exists forms a universe composed of individuals; that the universe and that each individual is an organic system; and that the relation which exists between the universe-system and the individual-systems is one of perfect harmony." And it is a fair deduction, he adds, that each individual is in harmony with all the other individuals. This much, according to Dr. McTaggart, the Hegelian logic (or some amended train of reasoning very similar to that actually elaborated by Hegel) can strictly prove. This statement, indeed, is by no means a full account of Dr. McTaggart's view of reality.

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He holds, not merely that the universe is an organic system composed exclusively of individuals, each of which is in its turn an organic system, but also, among other things, that these individuals are each of them conscious spirits connected by relations exemplified, in ordinary experience, by love; and that the Hegelian logic can by itself prove as much as this he does not claim. But it must be observed that the relation which his further conclusions about the nature of reality, as set forth in his other books, bear to the argument developed in this book, is such that, if that argument is unsound, it is, on his own view, very unlikely that the other arguments supporting his further views will be tenable. If anyone doubts that "all that is real is rational and all that is rational real," or that nothing whatever exists except conscious spirits systematically related by their emotions, it is to the Hegelian Dialectic that Dr. McTaggart will in the last resort appeal in order to dissipate such doubts. The question whether the Hegelian dialectic is, on the whole, valid is thus one of great speculative moment. Moreover, it also has a certain practical importance. For if it is true that nothing exists except a harmony of conscious and loving spirits, then the universe is, if not perfectly good, at any rate a great deal better than it seems to be to large numbers of people; and thus the demonstration of the truth of this belief might, as Dr. McTaggart has pointed out, make a considerable difference to human happiness.

The demonstration, however, is not yet complete. Dr. McTaggart does not aim in this book at a full and strict deduction of the true nature of reality; his object is merely to expound the successive steps of the process by which Hegel thought that he had penetrated that nature. He carefully weighs the validity of Hegel's every step and explains its meaning. And although, in his opinion, most of the steps come successfully out of the test, he discovers certain defects. Of these the gravest are the breaks in the dialectic chain which he is forced to recognize in the categories of Pleasure, Casuality, and Life. To fill these gaps would require a larger reconstruction of the dialectic process than came within the scope of the present work; and accordingly Dr. McTaggart, while in various places substituting an argument of his own where Hegel's seems to him unsound, has left the chain incomplete in at least these three important respects. Further, he mentions two other points which Hegel

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did not settle, and which require to be settled before the dialectic can be fully accepted. (1) The subject-matter of the dialectic is not 'all reality' in the widest sense of that phrase, but is only so much of reality as exists; it excludes, that is to say, all those things (if any there be) which, like propositions and possibilities, may be real, but are certainly non-existent. If Hegel had considered the question, he would probably, Dr. McTaggart thinks, have taken the view that nothing is real but the existent; but he did not consider it, and consequently his whole position is, we are told, both unjustified and rather vague. (2) The second point which, according to Dr. McTaggart, Hegel ought to have discussed, is the doctrine that when a thing stands in any relation to another thing, the fact that it stands in that relation is one of its qualities. This is a doctrine of far-reaching importance, and Dr. McTaggart considers that Hegel had no right to assume it, as he does, without attempting to prove it.

Evidently, then, since in commenting Hegel, it leaves defects such as these unremedied, this book must not be taken as an attempt to establish a system. Yet it would be a mistake to suppose that it therefore possesses a merely historical and expository interest. Where he does not correct it, Dr. McTaggart thinks that Hegel's argument is sound; and where he points out mistakes, but leaves them uncorrected, he makes it clear that he thinks the break in the chain capable of being remedied. The book is thus really a preliminary sketch of what its author thinks the right method of reaching ultimate truth about the universe. Its arguments, elaborate and ingenious though they are, will not, indeed, by themselves justify any reader, however much they may impress him, in concluding that the admission that something is (or, as Dr. McTaggart otherwise puts it, that there is such a thing as experience), necessarily implies that the category of the Absolute Idea completely expresses the nature of reality. This conclusion cannot be justified as long as the above-mentioned *lacunæ* remain. At the same time the portions of the argument now before us are of such a nature that a careful examination of them will enable the reader to form a tolerably good opinion as to the prospect of attaining ultimate truth by the Hegelian method. Such an examination, however, is a task beyond the limits of this review.

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La Philosophie de S. S. Laurie. Par Georges Remacle. Brussels: M. Weissenbruch, 1909. Pp. xxxi, 524.

M. Remacle has previously translated into French the "Metaphysica Nova et Vetusta" and the "Ethica" of Laurie, and the present work is an exposition of Laurie's philosophy as it appears chiefly in the "Synthetica." The actual text of the "Synthetica," M. Remacle explains in the preface, has been closely adhered to; and Laurie's chief terms have been either kept or literally translated. Indeed we might almost say that M. Remacle's book consists more or less of a paraphrase of the various chapters, sometimes taken paragraph by paragraph, of the "Synthetica." At times the order of presentation has been changed, where such change seemed to be needed to make the sequence more directly expository. To this end the form of Meditations, which is characteristic of the "Synthetica," has been abandoned. The bluntness, and at times roughness, of Laurie's expressions have been replaced by more polite forms. In this there is at once a defect and an advantage. We miss the intensely personal tone, and a great deal of the strength and nerve of Laurie's writing. And that is to be regretted. It is refreshing to meet a writer who expresses himself so directly and (we might say) unconventionally; for the unconventionality is always for the purpose of being more to the point.

But if we miss all these things, we have as advantage in M. Remacle's book a greater consecutiveness of exposition; and the uncouth phrases are always softened, either by an apology or by a polite translation. Thus sensitive readers are met halfway. And perhaps it was better to do this than directly to translate. If we admit this, then we may say that M. Remacle has performed his task extremely well; and we must be grateful to him for introducing to French-speaking peoples one who has been too much neglected in his own country.

We can only touch in more or less fragmentary manner on one or two of the characteristic features of Laurie's work, omitting all mention of a great deal which is supremely important for the understanding of Laurie.

At first sight, we say that an object remains the same (within certain specific limits) while its surroundings are changing. It is only because of this that we call it an object at all. And

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for common sense, so far, objects are independent, although they are at the same time related to one another in various ways. None of these relations is, however, able to do away with the independence of the individual things. This finding of common sense Laurie is at pains to confirm and justify. And he thus calls himself a natural realist. But he is a natural realist who has learned in the school of Kant and Hegel. Hence he will not ask the question so often asked in the name of common sense: "What, then, are these independent things *in themselves,* when you take away their relations, especially their relations to knowers?" This for Laurie is not the right kind of question to put; he recognizes, and insists on, the fact that the meaning and significance and individuality of the object is only to be found in the meaning it has as known. He even says that the object demands the subject as a condition of its self-fulfillment; and by a powerful analysis of the early stages of mental life, before self-consciousness has arisen, shows that the object takes possession of the subject to such an extent that the latter becomes almost the passive vehicle for the realization of the object. Nay more, even when the self has become free and self-conscious, so as to arrest objects in perception and attend to them, excluding other objects (and it is in perception, Laurie insists, that we must find free will, if anywhere), when the self asserts itself as active over against the object, yet it is still the object which provokes activity in the subject, setting him problems, keeping him restless, guiding and sustaining his thinking.

Correlative to this theory is the view that whatever the subject knows of the object, is in the object. The object is (for God) all it is for man, and more. Man's knowledge, in so far as it is correct for him, gives a true (though incomplete) account of the object. In the same way with primitive man and the animals; in so far as they are conscious, they are conscious of the very object as it really is. Thus Laurie speaks of 'grades' or 'levels' of experience, a term which he translates into 'planes of being.' He speaks of the "man-plane of being," by which he means, reality (including man himself) in so far as it is capable of being known by man. Each level of experience contains in itself the meaning and significance of all the lower levels, and also, the promise and potency of higher levels. We believe that it could be shown in the first place

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that this theory of grades or levels of experience contains all that there is of truth in the ordinary doctrine of degrees of reality, and avoids many of the difficulties to which that conception has been made to give rise; and in the second place that it must form an integral part of any realism which wishes to be consistent. But a full consideration of these questions is beyond the scope of a review.

It is evident that the question of negation must be very important to one who holds, as Laurie does, that the universe is a One of "dependent independents," and that there is nothing outside God. For Laurie, all negation is within God. It is the condition of there being a world of finites at all. Thus negation is real; and it is this which ensures the independence of the finites. It is this which enables conscious beings to be free. The self asserts itself freely at first against all other finites, and even against God. God realizes his purposes by laying on man the task of realizing himself by himself. But man's true being and his true realization are not to be found in this negative relation, but in his positive relations to other finites and to God. The negation is there to be struggled against, to be itself negated. It thus comes to be looked on as an obstacle to the progress of man and of God. This comes out clearly in Laurie's treatment of evil. By laying stress on the fact that the true significance of man is to be found, *not* in his negative, but in his positive relations, Laurie prepares us for the view that negation is not only a necessary means for the realization of God's purposes, but further an obstacle which even God finds it hard to surmount. Thus he speaks of God as a "Spirit in difficulty." And though in general, Laurie restricts this account to the plane of being occupied by man,—so as to say that, as far as man's knowledge can go, God must be held to have failed,—yet, we are left with the impression that God has failed more radically than this, and that the negation which is involved in the existence of a finite world brings with it a certain amount of actual and ultimate evil which it is not even in God's power to remedy. It looks as if God willed a world of finite beings, and accepted (though he did not will) the negation and evil involved. And it may be questioned whether this is compatible with the assertion that all negation falls within God. It seems rather as if it is a power hostile to God and outside God. The source of this

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tendency so to conceive negation may be difficult to trace; but it is to be found, I think, in the too great emphasis laid on the positive relations of man to the universe. By referring to all opposition, strife, and evil under the comprehensive title negation, we tend to slip into the mistake of regarding them as due to the *differences* between things; and from that it is an easy step to the position that a perfect world involves the doing away with the differences between things, either by a suppression of these differences or by a merging of them into something higher. And then the view that the world is and must always be a world where finite beings are *not* completely merged into a One of being, carries with it the view of evil as radical. But negative relations, in so far as they are necessary to a world of *different* individuals, are not merely the source, nor the sole source, of opposition and evil, things to be negated; they are bad only when set up as by themselves the important things, and opposed to the positive. It is a long step, and one only to be taken by a faulty logic, from "A is not B" to "A resists B."

Laurie's treatment of the problem of evil is extremely valuable, as indicating quite clearly what is, and what is not, to be taken as evil, and how far it is to be regarded as evil. Indeed, on all the problems of philosophy with which he deals, his work is stimulating and suggestive, and not to be overlooked. And we may hope that M. Remacle's enthusiastic and sympathetic account of Laurie's work will be the foreshadowing of a revival of interest in Laurie, and instrumental to it.

LEONARD J. RUSSELL.

University of Glasgow.

THE NEW LAOKOON: An Essay on the Confusion of the Arts. By Irving Babbitt. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1910. Pp. 259.

For stimulation and entertainment let the reader of serious essays turn to Professor Babbitt's brilliant indictment of Romanticism and its ally, if not its parent, Positivism. "The New Laokoon" belongs to a *genre* which is not treated in its own pages, but which is, perhaps, even more clearly marked than any of those the author would purge and defend; to wit, Polite Polemic. It is frankly Aristotelian and intellectualistic in sym-

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pathies, aspiration, and the calm *hauteur* of its criticisms against mere feeling, the blurred effect, and the latter-day mongrel arts, such as program music and the modern opera. Professor Babbitt's hatred of every nineteenth and twentieth century artist of fame is naked, honest, and hot. His contempt for modern science is no less so. Though he alludes to James, Bergson, Lipps, Croce, Haeckel, and Poincaré, he apparently has not studied them as closely as a critic should. It is very clear, however, that if he did, he would have only scathing for the unhappy thinkers. The following sentences depict the volume's method and intent:

> A clear-cut type of person, a person who does not live in either an emotional or an intellectual muddle, will normally prefer a clear-cut type of art or literature. Thus, he is not likely to care for a theatrical sermon or a play that preaches. In many historical novels he will feel that history is travestied without any corresponding gain for fiction. He will be partial to music that is first of all music and to poetry that is above all poetry. He will distrust a symphony that becomes intelligible only with reference to some picture or poem. He will not ordinarily care for a painting that is merely a symbolical transposition of a sonnet, or a sonnet that is a symbolical transposition of a painting. He will desire each art and every *genre* to be itself primarily, and to give, as Aristotle says of tragedy, its own special pleasure. This is the one serious argument against tragi-comedy, that, in trying to give the special pleasure of both tragedy and comedy, it may fail of the fullest unity of impression. . . . But to set color above design, illusion above informing purpose, suggestiveness above symmetry, is to encourage that predominance of the feminine over the masculine virtues that has been the main cause of the corruption of literature and the arts during the past century—what one may in fact term the great romantic, or it might be more correct to say Rousseauistic, error.

The reviewer admires Professor Babbitt's taste; it is indeed very close to his own preferences: Bach before Strauss, Phidias before Rodin, and generally the balanced, the symmetrical, the Golden Mean, rather than the bizarre, the noisy, and the impressionistic. But to translate one's personal taste into a philosophy of life, and even into a metaphysic, is a daring romantic flight which the philosophical critic shuns, as he would shun the products of artistic unrestraint in a picture gallery. When Professor Babbitt calls the law of measure "the highest law of which man has finite knowledge," he is no longer a true humanist, but an extravagant anthropomorphist. When he insists upon the divorce of nature from human nature in art because

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they are heterogeneous in reality, he lets his zeal for clear-cut distinctions consume him; nobody *knows* whether nature and human nature are one or two or many, though many *feel* a dualism. And when, as against the romanticist, he insists that life is a drama with a definite purpose, his is the most irresponsible impressionism. Life doubtless *seems* to be a play with an ever-impending, never-witnessed *dénouement;* but should we dare trust the appearance without considerable evidence? It is the most beautiful view; but only a Platonic Aristotelian like Professor Babbitt will accept it as true, though reinforced by no scientific verdict. It is tragic to find a preacher of the Golden Mean so forget it that he surrenders his intellect to his esthetic instincts as soon as he philosophizes. Romanticism may laugh in harsh mockery when it asks its brilliant critic for the ultimate grounds of his attack upon it. For, briefly, as "The New Laokoon" depicts the case, the purpose of art is not to please,—for, if it were that, then whatever pleases an artist or a group of persons would be good art; no, its purpose is to fulfill the law of measure to the mind through sensuous forms. But why this purpose? Because what is a good rule of conduct in everyday life is the rule of art, inasmuch as art is the handmaid of morality. And why this? Because, forsooth, the moral is the real; the true and the beautiful are its high slaves and mimics. And how do we know this? Because the thought of it gives us a pleasant glow all over? We *feel* that there must be such a cosmic conspiracy. In Plato's heaven all clear-cut distinctions on which the author dotes melt away most romantically.

Seriously, it is a pity that Professor Babbitt has not defended the supremacy of classical art standards with drier logic. They can be so defended, and ere long somebody will rehabilitate them without invoking antiquated metaphysics and without being compelled to pronounce the entire nineteenth and twentieth centuries muddle-headed. Whoever this savior may be, he will do well to peruse "The New Laokoon," which is as readable as Chesterton and as happily erudite (though in very different directions) as Santayana.

WALTER B. PITKIN.

Columbia University.

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THE LAWS OF HEREDITY. By G. Archdall Reid, M.B., F.R.S.E. With a Diagrammatic Representation by H. H. Turner, Savilian Professor of Astronomy, Oxford. London: Methuen & Co., 1910. Pp. xl, 548.

This volume is described as covering the whole field of heredity. It cannot be surprising if one finds inequalities in a work which deals with so comprehensive a subject from diverse points of view. The reader who does not mind taking trouble will be enlightened concerning almost every problem of heredity that is of supreme importance to the community. But he will have to take trouble, for the book contains little internal cohesion or arrangement, and the sentences are sometimes so long that their meaning is obscure.

The work seems to fall into three parts, which might with advantage have been separated. The first part is concerned with the general problems of heredity. Amongst these we may mention, as illustrative, the problem whether evolution is ever anything but adaptation; whether it is conceivable that the development of the individual can occur otherwise than by recapitulation, and therefore whether retrogression can ever be other than reversion; whether the main mass of retrogression is due directly to natural selection or also largely to retrogression occurring in complete absence of selection. To many of these problems the author gives original solutions, which, whether right or wrong, will be provocative of abundant discussion and criticism. Into the latter it is not possible for the reviewer to enter in any detail. Dr. Reid accepts the theory of natural selection in a form which is quite unique, and certainly there is much to be said for the view that he adopts. Speaking generally, however, he seems to attribute too much to natural selection and its rôle in the causation of progression and the origin of species. The author's premise that species have arisen through natural selection need not be granted. Natural selection can only act negatively, never positively. It can explain why certain imaginable types do *not* exist, but it can never explain the species of life that actually *do* exist. It can no more afford an adequate explanation of the latter than the neglect of a housemaid affords an adequate explanation of the existence of cobwebs. Indeed, there are several aspects of Darwinian criticism of which the author does not take sufficient account. He

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starts from the point at which Darwin stopped and combines with the latter's theory of evolution the following hypothesis, which he reaches by induction: that species tend to retrogress on cessation of selection, and that offspring recapitulate the main feature of parental development. From these he infers (1) "that retrogressive variations tend to predominate over progressive variations; (2) that, with rare exceptions, variations are spontaneous, and that spontaneous variations tend to occur all round the specific mean; (3) that, therefore, the germ plasm is highly insusceptible to change throughout the direct action of the environment; (4) that, apart from his own progressive variations, the development of the individual is an abbreviated and inaccurate recapitulation of the evolution of the race; and (5) that, therefore, every retrogressive variation is, in effect, a reversion."

The second part of the book, comprises Chapters XI to XXII. It is concerned with the evidence in favor of the conclusions arrived at in the earlier chapters, which is to be obtained from the study of human beings. The author does not make explicit his reasons for this reversion of the natural order of procedure. Facts which throw light upon two great problems of heredity are specially considered. The first of these problems is the causation of variations. From the study of microbic diseases and narcotics the author concludes that the great mass of variations are spontaneous. Other problems of heredity and evolution which arise in relation to disease and alcohol are treated in detail and with great lucidity. The conclusion concerning the offspring of alcoholics can hardly be taken as quite final, in spite of the fact that it is in harmony with the results of the recent researches of Miss Elderton and Professor Karl Pearson upon this subject. It does not recognize the probable truth of the statement that alcoholic habits chiefly attack our best stocks. If, as Dr. Reid says, alcoholism has no influence upon the germ plasm, we have yet to explain how it is that the offspring of these superior stocks do not show a very distinct superiority over the offspring of the sober, but weakling and inferior, stocks amongst which alcoholic habits have brought their parents down to live. The second great problem of heredity which is specially considered is that of the proportion which the 'innate' characters of any species bear to its 'acquirements.' This is treated in connection with the study of the influence of heredity on

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mind. Two views are held by opposing schools of biologists: those who hold that intellectual and moral characteristics are instincts, and therefore inherited, and to be improved by selective breeding; and those who hold that the innate mental characteristics are few in comparison with those which are acquired, and are therefore not transferable. The author's own view is that the intellectual characteristics of the adult human being have developed much more under the stimulus of use than under that of nutriment, and that therefore the adult mind is far more made than born. The general study of mind in Chapters XVII to XXII will probably be of interest to the general reader, but it has no real psychological value.

The third part of the book deals with the practical application of the principles of heredity to problems of great importance in human life. Amongst these it is sufficient to note, the methods of improving physical health and development, the prevention of disease, the reduction of alcoholism, the care of the feeble-minded and the insane, and the general problem of education. The importance of education lies in the fact that it very largely makes the individual, although it cannot be said to have any influence upon the biological evolution of the race. That is to say, the individual germ plasm is unaffected by any training or education which the parent may receive.

Finally, the book contains an appendix in which Professor Herbert Hall Turner represents diagrammatically many of the ideas connected with inheritance. This is a very new and distinctive feature of the work, which certainly adds to its lucidity, especially for those readers whose training has been mathematical.

There is one other criticism which we are disposed to offer, and that is the excess of repetition. The reader will be distracted by the innumerable and unnecessary discussions upon scientific method. Although he may not object to the chapter devoted to this subject, which would certainly have been better as an introduction, he will inevitably be oppressed by the perpetual recurrence of the topic throughout the whole work.

M. LIGHTFOOT EASTWOOD.

Bolton, England.

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A Guide to Reading in Social Ethics and Allied Subjects. Lists of Books and Articles Selected and Described for the Use of General Readers. By Teachers in Harvard University. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1910. Pp. 265.

We have here a long-desired bibliography of social ethics and kindred subjects which will be most helpful to the many persons interested in modern social questions: "college students in their class work, charity workers who look beyond the routine of their task, pastors of churches preparing for their classes in social questions, employers looking for the best types of industrial adjustment, workingmen eager for instruction in economic reforms, women in their clubs, readers in their homes." As Professor Peabody states in his prefatory note, it does not aim to present historical researches, erudite discussions, complete and comprehensive lists which bewilder the average student, but carefully selected titles of the best contemporary studies of social conditions and problems, with brief estimates of their importance or conclusions. The books are systematically arranged under five heads: Social Philosophy; Social Institutions; Social Service; the Ethics of Modern Industry; Social Aspects of Religion; and these are subdivided into forty-two sections, each one containing titles chosen by a competent Harvard teacher. A final section is devoted to encyclopedias, periodicals, and bibliographies; and an index of names of authors completes the volume.

Professor Peabody, the editor of this useful little book, and his colleagues who have so generously coöperated with him deserve the thanks of all students of ethical and social questions; and it is greatly to be hoped that the intention of the editor to re-edit the work at frequent intervals may be realized.

Frank Thilly.

Cornell University.

Studies in the Psychology of Sex. Vol. VI. Sex in Relation to Society. By Havelock Ellis. Philadelphia: F. A. Davis Company, 1910. Pp. xvi, 656.

Mr. Havelock Ellis is to be congratulated on the completion of his series of studies in the psychology of sex,—a difficult task, which has been accomplished with insight and learning, and

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with not less remarkable courage and patience. It is more than thirty years since he began to devote himself to a scientific study of sex-problems, and it is fifteen years since he published "Man and Woman."—a prolegomenon to his main work, the sixth and last volume of which is now before us. These studies give a scientific treatment of most of the problems connected with sex, with which it is the business of psychologists, moralists, teachers, physicians, alienists, and others to make themselves acquainted, and the treatment is one that may be relied on for its scholarliness and sanity. Much has to be said that is unpleasant, for sex has a hell as deep as its heaven is high, but the author's seriousness of purpose must have disappointed those who have sought his books for erotic stimulus.

The author reminds us that he has persisted in his work in spite of misunderstanding and even obloquy, and in spite of a prosecution that made it impossible for him to publish his volumes in this, his own country. "I supposed that a secluded student who approached vital social problems with precaution, making no direct appeal to the general public, but only to the public's teachers, and who wrapped up the results of his inquiries in technically written volumes open to few, I supposed that such a student was at all events secure from any gross form of attack on the part of the police or the government under whose protection he imagined that he lived." Looking backwards he is still naturally sore at the treatment he received; looking forward he recovers his serenity,—"in a few generations all these prejudices will have perished and be forgotten." Perhaps it is not inappropriate that the reviewer should voice the opinion of many who believe that a wholesome change of attitude has already been effected and that thanks are due to Dr. Havelock Ellis for his cold-blooded scientific investigations and his frank, clean-minded exposition.

At the same time there is no doubt that those who work for years at a difficult subject like sex are apt to forget that the facts can be looked at in any unwholesome or morbid way. The anatomist wondered that anyone could have the audacity to complain of there being a smell in the lobby of his institute, and the student of sex wonders that anyone can be excited to lust by a technical analysis of a universal human impulse. A serious inquiry should not, of course, be affected by the existence of eroto-maniacs who gloat over passages of suggestive value,

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procurable in Shakespeare and the Scriptures as well as in treatises on sex; on the other hand, the expert, remembering his own callousness, which is either in advance of his day and generation or has been gradually acquired, should prune his volume down to the very limit of efficiency. One should not be deterred from calling a spade a spade by the danger of doing harm to youthful trespassers in the library if due notice-boards have been erected, as in the case of this series; moreover, against this and other dangers, which we do not believe to be imaginary, one must place the benefit of thorough investigation. The pruriency of ignorance is probably a much commoner evil than abnormal excitation through the perusal of scientific treatises.

Any one of the chapters of this book could easily form the topic of a volume, and it is not within our power to give a critical review. We cannot do more than indicate the general scope of the book. The previous five volumes "have dealt mainly with the sexual impulse in relation to its object, leaving out of account the external persons and the environmental influences which yet may powerfully affect that impulse and its gratification." The present volume deals with sex in relation to society,—the relationship of the sexual impulse to third persons and to the community at large with all its anciently established traditions." It treats of the mother and her child, sexual education, nakedness, the valuation of sexual love, the function of chastity, the problem of sexual abstinence, prostitution, the conquest of the venereal diseases, sexual morality, marriage, the art of love, and the science of procreation.

Some of the great conclusions of the book are the following: the mother is the child's supreme parent, who must be reverenced and protected as well as loved; neglect of sexual education is at once cowardly and cruel; there is a hygienic, æsthetic, and moral value in nakedness which may help in the conquest of erotic kleptomania; the spiritual as well as the physical structure of the world is in part built on sexual love; chastity is essential to the dignity of love, but the prevalent conception of sexual abstinence (among the more moralized) must be replaced by a more positive ideal; on its personal side marriage is a sacred and intimate relationship with which the state has no concern, on the social side it is the assumption of the responsible public sponsorship of a new member of the state; in so far as marriage approaches its ideal those two aspects become one; we have to real-

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ize, not only that the question of love subserves the question of breed, but also that love has a proper, a necessary, even a socially wholesome claim, to stand by itself and to be regarded (as an art) for its own worth; but the culture of the art of love must be moralized by a quickening of the social conscience in regard to Eugenics.

J. ARTHUR THOMSON.

Aberdeen.

SOCIAL AND MENTAL TRAITS OF THE NEGRO. Research into the Conditions of the Negro Race in Southern Towns. By Howard W. Odum, Ph. D. New York: Columbia University, 1910.

It is an encouraging sign that so many scientific studies of the negro problem have been undertaken of recent years, and especially that so many of these studies have come from educated southern men. The present volume by Dr. Odum is the most recent of such researches and is a worthy contribution to the scientific study of the negro problem. The book is the result of the study of the conditions of the negroes in fifty southern towns in Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and Tennessee, most of them county seats, with some comparison of conditions in twenty towns representing South Carolina, North Carolina, Texas, and Louisiana. Data were gathered from all possible sources in the southern states, and continued research undertaken for two years in these southern towns. The result is a work which is a mine of information regarding the actual conditions under which the negro lives, his character, and his present progress. Students who have not the opportunity to investigate the negro problem at first hand could scarcely do better than to go over carefully all of the information which this book presents regarding the negro, for the facts concerning the negro's life in the average southern town are comprehensively and dispassionately set forth, usually also with great accuracy.

On the other hand, this study falls far short of scientific ideals of accuracy in certain respects. For example, while Dr. Odum professes to treat of the mental traits of the negro, he cites no results of laboratory experiments, although in a footnote he refers to experimental work which has been undertaken, but the results of which are not yet available. Of course, in this age of experimental psychology, it is scarcely pardonable to discuss in

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a scientific monograph the mental traits of any class without reference to the results of experimental study. Such experimental results are notoriously lacking in every discussion of the mental traits of the negro, and Dr. Odum's book does not supply the deficiency; hence also we find in the book many vague statements and sweeping generalizations which may easily be questioned. A grave fault of the book is that very frequently the author says 'the negro' when he should have said 'the mass of negroes,' or 'the average negro,' though perhaps this is merely a criticism of the writer's literary style rather than of his scientific reasoning.

As we have already said, the book contains a mass of information regarding such topics as, "Negro Schools and the Education of the Negro," "The Negro Church and Religion," "The Home Life, the Diseases and Morals of the Negro," "The Negro Offender," "The Social Status of the Negro," and "The Emotions of the Negro." Upon all these matters the writer has brought together a great number of dispassionate observations which need, however, as has already been said, to be worked over and to be presented in somewhat more exact and condensed form. The book is incidentally more than a study of the negro in southern towns. To a certain extent it is a study of the whole situation existing between the two races in such communities. Unconsciously Dr. Odum has given a picture of the attitude of the average southern white man toward the negro as well as a picture of negro character and life. He describes, apparently without knowing it, the neglect and indifference and unfairness of the superior race toward the inferior. Thus he says, for example, that "the whites never visit the negro schools" and that the white superintendent of city schools has only rarely any vital interest in the schools for colored children under his supervision.

Dr. Odum is himself remarkably free from the attitude of indifference and prejudice which he describes as existing among the southern whites. However, in some respects it would seem that he has not entirely emancipated himself from the influence of his environment. For example, he opposes the idea of white teachers in colored schools, although he admits that white Sunday-school teachers of the Southern Presbyterian Church have been much more successful in conducting Sunday-school classes for colored children than have colored persons. In general, how-

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ever, as has already been said, the presentation of facts is remarkably fair and unbiased, and such as only could be made by one who has lived for some time in the midst of the conditions which are described.

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD.

University of Missouri.

MODERN LIGHT ON IMMORTALITY. Being an Original Excursion into Historical Research and Scientific Discovery Pointing to a New Solution of the Problem. By Henry Frank. Boston: Sherman, French & Co., 1909. Pp. 467.

This work, the author tells us, is the result of an investigation on which he set out without the hope of discovering any positive grounds for immortality, and, to his own surprise, after testing and finding worthless all the time-honored claims and arguments of historical religions and philosophies on the problem, he discovered in the conclusions of modern natural science, not indeed a final proof of immortality, but a strong presumption in its favor.

The first two hundred pages of the book are occupied with a review and critical examination of the evolution of religious belief and speculation on the problem of immortality. There is nothing new or noteworthy in this part of the work. Mr. Frank regards Jesus and St. Paul as both pantheistic mystics. St. Paul he holds to have been deeply influenced by the Eleusinian mysteries.

In the second part of the work the bearings of modern science on the problem are examined. Incidentally, the futility of speculative philosophy in dealing with this problem is shown. Mr. Frank's references to philosophy do not indicate either that he has gone to the standard sources for his information or that he has any insight into the real character of philosophical inquiry. He seems to be equally in the dark as to the methods and results of modern psychology. Haeckel's monism and mythological hylozoism seem to represent, for Mr. Frank, the latest and truest light on biology, psychology, and philosophy. Mind is a very refined form of matter and, in its more complex forms, is made up of minute psycho-physical elements or atoms. Mr. Frank's original contribution to the discussion consists in the argument that a personal soul or self is the organization of these

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psycho-physical elements. The invisible physical substance of life (bioplasm) which is the seat of the psychic and vital souls is itself an immortal substance. "Consciousness" (in the form of a personal unity) "has itself become a perpetuating capacity of the organic system." The tentative conclusion of the book as to the scientific probability of immortality is to be reinforced in a later work from the conclusions of 'psychical research.'

I append a few quotations, which will enable the discerning reader to judge for himself the quality of Mr. Frank's contributions. "That the soul already existed potentially and genetically in the atoms that aggregate to constitute the body and brain of human beings, and that what we call the mind of a man is but the accumulation, in a sort of commonwealth, of an infinite number of minds resident in the millions of cells that constitute the organic constituency of human beings. These statements are but the latest and indisputable deductions of biological science." "Science is beginning to indicate that thought is an electro-magnetic process, affecting the biological cells of the cortical areas." "The invisible bioplastic body, then, which, as we have already shown, is in contour the exact counterpart of the exterior physical frame, is the seat of the human soul, in its two phases of manifestation, namely, as Vital Soul and as Psychic Soul." "*Substance is static energy; energy is dynamic substance.*" Further comment would be superfluous!

J. A. LEIGHTON.

Ohio State University.

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

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THE GARDEN OF ETHICS.*

C. LLOYD MORGAN.

"LET us understand, once for all," said Huxley in his Romanes Lecture, "that the ethical progress of society depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in running away from it, but in combating it."[1] The critics seized upon this statement and others of like implication, and charged the veteran evolutionist with inconsistency. What, they asked, is the cosmic process but evolution under another name? Are we then to understand that the ethical process is independent of and antagonistic to evolution? If so, he whom we have regarded as the champion of naturalism, leader of the forces of science against the ancient strongholds of dogmatic authority,—even he proves false to his trust. That same Huxley who has taught us that man, with all his powers and all his ideals, is but the flower of a natural process of development, now sides with the clerics and the university dons. Hear how, in his declining years, he preaches from the pulpit of Oxford:

> The cosmic process born with us and, to a large extent, necessary for our maintenance, is the outcome of millions of years of severe training, and it would be folly to imagine that a few centuries will suffice to subdue its masterfulness to purely ethical ends. Ethical nature may count upon having to reckon with a tenacious and powerful enemy as long as the world lasts.

* An address to the Moral Education League, February, 1911.

[1] "Collected Essays," Vol. IX, p. 83.

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Thus, as Mr. Leonard Huxley says in his admirable life of his father: "Some jumped to the conclusion that Huxley was offering a general recantation of evolution, others that he had discarded his former theories of ethics. On the one hand, he was branded as a deserter from free thought; on the other, hailed almost as a convert to orthodoxy."[2] Even those who realized that the cardinal feature of Huxley's thought was that the ethical process was differentiated within the cosmic process found in his doctrine a cause for stumbling. If the ethical process is part of, and therefore one with, the cosmic process, how can it possibly be said to combat it? How can the differentiated part be in antagonism to the whole of which it is thus admittedly a part? If the house of evolution be divided against itself, shall it not swiftly fall? In reply to this Huxley, writing to Professor Seth, says:

> I really have been unable to understand what my critics have been dreaming of when they raise the objection that the ethical process, being part of the cosmic process, cannot be opposed to it. They might as well say that artifice does not oppose nature, because it is part of nature in the broadest sense.[3]

In another letter, written to Mr. Common, Huxley succinctly summarized his position:

> These are two very different questions which people fail to discriminate. One is whether evolution accounts for morality, the other whether the principle of evolution in general can be adopted as an ethical principle. The first, of course, I advocate, and have constantly insisted upon. The second I deny, and reject all so-called evolutional ethics based upon it.[4]

On the former of these two questions I have here and now but little to say,—and that little merely with a view to render the position clear. When Huxley said that evolution accounts for morality, he gave expression to his belief that the ethical process is one with and part of the cosmic process. From the standpoint of empirical science,—of which Huxley was the untiring advocate,—

[2] "Life and Letters," Vol. II, pp. 352, 353.
[3] "Life and Letters," p. 358. [4] *Ibid.*, p. 360.

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evolution does not 'explain' either the one or the other. "It is very desirable to remember," he says, "that evolution is not an explanation of the cosmic process, but merely a generalized statement of the methods and results of that process."[5] It may appear at first sight that there was some inconsistency in Huxley's thought or expression. It does certainly seem as if he says that evolution accounts for that of which it can afford no explanation. The apparent inconsistency arises however from the use of such words or phrases as 'explain' and 'account for' with two different connotations; first, when they are used in the universe of discourse of science; secondly, when they are employed in philosophical or ontological discussions. The man of science accounts for the fall of a stone to the earth in terms of the formula of universal gravitation; he explains the formation of hoar-frost as an example of crystalization; and it is in this sense that Huxley would account for the facts of morality as falling within the concept of evolution. If the philosopher protests that such a mode of accounting for the facts affords no true explanation, since it gives no answer to the question, why the facts and processes are what we find them to be,—he finds that Huxley is in full agreement with him. In that sense of the term, "it is very desirable to remember that evolution is not an explanation of the cosmic process, but merely a generalized statement of the methods and results of that process." In that sense of the term, Huxley frankly confessed that he had no explanation to offer, and therefore labeled himself agnostic.

Contenting myself for the present with this passing allusion to the first of the two very different questions which in Huxley's opinion people fail to discriminate, I turn to the second question,—whether the principle of evolution in general can be adopted as an ethical principle. His answer was an emphatic negative. He went

[5] "Collected Essays," Vol. IX, p. 6.

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so far as to say that he rejected all so-called evolutional ethics based upon the premises of an affirmative answer. He said:

> I hear much of the 'ethics of evolution.' I apprehend that, in the broadest sense of the word 'evolution,' there neither is, nor can be, any such thing. The notion that the doctrine of evolution can furnish a foundation for morals seems to me to be an illusion which has arisen from the unfortunate ambiguity of the term 'fittest' in the formula, 'survival of the fittest.' We commonly use 'fittest' in a good sense, with an understood connotation of 'best'; and 'best' we are apt to take in its ethical sense. But the 'fittest' which survives in the struggle for existence may be, and often is, the ethically worst.[6]

Followers and disciples of Herbert Spencer were naturally up in arms. Had not their leader and master founded his ethical doctrine on a very different conception,—a conception more fully in accord with the cardinal principle of continuity in progressive development? What could Huxley mean by this repudiation of the ethics of evolution? If the notion that the doctrine of evolution can furnish a foundation for morals be, in accordance with Huxley's assertion, false, where can we find,—where indeed can we even seek,—a foundation firmly imbedded in the natural order of events?

I cannot but think that Huxley's *dictum*, as it stands in the extract I have quoted, is open to such criticism. None the less, I believe that it is rather in the mode of expression than in his underlying thought that Huxley was apparently inconsistent,—was seemingly false to the principles which he had advocated for so many strenuous years. Had Huxley substituted for the word 'evolution' the phrase 'natural selection,' there would have been far less valid ground for adverse criticism. I for one should be prepared to agree that the doctrine of natural selection does not furnish a foundation for the adequate interpretation of the ethical process. That this was what Huxley had in mind seems to be shown by the reference to the 'survival of the fittest' in the concluding part of his

[6] "Life and Letters," p. 303. *Cf.* "Collected Essays," Vol. IX, p. 80.

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sentence. If we can accept this view, we reduce, in some degree at least, the apparent paradox of the antagonism of the two processes. A measure of paradox still remains. To its discussion Huxley devoted the Prolegomena to the ninth volume of his Collected Essays. Here he endeavored to remove "that which," as he says, "seems to have proved a stumbling block to many,—namely, the apparent paradox that ethical nature, while born of cosmic nature, is necessarily at enmity with its parent. Unless," he adds, "the arguments set forth in the Prolegomena, in the simplest language at my command, have some flaw which I am unable to discern, this seeming paradox is a truth, as great as it is plain, the recognition of which is fundamental for the ethical philosopher."[1]

Of the state of nature the very essence is impermanence. That which endures is the process of which the cosmos is the product. As the expression of a fixed order, every stage of which is the effect of causes operating according to definite rules, the conception of evolution excludes that of chance. Scientific knowledge tends, with constantly increasing emphasis, to establish the belief that not merely the world of plants, but that of animals; not merely living things, but the whole fabric of the earth; not merely our planet, but the whole solar system; not merely our star with its satellites, but the millions of similar bodies which are scattered through boundless space, bear witness to the rational order which, underlying the flow of energy, pervades the cosmos. With none of these, however, has Huxley anything to do in the Prolegomena, except with that phase of the cosmic process exhibited by the forms of life which tenant the earth. Therein we see three great groups of facts; the facts of variation; the facts of overproduction, more young being brought into existence than can possibly reach maturity in a world already fully stocked: the facts of the struggle for existence involving elimination of the ill-

[1] "Collected Essays," Vol. IX, Preface, p. viii.

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adapted and consequent survival of the fittest. Looking out over the downs from the windows of his Eastbourne house, Huxley saw a state of nature which was the outcome of this phase of the cosmic process.

But turning his eyes towards the carefully cultivated plot of ground within his garden wall, Huxley saw not the product of natural selection through the elimination of the ill-adapted, but the outcome of deliberate choice and intelligent forethought. Trees, shrubs, and herbs, many of them appertaining to the state of nature in remote parts of the globe, abounded and flourished. Vegetables, fruits, and flowers were produced, of kinds which would never have existed except under conditions that obtain in the garden,—which would soon cease to exist if man relaxed his watchful care for their preservation. The state of art or artifice in the garden is only maintained on this condition,—that the state of nature shall be prevented from again encroaching upon and holding sway over the cultivated plot won from it by human toil guided by human forethought. For not only is the state of nature hostile to the state of art in the garden; but the principle of the horticultural process, by which the latter is created and maintained, is antithetic to that of the cosmic process. The garden and its products are the embodiment in concrete form of the ideals of man the gardener; he shapes them to his will so far as the materials open to his far-ranging choice permit; and only by holding at bay the forces of nature which tend to mar or destroy them can he hope to preserve the fruits or flowers which are the expression of his ideals of utility or beauty.

Such in outline is the parable of the garden with which the Prolegomena to Huxley's volume on "Evolution and Ethics" opens. I have been forced to mingle some of my own brass with the bright silver of the master's style. I have also borrowed from Huxley's thought the title of this address. The garden of ethics is the plot of cultivated ground in which, as members of this league, you

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labor; and the point on which I desire to lay stress is that the garden of ethics is a place wherein ideals are nurtured until they blossom and, if it may be, bring forth fruit to perfection.

Before passing on, however, to interpret the parable of the garden in some of its ethical applications, I must draw attention to an important difference between the natural selection which obtains in the organic phase of the cosmic process and the conscious selection which in large measure determines human progress, in horticulture and in ethics. "The endless varieties of cultivated flowers, fruits, roots, tubers, and bulbs," said Huxley, "are not the products of selection by means of the struggle for existence, but of direct selection, in view of an ideal of utility or beauty."[8] The distinction is here rather hinted than explicitly set forth. Let me try in a few words to render it somewhat clearer to our thought. Speaking of the logical and biological outcome of the struggle for existence, Professor Poulton[9] has emphasized the fact that "the process is of course selection by and through elimination." Here elimination implies the absence of any truly selective choice, and the presence of a mechanical or quasi-mechanical means by which the ill-adapted to the conditions of life are weeded out. Elimination begins at the bottom of the scale of variants and works progressively upwards. The first to go are those which are hopelessly ill-adapted; then those which, though not so ill-adapted, are yet not sufficiently well adapted to compete with their betters; and so onward up the scale until only the few eminently fit variants survive to mate with other survivors and thus continue a well-adapted race. It is otherwise with conscious selection. It begins at the top of the scale of variants. There is real choice; a deliberate and purposeful picking out of those variants which most closely accord with an ideal framed

[8] "Collected Essays," Vol. IX, p. 15.
[9] "Essays on Evolution," p. 105.

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in the mind of the selector. In the garden of ethics this is the process by which the highest results are achieved.

There is a sense, however, and a quite true and valid sense, in which it may be said that the selection of ideals involves the elimination, or at any rate the rejection, of other ideals. But the word elimination here carries a meaning different from that which natural elimination in the organic struggle for existence carries. For this elimination means conscious and purposeful rejection. We choose to eliminate because the rejected ideal does not satisfactorily meet the requirements of the case. We exercise positive choice at one end of the scale, negative choice at the other end. Still there are undoubtedly analogies between the two processes. Here is a plot of ground to be won from nature and to be converted into a garden. Before a sod of earth has been turned, the fortunate possessor surrenders himself to the pleasant task of planning and scheming. Perhaps he has long cherished the hope that some day he might have this opportunity of carrying out certain ideas which have gradually been taking shape in his mind. But from what a vast number of other ideas these are the selected few! In how many varied ways have these been grouped and regrouped! He could not count the number of garden plans which have been formed, entertained for a while, and then rejected,—or perhaps, rather, modified and refashioned. Within the specific type of horticultural scheme there have been diverse variations; through the fecundity of thought, many more variants have been mentally begotten than could possibly remain existent, now at last to be carried into execution; has there not been a struggle for existence among them as the outcome of which some survive just because they were the fittest to prevail? And is not all this equally true of the ethical process,—of the development of a plan of life-conduct in its social relationships? Surely our prevalent ideals—the prevalent ideals of each one of us individually—are those which

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have won their way to dominance through much competition and many inward struggles.

If then, alike in the development of horticultural and of ethical ideals, and in the evolution of organic species, there is variation, there is overproduction, there is struggle for existence, there is survival; wherein lies the justification for regarding the ethical process as different in principle, and antagonistic in result, to the cosmic process which prevails outside the garden wall? Different in principle, I take it, because the surviving ideal gets its value and sanction in relation to a conscious end or purpose within which it is a contributory factor. Different in principle, in short, because, where there is intelligent choice, certain conditions, which we name mental, are present, whereas these conditions are absent in organic evolution as such, just as certain other conditions which are present in organic evolution, are absent in the inorganic world. And antagonistic in result, because as matter of fact and common observation the garden products can only hold their own under the protective influence of intelligent care. If vigilant supervision be not constantly exercised,—if seeds from the flourishing representatives of the surrounding state of nature be not excluded, or if the products of those which do find entrance be not speedily destroyed,—weeds will spring up and choke the more delicate flowers imported and planted with so much care; weeds all the ranker in growth from the richness of the soil which has been artificially prepared. Sooner or later our garden will revert to a state of nature, differing indeed from that outside the broken wall, since the effects of new conditions once introduced can never be entirely effaced.

I have suggested that the purchaser of the garden plot has already, before he enters into possession, framed horticultural ideals. But so far, it is a garden *in posse*, not yet a garden *in esse*. It is the garden he would like to make and to have for his own; but all that he has as yet secured is the opportunity of carrying his plans into

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execution. This is a step towards the realization of his ideals. But he is unusually fortunate if he does not meet with many hampering conditions. The space at his command, which is all that circumstances permitted him to acquire, is a good deal less than that of his ideal garden. The soil is poor and refractory and he cannot afford to spend much money upon it. The contour of the ground does not well suit his purpose. The prevalent slopes give a northerly exposure. Climatic conditions leave much to be desired. He can only mould nature to his will within certain limits. If he be a practical man and not only a dreamer of garden day-dreams, he will carefully ascertain these limits and adapt the scheme which he proposes to put into execution to the actual circumstances presented in the concrete case. There is thus not only a selection of the contributory factors which shall be incorporated in the ideal construction of his thought, not only a selection of this ideal garden from among other such because it is the fittest to survive in the total environment of his mind and character; there is a further selection when it comes to the practical issue of putting his plans into execution,—a selection of the ideal garden which under the given circumstances can be embodied in concrete form on the plot of ground he has acquired. Here and now it is impossible to lay out and stock the garden of his fancy. He has to modify and refashion his ideal construction in accordance with conditions which he is incapable of altering,—the actual garden he can show to his neighbors and friends in the embodiment of the ideal that has survived those stern conditions which, in this and in all cases, nature imposes.

Let us now consider briefly another and somewhat different case. We have supposed that our horticultural friend is to be owner of his garden plot. He has, therefore, a perfectly free hand to do what he will with his own as best he may under the circumstances. But take the case of a corporate body that has acquired a considerable area of land which is to be converted into

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a public garden. A committee of management has been selected and appointed, presumably (if the presumption be not extravagant) because they have some knowledge of such matters and some ideas concerning the manner in which a public garden should be planned and planted. Our horticultural friend is a member of the committee. He is filled with new hopes. Now with a larger area, with better soil, under conditions much more favorable, and backed by funds from a corporate purse, he sees before him a better opportunity of realizing some of his cherished ideals, one more rich in promise of fulfillment. But he is only one member of the committee. Other members have quite different notions as to what ought to be done. A preliminary meeting discloses the fact that there is nothing approaching to a consensus of opinion as to what form the garden should take and what the chief aim of the committee should be. Indeed the most noteworthy outcome of the preliminary discussion is the record, in the minutes, of a great number of suggestions very diverse in character. Then follows, in subsequent meetings, a struggle for supremacy among many varying ideals with the ultimate prevalence of the fittest. We must be careful to note, however, in this connection, the exact connotation of 'the fittest.' It is the fittest to prevail, or in brief that which does prevail, under the conditions of the committee's deliberations, including much persuasive advocacy, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, some stubborn refusal to yield to such advocacy. Not improbably the garden plan which is finally accepted, perhaps by a majority vote, is not that which any single member regards as ideally the best among the practicable schemes. It is, in greater or less measure, a compromise; and in saying that it is a compromise one means that it is that outcome of mutual concession which the majority of the committee consents to accept. And so the public garden is laid out and planted. It is the embodiment of the committee's ideal. It is the ideal which has survived in the struggle for existence of ideals in the minds of

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individual men; it is the ideal which has survived as a practicable scheme under the conditions imposed by nature; it is the ideal which has survived in the give and take of social discussion; it is an ideal, the embodiment of which in the public garden can only be maintained by a staff of gardeners who, under skilled direction, keep wild nature at bay.

Such a garden, embodying ideals framed and surviving under somewhat analogous conditions, is the garden of ethics. All of us who have at heart the furtherance of moral education are members of such a committee. Each of us has an ideal of how the garden should be laid out and developed. For each of us some moral flowers or fruits appear more worthy of cultivation than others. We have all to realize that what we would do must inevitably be limited to what we can do under circumstances which are in some measure beyond our control. Any scheme of moral instruction which we propose must be in some degree a compromise which is accepted in order to secure joint and corporate action. But in our case the whole matter is complicated by the fact that, in the garden of ethics, the plants and shrubs have, or gradually acquire, their own ideals of what the garden should be and of their relations to each other. They are not merely more or less plastic material in the hands of the committee and the gardeners; they are, or may become, consenting parties to the development of the ethical scheme.

If we regard the flowering plants, the fruit trees, the 'vegetables,' and the ornamental shrubs, as embodiments of horticultural ideals, as products of artifice in contradistinction to products of nature, as the fittest to survive in relation to our conceptions of beauty and utility, though they would be swiftly eliminated in the environment of a state of nature,—if in brief we regard them as due to intelligent choice and preserved only by keeping nature at bay; we must none the less remember that from nature they are sprung and that thence come all the characters which the horticulturalist has selected with

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so much skill and patience. So too in the garden of ethics. That garden may contain moral products which nowhere outside the garden wall acquire the forms and proportions which evoke our approbation, but it contains no products whose origins may not be traced to the common ground of human nature. Moral ideals are no doubt highly differentiated products of psychological process, but within that process they have their natural genesis, no matter what the methods and conditions of their selection and survival may have been. They are products of evolution even though they come into conflict with other products of the cosmic process.

I suppose that in following up the parable we may look upon developing men and women as the analogues of cultivated plants, and their moral ideals and activities as corresponding to the flowers and fruit the gardener seeks to bring to fuller perfection. What we wish to develop is moral quality as ingrained in the character of the race. But is it open to us here, in the garden of ethics, where human beings are the plants, to adopt the methods of the horticulturalist or the like methods of the cattle breeder? Can we deliberately select for survival those human plants which produce the most beautiful moral flowers or ethical fruit of the highest social value, and of set purpose fling on the dunghill the worser variants which fail to meet with our approbation? Can we steadily and persistently, generation after generation, breed from the better moral stock and exclude from our garden the inferior seedlings? Obviously, with our existing ethical ideals, what we can do on such lines as these is a negligible quantity. It is not practically open to us to improve the moral stock in this way. Our task is thus rendered much more difficult than that of the horticulturalist or the cattle breeder. But we must take it as we find it. Of course it is possible that the moral character, raised to a higher level by education and training in one generation, may be transmitted through heredity to the next generation. I doubt it; but into the vexed

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question of the inheritance of acquired characters I cannot enter at length. Huxley himself said:

> There can be no doubt that vast changes have taken place in English civilization since the reign of the Tudors. But I am not aware of a particle of evidence in favor of the conclusion that this evolutionary process has been accompanied by any modification of the physical, or the mental characters of the men who have been the subjects of it. I have not met with any grounds for suspecting that the average Englishmen of to-day are sensibly different from those that Shakspere knew and drew. We look into his magic mirror of the Elizabethan age, and behold, nowise darkly, the presentment of ourselves.[16]

One may perhaps go a step further and say that the average English baby over whom the mother croons to-day is morally and intellectually no better endowed in hereditary character than the infant who lay in his mother's lap in early Plantagenet times.

In each case the child may be regarded as a bundle of inherited potentialities. But we must remember that potentialities can only be realized as actualities under appropriate conditions. The aim of moral training and education is to afford the best opportunities for the development of the child-plants for whom we hold ourselves socially responsible,—to provide an environment under whose stimulating influence every worthy potentiality shall blossom into the realized flowers of the ethical life, while the immoral and unsocial tendencies, which all of us inherit, shall remain in abeyance. As Buckle long ago urged, social evolution is a progressive development of opportunity. Opportunity is part of the atmosphere of social life. Moral respiration depends on two factors: the ethical lung-power which is, in a sense, inherited: and the air which is the breath of moral life. Both factors have to be brought into relation. Even if the conditions for the improvement of the hereditary lung-power be beyond our control, we may none the less afford the conditions for higher ethical vitality by controlling the moral atmosphere. To contribute to this higher ethical vitality

[16] "Collected Essays," Vol. IX, pp. 37, 38.

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(for which there surely should be greater opportunity to-day than there was in the times of Tudor or Plantagenet), is the central aim of the Moral Education League. That is part of its work in the garden of ethics. But do we always bear in mind how important, nay essential, it is that we should clearly understand the nature of the organism for whom we seek to enrich the environing atmosphere?

I spoke of the child as a bundle of inherited potentialities. Let us endeavor to give to this rather vague phrase a little fuller and somewhat less indefinite expression. In the first place, the child inherits tendencies to respond or behave in certain given ways under certain given circumstances, and thus to gain experience, first, of these circumstances as presented in some specific situation, secondly, of its own behavior in this situation, and, thirdly, of sundry emotional accompaniments. In the second place, the child inherits a capacity of profiting by experience and of modifying his behavior in accordance with what he has learnt and is daily learning concerning the nature and meaning of the world around him and the actions of his neighbors. Now both of these depend upon innate tendencies; but the behavior which logically falls under the former category is relatively independent of any previous experience, while that which logically falls under the latter category is partly dependent on previous experience. On the one hand, there is the unlearnt behavior which comes by nature; on the other hand, there is the acquired modification of behavior which comes through training and education. There are unquestionably innate tendencies to do certain things in special ways in given situations and thus to gain particular kinds of experience with their pleasurable or unpleasant accompaniments in feeling; but there are also unquestionably innate tendencies which guide and partly determine the direction taken during the process of learning. The outcome of nurture is itself in large measure dependent on nature. None the less the distinction be-

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tween nature and nurture as coöperating factors in the mental and active life of the child is valid and helpful.

A further distinction may profitably be drawn. It is one that is familiar to psychologists, but one which the ethical teacher too often fails to realize, although it is for him of much importance. Not only does the child inherit the capacity of profiting by experience in a naïve and simple animal fashion, he also inherits the ability to reflect upon both the processes and the products of his experience, to frame ideal constructions in terms of which they may be interpreted, to shape his behavior and guide his actions not only in accordance with the direct experience of the moment, tinged with pleasure or pain, but in relation to the wider significance of his conduct, enriched with a higher order of satisfaction or of regret. It is here, in this more highly developed region of mental life and activity, where behavior rises to rational conduct, where naïve experience is supplemented by knowledge, where emotion is in close alliance with sentiment,—it is here that ethical ideals come into being, it is here that moral education becomes possible.

Now, paradoxical as it may sound, it is just because here only does moral education become possible that the ethical teacher is apt to be inadequately prepared for his task, at any rate in so far as he confines his attention to the products and processes of this stage of mental development. He starts on his study of child-nature (and such measure of psychology as this may involve) at too high a level,—at the level of the rational and moral being. He takes, we may assume, abundant pains to grasp the nature of ethical problems, and the methods of their interpretation, more especially in their intellectual aspect; and, with the help, let us say, of Messrs. Welton and Blandford's "Moral Training Through School Discipline," he makes an honest and not altogether unsuccessful attempt to apply the results of his study in the training of the young. But of the underlying foundations of the organic and mental life at lower levels of development he is,—

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I will not say wholly ignorant, but I think I may say, almost entirely dependent on popular tradition, vaguely formulated and uncritically accepted. This is not by any means altogether his fault. The books to which he turns for guidance, themselves start at the moral and intellectual level and have little to say concerning sub-moral development. Even the psychologists too often fail to give him the kind of treatment which is suited to his special needs. For, in the terms of our parable, those who would do effective work in the garden of ethics should learn not to confine their attention only to the moral blossom and fruit which are the final outcome of a long and continuous process, but should have a sound and sufficient knowledge of the organic structure and mode of development of the whole plant. Their chief difficulty is to know where to obtain reliable information afforded in terms not too technical, and presented in such a form as may stimulate interest and lead them to feel that they are getting real help in view of their own work.

To this end I would direct their attention to Mr. W. McDougall's "Introduction to Social Psychology." I have the misfortune to differ from Mr. McDougall in his doctrine of instinct,—but this is a subsidiary matter. His book is, in my opinion, one of quite exceptional interest and value. Instead of taking at the outset the high-level route and regarding our noble selves as through and through rational, save for occasional lapses, he contends:

> Mankind is only a little bit reasonable and to a great extent very unintelligently moved in quite unreasonable ways. . . . The truth is that men are moved by a variety of impulses whose nature has been determined through long ages of the evolutionary process without reference to the life of men in civilized societies; and the psychological problem we have to solve is, How can we account for the fact that men so moved ever come to act as they ought, or morally and reasonably?[11]

The first thing we have to do is to dig down to the roots of human behavior that we may understand the nature of the primary innate tendencies. There are es-

[11] "Social Psychology," pp. 10, 11.

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sentially tendencies to behave in certain ways in certain circumstances and, as Mr. McDougall urges, to experience at the same time certain emotional accompaniments. Here we have the genesis of experience in its three-fold aspect—cognition, affective tone, and activity. Here we have the primal source of all organic and mental energy. From these innate tendencies,—using this phrase in the broadest sense and quite irrespective of the period of life at which they are manifested,—the whole of our mental life and conduct is elaborated by a process of continuous differentiation. I do not propose to follow Mr. McDougall in his suggestive treatment and in his difficult task of analysis, in the course of which he throws much light on the sub-moral and sub-rational foundations of moral conduct. No doubt, some will say that they did not need to be told that the child has innate tendencies,—tendencies, for example, both to imitation and its opposite, contra-imitation; tendencies to be domineering and self-assertive in one life situation, and subservient and submissive in another, to exhibit the germs of tender emotion, on the one hand, and of anger or resentment, on the other. But I conceive that they do need to learn how these and other traits of human nature have their origin, how they are related within an evolutional and developmental scheme, how they form a woven web of relatively unreasoned behavior, and how they are progressively touched to the finer moral issues.

If once we realize how large a proportion of human behavior, and *a fortiori* of child behavior, is of the relatively unreasoned order, we shall appreciate the importance of moral training as the natural and essential preparation for moral education. By moral training,—in which phrase I use the adjective in a proleptic sense,—I mean the establishment of right social habits and thus the development of what Messrs. Welton and Blandford term general habitudes,—as part and parcel of the custom and tradition of civilized human folk. A very large proportion of our own behavior, and a still larger pro-

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portion of that of children, is carried out just because, in our customary surroundings, non-rational, or what is technically termed perceptual experience has taught us that the results are satisfactory and pleasant. We come to act in this way or that simply because we feel like doing so, just as we eat our breakfast because, with eggs and bacon in front of us and a knife and fork at hand, we feel like satisfying a healthy appetite. Of course, if some one asks why we eat, we may indicate the significance of our act in relation to nutritive processes; or may even rise to a more exalted rational level and explain that physiology has taught us to realize that a due balance must be maintained between katabolism and anabolism, and that only by the absorption of nutriment in due amount, can the waste of the tissues be repaired. Now the rational justification and the physiological sanctions of breakfasting, important as no doubt they are, may I think be regarded as supplementary to the much less reasonable, but not less serviceable, mental attitude when one eats for no better reason than that one has an inclination to do so. I am well aware that eating is a natural process founded on a very obvious innate tendency, whereas social behavior, as the outcome of moral training, involves much modification and elaboration of diverse natural propensities. But take that pretty complex product of school life which we speak of as 'playing the game.' Does not the boy learn to play the game, and to feel like playing the game, in large measure,—I do not say entirely, but in large measure,—under the moulding influence of the custom and tradition embodied in his school environment? And if he be asked why he plays the game, is not any explanation he can give rather a supplementary afterthought, than the really guiding and driving impulse under the sway of which he does actually play the game? Now playing the game is surely one of the choicest flowers in the garden of ethics. I am not sure that, broadly considered, playing the game may not be regarded as the very quintessence of morality. And

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yet I venture to suggest that if he has not in the first instance been drilled through custom and tradition; if he has not been wisely licked into shape so as to feel like behaving with some show of decent respectability; if he has to await the development of strictly ethical motives before he even begins to play the game, his chances of eventually playing truly and well on the ethical plane of conduct are most seriously reduced.

I have taken playing the game as an example of social behavior. I have suggested the paramount importance of moral training which implies the enforcement of our ideals of conduct on agents who are allowed but little freedom of choice. But it is not my intention to imply that the boy as he passes up through the school does not rise to the ethical plane, the plane of moral liberty. On the contrary, it is just here that perhaps the most real and vital part of his moral education has its origin,—here in the every-day life of the school and of course also there in the every-day life of the home. For purposes of illustration I select the school; but the emphasis is on the fact that *in normal boy life* the most real and vital part of his moral education has its origin. By moral education, as contrasted with moral training, I mean the development of insight into and knowledge of the significance of conduct in relation to an ethical scheme; the linking of scattered impulses so as to form motives of real driving power; the organization of endeavor in accordance with more or less clearly grasped purpose; the emergence of that unified whole which may be properly called character; with liberty to choose for better or worse. Granted that at first and for some time, the boy plays the game just because the game is going on around him and he is a member of the society in which and by which it is being played, just because he so readily yields to suggestion, is imitative to the core, is an emotional chameleon taking his hue in relation to his social environment, is profoundly influenced by the prestige of older boys, and this in a relatively reflex and unreflective fashion, with

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relatively little free choice,—granted all this; we have here only one phase of development. There comes a time, sooner or later, when the boy frames ideals,—an ideal of the game as it ought to be played, an ideal of the part he himself has to play in it, an ideal of the parts others have to play with effective coördination and subordination; and he proceeds, within the limits of his freedom, to put these ideals into practice. The form the ideals take is largely determined by the way in which the game is, as a matter of fact, being played, probably under the influence of some masterful boys. He doesn't talk much about it; the word 'ideal' is not a familiar one in his practical work-a-day vocabulary; but he has pretty clear notions of the difference between 'good form' and 'bad form,' and he takes a quite definite part in the moral training of his juniors. He is not very lavish of praise, for he expects and demands conformity to a high standard of play; but such praise as he does occasionally vouchsafe, backed by his vast prestige, is worth much and quickens endeavor. Of blame, supplemented on occasion by a cuff on the head, he has a fairly rich and varied store. Since he is in a measure responsible for the good form of the school, he takes care to make it exceedingly unpleasant for those who don't or won't play up. The rules of the game—the whole game of school life—are perhaps not quite those which admit of universal application in the drawing-room or the counting-house,—for school morality has a complexion of its own. But the ethical system out of which they arise, has living force and is in close touch with the realities of a definite phase of social development.

I have assumed that the tone of the school is reasonably good, and that the ideals on the whole set in the right direction. That this assumption is unduly optimistic is unfortunately in some cases only too true. The schoolmaster is often well aware of the fact that the game is not being played well and that the standard of good form is lamentably deficient. Waves of moral obliquity of more

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or less pronounced type sometimes pass over a school. Occasionally it seems almost impossible to raise a low standard of behavior and conduct. The weeds of the garden of ethics grow so rankly that the flowers have little chance of development. These are stern facts to be faced. I take it that in some cases the school ought to be closed; in others that weak and ineffective masters, lacking in wise prestige and in suggestive influence, should be replaced by others better fitted to work in the garden of ethics. It is questionable whether the most admirable and well-conceived moral instruction is in such cases of much avail. If the game of what is to the boy real and practical life,—life as it is lived and not as it is talked about,—is being badly played, the only chance of improvement is for a wise, strong, sympathetic man to gain the ear and the admiration of the elder boys and gradually to induce them to play a better game. But there must be some coöperative playing the game with them. It is no use merely to lecture them on playing the game. In many cases, strong, manly, clean-cut junior masters, not too far removed from the level of the senior boys, are of great service in restoring good tone to a school. But theirs are not the methods commonly understood to be those of so-called moral instruction.

The difficulty with regard to moral instruction, as preparatory to playing the more complex game on the wider stage of adult life, is that in so far as the conduct dealt with, and the ideals illustrated, are beyond the practical experience of the hearers, the instruction is apt merely to afford additional material through which the intellectual faculties may be exercised. It is, however, generally recognized that an extensive and accurate knowledge about moral situations and ethical ideals may be,—nay, is in itself,—of little avail for the development of right conduct. Where behavior is concerned, the only way to learn is by behaving; and one cannot even begin to behave in an intelligent manner until one feels like acting in that manner. There must be present either the rel-

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atively simple and isolated impulses determined by the pleasures or pains in direct connection with the concrete situation and the immediate circumstances, or the more complex and highly organized motives arising within a rational system of which the self, as acting, is the center. In the latter case, the conduct is directed to an end which is not only significant for thought, but, what is far more important, an object of desire. Mere instruction of itself can neither teach us how to act nor supply the motive for action. The ablest course of lectures on billiard-playing is of no avail without concurrent practice; and the wisest instruction in the conduct of life can only be regarded as supplementary to constant practice in this yet more difficult game. There is, however, this obvious distinction. We may elect to play or not to play billiards, and if we don't want to play, we may safely cut the lectures. But we must all, young and old alike, take part in the game of social life. Yes, this is true enough; we have to play the game of life; still the really important question, I take it, is whether we want to play it well. That is fundamental. Unless there is a real desire to play the game at its highest possible level of attainment, the best moral instruction in the world will not lead to much, if any, improvement in the art of conduct.

Fortunately the young are born play actors. They are keenly susceptible to any vivid and dramatic presentation. There are three forms of mental interaction of fundamental importance for all social life: Suggestion, sympathy, and imitation.[12] These are closely and in-

[12] With regard to the relation of suggestion, sympathy, and imitation, Mr. McDougall says (p. 91): "These processes of mental interaction, of impression and reception, may involve chiefly the cognitive aspect of mental process, or its affective or its conative aspect. In the first case, when some presentation, idea, or belief of the agent directly induces a similar presentation, idea, or belief in the patient, the process is called one of suggestion; when an affective or emotional excitement of the agent induces similar affective excitement in the patient, the process is one of sympathy or sympathetic induction of emotion or feeling; when the most prominent result of the process of interaction is the assimilation of the bodily movements of the patient to those of the agent, we speak of imitation."

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timately related and have their roots deep down in the sub-moral and sub-rational foundations of the higher mental life. In their earlier manifestations they are non-rational. Indeed, Mr. McDougall[13] defines suggestion as a process of communication, resulting in the acceptance with conviction of that which is presented *in the absence of logically adequate grounds for its acceptance.* I take it that moral instruction must be in large measure suggestive in this sense. Now the dramatic situations presented in the course of moral instruction must of necessity often go beyond the actual experience of boys and girls. The game of life is portrayed on a larger scale and under more complex conditions than those of child life. But though the child has not yet had occasion to play the game of life on this scale, he has the inborn tendency *to play at playing the game.* Professor Groos has taught us that the evolutionary value of animal play lies in the fact that it affords ample opportunity for practising those modes of behavior on which success or failure in after life will depend. Should not the moral instruction lesson have an analogous value for the development of the child? Imaginative as he is, profoundly susceptible to the prestige of characters larger than his own, at a stage when the rapid and active growth of self-consciousness, in alliance with his innate actor-tendency, leads him to identify himself with the characters in the life drama presented, to share, and more than share, their elation in success, and their mortification in failure,—he plays, within the theater of his imagination, at playing the game and thus gains real and valid and ultimately serviceable experience. And the contra-phases of suggestion, sympathy, and imitation bear their part. As he identifies himself with the admired hero, clothed with the radiant glory of prestige, so does he turn in aversion, disdain, and disgust from the mean and underhand villain of the play, whose sardonic smile and gleaming white

[13] "Social Psychology," p. 97.

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teeth are in themselves sufficient to induce him to purse his lips tightly and forego the use of a toothbrush.

But such suggestion and contra-suggestion, though they lead to the adoption of certain mental attitudes, strongly tinged with emotion and sentiment, do so at first, as Mr. McDougall says, in the absence of any logically adequate grounds for their adoption; or at any rate, in large measure, independently of any rational or strictly moral justification. How far, in what manner, and at what stage of moral instruction, are we to deal with the ethical problem of the sanctions? These are difficult questions. Depend upon it, sooner or later,—I am inclined to think sooner than some of us are prepared to admit,—in some form or other, the question will arise: "Why *should* I play the game? Why should I not sneak an advantage when there is no risk of being found out?" What answer are we to give? The religious answer is somewhat out of vogue in these latter days. Are we prepared with another,—one that is within the comprehension of the child,—one which has the motive power which the older conceptions, in my opinion, undoubtedly possess for many, probably the majority of boys and girls? I shall probably be told by some extremists that the child is unable to grasp the idea of a God who approves the right and disapproves the wrong, who loves to see the game well and honestly played and hates all sneaking and underhand ways. But, merely as a matter of social and comparative psychology, I cannot accept this view. At the child's stage of mental development, the only kind of interpretation and explanation which carries conviction is that which is given in terms of human or quasi-human agency; the only sanction he can understand is that of human or quasi-human approval. What is completely beyond his reach is the scientific conception of universal law and ubiquitous causation. Many of his seniors find it exceedingly difficult to grasp the point of view of the man of science, who accepts determinism as a given fact and professes agnosticism when the question is asked how

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this given fact can be explained. I am not discussing the truth or validity of the religious thesis. I only express my conviction that conceptions of the order of those which are current among Christian folk, are not beyond the grasp of boys and girls, and that they are strongly influential on conduct. And I do, speaking merely as psychologist, ask the question, whether any substitute for this conception has yet been suggested,—any other conception which has, for those at this stage of development, a like functional value.

Mr. McDougall, in the book I have already more than once quoted, has an interesting chapter on *The Instinctive Bases of Religion*.[14] He is of opinion that, in the more primitive human communities,

> the conceptions of supernatural powers, the products of man's creative imagination working through, and under the driving power of, the instincts of fear, curiosity, and subjection became the great generators and supporters of custom. . . . The two things, religion and morality, were not at first separate and later fused together; but they were always intimately related, and have reciprocally acted and reacted upon one another throughout the course of their evolution. . . . No society has been able to survive in any severe and prolonged conflict of societies, without some effective system of such sanctions . . . while all societies that have made any considerable progress in civilization have been able to do so only in virtue of the stability they derived from their system of supernatural sanctions. . . . At the present time, the spirit of inquiry has broken all its bonds and soared gloriously, until now the conception of natural causation predominates in every field. . . . The change of belief [thus brought about], the withdrawal of supernatural power from immediate intervention in the life of mankind, inevitably and greatly diminishes the social efficacy of the supernatural sanctions. Whether our societies will prove capable of long surviving this process is the most momentous of the problems confronting western civilization.

Mr. McDougall treats the matter, as I have been treating it, solely from the point of view of social psychology and social evolution. His conclusions are at least worthy of careful consideration. In a more recent work, "Rationalisme et Tradition," M. Jean Delvolvé discusses, with admirable lucidity, the efficacy of non-religious moral in-

[14] "Social Psychology," pp. 302-321.

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struction as contrasted with that founded on traditional beliefs. Weighed in the balance he finds it, as developed in France, lacking in motive power, lacking in psychological efficacy, lacking in unity and centralization,—too theoretical, too analytic, too intellectualistic.[15] But though M. Delvolvé is persuaded that the traditional doctrines satisfy psychological conditions, there is one essential condition which in his judgment they do not satisfy,—a conviction of their abiding truth and reality. Scientific progress has not only destroyed belief in this or that theological dogma, it has produced a state of mind for which the basal conception of these traditional doctrines possesses only hypothetical and symbolic validity. This fact irremediably diminishes their practical efficacy.[16] The basal conception must, therefore, be remodeled so as to furnish the center of a scheme of organization which shall replace that of the older tradition. As the outcome of this naturalistic metamorphosis we have (1) a conviction of the unity of nature, (2) the identification of individual aims with the universal end and purpose, and (3) faith in ultimate realization. Such a transformation appears to M. Delvolvé not only to accord with the normal conditions of all experience, but to furnish a practical equivalent of Christian faith.[17]

One is here reminded of Huxley's transformation of the doctrine of Providence. He says:

> If the doctrine of a Providence is to be taken as the expression, in a way 'to be understanded of the people,' of the total exclusion of chance from a place even in the most insignificant corner of Nature, if it means the strong conviction that the cosmic process is rational, and the faith that, throughout all duration, unbroken order has reigned in the universe, I not only accept it, but I am disposed to think it the most important of all truths. . . . If this doctrine be held to imply the existence of an underlying Cause, possessed of intelligence and foresight, similar to our own in kind, however superior in degree . . . scientific thought, so far as I know anything about it, has nothing to say against this hypothesis, . . . but the evidence accessible to us is, to my mind, wholly insufficient to warrant either a positive or a negative conclusion.[18]

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[15] "Rationalisme et Tradition," p. 40. [16] *Op. cit.*, pp. 118, 119.
[17] *Op. cit.*, pp. 136, 137. [18] "Life and Letters," p. 302.

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Such were Huxley's views with regard to a naturalized conception of the universal 'providence' with which M. Delvolvé's naturalized conception of 'the divine' appears pretty closely to accord. But Huxley further says:

> So far as mankind has acquired the conviction that the observance of certain rules of conduct is essential to the maintenance of social existence, it may be proper to say that 'Providence,' operating through men, has generated morality. Within the limits of a fraction of a fraction of the living world, therefore, there is a 'moral' providence. . . . But outside the very rudimentary germ of a garden of Eden, thus watered, I am unable to discover any 'moral' purpose, or anything but a stream of purpose toward the consummation of the cosmic process, chiefly by means of the struggle for existence, which is no more righteous or unrighteous than the operation of any other mechanism.

Now granted that Huxley's remodeled conception of moral providence commends itself to a committee charged with the duty of supervising the garden of ethics; I conceive that some of them would feel that they were confronted by a grave practical difficulty. Some of them, I conceive, must doubt whether this conception can be 'understanded of the people,' or 'understanded of children'; whether, so far as understood, it affords an adequate motive for playing the game; whether it provides, for the majority of mankind, an effective substitute for the traditional sanctions of morality. In dealing with children, and a great number of adults, these members of the committee may feel that they are on the horns of a dilemma; the sanctions which are efficacious are not true; and the sanctions which are true are not efficacious.

I am well aware that many people will say that this practical dilemma is wholly fictitious. Let us assume that this is the case. Let us endeavor to remodel, if remodel we must, on the best possible lines. It was Huxley's deliberate opinion that the cosmic order, though it may be through and through rational, is nowise moral,—it is frankly unmoral. He himself spoke of his Romanes Lecture as "a very orthodox discourse on the text 'Satan, the Prince of this World.'"[19] It is true that this po-

[19] "Life and Letters," p. 303.

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tentate is commonly regarded as blackly immoral; but after all there is perhaps something to be said for the view that he typifies the underlying principle of the merely unmoral cosmic order, and that only when he steals into the garden of ethics and lurks in the deeper shadows, does he seem so sombre of hue. In any case, according to Huxley, rational as it is, the cosmic order has to be combated. Only within the garden of ethics are the rational and the moral combined in one higher synthesis. Here and here only, not in the world at large beyond its walls, is to be sought and found a tendency which sets towards righteousness.

A final application of our parable is thus suggested. M. Delvolvé, as I understand him, contends that, at the foundation of lay instruction, there should be a conception and sentiment of the divine; but for him the divine is synonymous with the cosmic order. If however there is any truth in the conception of the garden of ethics which, as a pupil and disciple of Huxley's, I have tried to set forth, the divine, in M. Delvolvé's sense of this word only attains to ethical self-consciousness within the moral order. For agnostic ethics, therefore, under a naturalistic transformation, stress should be laid on the distinctively human relationships which obtain in the garden of ethics. Under such a transformation the basal conception would be: (1) A conviction of the dignity of man as a moral being; (2) the identification of individual aims with the moral (and not the cosmic) end and purpose; and (3) faith in realization,—a realization which, in so far as it is a fulfillment of the moral order, is also a triumph over the merely cosmic order as represented in man's animal nature. There is, I conceive, nothing here to which Christian ethics could reasonably take exception, though the Christian moralists would, no doubt, regard the formula as lamentably inadequate and incomplete, since it lacks the only valid basis and the only effective sanction of the categorical imperative. From the radically empirical point of view, the fact that moral ideals

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do take form in the human mind as the outcome of evolutionary process is just a fact of which no ultimate explanation can be given. From this point of view, it must suffice to recognize the existence of the ethical process as a differentiated product which crystalizes within the evolutional magna, to trace, so far as we can, the conditions of its genesis, and to take part in its further development. And if some of us, from a different point of view, feel impelled to postulate a Cause in terms of which both the evolutionary process and the moral order may in some measure be explained, we may at least take comfort in Huxley's assurance that scientific thought has nothing to say against this hypothesis.

I am well aware that there are many who will reject Huxley's thesis on the ground of its implied dualism. The tendencies of modern science and of modern philosophy set towards monism. As Professor Riehl has said,[20] "The spirit which feels itself one with the ground of all being is the poet of monism." But, surely, in one sense of the term, Huxley was a consistent monist. He was a monist in his abiding conviction of the abiding rationality of one cosmic process. Of this monistic conception he retained a firm hold, staunch and true to the end. Within this cosmic order as a whole, he believed the morality of man to be a differentiated product. But there is another monistic interpretation to which Huxley felt constrained to assume an attitude of antagonism,—that according to which the moral order, as such, is coextensive with the universe; that to which Dr. Riehl applies the phrase Platonism in Philosophy in the following sentences:

> The improper application of an ethical or an æsthetic idea to the explanation of natural processes, when such an idea can only serve for the judgment and direction of human actions, is the source and the meaning of all Platonism in philosophy, by which I mean the effort to reach an ethical view of life, and an explanation of things, on the basis of one and the same principle. Plato transformed the Good, *i. e.*, the truly and enduringly useful, as Socrates defined it, into a transcendent being, and

[20] "Science and Metaphysics," p. 96.

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made it the cause not only of knowledge, but of the very existence of nature itself. This conception, which has its origin in human society, loses every definite meaning when separated from its relation to society. The Good is not a ground of explanation, it is only a standard of judgment, and this not for external nature, but simply and only for the character and actions of men. The introduction of practical concepts, especially the concept of purpose, into external nature, makes the knowledge of this difficult if not impossible. Nature, or as metaphysicians say, the ground of nature, cannot be thought as equipped with moral qualities, except when uncritical anthropomorphism is given loose rein (pp. 19, 20).

This passage I think pretty exactly defines Huxley's position. Whether it expresses the last word of philosophy on this difficult problem is another question.

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ENERGISM IN THE ORIENT.*

PAUL S. REINSCH.

THE ethical conceptions of oriental peoples are as manifold as their conditions of life; and yet, in the common thought of the western world, the ethical temper of the East is quite different from that of our civilization. When ethical standards are discussed between different nations, it is difficult to avoid misunderstanding because each nation or race, having its own social conventions, which to it have become second nature, sees in the conventions of other peoples compromises with truth, if not a complete departure therefrom. Thus when the East and the West mutually compare their moral beliefs and modes of action, there is apt to be present a lack of sympathetic insight. Yet the ethical thought of India, traced to its simple Aryan sources, inculcates the same cardinal virtues which are contained also in our western codes. Purity, benevolence, and truthfulness are as important there as in our morality. Quite contrary to the common belief in the West, the appreciation of veracity is just as constantly and urgently held up as a fundamental virtue

* From a forthcoming book on "Intellectual Currents in the Far East."

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as in our own ethical literature. Nor are the knightly virtues of courage and firmness neglected in these earlier Indian models of conduct.

But as Indian civilization developed in complexity through modifications introduced by conquest and through the growth of the caste system, moral doctrine lost its primitive simplicity. It was divided into parts, many secondary elements were added, and there was a new distribution of emphasis. In the final result the doctrine of renunciation overshadows everything else. Indian ethical sentiment of later ages favors the abdication of life, inaction, and the uncomplaining acceptance of the evils of existence. It is a creed of inactivity, contemplation, quietism, and self-suppression. The repeated conquests of India, the overpowering forces of nature, the absence of national self-consciousness, have all helped to emphasize these characteristics. They are present, not only in Hinduism, but in other forms of beliefs, like Buddhism and Jainism, that have originated in India. But our own generation is witnessing in India a great stirring of social life, the awakening of new national forces. The ancient texts are read from a new point of view and in a different temper, and it is discovered that the morality of non-action and submission is only one part of a complex system, that there are other more active and more manly virtues inculcated as well. It is these latter that now receive the emphasis. The achievements of nationalism in Japan are having their effect; and though Japan may lately have alienated sympathy through her forward policy in Manchuria, the energy revealed in her national life remains a model to the rest of Asia.

The searchings of the national spirit in Indian tradition have promptly brought out the fact that Hindu morality, side by side with *mukti,* or renunciation, contains the ideal of action in *dharma.* While the former has for centuries been emphasized through the repression which history has imposed on India, the more vigorous forces of life have not been extinguished and will now seek new ex-

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pression with the help of the principle of *dharma* which is native to Indian thought. This does not mean that the national ideal of renunciation as the highest quality and virtue is to be abandoned. On the contrary, the low valuation of the material universe and the proud belief in the conquering force of spirituality which it contains will remain the essential part of the Indian conception of human destiny and action. But it is also recognized that this idea of renunciation has been falsely understood and grievously misinterpreted in the past; that it has been a cloak for laziness and torpidity under which it has been attempted to make the most pitiful weakness appear as strength. To the present Indian mind, renunciation in its true sense appeals only as a higher form of *dharma.* Before one may reject, one ought to understand; before renouncing, one ought to have experienced; before yielding to the greater, one ought to have mastered the lesser. Thus renunciation, to be more than weakness and self-deception, presupposes a mastery of the world of fact and action, and it requires the power to rise superior to ordinary struggles and ambitions. Through mental energy and understanding of the world only can such mastery be acquired. Renunciation must be strength, not weakness. In the words of Vivekananda, *mukti* is far superior to *dharma,* but *dharma* must be finished first of all. This eloquent writer and preacher, whose thought is one of the most important influences in the awakening of Indian life, has expressed this transition in ethical temper with great effectiveness. In his view, that society is the greatest where the highest truths become practical or embodied in action. Like the Chinese Wang Yang Ming, he was, therefore, a pragmatist before William James. He strives for power and energy; and prays: "Thou Mother of Strength, take away my unmanliness and make me man."

Of all the religious books in India, that which is at present most frequently appealed to and most diligently studied, the "Bhagavadgita," is eloquent in inculcating

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the morality of action together with the ideal of renunciation. The "Gita" says, "Be more manly; destroy your enemies and enjoy the world. It is for heroes only to enjoy the world. Rise and obtain name and fame by conquering your enemies." As has often been pointed out by Orientals, the Christian nations in active life, far from following the injunctions of their Master as to forbearance and gentleness, seem to be guided rather by the principles of the "Gita." Whereas the Hindus on their part had for a while forgotten these stirring injunctions and had lost themselves entirely in a weak interpretation of the doctrine of *mukti,* without remembering that renunciation cannot begin before power has fully proved and asserted itself.

The "Bhagavadgita" enshrines caste morality. The position of each man in life indicates those virtues in which he must strive to excel. "Better is one's *dharma,* though destitute of merits, than the well-executed *dharma* of another. He who doeth the *karma* laid down by his own nature incurreth no sin." It is the same idea of the relativity of virtues to the position of a man that we find in Plato's "Republic." The special virtues required of the three classic castes of Brahmans, warriors, and landholders, are dwelt on in great detail; all other classes are assigned acts in the nature of service, with a corresponding lowliness and humility of conduct. Vivekananda complains that the august virtues of the higher castes are no longer practised, but that the whole nation has adopted servile ways, singing everywhere without end in weak abandonment: "As the water on the lotus leaf is thin and trembling, so unsteady is the life of man." The heroic, both in action and in renunciation, has become rare. Nietzsche would say that the Indian nation has adopted slave habits and has forgotten its master morality. The "Gita" itself says: "Then I shall destroy all caste distinctions and thus ruin all these people"; and Vivekananda exclaims, "Buddha ruined us as Christ ruined the Romans," laying India's downfall to the aban-

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donment of the heroic caste virtues. It is remarkable that a man like Vivekananda, who fought against the artificial restrictions of the caste system, should yet see in this relativity of moral precepts, including the prescription of heroic virtues for the higher classes, the saving principle. But he evidently despairs of raising the vast masses of the Indian population to the plane of energism in morality; he feels that if the leaders of social life in India were inspired by these ideals, it would be sufficient. While abandoning the external accessories of caste, advancing Indian thought is, therefore, inclined to retain some of its essentials. I shall refer again later to this very important fact, which involves a question as to whether a unified morality is possible for the entire human race in the Orient or whether we must accept the principle of relative duties and virtues.

Thus Hinduism is becoming aggressive in the sense of seeing greater virtue in action and being inspired with ideals of positive achievement and progress. In speaking for this ideal in her brilliant little pamphlet on "Aggressive Hinduism," Sister Nivedita shows her grasp of the essentials that make up western national energism. She knows what the historic sense has done for the West and demands that the "history of India, which has yet to be written for the first time, should be humanized, emotionalized, made the trumpet voice and evangel of the races that inhabit India." She also says that Indian life must seek expression in nationalism, must make itself strongly national before it can take its part in the full life of the world. Many Hindus are inclined to believe that political salvation is to be found in the idea of a world state, but in the view of this eloquent writer "only the tree that is firm rooted in its own soil can offer us a perfect crown of leaf and blossom."

But all the writers and thinkers of new India agree that above all they must cherish that national ideal which expresses itself in spirituality. In intellectual and spiritual force they see the highest energy, and so renunciation,

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truly interpreted, is, after all, the highest virtue. "Concentration, calmness, and inactivity are the result of centralization of great powers,—calmness is the mother of tremendous energy," these words of Vivekananda express that valuation which sets mental strength high above all mechanical contrivance, which appreciates that by the side of the thought-energy of the human mind everything else is insignificant. This is the greatest paradox in philosophy, that the West, where man first became conscious of his powers, where he learned to master the forces of nature before which the oriental peoples bowed down in awe, should invariably have to yield to the Orient in fully appreciating the intense power of that very human mind and its activity.

It is here that Hinduism and Buddhism converge. In both, spiritual force is most highly valued, most intensely striven after. But as the Buddhist belief swept away the whole fabric of caste distinction and assumed a position of utter unworldliness, it has always seemed to be the religion of renunciation carried to its greatest possible extreme. The concept of unending change is the essence of Buddhism as it is the essence of all oriental thought and poetry; this proves how true, after all, an expression of the real spirit of the Orient is to be found in Buddhism. Where nothing is stable, where all life flows past the beholder like a stream, where all things of beauty fade and all things of force decay, there is no room for anything but that quiet abdication which always has a pessimistic tinge. Now the West has arrived at a similar position in its interpretation of the universe. Both the principle of evolution and the electric theory of matter are not only consonant with Buddhism, but are to a certain extent anticipated by its thought. A realization of this truth will make it plain that in its real and deeper meaning Buddhism is neither nihilistic nor pessimistic; that it is a superficial view to think that Buddhism erects self-annihilation into an ideal, sees no value in action, and preaches the prone acceptance of all evil as inevit-

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able. If this were true, Buddhism could never have been a religion of salvation to millions, it would have ceased to exist long ago. It is also a significant fact that the great energist philosopher, Schopenhauer, stands in the closest relationship to Buddhism. He is for this condemned by his dissident pupil, Nietzsche; but if this brilliant aphorist had lived to see the present development of energism in the Orient, he might have looked even upon Buddhism from a different point of view.

As a matter of fact, while Buddhism is a quietist, renouncing, contemplative religion, it after all has its deepest meaning and most striking significance as an appreciation of the energy of the human mind. Nirvana is the ultimate achievement of the complete self-possession and mastery of mind, gained through the application of the most concentrated energy in mental processes through generations. It is significant that it is this side of Buddhism, the side of intellectual energism, which is at the present time most insistently dwelt upon by its ablest devotees, to the confounding of the notion that Buddhism is enervating and reduces to a lower level of life. While these energistic implications have always been present in Buddhism, it is only now that they are being fully appreciated in the oriental world of thought.

The Chinese are far less inclined to abstract speculation and philosophical ideals than are the people of southern Asia. They follow a common-sense morality which is practical in its categorical precepts and judgments. But the traditional temper of the Chinese is also eminently pacific and quietist. The great strength of the Chinese lies in peaceful resistance; without meeting force by force they negative the effects of conquest and oppression in a manner that elicited the deep admiration of Tolstoi. He held up the Chinese as a model to his fellow Russians and called attention to the quiet patience of this vast mass of humanity, to their manner of following the rule 'resist not evil,' in not opposing to injustice harsh and rebellious measures, but in following the quiet and natural

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remedy of non-action. The Chinese philosopher whose thought has been most potent in giving form to the quietist ideals of this vast population is Lao-Tze. Often called the Epicurus of China, he does indeed resemble the Greek philosopher in the manner in which he values reason above all things. In his view, compared with reason as working itself out in things and men, self-conscious human energy is of no avail. The sage must accept the course of nature and adapt himself to it by the use and development of his individual reason. "Reason always practises non-assertion, and yet there is nothing that remains undone." While Lao-Tze's ideal of non-assertiveness does not mean inactivity, but the desire to allow things to develop naturally and not to force their growth in an artificial way, such has not been the popular understanding of his thought. The merely passive elements in his philosophy have been unduly emphasized. Virtue and strength have thus been turned into weakness, and at present many Chinese hold Taoism responsible for that inadequacy of national organization and action through which China has suffered numberless disadvantages and humiliations.

To-day we are witnessing the awakening of this vast people to new energies and to a more active conduct of affairs. Peaceful China, the land of non-assertion, is fast becoming military. The ideal of national energy, efficiency, and strength expresses itself in all public utterances. Great sacrifices are made for military preparation, and throughout the provinces even the children in the schools are put into uniforms and trained in soldierly fashion. The old contempt in which the profession of warriors was held in this most rational of countries has passed away, as fresh energies are beginning to stir.

The literary evangel of this new national faith is found in the writings of Wang Yang Ming, the Chinese soldier-philosopher, whose value for present-day needs the Japanese were the first to discover. During the last decade he has become the most widely read author of China.

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Wang Yang Ming's practical ethics hinge upon the theory that thought and knowledge are of little value unless translated into action. Adequacy in action is, therefore, a test to be applied to ideas of conduct and of philosophy. Himself a man of affairs as well as a writer, he could express these thoughts in language pulsating with life and stimulating to deeds of valor. Among all native writers, he has contributed the most characteristic element in the present state of Chinese public feeling. This zeal for action expresses itself also in the prevalence of revolutionary sentiments and desires, which go far beyond anything the old philosopher would probably sanction. The ideal that evils are to be borne or at most resisted quietly has largely passed away, and in its place there has arisen the belief that only through positive heroic action can the most serious problems of national life be solved. The words of Wang Yang Ming are like a trumpet call to Modern China.

Japan is the true apostle of energism in the Orient, representing this temper not only in her present life, but also in her traditional practices.[1] She is the one oriental nation in which military feudalism developed in a manner almost entirely parallel to that of Europe. The militant side of feudalism still constituted the essence of her action

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[1] In 1910 a leading Japanese review took a vote among prominent men on the question of who are the greatest moral heroes of the world. It is interesting to note that the Hideyoshi and Napoleon tied for first place; after them followed Bismark, Washington, Iyeyasu, and then Luther, Shokatsu Komei, and Lincoln; Cæsar and Gladstone came at the end among the first ten. This will indicate the importance given to military achievement in Japan. In commenting upon this matter, Dr. Inouye Tetsujiro said that there are only four men who are entitled to be called *seijin*, or great moral heroes: Christ, Socrates, Confucius, and Buddha. All other heroes are of ordinary fiber. Both these classes of heroes are judged by character as a standard, their work must be an outgrowth of their character; both display great strength of will. But the truly great heroes are spiritual in influence, while the others are material. The teachings of the greatest heroes have been turned into weakness by degenerate followers. Therefore, in our age of relentless competition, the military and virile virtues of ordinary heroes are necessary. *Japan Mail.*

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and ideals as she emerged into the fullness of modern life. The priest and the philosopher never gained the ascendency in Japan which they had in the Chinese and Indian systems. Though Japan has accepted and is harboring both Buddhism and Confucianism, she has fused them with her own peculiar forms of thought into a distinctive national unity. Undaunted by the contradictions between these different systems, she has adapted them to her eminently positivist temper, and has molded ideas of conduct in which the development and expression of human energy hold the central place. From the militant ages she has taken over her gentlemanly code, *bushido,* the Way of the Warrior, which inculcates loyalty, generosity, bravery, and other virtues that Plato and the Hindu classics demand of the governing castes. Here the code of the select has not been swamped, as in India, in the resigned and servile misery of the masses. New Japan has, indeed, attempted to extend the sway of traditional moral precepts to all classes of the population, but the problem has not by any means been solved as yet, and it is apparent that a code made for knights in a militant age does not meet all the moral difficulties of a modern industrial society.

The ethics of Japan are notable in that suicide itself is not viewed as resignation, but as the highest and most emphatic expression of personality. Under the code of *bushido,* the feudal knight or dependent felt his duty of loyalty most intensely; should his superior pursue a course of action that seemed ill-advised and dangerous, respectful representations might be made; but if no heed was given to such quiet and polite suggestions, the loyal retainer still had the recourse of taking his own life in order to awaken the conscience and good sense of his master. In this most powerful appeal life itself, with all its energy, was consumed. These tendencies still hold sway in modern Japan; suicide is not merely, or principally, a means of escaping from a situation grown unbearable, but it is the most intense self-assertion, either

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as a protest against some great evil, or an appeal intended to bring about important action.

This brief review of the contemporary thought of the eastern world will show how far these ancient nations have gone in turning to a philosophy of action and of energy. The manifestations of this spirit will indeed differ in many ways from similar tendencies in the West because of certain fundamental distinctions that separate external development. Western individualism, with all it implies and involves, is still foreign to the Orient. When we inquire for the root and source of this prominence of the individual personality, of this freedom of development, we have to go to the classicism of Greece and Rome. The classic spirit is the spirit of self-limitation, it implies the power and will to limit both our view of things and our expression, restraining them within a definite orbit and excluding all that is merely curious, or horrible, or insane. Thus liberty is born of self-restraint. As a result of this mutual limitation, individuals become conscious of their differences of character and of that subtle complex which we call personality. At first sight it is strange that it has been exactly this individualistic West that has striven to apply its moral principles to all alike, in other words, that has transfused ethics with democracy. Yet when we remember that personality is the result of self-restraint, this will seem less paradoxical.

In all these matters important differences exist between East and West. We have already seen that as the demand for energetic manifestations of human character and action arises in the Orient, it is prone to appeal to caste instinct and to invoke those codes of behavior which rest upon social selection. This is the deepest problem involved in the present oriental transition: Can a common morality of mankind, applicable to all human beings, enjoin those qualities of character which are demanded by energist ideals? Are we to have democracy or aristocracy in the realm of morals? Of the three principal

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countries of Asia, China is most truly the home of democracy. While democracy was not formally recognized as a method of government, the temper of Chinese affairs was such that whatever concerned a community was not settled without its consent; though there also existed a certain social hierarchy. These democratic sentiments prevail even more fully in the present national transition, when the effort is being made to mold the forms of the state in accordance with popular ideals, to go beyond the superficial parliamentarism of Japan and to give the vast empire a system of truly popular institutions. It is, therefore, not surprising that those manifestations of energism which we note in contemporary China assume a thoroughly popular character. Participated in by the masses of Chinese humanity, this tendency will produce movements responsive to ideals that are not exclusive.

It will be of the greatest interest to watch the unfolding of the contrast between aristocratic and democratic forms of morality in the Far East. In India and Japan the question is, Can the energism which the national life requires be developed without recourse to the historic codes of the warrior castes? And if these codes are necessary, is there any way in which the master morality, which they contain, can be transfused into more general social precepts? China, on the other hand, is confronted with the question whether, without the leadership which is so strongly developed in Japan and which is striving for ascendency in India, the national regeneration can be carried through successfully. If it should become clear that this could not be done, then there may gradually emerge in the morality of China more aristocratic conceptions. Who would have suspected a decade or so ago that the great problem of slave and master morality would so soon be fought out on the vast theater of Asiatic civilizations? Here it is really to be decided whether the world is to have a human, a universal code of ethics.

It is perhaps true that the thinking men of the Orient,

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as they compare their own civilization with that of Europe, feel keenly the lack of individualism with its resultant personal energy. Touched with the fire of active ambition, they are seized with the renaissance spirit. They desire that human energy and personality should exert themselves in every possible way. Instinctively they suspect that such a development cannot be hoped for if there is only a mass movement; they therefore turn to those aristocratic codes which the past has developed and hope to get from them that invigoration of human personality which national life requires. If the Orient is to travel the road of democracy in the western sense, it would seem that it could be reached only through the development of individualism, which is often anti-democratic in tendency.

The new temper of the East involves a radical change of attitude toward physical nature; patient submission to nature's force and caprice must make room for ambition of mastery. Altogether the most important intellectual change which the Orient is undergoing is the acquisition of that idea of the rule of natural law which was first developed in the West. Up to very recent times the mystic element has been strongest in oriental life. The Oriental would rather imagine and interpret than understand; he does not long to lift the veil of mystery that shrouds religion and authority. Carrying out the idea of Dostojevski's words, "Russia cannot be understood, she must be believed in," the Orientals are ready to believe in anything that surrounded itself with splendor and the emblems of authority. Moreover, every aspect of life is viewed as an expression of mystic spiritual forces. Spirits are everywhere; the poorest Hindu peasant constantly feels their imminence; in the beliefs of Chinese folk-lore, air and soil are peopled with genii. The Japanese build delicate temples in woodland glades; no human being ever enters them; but many gaze reverently through the latticed windows into the twilight silence within, where abide divinities and ghosts of noble men. The highest

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and purest expression of this belief is found in the hero-worship among oriental nations, especially among the people of India and Japan. The great man, the noble character, is held to be a direct impersonation of the divine spirit; and to worship him appears a most natural thought. Thus the Oriental feels himself surrounded on all sides by spiritual forces by whose influences his every-day life is molded and his destiny controlled.

The one important conception which the popular oriental mind lacks is that these mysterious and all-powerful manifestations are themselves governed by a great law. The reign of natural law is not a current thought among the oriental masses, who still live under a tyranny of capricious spirits. The idea of gradual, orderly development, according to a universal rule,—the cosmos of the physical world,—though comprised in their philosophical system, is not familiar to larger numbers as it is in the West. This attitude of the oriental mind toward natural phenomena is due to two causes: in the first place, nature in her manifestations is so overpowering as to awe and suppress the spirit of man and to prevent him from conceiving himself as the central figure, as the ruler and director of all this energy; on the other hand, the philosophical mind of the Orient is so much taken up with the things of the spirit that, while it does construct and develop comprehensive systems of cosmogony and evolution, it does not study natural phenomena in detail and by the experimental method. The development of energism which we have been tracing, however, involves a profound change in the attitude of the oriental mind toward natural phenomena. The field in which human talent and energy has so triumphantly manifested itself in the West will not remain closed to oriental experience. Already the Japanese are taking a high position in the physical sciences, and in India the pressure is enormous to pass from the narrow tutelage of the classics, as taught under the British system, to the splendid vistas of modern scientific achievements. The highest ambitions, the profoundest

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sentiments of the Orient are bound up with the desire, now suddenly revealed, to rival the West in scientific mastery, and so the spirit twilight will soon disappear. In a measure, the Orient will repeat the experience of the ancient pagan world, as pictured by Shelley when he speaks of "the hills and seas and streams, dispeopled of their dreams."

But if the Orient is to adopt the philosophy of energism and active life, it does not, after all, follow that it will change its most underlying and essential ideals. It has often been said that if the Japanese have made themselves strong by the adoption of western methods and processes, they have done so in order to be able the more effectively to protect the treasures of their own ideals and civilization. "Make yourself strong so that you may retain the right to be yourself," that seems to be the temper, not only of Japan, but also of China and India; and the self of the Orient is now, and intends to remain, highly spiritual. Mastery over external nature, indeed, attracts as part of the régime of energy or activity, but to the Orient the spirit of man, the mysteries of his psychology, the grandeur of the limitless vistas of development of which the human soul is capable and the heights to which it may attain, are more fascinating than any of the phenomena of external physical nature. It is to Orientals a source of great inspiration and enthusiasm to think that they are called to give to the world, and to perpetuate in it, this noble spirituality. They have come to recognize the merits of the West, its high individual development, its energetic activity, its clean and successful methods, its complex system of machinery; but they also well understand that the human spirit does not always come to its own with all this efficiency and outward success, that machinery kills souls, that mechanism destroys spirituality. When they see the West striving to introduce mechanical ideas into the most sublime realms of thought, standardizing everything upon the basis of computed units of efficiency, they feel that the Orient still has a message

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that will be heard. It is from materialism that they hope to bring salvation. The manner is not yet clearly seen; but as the West glories in its efficiency, so does the East draw comfort and confidence from the thought that its spirituality is to be the salvation of the world. This destiny it can fulfill only if its newly aroused energies are directed to the achievement of aims that have a spiritual meaning and value.

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MILTON'S ETHICS.

ALFRED W. BENN.

IT need hardly be said that Milton never constructed a system of moral philosophy. His English critics have even gone so far as to deny the poet any philosophic ability whatsoever. On this point, however, one may be allowed to prefer the opinion of Taine, himself a systematic thinker of conspicuous ability; and in what seems to me by far the best account of his prose writings that we possess the great French writer repeatedly calls Milton a philosopher. The word is, of course, used in a purely popular sense, nor does it imply any comparison with such masters of pure thought as Hobbes, Spinoza, and Locke. Held in bondage by the traditional theology, he had not the wish, even supposing that he had the power, to construct a metaphysical system; and in any case the whole bent of his genius would have determined him, as a thinker, to deal only with questions of immediate practical interest. And being so practical, his tendency would be rather towards a new application of ancient or admitted principles, than towards any innovation on the principles themselves. But even within such limitations, there is room for philosophy, for comprehensive independent thought; and such speculative originality Milton may claim.

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Milton, as we know, was a child of the Renaissance; and, being so, he seems to have acknowledged this filiation to a greater extent than is generally imagined. It has been said,—if I remember rightly, by Mr. Andrew Lang,—that in Rabelais the Renaissance became conscious of itself. But if it be true, as Michelet supposes, that Gargantua is a personification of the New Monarchy, then Rabelais practically ignores that whole side of the Renaissance by which it stood for republican liberty against the mediæval tradition of Roman imperialism; while the Greek virtue of Sôphrosynê finds no counterpart in the Rabelaisian gospel of unlimited license. In Milton, on the contrary, the power of the New Learning to emancipate from all that was evil and to coöperate with all that was good in the Middle Ages becomes truly conscious of itself. In the "Areopagitica" he refers to "those ages to whose polite wisdom and letters we owe that we are not yet Goths and Jutlanders"; defending himself against a possible charge of novelty by an appeal to "the old and elegant humanity of Greece."[1] And in his tract "Of Education" the Greek and Latin moralists are recommended as a school of virtue,[2] though of course they are to be checked by the study of Scripture. In this connection readers of Milton's "Comus" may be reminded that the celebrated passage where the sensual soul after death is described as

> Lingering and sitting by a new-made grave

merely paraphrases an edifying piece of mythology to the same effect in Plato's "Phædo."[3]

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[1] *Works*, Vol. IV, p. 398. (The references throughout are to Mitford's edition, reprinted by Bickers & Buch in 1863. The spelling has been modernized. For the Treatise on Christian Doctrine, I have used the translation in Bohn's edition.) [2] IV, p. 387.

[3] "Comus," p. 463 ff; "Phædo," 81 B. C. It may be noticed that the 'divine philosophy' spoken of by the Younger Brother is not philosophy in general with a eulogistic epithet prefixed. It means metaphysics as distinguished from mundane learning.

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Our poet, however, did not, like the mediæval scholars, regard the great ages of antiquity as an unattainable ideal to which Christian Europe might look up without any hope of equalling it. Nothing, he declares, that the Greeks and Romans had ever done can be compared for heroic virtue with the victorious efforts by which the people of England and their leaders had vindicated their civil and religious liberties against the tyranny of their king.[4] In Milton's eyes the English people were the most gifted the world had ever seen. But this preëminence was not solely or chiefly illustrated by civil and military courage. It was above all intellectual. It is "a nation not slow and dull, but of a quick, ingenious, and piercing spirit, acute to invent, subtle and sinewy to discourse, not beneath the reach of any point the highest that human capacity can soar to."[5] Above all, it is filled with the spirit of innovation and improvement. Let me quote once again the famous description of London in 1844:

> Behold now this vast city; a city of refuge, the mansion-house of liberty encompassed and surrounded with his protection; the shop of war hath not there more anvils and hammers, to fashion out the plates and instruments of armed justice in defense of beleaguered truth than there be pens and heads there, sitting by their studious lamps, musing, searching, revolving new notions and ideas wherewith to present, as with their homage and their fealty the approaching Reformation, others as fast reading, trying all things, assenting to the force of reason and convincement. What could a man require more from a nation so pliant and so prone to seek after knowledge? What wants there to such a towardly and pregnant soil but wise and faithful laborers to make a knowing people, a nation of prophets, of sages, and of worthies?[6]

Two centuries before Buckle, Milton discerned the "essentially cumulative" character of knowledge; only he does not possess the pregnant word for its expression. This is how he puts it: "To be still searching what we know not, by what we know (for all her body is homogeneal and proportional), this is the golden rule in theology as well as in arithmetic."[7]

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[4] VI, p. 247. [5] IV, p. 436. [6] IV, p. 438. [7] IV, p. 436.

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However, as regards the point immediately in view, the argument of the "Areopagitica,"—for it is that from which I have been quoting,—reminds us of Mill rather than of Buckle. The value of liberty for Milton is that it favors the production of "new notions and ideas"; in other words, it is a system of experimentation on the largest scale. Thus unlike his great contemporary Hobbes, whose apriorism impresses one like a huge boulder carried by glacial action into our insular speculation from the Continent, he moves in the main current of English philosophy as a connecting link between Bacon and Locke, anticipating those nineteenth-century gospels in which the theory of liberty was to receive undreamed-of expansions and applications. More particularly, like Archbishop Magee, Milton would rather see England free than sober. In his time, also, our countrymen had an evil notoriety for drunkenness; he observes:

> No sin more foul and common among us . . . and who can be ignorant that if the importation of wine and of all strong drink were forbid, it would clean rid the possibility of committing that odious vice, and men might afterwards live happily and healthfully without the use of those intoxicating liquors. Yet who is there, the severest of them all, that ever propounded to lose his sack, his ale, toward the certain abolishing of so great a sin, who is there of them, the holiest, that less loves his rich canary at meals, though it be fetched from places that hazard the religion of them who fetch it, and though it make his neighbor drunk out of the same tun?[8]

The Puritan poet uses this assumed reluctance on the part of moderate drinkers to sacrifice their own indulgence for the sake of "utterly removing a most loathsome sin" as an *argumentum ad hominem* in favor of his own proposed reformation of the marriage law; but his sympathy with their objection to the enforcement of total abstinence is evident.

There is a current idea to the effect that the English revolutionists of the seventeenth century differed from the French revolutionists of the eighteenth century, first

[8] IV, p. 196.

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and above all, by the much greater narrowness of the principles on which their claims were based. The English leaders, we are told, in demanding a free government appealed to the traditional rights of Englishmen, whereas the orators of the Constituent Assembly appealed to the rights of man. And in this connection much is made of the mischievous influence supposed to have been exercised by Rousseau. No doubt there is a good deal of truth in the distinction; although it also remains true that such statesmen as Eliot and Pym were well advised, as a matter of party tactics, to take their stand on the laws of England, whatever may have been their private views about the Law of Nature. But however this may be, the interesting fact remains that Milton had already risen far above any such insular restrictions, and that the liberty he personally held so dear was to him, as to Rousseau, nothing less than the natural right of all mankind.

This idea of natural law was widely diffused among the moralists of the seventeenth century. Milton shared it with his elder contemporaries Grotius and Hobbes, as well as with his younger contemporary Locke. Indeed it goes back to the Middle Ages, as we know by the celebrated proclamation of Louis X (Hutin) declaring that "all men ought to be born free" (1315),[9] and must have been constantly kept in view by the study of Roman jurisprudence. For Justinian tells us still more categorically, that "all men *are* born free."[10] Roman law took the idea of nature from the Stoic philosophy, which had inherited it from the Cynics, who, in their turn, derived it from the physiocratic Sophists, Prodicus and Hippias. It must, however, be noted that these two most remarkable teachers did not, so far as we know, rise to the notion of liberty as a universal human right. That seems to have been the work of Alcidamas, a pupil of

[9] Maine's "Ancient Law," p. 94 (seventh edition).
[10] "Institutes," I, 2.2.

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Gorgias, who first combined the humanism of his master and of Protagoras with the naturalism of their illustrious rivals. And in the like spirit, another still more daring innovator, his fellow-pupil Lycophron, proclaimed human equality as against the unreal distinctions of high and low birth.[11]

These facts in the history of opinion have been preserved almost accidentally by Aristotle. And Milton, whose scholarship was wide rather than accurate, credited Aristotle, perhaps on the strength of such references, with a liberalism to which the tutor of Alexander was a complete stranger. Defending the people of England (or rather the English army) against the charge of criminal regicide, he quotes Aristotle as saying: "It is neither for the public good nor is it just, seeing all men are by nature alike and equal, that anyone should be lord and master over all the rest."[12] What the philosopher really said was that "*where* men are alike and equal it is neither expedient nor just that one man should be lord of all."[13] But however this may be, it seems clear that Milton for his part would fully accept the responsibility of the larger utterance; and so we find him elsewhere pronouncing that "all men since Adam are born free."[14]

The law of nature does not stop at the liberty and equality of all men (women, of course, not counting as men). It is also "the very rule of justice," dispensing a people from their oaths of allegiance "if their king should give himself over to sloth and voluptuousness."[15] Finally, as in France a hundred and forty years later, Liberty and Equality are completed by Fraternity. "Who knows not that there is a mutual bond of amity and brotherhood between man and man all over the world?"[16] Hobbes apparently knew no such thing, the contrary being equally evident to him; but had that particular

[11] On this subject I may be permitted to refer to my "Philosophy of Greece," pp. 148, 149, 284. [12] VIII, p. 144.
[13] Pol., III, p. 17; Jowett's transl., I, p. 104. [14] III, p. 72.
[15] VIII, p. 126. [16] IV, pp. 467, 468.

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brother remonstrated, the poet would probably have called him a hog. Nor should such a phrase as "all over the world" be too literally construed. "What nature and right reason dictates we are not to gather from the practice of most nations, but of the wisest and most prudent,—the Greeks, the Romans, the Italians, the Carthaginians." Theological objections derived from such doctrines as the divine right of kings or the duty of passive obedience are summarily barred out by the plea of its "being very certain that the doctrine of the Gospel is neither contrary to reason nor [to] the law of nations."[17]

In point of fact, liberty interested Milton far more than either equality,—which he only valued as excluding kingship,—or fraternity, which he certainly never practised. And he particularizes three fundamental liberties without which life would be almost intolerable: liberty in the Church, liberty in the State, and what he calls domestic, but what we should rather call personal liberty. This last also takes three forms: in marriage, of free choice and free divorce; in the rearing of the young, of such an education as alone makes true freedom possible; and in speculation, of a free, that is to say, an unlicensed press.[18] It is only as regards the last that Milton's views have won universal admission. They need not delay us here, being contained in the most famous and popular of his prose writings, the "Areopagitica." His theory of education is no less chimerical than J. S. Mill's, and without Mill's excuse of practical unacquaintance with the subject, for the poet had passed through the regular public school and college curriculum of his time. He had made himself, it is true, the most cultivated man of his age,—perhaps of all ages,—but to expect, as he seems to do, that others should reach the same perfection was to assume that they possessed the same leisure, the same affluence, the same health, the same unrivalled combination of acquisitive with originating genius. England

[17] VIII, p. 80. [18] VI, p. 291.

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might have waited long enough for her liberties if her citizens were only fit to be free after they had received such a training as would have raised them to the level of her loftiest son.

As regards religious liberty, Milton is equally unpractical, but unpractical from an opposite cause, from the narrowness rather than from the breadth of his personal horizon. Taking the Bible,—whose infallibility he never questions,—as his own sole guide in religion, he would restrict toleration to those who are like-minded with himself. We gather from his tract on "True Religion, Heresy, and Toleration" (1673), that heresy consists in adding to or taking away from the letter of Scripture. Roman Catholicism adds to it, besides practising idolatry, and therefore should be forcibly suppressed. And it seems to follow that any criticism, having for its object the disauthentication of any book in the Bible, should be similarly dealt with. Milton had by this time abandoned what is commonly called orthodoxy for what is commonly called the Arian heresy, and on his own principles ought to have classed all Trinitarian believers as idolaters worthy of condign punishment. But such rigid consistency was too much even for his impractical genius; so he preferred the discreditable scheme of banding together the Protestant sects in a league of persecution against a church with whose dogmas most of them were in closer sympathy than with the theology of "Paradise Lost."[19]

[19] Milton's Arianism offers a curious exemplification of his Hellenizing tendencies. It has, in my opinion, a very strong Biblical foundation. But no one who has studied Milton's methods of reasoning can suppose that objective evidence and love of truth for its own sake had much to do with the conclusions he arrived at. If his theology was Scriptural, it was so, one may almost say, by accident. With his Hellenic training he naturally tended to conceive the relation between the Father and the Son on the type of the relation between Jove and Apollo (compare Lycidas) rather than on the type of two coeternal and unsubstantial persons. And if, as I believe, he correctly interpreted the theology of St. Paul and of the Fourth Evangelist, this was *almost* but not quite by accident. For they, too, came under the same Hellenic influences when they reinterpreted Jewish Messianism on the lines of heathen apotheosis. I am aware that

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As an advocate of what he calls domestic liberty, Milton is far more logical and liberal than as an advocate of free thought. His views on divorce are indeed such as only the most advanced reformers would advocate at the present day. To some people, the circumstance of their having been suggested by his own matrimonial experiences, seems a sufficient ground for dismissing them with contempt. And that might be very well if we were invited to accept them on the authority of so great a man. It is in fact a common trick with those who take their opinions on authority, to talk as if adverse criticism of those opinions could be disposed of by making out that the critics are themselves very prejudiced persons. They may be so; but that has nothing to do with the logical value of their arguments. Burke is not the only instance of an advocate who, as Macaulay says, "chose his side like a fanatic and defended it like a philosopher." In all such cases we have to answer the philosopher after his wisdom (that is to say, if we do not agree with him), not after his fanaticism.

Another disadvantage under which these divorce tracts of Milton's suffer, and the reason why, as he himself tells us was the fate of the "Tetrachordon" not long after its publication, they are "seldom pored on" is the wearisome scholasticism with which he labors the Scriptural side of the controversy. It is a side which for our misfortune has received far too great prominence in contemporary English discussions on the subject; and we have to submit to the public scandal of having it pro-

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Cardinal Newman in his "Arians of the Fourth Century" has given currency to the opposite view, the view according to which Arianism was a heresy not of Greek but of Jewish origin. But in this instance, his authority goes for little or nothing. For in the first place, being tied to the orthodox interpretation of St. Paul and St. John, he could not admit that they were potential Arians. And, in the next place, the Jews whom he quotes as precursors of Arians were probably speculating under the stress of Greek ideas. Similarly, the great founder of modern pantheism, Spinoza, did not become a pantheist because he was a Jew, but rather in spite of his being a Jew.

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posed to make English legislation depend upon a disputed reading in certain documents whose date and authorship are unknown, and in whose inerrancy most educated persons disbelieve. Apart from marriage, no prescription in these documents has force of law; while some of their prescriptions could only be obeyed at the price of speedy ruin to the community. The bulk of the community know that perfectly well, and so good care is taken that those prescriptions shall remain a dead letter. But in Roman Catholic countries and in England they compound for this disobedience by refusing to redress the grievances of a minority small enough to be neglected with impunity.

What value Milton himself set on the precepts of either Testament as guides of conduct for modern men, we shall probably never know. But whatever his private convictions may have been, addressing himself to such a legislature as the Long Parliament, he had to assume the infallibility of both, except in so far as the earlier legislation was repealed by the later revelation. The problem was to reconcile both Law and Gospel with that Law of Nature which, whether he believed in the Bible or not, was to him the supreme standard of ethics. Now the law of nature is for all things to persevere in their own state, or, as Matthew Arnold puts it, to fulfill the law of their being. For rational creatures, for men and women it is, more particularly, to defend the essence of their personality against all attacks and encroachments from without. Therefore, from Milton's point of view, it is not only the right, but the bounden duty of all human beings, both men and women, who find themselves unsuitably mated to recover their freedom without delay.

If any demand which is now most perfection to ease an extremity by divorce, or to enrage and foster it by the grievous observance of a miserable wedlock, I am not destitute to say which is most perfection (although some who believe they think favorably of divorce esteem it only venial to infirmity). Him I hold more in the way to perfection who forgoes an unfit, ungodly, and discordant wedlock, to live according to peace and love, and God's institution in a fitter choice, than he who debars himself the happy experience of all godly, which is peaceful conversation in his

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family, to live a contentious and unchristian life, not to be avoided, in temptation not to be lived in, only for the false keeping of a most unreal nullity, a marriage that hath no affinity with God's intention . . . to the lamentable superstition of ruining themselves.[20]

It will be observed that the masculine pronoun is alone employed in the passage quoted; and no doubt Milton, both from his own experience and his general opinion of women's inferiority, would be more keenly susceptible to the sufferings of the husband in an ill-assorted union than to the sufferings of the wife. But it is to the eternal honor of the poet that in reference at least to divorce he recognized the equality of the sexes. "Law," he maintains, "is to protect the liberty and the human dignity of its subjects, whether it be the man's right above the woman, or the woman's just appeal against wrong."[21] It has been asserted indeed, and by no less an authority than Leslie Stephen, that Milton looks at the matter entirely from the husband's point of view;[22] but the charge cannot stand in the face of various passages to the contrary effect, some of which I shall now proceed to quote:

The wife being herself the redeemed of Christ is not still bound to be the vassal of him who is the bond-slave of Satan: she being now neither the image nor the glory of such a person, nor made for him nor left in bondage to him, but hath recourse to the wing of charity and protection of the church, unless there be a hope on either side; yet such a hope must be meant as may be a rational hope, and not an endless servitude.[23]

According to Chrysostom, a bad wife is a help for the devil; to which Milton adds that "the like may be said of a bad husband."[24] Divorce at the husband's pleasure already practically exists, but under such a form as to give the wife no relief, compelling her "to live a part still married without marriage, a married widow."[25] The early Christian emperors made the Roman divorce law easier than before by increased concessions to the wife, "for the help and consideration of the weaker sex, ac-

[20] IV, pp. 231, 232. [21] IV, p. 186.
[22] "Dictionary of National Biography," XXXVIII, p. 29a.
[23] IV, pp. 149, 150. [24] IV, p. 168. [25] IV, pp. 125, 126.

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cording as the Gospel seems to make the wife more equal to her husband in these conjugal respects than the law of Moses doth."[26]

"The law of Moses" in fact only permits divorce to the husband,—a very awkward fact for one who makes that law the mainstay of his whole plea, while at the same time he is advocating equal liberty for both sexes. But the lawyer that is in every Englishman speedily comes to the rescue of our poet, who proves himself no less accomplished a legal, than Cardinal Newman was a theological evolutionist. We have seen how he uses Christianity, which emphatically condemned the Mosaic law, as an instrument for giving it increased relaxation. But, not content with this constructive interpretation, Milton boldly reads his own liberalism into the old Hebrew code.

Although there be nothing in the plain words of this law that seems to regard the afflictions of a wife, how great soever, yet expositors determine, and doubtless determine rightly, that God was not uncompassionate of them also in the framing of this law. For should the rescript of Antoninus in the civil law give release to servants flying for refuge to the emperor's statue, by giving leave to change their cruel masters, and should God who in his law also is good to injured servants, by granting them their freedom in divers cases, not consider the wrongs and miseries of a wife which is no servant?[27]

After playing off Christianity against Judaism, the next step was to play off Judaism against Christianity. In his discussion of the celebrated synoptic precepts relating to marriage and divorce, Milton uses a liberty of criticism which is nothing less than pretentious. To be plain, he flatly contradicts the Teacher whom he professes to regard as the incarnate Son of God. The words "from the beginning it hath not been so" are bluntly met by the assertion that "the rule of perfection is not so much that which was done in the beginning, as that which now is nearest to the rule of charity."[28] The explanation that "Moses for the hardness of your hearts" permitted the

[26] IV, pp. 269, 270. [27] IV, pp. 187, 188. [28] IV, p. 232.

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repudiation of objectionable wives, is firmly and not very respectfully shown to be untrue.[29] After all, the Puritan controversialist might have spared himself and his readers these almost unveiled blasphemies,—blasphemies from his point of view, I mean,—had he begun by playing out his trump card, which is the bold assertion that an unsuitable companion is not a real wife, but "an intolerable adversary, a helpless [unhelping], unaffectionate, and sullen mass (*sic*), whose very company represents the visible and exactest figure of loneliness itself."[30] Besides, even assuming a wife to be a wife, we must remember that Christ habitually acted on the principle of straightening a twig by bending it in the opposite direction, and that he accordingly strove to countervail the unbounded license of Pharisaic casuistry by prohibiting divorce altogether without meaning that his words should be pressed to their literal significance.[31] Milton justly observes that our divines make no scruple of applying this convenient method of interpretation "to soften the high and vehement speeches of our Saviour" in every case except that of the marriage law.

Even the marriage law of Christ leaves a loophole through which our poet-lawyer proceeds to drive a coach-and-four. As is well known, the received text of Matthew contains a clause exceptionally permitting a husband to put away his wife "for the cause of fornication," but not granting a like privilege to the injured wife. This clause does not occur in Mark or Luke; it labors under grave suspicion of being an interpolation and seems to have been regarded as such by early church tradition. Moreover, even admitting it to be genuine, the breach of duty on the wife's part referred to is not simple adultery, for had that been meant, the word employed would not have been πορνεία (fornication), but μοιχεία. And fornication must be understood not as unchastity, but as prostitution, the habitual practice of venal vice.

[29] IV, p. 225. [30] IV, p. 236. [31] IV, p. 234.

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I do not know whether anyone has ever attempted to explain why the interpolated exception,—assuming it to be an interpolation,—should have taken this particular form; but as an explanation has occurred to me, I may be permitted to offer it for whatever it is worth.

It would appear from the Shepherd of Hermas that divorce was prohibited by the early Church, not in obedience to its Founder, but because the husband, by repudiating his wife and marrying another, took away that inducement to repentance which would be afforded by the knowledge of his readiness to take back the erring partner should she abandon her evil courses.[32] And as the practice of prostitution would make the return to virtue a much more improbable event than would a single lapse from virtue, it occurred to some lax believer that the Lord would in that one case have relieved the husband from the obligation of welcoming back his penitent partner; whereas a vagrant husband would be far more likely to give up a life of sin.

However this may be, Milton with characteristic ingenuity seizes on the disputed passage as an argument for relaxing the Gospel precept to the farthest possible extent. Interpreting the Mosaic law, he had argued that if motives of physical aversion were to be accepted as a sufficient reason for divorce, much more should insuperable mental alienation of the husband from the wife be allowed as a reason for liberating him from the marriage bond; and, as we have seen, by a second generalization he makes liberty of divorce equal for both sexes under a law in which no such equality was recognized. And so, on passing to the Christian dispensation, he tells us that "fornication is to be understood as the language of Christ understands it (!), for a constant alienation and disaffection of mind, or for the continual practice of disobedience and crossness from the duties of love and peace, that is, in sum, when to be a tolerable wife is naturally not in their

[32] "Hermas," Mandate, IV, p. 1.

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power, or obstinately not in their will."[33] He then proceeds to contrast the comparatively trifling and venial sin of adultery with the heinous and irredeemable guilt of unamiability with a zest which would have been thoroughly appreciated in high French society under Louis XV, as described by Voltaire in his "Babouc," but which takes one rather aback in an appeal made by the great Puritan poet to the public opinion of Puritan England. No wonder that Milton speedily found himself environed by what he called "a barbarous noise, of owls and asses, cuckoos, apes, and dogs." In other words, by the clamor of those who, like owls, shunned the light, like asses were impenetrably stupid, like cuckoos could never strike out any variation on the old traditional note, like apes were always copying what others did, and like dogs raised the voice of alarm at the appearance of anything new.

Contrary as all this seems to English ways of thinking, still even here Milton incidentally illustrates the characteristically English method of experimental inquiry. After complaining that there is not in courtship (as then conducted) "that freedom of access granted or presumed, as may suffice to a perfect discerning [of character] till too late," he adds with touching reference to his own personal experience:

> It is not strange, though many who have spent their youth chastely, are in some things not so quick-sighted, while they haste so eagerly to light the nuptial torch, [while on the contrary] they who have lived most loosely, by reason of their bold accustoming prove most successful in their matches, because their wild affections, unsettling at will, have been as so many divorces to teach them experience.[34]

It may be doubted whether this is altogether true,—or indeed true at all. Neither social experience, nor realistic fiction, nor the annals of the divorce court seem to prove that 'fast men' make the most successful husbands. The partner of a passing amour is not on what George Eliot calls "the formidable level of wifehood,"

[33] IV, pp. 239, 240. [34] IV, p. 27.

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nor has she the opportunity of developing those angularities by which conjugal peace is sometimes unexpectedly disturbed. And this goes to confirm Tolstoy's paradox that the man whose intimate acquaintance with the sex does not go beyond his wife really knows more about women than the unmarried hero of many gallant adventures.

Milton, as I have said, was a man of the Renaissance, and his ideas are those of old Rome masquerading under a piebald costume of Scriptural citations. Natural liberty, more or less limited by contract, was to him both Law and Gospel. Spinoza's identification of God with nature would have shocked him in theory; but he identifies them in practice. If marriage is a social convention, it must give way to the prime dictates of nature; if it is a law of nature, it must give way to a still higher law; for what can be so natural as to dissolve that which leads to suffering and hostility?[35] If it is argued that faith should be kept in a covenant, the answer is that this

> only holds true where the other side performs, which failing he is no longer bound. Again this is true [only] when the keeping of faith can be of any use or benefit to the other. But in marriage, a league of love and willingness, if faith be not willingly kept, it scarce is worth the keeping; nor can [it] be a delight to a generous mind with whom it is forcibly kept: and the question still supposes the one [side] brought to an impossibility of keeping it as he ought by the other's default. And to keep it formally, not only with a thousand shifts and dissimulations, but with open anguish, perpetual sadness, and disturbance, no willingness, no cheerfulness, no contentment, cannot be any good to a mind not basely poor and shallow with whom the contract of love is so kept.

To dissolve such a contract is therefore just.[36]

Here we see in Milton's prose that tenderness which Keats learned to admire even more than his strength in "Paradise Lost." But lest it should be thought that the tenderness was only for the sufferings of himself and other disappointed husbands, let me quote another passage where all distinction of sex and all opposition of interest seem to be lost in the pleadings of an infinite pity:

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[35] IV, p. 181. [36] IV, pp. 185, 186.

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Can anything be more absurd and barbarous than that they whom only error, casualty, art, or plot hath joined should be compelled, not against a sudden passion but against the permanent and radical discords of nature, to the most intimate and incorporating duties of love and embracement, therein only rational and human as they are free and voluntary, being else an abject servile yoke, scarce not brutish. And that there is in man such a peculiar sway of liking or disliking in the affairs of matrimony is evidently seen even before marriage among those who can be friendly, can respect each other, yet to marry each other would not for any persuasion. If, then, this unfitness and disparity be not till after marriage discovered, through many causes and colors and concealments that may overshadow; undoubtedly it will produce the same effects and perhaps with more vehemence that such a mistaken pair would give the world to be unmarried again.[37]

To grant them that release would be "to wipe ten thousand tears out of the life of man."[38]

To decide whether incompatibility of temper goes far enough to justify divorce is, in Milton's opinion, not a question for any law court to decide. And here it must be admitted that his conviction of masculine superiority operates in a way which to modern feeling seems grossly unjust. "For even the freedom and eminence of man's creation gives him to be a law in this matter to himself, being the head of the other sex which was made for him."[39] At the same time to be privately divorced must suit the feelings of a wife better, "it being an unseemly affront to the sequestered and veiled modesty of that sex to have her unpleasingness and other defects bandied up and down, and aggravated in open court by those hired masters of tongue-fence."[40] How far husbands would like to be sent away privily is not a question that Milton cares to discuss; but assuredly, on his own principles, it would have been undignified conduct in a man to force his company on a woman who did not want it. She has, indeed, merely to invoke his own summary argument that "injury to the divorced it can be none; for if she consent, wherein has the law to right her? or consent not; then is it either just, and so deserved; or if unjust, such in

[37] IV, p. 183. [38] IV, p. 22. [39] IV, p. 123. [40] IV, pp. 123, 124.

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all likelihood was the divorcer, and to part from an unjust man is a happiness, and no injury to be lamented." [41]

That the publicity of divorce-court proceedings may act as a deterrent would, from Milton's point of view, be a strong reason for suppressing it. For he holds that separation from an uncongenial partner is not merely a right, but a religious duty.

Sacred things not performed sincerely as they ought are in no way acceptable to God in their outward formality. If personal duties be not truly done, the fault is in ourselves; but marriage to be a true and pious marriage is not in the single power of any person; the essence whereof as of all other covenants is in relation to another; the making and maintaining causes thereof are all mutual, and must be a communion of spiritual and temporal comforts. If, then, either of them cannot or obstinately will not be answerable in these duties, so as that the other can have no peaceful living, or enduring the want of what he justly seeks and sees no hope, then from that dwelling love, which is the soul of wedlock, takes his flight, leaving only some cold performances of civil and common respects, but the true bond of marriage, if there were ever any there, is already burst like a rotten thread.

Then follows perpetual dissimulation and dissension quite against the Christian ideal of marriage and highly displeasing to God, whose law (as Milton conceives it) intervenes to put an end to this deplorable state of things, "loosening a sacred thing to peace and charity, rather than binding it to hatred and contention." [42]

Mill has complained that the divorce question is generally discussed as if the children were everything and the parents were nothing. It might sometimes seem as if to Milton, on the contrary, the parents were everything and the children nothing. He does, however, occasionally remember the existence of the latter. But the difficulty is not one that troubles him seriously. In fact, with his usual ingenuity he makes the children an additional argument for unrestricted divorce.

Nothing more unhallows a man, more unprepares him to the service of God in any duty than a habit of wrath and perturbation arising from the

[41] IV, p. 125. [42] IV, pp. 191, 192.

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importunity of troublous causes never absent. And where the household stands in this plight, what love can there be to the unfortunate issue, what care to their breeding which is the main conducement to their being holy? God therefore knowing how unhappy it would be for children to be born in such a family, gives this law either as a prevention, that being an unhappy pair, they should not add to be unhappy parents, or else as a remedy that if there be children, while they are fewest, they may follow either parent, as shall be agreed or judged, from the house of hatred and discord, to a place of more holy and peaceable education.[43]

Elsewhere law is assigned the office of "appointing the just and equal conditions of divorce," among which no doubt are included the division of property and the guardianship of the children, if any.[44]

As might be expected from his abstract and individualistic method of speculation, Milton totally leaves out of account the reaction on conjugal relations which might be expected to follow from the knowledge that marriage was dissoluble at any moment at the pleasure of either party to the bond. The consciousness that marriage is either indissolvable, or that it can be dissolved only for definite physical reasons and after the deliberate sentence of a public tribunal, is enough of itself in many cases to nip in the bud those growths of dissension which the hope of starting a new life may stimulate to the rankest luxuriance under the favoring influence of natural restlessness or of a vagrant fancy. When Fox spoke of the right of resistance as something that the people should never remember and that the kings should never forget, he put a serious strain on the possibilities of human nature. But that each party to the marriage contract should regard it as binding forever on him or herself, and at the same time as terminable at the pleasure of the other party, would be a state of mind rather conducive to domestic tranquility than possible or conceivable in itself.

For the rest, Milton's views on divorce, whatever their origin or value, remained with him as deep-rooted con-

[43] IV, pp. 192, 193. It must be remembered that when Milton speaks of "God's law," he is referring to the Deuteronomic prescription which, in his opinion, held for all time. [44] IV, p. 125.

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victions through life. They are repeated without modification in the elaborate "Treatise on Christian Doctrine," which was the fruit of his ripest reflection,[45] where they are accompanied by a much more startling moral heresy, the approval of polygamy. This is defended on Scriptural grounds as practised by the Hebrews under God's law and indirectly sanctioned by the Christian Apostles. There is no evidence that he wished to introduce the institution into modern England, but neither had he any objection to it in theory, since "for one man to have many wives" is referred to in his "History of England" as "a liberty not unnatural."[46] In this instance Milton forsakes the guidance of Græco-Roman practice and philosophy to which polygamy was profoundly abhorrent—incidentally falsifying Macaulay's celebrated description of his conception of love as "uniting all the voluptuousness of the Oriental haram and all the gallantry of the chivalric tournament with all the pure and quiet affection of an English fireside." It may not be possible to combine three such disparate elements in a single ideal. But, at any rate, Milton, with his low view of woman, his loose view of marriage, and his latitudinarian view of marital fidelity, had neither the will nor the power to attempt it.

I now pass to a side of Milton's moral philosophy, not less interesting and famous than his theory of divorce, but like that little studied at the present day and therefore imperfectly understood. I refer to his republican ideas and more particularly to his defense of the execution of Charles I. Here also we find what at first sight looks like a complete anticipation of eighteenth-century revolutionary theories, but what in reality is like them a fruit of the Renaissance, a revival of Græco-Roman ideas.

In politics, as everywhere else, the fundamental prin-

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[45] "Christian Doctrine," I, p. 240 (Bohn's edition).

[46] *Ib.*, p. 225, note 1 (quoted by Summer).

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ciple is the assumed Law of Nature, the right of every individual, thing or person, to persist in its own state of being, to resist by any exertion of force that may be necessary the attempt to interfere with it from without. Such a principle is radically opposed to the Oriental philosophy of submission to the divine decrees,—Islam under one form or another,—whence Milton had derived his religion. From Charlemagne on, this Orientalism had expressed itself in European politics under the notion of a certain sacredness attached to the kingly office, held in check, more or less, through the Middle Ages by the counter-notion of Papal supremacy. With the New Monarchy and the Lutheran Reformation, the divine right of kings was threatening to claim undisputed sway, when Calvinism, a product of the uncompromising French intellect, evolved a new center of resistance to loyal authority. Appealing originally to the theocratic idea and to Old Testament theology, the new spirit soon joined forces with the revived tradition of republican antiquity. Milton marks the meeting point,—to this extent at least that he formally admits the necessity of finding sanction for popular liberty in the Scriptures. But here, just as in the divorce question, Biblical texts merely furnish an opportunity for the exercise of legal sophistry. His arguments, where they are sincere, rest on the authority of Greek and Roman precedents and precepts.

What brought Milton's republicanism to a head and gave occasion for its clear expression, was the action of the revolutionary party,—that is to say, of the army and its chiefs, in bringing the king to trial and execution. I presume one may say now without fear of contradiction that Cromwell and his associates adopted this course as a measure of simple expediency, that they were acting in self-defense, and that they put Charles to death because his removal was necessary to their own safety as well as to the preservation of everything for which they had been fighting. Had the king frankly thrown in his lot with the independent party, furnishing adequate guaran-

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tees against Episcopacy on the one hand and the Presbytery on the other, this 'man of blood' would have been willingly restored to his old dignity, and not a word said of 'high and treasonable offences' formerly committed by him. Being, however, unable to gain his assent to any acceptable arrangement, and afraid to leave so dangerous a captive alive, they put him to death, under a false show of legality, by what was in fact a judicial murder.

Milton defends the regicides; but there is no constitutional pedantry about his justification of their act. On the contrary, the arts of political opportunism are lifted into a region of immutable valuations. The power of kings and magistrates is held in trust from the people for the common good of all.[47] And so far from any sanctity attaching to the office of kingship, its possession has a distinctly demoralizing tendency. "Kings are commonly the worst men,"[48] . . . as a rule far inferior to other men and very often fools,[49] brutish and devoid of all sense and reason.[50] So far from reigning by divine right, such persons have no claim on the obedience of their fellows. "When a lawful prince becomes a tyrant or gives himself over to sloth and voluptuousness," the people are dispensed from their oath of allegiance by "the rule of justice, the very law of nature."[51]

Not only may the people refuse to obey a bad ruler, but they may lawfully put him to death in self-defense. That the people may kill a tyrant is taught by nature herself; and a tyrant is one "who regarding neither law nor the common good reigns only for himself."[52] Milton holds this to be a self-evident truth; but for the benefit of those who are only convinced by authority, he justifies tyrannicide by the opinion of the wisest Greeks and Romans. If it is objected that they were heathens, he

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[47] IV, p. 459 ("The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates").

[48] VIII, p. 55. (This and the next three references are to passages in the "Defensio Populi," which I quote according to the old English version in Mitford's edition.) [49] VIII, p. 61. [50] VIII, p. 65.

[51] VIII, p. 126. [52] IV, p. 466.

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further appeals to the Jews, among whom, according to him, "this custom of tyrant-killing was not unusual."[53] His chief example is the slaying of Eglon by Ehud, as an apology for which the divine command may certainly be pleaded. But neither here nor elsewhere does that make any difference. "It was not lawful to kill a tyrant because God commanded it; but God commanded it because antecedently to His command it was a justifiable and a lawful action."[54] Similarly, appeals to the New Testament in favor of passive obedience are summarily invalidated by its "being very certain that the doctrine of the Gospel is neither contrary to reason nor the Law of Nations."[55]

From a more modern point of view, this same "Law of Nations," as interpreted by Milton, seems, to say the least of it, rather barbarous. It appears that "the King of Spain, coming in person to subdue or to destroy us, might lawfully, by the people of England, either be slain in fight or put to death in captivity."[56] Not only would the Puritan publicist have approved of the conduct of Juarez in having Maximilian shot, but it would have been inconceivable to him that there could be two opinions about the execution of the royal filibuster.

Not only may the people kill a tyrant, but any individual who feels a call in that direction may justly do the same. "Men, not to speak of heathen, both evil and religious, have done justice upon tyrants what way they could soonest." Milton would have been much surprised to hear a political assassination described as a dastardly act. He quotes with high approval the ecclesiastical historian Sozomen, to the effect that "not only the Greeks, but all mankind hitherto have agreed that it is a commendable action to kill a tyrant, and that they deserve all men's praise who are willing to die themselves to procure the liberty of all others."[57] What excites the en-

[53] IV, pp. 466, 467. [54] VIII, p. 111. [55] VIII, p. 80. [56] IV, p. 467. [57] VIII, p. 121.

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thusiasm of Sozomen and the sympathy of Milton is the story that the Emperor Julian was treacherously murdered by one of his Christian soldiers on the battlefield.

Milton probably had an obscure consciousness that Scriptural and patriotic authorities were not the safest for his purpose; "generally the people of Asia, and with them the Jews also," being "noted by wise authors [as] much inclinable to slavery."[58] So he falls back on his beloved classics as evidence "that the best of the Romans did not only kill tyrants, as oft as they could and howsoever they could; but that they thought it a commendable and a praiseworthy action to do so, as the Grecians had done before them."[59] Among these commendable actions is the assassination of Julius Cæsar, whom "the best men of that age killed in the very Senate." Nearly a century after Milton, the same approval of Brutus was repeated with impassioned poetic rhetoric by Akenside, and reiterated later still by Coleridge in almost equally impassioned prose. But Coleridge is careful to guard against being understood as approving of tyrannicide in general. He agrees "with Machiavel and with Spinoza, for many and weighty reasons assigned by those philosophers, that it is difficult to conceive a case in which a good man would attempt tyrannicide, because it is difficult to conceive one in which a wise man would recommend it. In a small state, included within the walls of a single city, and where the tyranny is maintained by foreign guards, it may be otherwise, but in a nation or empire it is perhaps inconceivable, that the circumstances which made a tyranny possible, should not likewise render the removal of the tyrant useless."[60]

A stronger reason, perhaps, for the moral condemnation now generally attached to political assassination is that two can play at the game; and this must have

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[58] IV, p. 459. [59] "Pleasures of the Imagination," Bk. II.

[60] "The Friend," II, pp. 171-177 (fourth edition, Lond., 1850), where also the passage in Akenside will be found.

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been rather forcibly brought under Milton's notice by the hope of his royalist opponent, Saumaire, "that such men as Harmodius and Thrasybulus will rise up amongst us and make expiation for the king's death by shedding their blood that were the authors of it."[61] And, assuredly, Cromwell was as fair a mark for the patriot's dagger as Julius Cæsar had been.

A few theological prejudices of no practical importance, and belonging more to his age than to his character, were all that in principle distinguished Milton from the French revolutionists of a century and a half later. To him as to them the will of the people, as determined by a majority of votes, counted for nothing when it collided with his political convictions. He ignores the fact that an immense preponderance of public opinion condemned the execution of Charles I. In 1660 he becomes painfully aware that a free popular vote would call for the immediate restoration of Charles II. He then discovers,—or rather, perhaps it was always his opinion,—"that most voices ought not always to prevail where main matters are in consideration."[62] That minority of the Long Parliament which set up a Commonwealth was "bound by the Law of Nature only,"[63] which, it seems, prescribes that form of government for all mankind, whether they like it or not. For, to repeat what has been already quoted, "what Nature and right reason dictates we are not to gather from the practice of most nations, but of the wisest and most prudent," such as "the Grecians, the Romans, the Italians, the Carthaginians, with many other."[64]

"The dictates of nature and right reason" was in truth no more than a circumlocution for Milton's own opinions. When Cromwell turned out the Rump, he does not seem to have raised any protest. But when, in October, 1659, after a brief resuscitation, the same body was a second time dissolved by military violence, his horror was ex-

[61] VIII, pp. 157, 158. [62] V, p. 424. [63] V, p. 422. [64] VIII, p. 137.

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treme. What, he asks, prevents the armies of Holland, France, and Venice from similarly making themselves supreme in the State? Before all things "the Light of Nature."[65] Under the guidance, we may suppose, of the same kindly light, he invites Monk, a few months later, to pick a Republican Parliament; and should the "gentlemen thus convocated refuse these fair and noble offers of immediate liberty," the general is to choose other gentlemen of a more amenable disposition for the purpose of forcing the English people to be free.[66]

No student of the history of the French Revolution can fail to be reminded of those repeated attacks on the representative principle, in whose sinister chronology such tragic records of guilt and shame are dated, with such lovely idyllic names,—Vendemiaire, Fructidor, Floreal, Prairial, Brumaire,—by which the will of the French people, whether Jacobin or royalist, was continually baffled, and the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy delayed for twenty years.

To recapitulate: Milton as a moral and political philosopher is a true child of the Renaissance, a representative of the Græco-Roman far more than of the Christian or Protestant tradition. His acceptance of Scriptural Christianity, interpreted in the Hellenic spirit, is sincere, but he practically identifies it with the anarchic individualism of a metaphysical nature-worship. Liberty with him is saved from being a mere abstraction by its close alliance with the experimental genius of England. When the crust of Biblicism is removed, we recognize in him a precursor of the ideas that animated the eighteenth century and the French Revolution. Let me add that Milton is in his prose rather than his poetry the precursor of Wordsworth, Byron, Shelley, and Swinburne.

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[65] V, p. 402. [66] V, pp. 456, 457

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THE INFLUENCE OF THE DARWINIAN THEORY ON ETHICS.*

B. BALMFORTH.

SELDOM has a greater change taken place in the world of thought than that caused by the almost universal acceptance of the Darwinian theory of evolution. The change, which might well be called revolutionary, has been compared to that caused by the substitution of the Copernican for the Ptolemaic theory in astronomy. In every department of scientific activity, the evolution theory may now be said to have become the governing conception of thought. It is true there are important points in the theory on which men of science still differ, but their differences are differences about the method, not about the fact of evolution itself. We think and speak in terms of evolution, and the theory has so far permeated all our thinking that not only biological science, but ethics, economics, and social and political theories and institutions, are beginning to feel the influence of the new ideals and methods of thought which the theory has brought with it. An overwhelming accumulation of facts, drawn from nature and history, has broken down the old conception of things, and has compelled us to adopt new conceptions and adapt our mental and spiritual outlook to the new world of knowledge. It is the object of this paper to emphasize the influence of this great change of thought in so far as it has affected, or is likely to affect, our ethical relationships and outlook.

Fifty years ago, when Darwin's "Origin of Species" was first published, a feeling of indignation and despair passed through certain circles of thought. Many minds were filled with indignation at the thought that the ground

* A paper read before the South African Association for the Advancement of Science.

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was so completely cut from under many ancient and cherished theories. Others were in despair in that the very foundations of both religion and ethics seemed to be quaking under their feet. Looking back upon the stormy controversies which followed the publication of that remarkable book, one may well wonder both at the horror-stricken anathemas of theological extremists and the pessimistic forebodings of more thoughtful and charitable minds. We can see now the clear gain which has come to humanity, and how the whole field of ethical study has been enriched by the vast mass of knowledge which Darwin and his fellow-laborers and successors have brought to our minds. Ethical advance has become clearer and surer. Science, which is organized knowledge, has shown itself once more to be the willing servant and helper of humanity. It has shown, quietly, unobtrusively, and even unintentionally, that where any speculative system or theory of life is founded upon error that system or theory is doomed to decay, and deserves its doom.

Much, indeed, of what was thought to be indissolubly bound up with the most cherished convictions of men has, during the past fifty years, gone by the board. The ancient story of the fall of man is now either allegorized, or has given place to the more scientific theory of the gradual ascent of man,—with important consequences to ethical science. In the light of this wider truth, our attitude towards sin and moral evil, and our treatment of them, have undergone great modification. The theory of religious exclusiveness also has had to give way before the study of the religious history of mankind and the wider revelations of truth which comparative religion, the progress of science, and the evolution of the human mind have brought to view, with the result that our ethical relationships and duties towards so-called heathen races have undergone considerable modification. On the other hand, there have been great positive gains. The spiritual and idealistic view of life, so far from quaking under our feet through the discoveries of science, has been based

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on stronger foundations than ever. One can hardly realize now the despairing state of mind which, fifty years ago, regarded materialism as triumphant, and looked upon the universe as summed up in the words 'Evolution' and 'Law.' The old mysteries remain. We are as far as ever from knowing the constitution of the atom, or from fathoming the mystery of the Energy which binds its elements together. As ever, we stand in the midst of "an infinite and eternal energy from which all things proceed." That is the mystery of philosophy, of ethics, and of religion. He would be a bold man who would say that the theory of evolution has solved that mystery or has plucked out its heart. The theory of evolution, valuable as it is, is helpless here. It knows only a succession of phenomena. It simply brings together the objective facts of life and leaves them unrelated to each other by any binding principle of moral intelligence. Idealism furnishes that binding principle. Here, then, is where the spiritual view of life gains its standing-ground, and it is ground which is firm as a rock. Let us see what it builds on this foundation.

Evolution, I have said, gives us a mere succession of phenomena. Ethics and philosophy examine these phenomena and try to appraise their value. They see that the facts or phenomena which science and evolution present to the intelligence of man, are facts which have a varying value, but which, in the changes which they manifest, betoken a definite principle and purpose at work,—a purpose which seems to demand that progress shall proceed from the simple to the complex, that is, from the physical to the psychical and the ethical. These changes are obviously the result of an interpenetrating spirit or principle of life which manifests order, intelligence, and will, for without intelligence there would be no progress. It is idle to assert, as some evolutionists have done, that these increments of spiritual power, rising from the simplest cell to man, have accrued, as it were, out of nothing or merely as the result of the interplay of blind forces.

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Out of nothing, nothing can come. The meaning of the universe, or such meaning as we can discern here, must be read, not in the dim beginnings of life, but in its potencies, as manifested in its most highly evolved types. To say that the slowly-evolving increments of consciousness are so infinitesimal that they do not count is to shut one's eyes to the problem. The 'infinite and eternal energy' must at least be equal to its highest product. Dr. Edward Caird puts this point very clearly when he says:

> It lies in the very nature of the case that the earliest form of that which lives and develops is the least adequate to its nature, and therefore that from which we can get the least distinct clue to the inner principle of that nature. Hence, to trace a living being back to its beginning, and to explain what follows by such beginning, would be simply to omit almost all that characterizes it, and then to suppose that in what remains we have the secret of its existence. That is not really to explain it, but to explain it away; for on this method we necessarily reduce the features that distinguish it to a *minimum*, and, when we have done so, the remainder may well seem to be itself reducible to something in which the principle in question does not manifest itself at all. If we carry the animal back to protoplasm, it may readily seem possible to explain it as a chemical compound. And, in like manner, by the same minimizing process, we may seem to succeed in reducing consciousness and self-consciousness in its simplest form to sensation, and sensation in its simplest form to something not essentially different from the nutritive life of plants. The fallacy of the *sorites* may thus be used to conceal all *qualitative* changes under the guise of quantitative addition or diminution, and to bridge over all differences by the idea of gradual transition. For, as the old school of etymologists showed, if we are at liberty to interpose as many connecting links as we please, it becomes easy to imagine that things the most heterogeneous should spring out of each other. While, however, the hypothesis of gradual change,—change proceeding by infinitesimal stages which melt into each other so that the eye cannot detect where one begins and the other ends,—makes such a transition easier for the *imagination*, it does nothing to diminish the difficulty or the wonder of it for thought. ("The Evolution of Religion," Vol. I, pp. 49, 50.)

The product of the universe, then, being psychical or ethical, the substratum must surely be psychical or ethical in its nature and purpose. Here we are on the heels of the ancient controversy between ethics and metaphysics, a controversy into which I do not propose to enter. I cannot agree with those who say we must first arrive at some common conclusion with regard to the ultimate

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reality of things before we can frame any consistent ethical theory. Our knowledge of that ultimate reality is necessarily fragmentary, partial, inadequate, and therefore provisional, and subject to revision in the light of wider knowledge. Indeed, I think it would be easy to show from history that men's conclusions in regard to that ultimate reality have frequently stood in the way of ethical advance, and have led to conduct which we now condemn as unethical. Life is a warfare. It is dynamic, not static. Every waking moment has its ethical constraints and behests, and the result or outcome of these enters into our estimate of the nature of reality. I have my own view as to the nature of the ultimate reality, but I should not care to say that this particular view is necessary to any fruitful or consistent ethical theory for another man. We must be prepared to recognize temperamental differences in this matter, for our outlook upon the universe is determined largely by our temperament, that is, by our hereditary mental endowment. It will be sufficient for my purpose here if I indicate my standpoint, which, briefly, is this,—that inherent in every form of life, however lowly, there is a desire, a craving, a love for something higher than self. This something in man we may call his moral and affectional nature. Readers of Spencer, Darwin, Wallace, and Drummond will remember that magnificent poem of evolution which science has presented to us in the gradual unfolding of this, the *highest* attribute of life,—how, from the lowliest beginnings and by the smallest increments of power, the seat of consciousness developed, how the cerebrum and the cerebellum grew larger by almost imperceptible degrees, how the gray matter of the brain slowly became more deeply furrowed and of finer quality, how, as the moral and intellectual faculties developed, man began so to order his environment that the environment, in its turn, reacted upon and strengthened that development through family, tribal, national, and racial customs, organizations, and institutions, until this moral and affectional nature arrived

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at the stage at which we see it to-day. Out of the deeps that moral nature comes, yet it must first have been in the deeps ere it could arise out of them. Hence the "Infinite and Eternal Energy from which all things proceed" must have a nature, a positive character, from which its offspring draw the spiritual material for the warp and woof of life. It cannot be signified or represented by a cipher. It is through evolution that we learn its significance, its character. Evolution gives us the facts, science arranges and classifies them, philosophy and ethics assign to them their value and help us to determine the aim of life accordingly. For life is not a simple series of isolated states, a mere disconnected fragment of nature; it is a complex something bound together by a pervasive intelligence and will, which, as it expresses itself in our individual life, judges, condemns, and approves in accordance with a higher realm of ideas, which look down upon that sense-life which is the channel or instrument through which evolution, in its higher aspect, works. Hence, the fact that man is not a mere fragment of nature, but stands, in his spiritual essence, apart from and above nature, and, while partaking of her life, questions, judges, uses, and at times despairingly condemns her,—this fact, I say, lifts him out of the realm of mere physical cosmic processes, and leagues the highest part of him,—his personality,—with something which is infinite and eternal. It is here that the theory of evolution has so deeply influenced the development of philosophic, ethical, and religious thought. So far from getting rid of the old mysteries it has brought them back in new and more deeply spiritual guise to stimulate the eternal hunger of the soul. Hence the commanding place which the science of ethics occupies in our life and thought, claiming the right to be heard on these supreme questions of life, *e. g.*, the norm or standard of moral judgment, the aim of life, the value of life to the individual, and the relation of the individual to the whole.

If we pass from a consideration of evolution in general

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to the methods by which it works and the results which it brings about, we shall see at once how closely bound up its processes are with ethical considerations, and how deeply the theory has influenced modern ethical speculation. Here, again, the whirligig of time has brought about a very definite change in opinion as to what evolution and the struggle for existence implies. It was at one time thought by many that that struggle, with its concomitant of the survival of the fittest, meant a blind warfare between different species, or between individual members of the same species, a warfare determined mainly by brute strength or cunning, and unconditioned by moral forces, ends, or aims. This interpretation of the theory seemed to fix itself in the public mind for a time, and "Nature, red in tooth and claw," came to be regarded as a great force dominating and controlling evolution. But a deeper consideration of the theory soon brought new, or rather neglected, factors into the foreground. It soon became obvious that the interpretation of the word 'fittest' must depend on the conditions to which life has to adapt itself. As I have pointed out elsewhere:

> In a community of foxes the most cunning fox would survive; in a pack of wolves the wiliest and strongest wolf; while in a community of ants, those which had the least power of intelligent coöperation would be the first to become extinct. And it is equally obvious that the interpretation of the word 'selection' must vary in every grade of life, with every rise in intelligence—intelligence being, in normal circumstances, the prime factor which determines selection. Our garden roses would soon degenerate were not the selective intelligence of the gardener brought into play. Hence, intelligence, whether self-determining or brought into play from without, is obviously one of the conditions which determine fitness. But there are even higher determining conditions than intelligence, for intelligence alone may manifest itself in mere cunning. The qualities of prudence, temperance, fidelity, sympathy, coöperation, self-sacrifice for a common good—all these are amongst the determining conditions of fitness, for a people that has these qualities will always be able to hold its own against an imprudent, intemperate, unfaithful, unsympathetic, and selfish people. As Darwin himself says, "A tribe rich in moral qualities would spread and be victorious over other tribes, and thus the social and moral qualities would tend slowly to advance and be diffused throughout the world because they were the fittest to survive."[1]

[1] See article on "Darwinism and Empire," *Westminster Review*, July, 1902.

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All this is now commonplace to the thoughtful evolutionist, but it is necessary to emphasize it occasionally, for I submit that this consideration throws great light, not only on the methods of evolution, but on the nature of the spiritual forces which are working in and through evolution. I am not one of those who shut their eyes to the darker sides of nature, or who, burying their heads, ostrich-like, in the sands of what Viscount Morley calls a "complacent religiosity," pretend that everything is for the best in the best of all possible worlds. The evils which surround us, many of which seem to be bound up with life itself as we know it, are too palpable to be ignored or minimized by any clear-sighted or right-thinking mind. But, on the other hand, this upward life-tendency, which is everywhere observable in nature, cannot be ignored either. If it does not give us all the light we desire, it gives us enough to show the way we ought to go. For if nature's way is, in the long run, upward, then our way is upward too, and the lower reaches of nature, in so far as they seem to contradict or militate against this upward tendency, are to be avoided, not imitated, by us. "But we have sprung from these lower reaches!" So we have. But because the darkness of the night gradually and by imperceptible degrees gives place to its apparent opposite, the light of day, that is no reason why we should deny the light or try to adapt our sight and life to conditions of darkness. Professor Huxley's dictum, that the cosmic process is at issue with the ethical process is only half a truth, even if that, for the cosmic process *included* the ethical process, and, on the higher planes of life, both are often at one. The struggle for existence, even in the lower reaches of life, implies the observance of certain elementary rules of conduct, non-observance of which may bring death to the individual and extinction to the species or race. The teaching is clear. Natural selection means, for us, not merely the selection of the fittest in any given surroundings, it means the fittest and the best in the fittest and the best surroundings which are likely to aid

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in the development of ever more perfect, or less imperfect, types of life. Nature's command is: Grow more intelligent, more justly sympathetic, more moral,—or, perish.

Neither must it be thought we are mere *products* of evolution. Such a conception would strike at the root of ethics and would leave us to watch, with folded hands, for whatever the blind gods of Fate might send. We are factors in, and not merely products of, evolution, and our moral ideals and judgments help to determine the process. Hence, the production of such an environment as will help in the evolution or development of the best and highest types of life should be the first business of the philosopher, the teacher, the legislator, the parent, the minister. It is the business of ethics to discover the conditions of such an environment, and it is the chief business of the parent, the teacher, the sociologist, and the legislator to arrange the affairs of the home, the school, society, and the state, in such a way as will conduce to its realization. In doing this several considerations naturally present themselves:

(1) If natural selection is to have fair play, to what extent should the laws of inheritance, and the laws and customs which determine the distribution of the 'unearned increment' be modified in order that all may have a fair start in the battle of life, and freedom of opportunity be given to everyone to develop the best that is within him? (2) To what extent will the forces underlying natural selection be modified by this freer, healthier, and juster environment? (3) Will natural selection be ultimately superseded by what is termed 'artificial' or intelligent selection? (It follows, of course, from what I have said above, that artificial selection is really a part of the natural, using the latter word in its widest sense.) (4) To what extent will racial developments, racial antipathies, and racial strife and competition be affected by the struggle for existence and the methods of artificial or intelligent selection to which it may give rise?

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I can deal with these four considerations in only a very brief and inadequate way, as suggesting matter for discussion rather than as laying down definite conclusions.

(1) First, then, if natural selection is to have fair play, the state must see that all have a reasonably fair start in the battle of life. Few people now-a-days will contend that there is much regard for morality or ethics in our present laws of inheritance. Long ago Matthew Arnold pointed out that no civilization could endure for long which was based on such laws. That a millionaire or a multi-millionaire whose wealth has been made by very questionable means, should be allowed to tie up and bequeath this immense stock of socially produced wealth to whomsoever he pleases, without any consideration for the welfare of the society which has enabled him to accumulate his wealth, is one of those customs which, as a result of modern ethical developments, is already undergoing considerable modification. When his accumulations consist of what is really 'unearned increment,' the injustice becomes more glaring; and when those to whom he bequeaths his gains are obviously unfitted to use the enormous powers which great wealth places in their hands, the evil effects upon society are still more patent. It is artificial selection carried to an absurd and pernicious extreme, often giving undue advantages to the least desirable types of character. The millionaire is rapidly coming to be regarded not only as a social, but also as a moral monstrosity. One of the more enlightened ones has already enunciated the doctrine that no man should die rich. The new ethics, in the interest of the general good, will insist that no man should live unduly rich. It will emphasize the fact that robbery by the individual from the community is as immoral as robbery by the individual from other individuals. And it will point out that such robbery produces depraved and undesirable types in three directions,—types which become ethically diseased or depraved by the excessive luxury and power which inordinate wealth gives; other types which become para-

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sitic on the former, and which help to spread throughout the community a truly loathsome spirit of subservience and servility; and a third type, which is deprived sometimes of the very necessaries of physical health, and often of the opportunity for intellectual, moral, or spiritual development by the unjust usurpations of the two first named. To use an expressive phrase of Mr. Ruskin's, just as modern industrial developments exterminated the "crag-barons" of feudalism, so the higher social conscience developed by evolutionary ethics will, in time, exterminate the "bag-barons" of modern commerce and finance. As a means towards a more intelligent natural selection and survival of the most desirable types, it will urge that all unearned increment, whether of land or other forms of wealth, should be handed over to the State and used for the general good, more particularly in the endowment of childhood and the various forms of education, so that the younger members of the community may enter the struggle for existence on fair terms. As Mr. Francis Galton points out: "The best form of civilization in respect to the improvement of the race, would be one in which society was not costly; where incomes were chiefly derived from professional sources, and not much through inheritance; where every lad had a chance of showing his abilities, and, if highly gifted, was enabled to achieve a first-class education and entrance into professional life, by the liberal help of the exhibitions and scholarships which he had gained in his early youth." It would take me too far afield to attempt to forecast or discuss the great changes which such a policy would bring in the evolution of new industrial, æsthetic, and moral types. It is sufficient to say that progress has two roots,—the economic and the spiritual,—the latter including the intellectual, æsthetic, and moral relationships of men, each having its separate growths or causal series; and it is by the reciprocal action of the two that human evolution, or moral and social progress, is made not only possible, but, I think I may say, inevitable. In any case, it is

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obvious that just as the evolution of ethical ideas affects social customs and institutions, so will the modification of social customs and institutions affect evolution and selection, and therefore, the types of character which evolution produces.

(2) To what extent will the principles underlying natural selection be modified by this superior environment? It is difficult and perhaps idle to attempt to forecast the types of character which this so-called artificial selection will tend to produce. Much will depend upon the ideals which mankind may have formed and which the state may strive to realize. In a society dominated by the ideals of science, the scientific character and the scientific type will be fostered. Already our educational institutions and our educational policy are being influenced, though perhaps not yet consciously influenced, by such ideals. There is not the least doubt that, in the long run, the forces which make for a superior kind of so-called artificial selection will begin to tell,—indirectly I mean. Every extra pound, taken from unearned increment which is at present spent on 'freak dinners,' and devoted instead to public education, is so much wealth and energy devoted to foster one type of character as against a lower and baser type. What form, in every given case, public education should take, what amount of money should be devoted to it, what particular aptitudes should be stimulated, what traits developed, what opportunities given to the superior types, and what measures should be taken for the surveillance, or even the suppression of such methods of industry and life as tend to injure or undermine the health of the individual, and through the individual, the race,—all these are questions which are full of interest to the student of ethics, questions the solution of which will have a very direct influence on the working of the principle of natural selection. The chief point, however, which I wish to emphasize is this,—that evolution, so far from promoting the survival of that individualistic type of morality which the phrase 'the survival of the fittest' seems to some people to imply, pro-

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motes and strengthens rather the survival of those forms of life which embody the social ideal of morality. The personally upright man cannot survive, or finds it difficult to survive, in a society in which personal rectitude is of no account. Galton, I think it was, pointed out long ago how severely the best types of life suffered during the prevalence of the persecuting spirit of the later middle ages. The very phrase, 'personal morality,' cannot be adequately defined apart from a complementary conception of civic virtue,—so closely is character bound up with citizenship,—so that civic virtue is necessitated by evolution if the best types of life are to survive.

(3) Closely connected with the above is the question as to whether the methods of artificial selection will be carried so far as to take the place of natural selection. It is sometimes urged that the tendency of modern civilization, especially where it is animated by Christian ideals, is to preserve rather than to eliminate the unfit, and that the multiplication of charities, hospitals, and philanthropic institutions, tends to produce and prolong the existence of a weak, nerveless, and decadent population. The only way to avoid this, it is said, is to carry artificial selection to such an extent as to segregate or otherwise deal with the morally depraved or the physically inferior or infected types, and allow only the fit types to propagate their species. Sympathy, it is said, may be carried too far,—so far, that the multitude on whom it is expended may become a drag and an encumbrance on the nation which has to bear the added burden imposed by the presence in society of a relatively large number of weaklings and incapables who are allowed to propagate as they please. We are told by Mr. Sidney Webb that the average number of offspring amongst English intellectuals is only 1.5. In the criminal, depraved, and imbecile classes it ranges between 6 and 7 per family. Leaving the moral point on one side for a moment, it may be pointed out that the policy of segregation is already carried out to a certain extent. We segregate imbeciles, lunatics, and crim-

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inals. To what extent the same policy should be adopted with regard to chronic physical and hereditary diseases is a matter of opinion, and opinion is strongly growing in this direction. Whether public opinion on this matter should crystallize into law is a question which I cannot now stop to discuss. But I may point out on the other side that society has not yet taken sufficiently active steps in the direction of eliminating disease by sanitation; the provision of a healthy environment and healthy conditions of labor; education, physical, mental, and moral; and the provision of means of pure and cleanly living, to justify it in going far in the direction of a policy for the compulsory segregation of the physically unfit. As showing what may be accomplished by a purer and healthier environment, Professor Henry Jones points out that the Poor Law Inspector of Glasgow sends every year into the country districts of Scotland numbers of little children found in the streets, "picked up selling newspapers between the knees of drunkards in public-houses." These children are "born invariably of the worst parents," but on being placed in proper homes and good surroundings they usually turn out all right. They are kept under close observation for years, and out of 630 children so sent out and brought up, only 23 turned out bad,—"a smaller proportion," the Inspector playfully added, "than if they had been the sons of ministers or professors."

We must also bear in mind that many persons who might, by some, have been regarded as mentally and physically unfit,—the apostle Paul, for example,— were men who reached the topmost heights of personality. Genius is often near allied to madness. We must remember also that the policy of segregation (and the more drastic policy advocated by some eugenists), if carried too far, though it might appear to promise obvious and immediate advantages, would have less obvious but none the less certain and serious dangers which would more than neutralize any advantages it might bring. The moment we begin to tamper with the roots of human sympathy,

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that moment are we on a dangerous incline which might lead us to a worse than Pagan cruelty, selfishness, and slavery. We might find that the discouragement of the growth of human sympathy, leading to the segregation or the extinction of our less fortunate fellow-creatures, might so affect our civilization that its very root and basis would begin to canker and decay. And here let me say that I am not one of those who look upon charity, as it is usually understood, as one of the highest of virtues. There is a morbid, unhealthy spirit abroad which seems to take the view that self-sacrifice, as self-sacrifice, is a good thing in itself, and that it is necessary that we should have a certain number of unfortunate members of society, —the halt, the maimed, the blind, the imbecile,—for the purpose of stimulating the sympathetic virtues of charity and self-sacrifice in our fellows. Such a view of life seems to me to be morbid and unhealthy. It is "more life and fuller that we want," and the mission of the greatest of teachers was well said to have been to give life and "to give it abundantly." By all means let us have the superman, if we can get him without the loss of those qualities which have brought human nature to its present level from savage and barbarous beginnings. A healthy public opinion will do much towards creating, fostering, and deepening that sense of responsibility which should be felt by all who take upon themselves the duties of parenthood. How far we should go in enforcing the prior conditions of parenthood which that sense of responsibility should teach us to secure, is a question much too large for discussion in this paper, but there is no doubt that the evolutionary ethics of the future will give the question serious consideration. Already, indeed, we may all describe ourselves as moderate eugenists when the health and welfare of our own descendants are concerned.

4. The fourth question suggested by a consideration of the problems surrounding the survival of the fittest and the best, *i. e.*, the extent to which racial developments and

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antipathies will be affected by the struggle for existence and by methods of artificial or intelligent selection, is one which may well appal the stoutest heart and mind when we think of the many and grave issues which are involved. A great conflict of races, the East with the West for example, is not by any means an improbable event, when we consider the result of the late war between Russia and Japan, and the racial developments which are so rapidly making their influence felt in the economic and industrial world, especially in the United States, Canada, and Australia, not to mention South Africa. There are some who speak of these racial antagonisms in a light and airy way, and say, "Let the conflict between West and East come,—the law of the survival of the fittest must prevail there as in other spheres of life." Such people do not know the strength of the forces and passions of which they speak so lightly, neither do they sufficiently consider whether a racial war would really decide all the issues, or even the chief issues involved. It is too often forgotten, that, as far as the survival of races is concerned, a war decides little or nothing. Even a conquered race may be so prolific, or may so use its natural capacities, advantages, and power of adaptability to varying conditions, as to modify the characteristics of a temporarily conquering race, or even to absorb such a conquering race altogether, as the Anglo-Saxons absorbed the Normans. It is said, for example, that when Chinese or Japanese intermarry with Europeans, the Eastern type tends to persist as against the European. It cannot be too strongly insisted upon that on this point war settles nothing; while the notion of holding some five hundred millions of Eastern people permanently in subjection,—even if they could be conquered,—is surely too wild even for the wildest Jingo to entertain. As Mr. Bagehot in his "Physics and Politics" points out, in a very pregnant sentence: "Military morals can direct the axe to cut down the tree, but it knows nothing of the quiet force by which the forest grows." Hence, the moment the period of conflict is over,

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all the other more permanent and persistent determining conditions of struggle and progress come into play.

What then, is the teaching of evolutionary ethics in this matter? It is surely to pay more attention to these determining conditions of survival, and to do all in our power, by conference, by conciliation, by education, by respect for national rights and national religions, and by international deputations and congresses, to bring the best thought of each civilization into sympathetic contact with that of the other, and so promote the establishment of that "paramount authority of right reason" which will make for the development of a sense of world-citizenship, and the constitutional machinery by which it may be fostered. As Darwin himself said: "As man advances in civilization, and small tribes are united into larger communities, the simplest reason would tell each individual that he ought to extend his social instincts and sympathies to all members of the same nation, though personally unknown to him. This point being once reached, there is only an artificial barrier to prevent his sympathies extending to men of all nations and races." Already a beginning has been made in this direction. This year a Universal Races' Congress will meet in London for the purpose of discussing racial, national, political, sociological, economic, and commercial questions in this spirit. And it is only by discussing our problems in this spirit that we can promote, directly within each nation itself, and indirectly by the friendly rivalry of races and nations, the survival of the best types. Just as Dante had his dream of a world-empire from the point of view of the mediæval spiritually-minded Catholic, so the modern evolutionist may have his dream, not perhaps of a world-empire, but of a world-commonwealth in which the penetrative power of ideas, and the freedom of the spirit in assimilating and propagating ideas, shall triumph over the brute conditions of struggle which have hitherto been the determining conditions of survival. New types begin in the realm of consciousness, in the dim dawn of an ever-ascending conscious-

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ness, and it is to this ever-evolving and developing conciousness,—with full opportunities given to it to manifest its life at its best,—that we must look for the emergence of those higher types which this secret and mysterious realm holds within its illimitable domain.

It will be obvious, I think, from this paper, that the Darwinian theory of evolution has enriched the whole field of ethical study. It has brought new ethical problems to our notice and has shown how intimately connected the science of ethics is with evolutionary thought. Whether our individual standpoint is naturalistic or spiritualistic, we cannot but express our indebtedness to the labors of the evolutionists, and join hands together in the work of endeavoring to solve the problems which this great upheaval of thought has brought more fully and clearly into the light of day. The cause of ethical progress is a platform on which all can meet.

RAMSDEN BALMFORTH.

CAPE TOWN.

THE ETHICS OF THE BHAGAVADGITA AND KANT.

S. RADAKRISHNAN.

MUCH has been made of the apparent similarity between the ethical systems of the Bhagavadgita and Kant, the critical philosopher. To the superficial reader, the similarity is no doubt striking. Both systems preach against the rule of the senses; both are at one in holding that the moral law demands duty for duty's sake. In spite of the agreements between the two systems, however, sober second thought will disclose differences of great moment. In the present article, the writer has neither the space, nor is he competent, to make a critical study of the two systems. All that he can hope to do, is to lay bare the practical side of the Vedanta system, or, more accurately, the Bhagavadgita, and to com-

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pare its teaching with that of Kant on the fundamental questions of free will, the moral problem, and the law of duty.

In the Vedanta system, religion, metaphysics, and ethics are so closely bound up, one with another, that it is difficult for us to separate them. One can, however, state, without fear of contradiction, that the elements of a science of ethics, though not a perfected system, are to be found there. The main questions and topics of dispute are the same as those which occupy the attention of the western moralists. Hedonism and rationalism, in all their varieties, struggle for supremacy. The Katha Upanishad declares in unambiguous language, that the good or the ethical ideal ought not to be identified with pleasure: "The good is one thing, the pleasant another; these two, having different objects, chain a man. It is well with him who clings to the good; he who chooses the pleasant, misses his end."[1]

Ethics, in the Vedanta system, appears in the phenomenal realm, or the sphere of relativity. Reality, according to the Vedanta, has two aspects, the higher and the lower, the fixed and the changing, the absolute and the relative. The higher aspect of reality is Brahman, the unconditioned, infinite, and perfect. The lower aspect, or the universe, appears and disappears, in turns, in the higher reality of Brahman. The theory does not deny the reality of the world or the individual souls in it. The plurality of individual souls and the material universe are not 'real' in the absolute sense of the word, for they are subject to change. They are only relatively real. Ethics belongs to this world, which is real for all practical purposes. The late Professor Max Müller says: "For all practical purposes, the Vedantist would hold that the whole phenomenal world, both in its objective and subjective character, should be accepted as real. It is as

[1] Max Müller, "The Upanishads," p. 8 (Sacred Books of the East Series, Vol. XV).

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real as anything can be to the ordinary mind. It is not mere emptiness, as the Buddhists maintain."[2]

But it may seem to some that the very conception of the ethics of the Bhagavadgita is impossible, since it is incompatible with a belief in the doctrine of karma. What is the use of teaching and preaching about duty if a man's predetermined condition renders him incapable of profiting by the counsel? What is the use of applying moral judgments, if man's actions do not represent his character? Freedom of the will is the fundamental postulate of morality, without which the moral life loses its integrity. Plainly, there can be no such thing as Vedanta ethics. This idea is expressed in the tersest and most extreme terms by Hegel, one of the greatest of the world's philosophers, when he says: "No morality, no determination of freedom, no rights, no duties have any place here; so that the people of India are sunk in complete immorality."

But the cautious reader of the Bhagavadgita will find that the real meaning of karma does not exclude free will. In a verse of that famous book we find it said: "Every sense has its affections and aversions to its objects fixed; one should not become subject to them, for they are one's opponents."[3] The law of karma, or necessity, is true. Every action will be followed by its proper result; every cause has an effect. Our actions in our past life have resulted in certain fixed tendencies, which are termed 'affections' and 'aversions.' A Nyaya aphorism declares that "our actions, though apparently disappearing, remain, unperceived, and reappear in their effects as tendencies" (pravrittis). But we must not become 'subject' to them. We are, so to say, tempted to act according to these tendencies; but we must not allow them to have their own way; we must not surrender our-

[2] Max Müller, "The Vedanta Philosophy," p. 161.

[3] "Bhagavadgita," p. 56. References are to Telang's translation in Sacred Books of the East Series.

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selves to the senses, through which alone the tendencies show themselves.

Karma, thus, is a name for the sumtotal of the tendencies with which a man is born; along the lines marked out for him by his inner nature and outer circumstances, man has to develop a character, good or bad. The universal of law of karma has nothing to do with the *real* man, if he understands what is his *real* nature. We have to throw off the yoke of the passions and rise to rational freedom; in exercising the power of reason to subjugate the senses, or the given element, man is free. To adopt a metaphor, wind and tide have to be controlled by the steersman's mind; that is, he has to make use of them and see to it that they will carry him to his goal. But, it is urged, should they prove too strong, what is he to do? In spite of the best intentions, owing to the "niggardly provision of a stepmotherly nature," calamity may overtake us. Carve as we will the mysterious block of which our life is made, the dark vein of destiny again and again appears in it. The force of this objection is much weakened by the fact that, according to the Gitaic ideal, virtue consists, not so much in the achievement of any external results, as in the noble bearing of the agent amidst the vicissitudes and accidents of fortune. We are asked to do our duty without caring for the results. "Blessed are the pure in heart." The soul, though it may be opposed in the realization of its volition by many untoward occurrences, would still shine, like Kant's will, "by its own light, as a thing which has its whole value in itself."[4]

This reconciliation of freedom and necessity is sometimes considered to be identical with Kant's solution of the same problem. With Kant, freedom is a matter of inference. In the "Principles of the Metaphysics of Ethics" he says: "Freedom, however, we could not

[4] Kant's "Principles of the Metaphysics of Ethics" (Abbott's translation), p. 11.

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prove to be actually a property of ourselves, or of human nature; only, we saw, that it must be presupposed, if we would conceive a being as rational, and conscious of its causality in respect of its actions, *i. e.*, as endowed with a will" (p. 81). All that we know is that we have such a thing as an absolutely obligatory or categorical judgment: I ought to act in such and such a way, regardless of my inclinations. Thou oughtest; therefore thou canst. But if we regard ourselves as free agents, how shall we avoid laying ourselves open to criticism from the scientific sphere? The foundation of science is the law of universal causality, which we ought not to violate. Some way to hold conjointly both freedom and necessity must be devised; or else our mental house will be divided against itself.

Kant holds that man is both determined and free; determined, with regard to his relations as a member of the phenomenal realm, and free, with regard to his relations as a member of the noumenal realm. The same act is determined when regarded as belonging to the empirical series, and free when we consider it due to the underlying cause, the noumenon. Freedom, therefore, is vested in man, the noumenon; the cause is noumenal, the effect phenomenal. The empirical series of antecedents and consequents is but the phenomenon of the noumenal self.

What shall we say by way of a relative estimate of the two theories? What have the two systems in common? To the question of determinism or freedom, both systems reply, determinisn *and* freedom; but the similarity ends there. On ultimate analysis, we find that Kant offers us only the semblance of freedom and not the reality of it. Moral relations exist in the phenomenal realm; and there, according to Kant, it is necessity that rules. Besides, Kant's solution seems only another form of determinism. If the empirical chain of antecedents and consequents is but the phenomenon of the noumenal self, it is plain that it cannot be other than it is. On such a

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theory, moral regeneration and moral progress seem out of place. As Schurman remarks: "That Judas betrayed Christ, neither he himself, nor any other creature could have prevented; nevertheless, the betrayal was not a necessity, but an act of perfect freedom."[5] The freedom which Kant offers us is thus empty and unreal. The solution offered by the Vedanta theory gives us real freedom, freedom even in the phenomenal realm, where we are powerful enough to check our impulses, to resist our passions, and lead a life of satisfied selfhood in which the lower passions are regulated by reason.

Let us next turn our attention to the origin of the moral problem and the law of morality. The opening section of the Bhagavadgita indicates to us that the problem of morality arises only when there is a conflict between reason and sense, duty and inclination. Had Arjuna been mere reason, there could have been no Bhagavadgita. If, on the other hand, he had been mere sensibility, what would have been the occasion for it? It is because he was dominated by both sensibility and reason, and because, there was a perpetual conflict between them, that we have the Gita. In spite of all his knowledge, prowess, and other admirable qualities, Arjuna is just an ordinary mortal, endowed, among other things, with both reason and sense. Fully convinced of the righteousness of his cause, he comes to the battlefield of Kurukshetra, prepared to meet the enemy and fight to the bitter end. Taking a position between the hostile ranks, whom does he behold? The flower and choice nobility of Indian chivalry drawn up in the order of battle. Looking at the beautiful array of troops in his front, all come to fight in this civil war in which every man's hand was to be turned against his brother's, Arjuna, smitten with despondency, flings away his arms and falls down. He cares not for victory, throne, wealth, or glory, for they have to be purchased at a great cost. They have to be won

[5] "Kantian Ethics and the Ethics of Evolution," p. 7.

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by profaning the religious rites, by destroying so many of God's children, by the regular slaughter of one's nearest and dearest. Arjuna, in deep distress and despair, exclaims:

I do not wish for victory, O Krishna! Nor sovereignty, nor pleasure. What is sovereignty to us, O Govinda! What enjoyments, and even life? Even those for whose sake we desire sovereignty, enjoyments, and pleasures, are standing here for battle, abandoning life and wealth. . . . It is not proper for us to kill our own kinsmen. . . . For how, O Madhava! shall we be happy, after killing our own relatives? [6]

Arjuna had come to the battlefield thinking that it was his religious duty to fight unto the very death; but now the claims of blood and friendship assert themselves in him. Lower passions struggle for the mastery, and doubt divides his mind. And to quell the qualms of an educated conscience, scriptural texts are quoted. Be the cause as righteous as it may, the eternal law which declares, Thou shalt do no murder, has to be violated. Better were it, then, to die than to fight against part of one's own nature.

Here is a situation, a most critical one, requiring a solution. Reason stands against sense; duty is opposed to inclination. Arjuna refers the matter to Krishna, his divine guide: "With a heart contaminated by the taint of helplessness, with a mind confounded as to my duty, I ask you to tell me what is assuredly good for me. I am your disciple. Instruct me who have thrown myself on your indulgence." [7] Krishna asks Arjuna to be of good cheer and fight. He says: There is no cause for grief: you cannot kill or be killed, for you and your relatives are all immortal souls, and though the body be slain in the performance of your duties in life, you and they are, in essence, indestructible. If you shirk from, or decline to do, your duty, you will sin. And, besides, you can never be actionless by shunning action. Life is action and action must go on. Come good or evil, wealth or poverty, do your duty regardless of results.

[6] "Bhagavadgita," pp. 40, 41. [7] "Bhagavadgita," p. 43.

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> Therefore, arise, thou son of Kunti! brace
> Thine arm for conflict, nerve thy heart to meet
> As things alike to thee—pleasure or pain,
> Profit or ruin, victory or defeat;
> So minded, gird thee to the fight; for so
> Thou shalt not sin.[8]

The demands of the lower self, or sense, have to be subordinated to the dictates of reason.

The case of Arjuna is typical of what is taking place every minute of our lives. It expresses what every one of us has often felt, it points out to us how our moral life is, after all, a conflict between duty and inclination, a struggle between reason and sense, and impressively instills into our minds the great truth, that morality consists in doing one's duty. What is the battlefield of Kurukshetra if it is not the battlefield of life? Who is Arjuna if he is not an ordinary mortal endowed with both reason and sense? Who are the Kauravas and others standing in array before Arjuna if they are not the lower passions and temptations? Who is Krishna if he is not the voice of God echoing in every man? Each one of us stands in the battlefield of life, in his chariot of mortal flesh drawn by the horses of his passions and sense faculties. These faculties, according to the ethics of the Bhagavadgita, are to be controlled and intelligently guided by reason and are not to be allowed to carry him to the abysmal depths of ruin.

Kant declares that the problem of morality arises only for beings in whom there is a conflict between duty and

[8] Edwin Arnold, "The Song Celestial," p. 16. Compare: "You have grieved for those who deserve no grief, and you talk words of wisdom—learned men grieve not for the living nor the dead—never did I not exist, nor you, nor these rulers of men; nor will any one of us ever hereafter cease to be . . . therefore do engage in battle. . . . He who thinks to be the killer and he who thinks to be killed, both know nothing. . . . Therefore you ought not to grieve for any being. Having regard to your own duty also, you ought not to falter. . . . But if you will not fight this righteous battle, then you will have abandoned your own duty" ("Bhagavadgita," pp. 43-47).

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inclination, men in whom reason and sense stand opposed. Were we completely members of the rational world, our actions would tally with the law of reason or duty. And again, if we were merely members of the world of sense, our actions would take place according to the laws of sense, and could never be made to conform to duty. "If, therefore, I were only a member of the world of understanding, then all my actions would perfectly conform to the principles of autonomy of pure will; if I were only a part of the world of sense, they would necessarily be assumed to conform wholly to the natural law of desires and inclinations" (Kant's Ethics, page 7).

Thus we find that both the Bhagavadgita and Kant hold that the conflict between duty and inclination is the essential rule of morality, and the suppression of inclination by duty, the condition of moral worth. Though men may agree to differ on this point, it is, none the less, true that only in such a conflict can true moral character be revealed. As Professor Paulsen has said: "Where there has never been a conflict between inclination and duty, where the will has never had an opportunity of deciding against inclination and for duty, the character has not been tested."

Turning our attention to the moral law, we find that both Gita and Kant preach duty for duty's sake. "Your business is with action alone, not by any means with fruit. Let not the fruit of action be your motive to action."[9] "That an action done from duty, derives its moral worth, *not from the purpose* which is to be attained by it, but from the maxim by which it is determined, and therefore does not depend on the realization of the object of the action, but merely on the *principle of volition,* by which the action has taken place, without regard to any object of desire."[10] Thus according to both Gita and Kant, the highest type of morality consists in doing duty for

[9] "Bhagavadgita," p. 48.

[10] Abbott's translation of Kant's Ethics, p. 19.

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duty's sake, without any personal attachment or hope of reward. The moral man must do his duty simply because it is duty. A man's will is good, "not because of what it performs or effects, not by its aptness for the attainment of some proposed end, but simply by virtue of the volition, *i. e.*, it is good in itself."[11]

Thus far the two systems are agreed; but as we proceed we find that Kant excludes from moral actions, actions which are consistent with duty, but yet are done from inclination. A trader is honest from good policy; a man preserves his life 'as duty requires' and not 'because duty requires.' "It is a duty to maintain one's life; and, in addition, every one has also a direct inclination to do so. But on this account, the often anxious care which most men take for it, has no intrinsic worth, and their maxim has no moral import. They preserve their life, *as duty requires*, no doubt, but not *because duty requires*."[12] Acts done from inclination, are not, according to Kant, moral. It is a defect of Kant's ethical theory that he conceives an act of duty as positively indifferent, nay, disagreeable to the senses. He even defines duty as "compulsion to a purpose unwillingly adopted."

The Gita ethics, on the other hand, does not ask us to destroy the impulses, but asks us only to control them, to keep them in their proper order, to see that they are always subordinated to and regulated by reason. By a life of reason the Gita ethics does not mean a passionless life, but one in which passion is transcended. "Great are the senses; greater than the senses is the mind; and greater than the mind is the understanding."[13] Though the Gita ethics does not enjoin upon us the complete eradication of the sensuous impulses, the demand for their control is so insistent as to lead us to think that it also advocates their total suppression.

How shall we explain this outcry against the senses? The Vedanta does scorn the sway of the senses. The Ve-

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[11] *Ibid.*, p. 11. [12] P. 16. [13] Telang's translation, p. 57.

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dantin flies from sensuous pleasure in every form, not because it is sinful in itself, but because it is too apt to endanger the soul by fettering it to that which is earthly and perishable. "Pleasure," says Professor Paulsen in his description of the Christian conception of life, "is the bait with which the devil ensnares the soul to chain it to the world." Things of the earth are the burdens that weigh us down and crush our hearts. Every great religious teacher has taught this important truth. Jesus rightly perceived that it was easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God. Wealth alienates us from God.[14] But this does not mean that we must live a life of passionless quietism. We are not asked to uproot all desires; for that would imply the cessation of all activity. But life is action and action must go on. The Vedanta does not see any evil in the earthly life as such. It does not ask us to withdraw from the ordinary pursuits of life; but it does ask us to renounce the luxuries of life. We are asked to live the spiritual or the unworldly life in the world. The asceticism, if we may say so, which is insisted upon in the Gita ethics, is the asceticism of the inner spirit and not of the outward conduct.

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THE WRITTEN LAW AND THE UNWRITTEN DOUBLE STANDARD.

ADA ELIOT SHEFFIELD.

THE enforcement of a law has its most far-reaching effect in driving home to the public mind a moral standard. Crude though the legal distinctions between right and wrong may be, they on the whole reflect the scruples of the average man, and they go to form the

[14] Paulsen's "System of Ethics" (Thilly's translation, pp. 88*ff*).

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standards of the next generation. How far legislation should anticipate public opinion is a difficult question. A progressive law is probably advisable only when its merits are fairly obvious, and when it runs against no such implanted prejudice as to make enforcement doubtful. But when behind the written law is a tacit assumption at variance with it, the law falls under risk of contempt.

The ill effects of pressing advanced ideals impatiently into statutes show conspicuously in the case of those bearing on the largest number of delinquent women. The problem of the delinquent woman resolves itself into the problem of the social evil. To reclaim girls whose only offense against society is larceny, for instance, is a comparatively easy matter. When there is no question of improper relations with men, the mildest penal measure,—probation,—will as a rule bring shop-lifters or dishonest servants back to the straight path. Even intemperance, though not invariably accompanied by other vice, is apt among women to be at least a contributory cause of the more fundamental lapse. As soon as the other sex shares in a girl's wrong doing, the problem becomes as complex as society itself. The pressure on any weak girl to indulgence with men is so much stronger than any other temptation she meets, that her lack of moral standard usually manifests itself in this way, and with a terrible persistence. Her own nature and circumstances may give impulses in this direction for which she is not herself to blame. A girl is bound to enjoy admiration, and to like men for their own sake. She may have an injudicious mother, or no mother or home at all. Her work may be monotonous and ill paid. Increasing the force of every other temptation, is the disheartening fact that she can earn more money by the sale of her self-respect than by any gifts of mind or character. I think this knowledge must be embittering to many a good girl who never puts it to use. Finally, if she once falls, her shame bars her from respectable companionship wherever it is known.

These causes, constantly operative in society, make of

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the delinquent girl a question of far-reaching civic interest. Probably no problem that comes before social workers is more complex, or more necessary and at the same time difficult to handle in a statesmanlike way. The best intentioned charity may do actual harm, by confining its view to merely one special phase of it. Religious people, for instance, often look at it from a personal, instead of a civic, point of view, solving some difficult situation with a quotation from Scripture about 'the one sinner that repenteth,' 'forgiveness unto seventy times seven,' 'the charity that endureth all things,' etc., etc., when more sophisticated persons know well that to carry such texts out literally would add steadily to the number of sinners in need of repentance. After all, is it meritorious to forgive sins committed, not against oneself, but against other persons, or against society? Such texts, intended presumably to have a limited personal application, appear unpractical, not to say ridiculous, when they are made the literal basis for dealing with a civic situation.

Social workers with a wider outlook will yet often fall into the fallacy of thinking that they touch the social evil itself by striking at some one of its numerous manifestations. The importation of alien women, for instance, is a peculiarly revolting feature of the evil, yet the radical danger to society lies in prostitution itself, and not merely in the 'white slave' traffic. The report of the Immigration Commission states that "to the motive of business profit is due beyond question the impulse which creates and upholds this traffic. Though in all probability many (of these girls) are innocent, in a large majority of cases the women imported contrary to the provisions of our law have already been leading an immoral life abroad." Every decent man despises the wretch who lives on the earnings of this depraved calling, and as for the man who corrupts innocent girls to induce them to enter a life of shame for his advantage, no words are too strong to express one's loathing. But from where does the money-profit come? One would be glad to escape the fact,—

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grimly humorous under the circumstances,—that if all the men in any city, who are following respectable callings, should combine to boycott the business for which these wretches are feeders, the practice itself as well as the traffic would quickly languish. The large amount of money which goes into this vice indicates why delinquent girls offer so difficult a problem. Their support must, in the nature of things, come mainly from men who have money to spend—from fairly steady working men, or from the well-to-do. A New York prostitute from a raided house said to a lady who urged her to leave that life: "If you well-to-do women would keep your husbands and sons at home, there wouldn't be any women like us." Yet, though it is doubtless true that a good many girls are put into prostitution unwillingly, my own impression, drawn from no statistics, but from a dozen years in philanthropic work, has been that the majority of girls in this life could not be considered victims, except in the sense that one may be called a victim of poor environment and injudicious training. These are sufficiently heavy handicaps, yet it is possible, in any given case, to throw responsibility back from the weak to the tempter, from one generation to the generation before it, until one's moral judgment becomes a mere pulp of tolerance. When it comes to the attraction between a man and a woman, it is a nice question to decide which is originally responsible. Half the time the parties themselves do not know. The social evil, in short, has deeper sources than the white slave traffic. It is more serious, because it is the cause, of which the traffic is one shocking effect, and most of all because it is a menace that extends through all ranks and grades of society. Any one who has had opportunity to study prostitution will agree that he is a sanguine person who hopes to see in his own lifetime any appreciable lessening of the evil. One may even doubt whether the time will ever come when populous communities are free from it. One cannot doubt, however, that wise measures and continuous work may greatly decrease its prevalence.

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Like every other great undertaking, the lessening of the social evil will take faith. At present, the average man is more than a sceptic as to the possibility of any genuine improvement in its conditions. The men about a criminal court, for instance, those who have the enforcement of the law in their hands, take the prostitution of a certain proportion of women as a matter of course, a necessity. They no more doubt it than they doubt the necessity for air or for food. They never question the double standard of morality, which condones the man, and ostracises the necessary woman. They would probably admit that indulgence is wrong for a man, just as they would agree that a white lie is not perfectly right. But no one expects to go through life without telling some white lies. It is a high ideal, but impracticable. So with men's chastity, a beautiful ideal,—for the saints. The attitude of the man about town is exemplified in that of a newspaper reporter in the court in which I was probation officer. A number of girls were brought in one morning from a raid in the neighborhood. It transpired that this reporter knew one of the girls in the group only too well. He showed a humorous embarrassment at the situation and withdrew from the court room, but did not appear to feel the slightest shame at its being known. You may say he must have been a poor sort of fellow. Not at all. He had a thoroughly kind heart, and was an industrious and capable reporter: but he knew the standards of the men among whom he was thrown. One of the ablest of the magistrates in New York said to me that he had argued at length with a certain reformer in that city against the proposal to send prostitutes to Bedford Reformatory for three years. He believed it to be unjust to the girl and inexpedient for society. He knew that while society as a collective body was hunting these girls from houses of ill fame, from Raines Law hotels, from the tenement houses, and from off the streets, society as individuals was paying them well to continue their miserable trade. He knew, though perhaps he would not have expressed it in just that

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way, that while a double standard of morality for the two sexes prevails, it means that society does not wish these laws to be enforced. At another time a member of the district attorney's office asked me to talk with a girl whose lawyer represented her as a promising subject for reform. The girl's account of herself and of her plans for the future showed clearly that she had no notion of changing her way of life, and I so reported. The prosecuting attorney, however, decided to let the girl off easily, remarking, "I don't believe in sending these girls to reformatories anyway. It only means that good girls must be sacrificed to fill their places." In other words, he believed that men must have their pleasure. The same feeling was less reflectively expressed by one of the higher police officials, who said to me, "You are a broad-minded woman." (That was his way of saying that he expected me to agree with him.) "You know there's no use trying to reform these women. It's human nature." Since the severest critic of women will not accuse them of being naturally polyandrous, it was of course man's nature to which he referred. It must be said for these men that in one respect they are unexpectedly just: so far as I could judge, they do not feel the contempt for these girls that one often hears of men. It would be the last touch of injustice if they did. As it is, a fair-minded woman must feel her blood boil to see girls arrested, arraigned, and sentenced by men who may not know those particular girls, but who have certainly most of them done each his little part at some time in his life towards the maintenance of their miserable calling.

Now if these particular men instanced, each a creditable representative of his class, believe prostitution to be a social necessity, it means that they consider the present laws of uncompromising repression to be unenforceable. My belief is that any person who understands human nature, and who observes the working of these laws, must hold the same opinion. At present they *are* unenforceable. Why is it that while women are arrested by hundreds for

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soliciting on the streets, the same act on the part of a man, though stamped as a misdemeanor on the statute books, is practically never punished? For two blocks from a high-grade Raines Law hotel near where I lived in New York, men would every evening station themselves at intervals on either side of the street, watching and waiting for some responsive woman. A decent woman could not cast an unguarded glance without bringing some fellow towards her. Yet in the two years and a half for which I worked in the courts of that city I never knew of a man's being even arrested for such an offence. Public opinion does not demand it, and, indeed, would be quite out of sympathy with such a course on the part of the police. If the police were to arrest all the women on the street, close up all the houses they frequent, what would be the feeling of the patrons of these women—the men who pay the money which makes the women themselves and the houses worth blackmailing? These men would feel disgust and indignation at what they would regard as a quixotic interference with nature. Given the double standard of morals, and laws which undertake to repress the social evil are on the face of it futile. This being the case, is it to be wondered at that corruption in the police force follows in the trail of vice? If the police believe, as they undoubtedly do, that hundreds of respectable men do not wish to have such laws enforced, while at the same time they know that by not enforcing them, they themselves will be liable to loss of position whenever a wave of reform sweeps over the city, it can hardly occasion surprise that they accept bribes as a compensation for the risks they run. This is not to excuse graft. It is only to remark that, given these conditions, graft is almost certain to follow. Practical statesmanship must start with human nature as it is, and not as we should like to have it. The New York Committee of Fifteen remark: "A law on the statute books that cannot be enforced is a whip in the hands of the blackmailer. Corruption in the police force can never be extirpated until this prolific source of it is stopped."

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What measures looking toward the restraint of this evil is it possible to enforce? The system, frequently advocated, of placing licensed women and houses under sanitary restrictions, does not, as students of the subject have shown, accomplish what it attempts. In cities where regulation has been or is the method pursued, clandestine prostitution has flourished in spite of it, and the sanitary precautions have proved insufficient to be an effective safeguard. Even were this not the case, the moral objections to such recognition of vice are unanswerable. Segregation, another method of dealing with the evil, is no more practical. Not only does it fail really to segregate, but it makes vice bolder in the districts given over to it, and such districts are likely to become dangerous centers for crime. If license and segregation are disallowed, may not some modification of the existing system make for more actual repression than at present, while lessening the opportunities for blackmail? Soliciting on the streets, practising prostitution in tenement houses, any outward disorder or advertisement on the part of brothels, is a public nuisance, and should be punished as such. But when prostitution goes on in houses given over to that purpose, houses which commit no overt offense, does not practical wisdom advise that it should be left to itself? Society being what it is, why should a girl, unless very young, be sent to a prison or reformatory simply for being a prostitute? The chances are against her reforming. The male partners of her sin keep the respect of the world. To add a legal penalty to her outcast state is to aggravate an injustice.

With a change in the laws should go preventive work for both girls and boys. Measures that increase the comfort and happiness of working girls, will tend to lessen their temptation to enter on a dissipated life. Good boarding houses, ample opportunities for wholesome recreation, improved conditions of labor, will make their path of duty more attractive. The boys offer a larger and more difficult problem. With girls you have a standard of chastity

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already established. In dealing with boys of whatever class you must break down the tradition of self-indulgence. You cannot hope to make such progress in one generation as to offset the tradition of all the generations behind. You can, however, do something to shake their unquestioned acceptance of the double standard. I can think of no more civilizing influence for boys and young men than to stimulate their imagination to put themselves in a woman's place; than to give them a live grasp of the heavier price she pays, not only for her own indulgence, but for theirs; in short, than to think of a woman with something of an unselfish appreciation of her position in the world as compared with theirs. To make men thus unselfish, women must be sincere, and sometimes courageous, in letting men see how they really feel about matters that bear so closely on their lives,—good women, I mean: mothers with their sons, wives with their husbands, even sisters with their brothers. Men cannot be expected to have a regard for women's feelings, unless they are made aware of what those feelings are. Their imaginations, left to themselves, will never enlighten them, because men's experience in life is so different from women's. The chivalry that would withhold a man from helping to drag even a fallen woman down farther, he can learn only from a good woman's loyalty to her sex. It is women who must make men's ideals in such matters as this. Education in hygiene is well enough. Rightly given, it should have an appreciable effect upon the morals of the community. But in order to bring about real improvement, the young man must feel other motives besides those of prudence. He must reflect what the cost is to the woman in the case. She pays and he doesn't, and no amount of money can make up for that injustice. The very fact that there is a double standard, that his pleasure means some woman's ostracism, would make a man who had a woman's imaginative sympathy resolve never to take part in so unfair a deal. But men have not women's imaginative sympathy, and will not divine that wild oats mean not only

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ostracism to the mistress, but disillusionment to the wife. Unfortunately, wives only too often nurse the secret bitterness in their hearts, while they try to smile at what they call romantic ideals. Women can remove the double standard if they wish, first, by being just toward other women, and second, by being honest with men. Doubtless it is a difficult thing for a good woman to understand a bad one, women though they both are. Even long experience with erring girls leaves a refined woman still puzzled as to how any human being can bring herself to lead such a life. As you talk with such girls, you may find yourself judging them with charity, liking them personally, seeing their pretty attractions, while at the same time you remain bewildered that they can put up with their lot, when it gets past the point of their being in love with some particular man. It takes more imagination to bridge a gulf of refinement than to comprehend even great moral differences. The best women feel such a gulf opening when they learn that a man can get pleasure from what is hideously unæsthetic. This feeling, sincerely expressed, is the strongest support to the moral reasons for self control that a woman can possibly hold out to a man. The double standard, with its implication of the social necessity of prostitution, reduces the poetry of life to an ignoble physical fact. I think that this is the fundamental reason why every good woman, high or humble, loathes the social evil.

This is not a matter merely of reforming girls from a humble walk in life. It concerns the relation of every woman with the men she knows best and has the most influence over. It does not mean that any woman need break through the bounds of delicacy in order to be sincere. It certainly is no more indelicate to discuss such a question seriously with men, than to attend the theatre with them to see *Camille,* for instance, or *Mrs. Tanqueray.* To the thoughtful either of these plays opens up the whole subject here discussed—and to the thoughtless it ought to be opened up. A man who can see either of those

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plays without having his ideas of the relation of men and women shaken to the depths, needs sincere talk from a high-minded woman. Every woman should fear lest her silence on this subject be taken as cloaking consent. No woman need fear to disturb a man's complacency by disclosing her repugnance to an unjust social régime. He may rally her as unsophisticated, but in his heart he will know that she is right.

ADA ELIOT SHEFFIELD.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS. By Bertrand Russell, M.A., F.R.S. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1910. Pp. vi, 185.

The first three of the essays collected in this volume are on ethical subjects. Of the other four, two are criticisms of Pragmatism and one of the monistic theory of truth, while the last (the only one not published before) gives Mr. Russell's own view as to the nature of truth. I am concerned in this notice only with the ethical essays, although the others are perhaps better examples of the qualities in which Mr. Russell excels as a philosophical writer. No one knows better than he how to elicit, by a series of subtle discriminations, the premises used by his opponents, and to show the contradictions which they involve; and he applies this method to Pragmatism and to Mr. Joachim's 'coherence' theory of truth with deadly effect. On the constructive side, his present analysis of the difference between true and false judgments is a piece of work of the greatest interest.

The first and longest essay is a sketch of the elements of ethics. Here his starting-point is the position familiar to readers of Mr. G. E. Moore's "Principia Ethica," that good and bad are simple indefinable concepts,—that 'the good' can be described (as, *e. g.*, what ought to exist for its own sake), but that it cannot be defined or analyzed. To establish this position he uses much the same arguments as Mr. Moore did; that is to say, he brings forward, with regard to the chief ideas which it has been proposed to take as the meaning of the word 'good,' various considerations to show that the good cannot plausibly be identified with any of these ideas; and he also has a general argument "by which we can refute those who propose any other idea, such as pleasure, as the actual meaning of good" (p. 7). I am inclined, though, to doubt whether this argument, which resembles that used by Mr. Moore in Section 13 of "Principia Ethica," is quite sound. Mr. Moore's object was to show that, if we deny that 'good' denotes something simple and indefinable, only two alternatives are possible,—either the word denotes a complex, about the analysis of which

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there may be disagreement, or else it means nothing at all; and he showed that it does not denote a complex, by pointing out that, whatever complex be proposed as the definition of 'good,' it is always significant to ask whether that complex is itself good. Mr. Russell, on the other hand, does not expressly consider the possibility that 'good' may mean some complex. None of the proposed definitions of 'good,' he says, are really verbal definitions like those contained in a dictionary; such definitions as that 'good' means pleasure or the will of God do not give us information about the meaning of a word, but tell us something which we feel to be philosophically important; they can be seen, in fact, to be "substantial affirmations concerning the things that are good," and, as such, they assume that the meaning of 'good' is already known. Hence we can say *a priori* that no definition of 'good' is possible. To this I think it might be objected that, unless we already know that good is not a complex (and then Mr. Russell's test is unnecessary), we cannot be sure that there may not be some definition which is not *merely* a statement of the form 'everything that is good is also so-and-so.' The point may be illustrated by the problem as to the definition of beauty. Mr. Moore, it will be remembered, defined the beautiful as "that of which the contemplation with a particular kind of emotion is good,"—let us say for short 'what ought to be admired.' Now here we have what seems to be a 'substantial affirmation' about things that are beautiful: it seems to be true that everything that is beautiful ought to be admired. If, then, Mr. Russell's argument from the general nature of definitions is sound, we ought to suspect that 'what ought to be admired' is not a real definition of 'the beautiful'; but obviously the truth that everything beautiful ought to be admired is no evidence that 'what ought to be admired' is not *also* the very meaning of the word 'beautiful.'

He next discusses various consequences of the view that good is indefinable. In the first place, whatever is good in itself is so independently of anyone's opinion. Again, the fact that such and such things exist, can never throw light on the question what things are good; this is important in connection with the grounds sometimes alleged for religious optimism, and also as refuting the modern view that what survives in the struggle for existence is better than what perishes. From these topics, which spring from the question what 'good' means, he turns

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to the other main branch of ethics,—that concerned with human conduct.

In this part of the subject again his position is fundamentally the same as Mr. Moore's. According to Mr. Moore (*op. cit.*, p. 147), it is 'demonstrably certain' that the answer to every question in practical ethics must be a causal generalization: it is certain that, besides the judgment that certain effects are better in themselves than others, every question about right conduct involves a judgment that these better things are effects,—are causally connected with actions. With this doctrine Mr. Russell agrees; he agrees that one difference between every right and every wrong act consists in the fact that they differ in respect of their consequences. And in discussing the manner in which the rightness of an act depends on its consequences, he is led to distinguish two main senses of the word 'right.' (1) There is a sense of 'right' in which an act is right when, and only when, it is that act which, of all the physically possible alternatives, will actually produce the greatest balance of good on the whole. This act,—the most beneficial act,—is the one which, in one sense, we ought always to choose. It might seem natural to call this the 'objectively right' act, since its rightness is preëminently of the sort that does not depend in any way on the agent's opinion: the most beneficial act will produce the best results whether the agent knows that it will or not. But this is not Mr. Russell's use of the phrase 'objectively right.' For (2) he points out that it is difficult, not to say impossible, ever to know which one of a set of alternative acts will really give the greatest total balance of good. In most cases all we can hope to know is that one act will probably give better results than any alternative; and it is for this act that he reserves the name 'objectively right.' The 'objectively right' act, he decides, is that one among physically possible alternatives which, after taking account of all available data, and after a suitable amount of deliberation, a man has good reason to expect will probably produce the best results.

But there may be, in addition to the fact that they differ in respect of their results, actual or probable, other marks distinguishing every right act from every wrong act; and Mr. Russell recognizes at least two such marks. (1) He tells us that the 'intuitionist' theory, according to which the rightness of an act is to be judged not by reference to results, but

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by the approval of the moral sense, contains part of the truth; and part of what he means by this is, I think, that in one sense of the word 'right' every act is right, irrespective of its results, towards which the agent feels a specific emotion. But (2) part of what he means, and the part on which he lays most stress, is that, besides the sense in which every action is right which has the emotional approval of conscience, there is yet another sense in which an act may be right irrespective of its results; there is a sense in which an act is right, whatever its results, and apart from any specific emotion, provided that it is approved by conscience in a certain non-emotional way. And this sense of right he calls 'subjective rightness.'

These, then, are the four senses of 'right' which Mr. Russell mentions, and it is obvious that to determine precisely their relations to one another is a problem of immense intricacy. As a matter of fact, he confines himself almost entirely to considering the connection between those two of the above senses which he holds to be the most important,—namely objective and subjective rightness. And the principal point which he wishes to make clear about these two senses of 'right' is this. When a man does what is objectively right, in the sense just defined, we say he acts judiciously. But it is possible, it would seem, to act injudiciously,—to be mistaken as to what is objectively right,—and at the same time to act, in some sense, morally, and this sense of 'right,'—the sense in which an act may be 'moral' or 'approved by conscience' without necessarily being objectively right,—is what Mr. Russell's definition of subjective rightness is intended precisely to determine. At first sight it might seem plausible (since we are not taking the approving *emotion* of conscience as the distinctive mark of moral action) to say that an objectively wrong act may be subjectively right if the agent *thinks* it is either objectively right in the sense defined, or at any rate right in some good sense. This view, however, he rejects, mainly on the ground that in adopting it we run some risk of excusing many acts that would commonly be condemned. A selfish man, for instance, when he chooses a course of action which is really far from likely to prove the most beneficial, may honestly think his action right; yet we do not therefore call it moral. Hence Mr. Russell decides that we must look for the distinctive mark of subjectively right or moral acts elsewhere than in the mere fact that the

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agent judges them to be right, and his final definition is as follows: A moral act is one "which the agent would have judged to be right if he had considered the question candidly and with due care." But this definition seems highly ambiguous. Mr. Russell implies (p. 27) that some unreflecting impulses, such as acts of generosity, are moral in this sense; and he does not observe that such acts may, if they are subjectively right, be of two kinds. We have seen that any act may be right, in a sense, which is emotionally approved by conscience; and an impulsive act of generosity is usually, if not always, accompanied by the agent's emotional approval. Now, since Mr. Russell expressly says (p. 18, note) that the emotion of approval is not in question, it follows that, when he implies that some unreflecting generous impulses are subjectively right, he may have either or both of two classes of acts in mind. He may have in mind (*a*) an unreflecting impulse which is accompanied by the emotion of approval. Such an act, we must suppose, he would hold to be moral in two different senses at once; *i. e.*, both in the sense of being emotionally approved by conscience, and in his sense of subjectively right. But (*b*) he may also have in mind such unreflecting impulses (if there are any) as are unemotional; these acts also might come under his definition. It is plain, however, that there is some important moral difference between these two classes (*a*) and (*b*); and it is plain, further, that his definition of subjective rightness also covers a third class of acts (*c*), different both from (*a*) and from (*b*), and morally differing greatly from (*a*). This is a class of acts which may be described as purely mechanical. We might say that a man, who has got into the habit of giving a crossing-sweeper a penny every day as he walks to his office, is acting morally in a sense which would seem to be that intended by Mr. Russell's definition of subjective rightness; for such an act is one which, if the man were to think about it honestly and carefully with a view to discovering whether it was right, he would very likely decide to be right, although as a matter of fact it would probably produce none but the worst results. But (*d*) there still remains a large class of acts to which Mr. Russell's definition seems to apply, and which yet evidently differs in various important respects from each of the above three classes,—the class, namely, of all those acts which we perform after honest and careful deliberation. These acts seem to differ in respect

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of their moral character so greatly both from any unreflecting impulse and from any purely mechanical act, that it is misleading to include them in the same definition. In short, among the differences in the kind of morality belonging to the above four classes of acts which Mr. Russell would call subjectively right, there is one, if not more, which it is probably as important to define as the difference, which is all that he tries to define, between objective and subjective rightness.

The discussion of right and wrong is followed by a section on determinism, in which he shows that determinism does not destroy either the distinction of good and bad or the distinction of right and wrong, and therefore does not interfere with morals, whereas free will does interfere seriously with morals. But I have no space to examine this argument, which raises a very interesting point about the different senses in which an act is *possible*. Next to it come proofs that none of the forms of egoism is valid; and finally Mr. Russell suggests various methods to be employed and fallacies to be avoided in considering intrinsic goodness and badness.

I think it is a pity that at this point he refrains from giving any list or classification, such as that attempted by Mr. Moore in the last chapter of "Principia Ethica," of the things that are good and bad in themselves. Such a list is unnecessary, he thinks, because disagreements about intrinsic value, when people really make immediate judgments of value, are very rare, most disagreements depending on the prejudices caused by false ethical theories. When we have removed the fallacies which are the most fertile source of disagreement as to what things are good in themselves, not much remains to be done; and not only so, but it is not practicable to do more, because, when a man does directly judge something to be good, there is no means of changing his opinion. No doubt it is true that much real agreement is masked by fallacies held consciously or unconsciously; but, even so, Mr. Russell is perhaps slightly too optimistic in thinking that genuine disagreements in immediate judgments of intrinsic value are very rare. For instance, most people take pleasure in very different things and wish to think good as many of the things they like as they plausibly can; and this attitude, which is not usually caused by their holding the false theory that pleasure is good in itself, is not likely to be altered in any large number of cases by getting them to see

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that that theory is false. As a corrective of this tendency, which most of us have, to overestimate the value of many of the wholes into which our own pleasure enters, a careful classification of goods made by a philosopher,—especially when he is so acute and fairminded a writer as Mr. Russell,—might, one would think, be of great use. To some small extent, indeed, this gap is filled by the papers called 'The Free Man's Worship' and 'The Study of Mathematics,' which he appends to his outline of ethics; for these papers describe in glowing language some of the things to which he attaches the very highest value. Among these we may particularly notice certain states of mind. Thus he gives very high praise to that state of mind in which a man, acutely conscious of the badness of the actual world,—of the blind forces of nature and the all-conquering might of death,—overcomes the powers that be, by adoring, in spite of them, the ideals where the mind is at home,—the eternal truths, the supreme and austere beauty of mathematics, and the triumphant transmutations of reality which art effects. Both in mathematics and poetry, he says, we get "the sense of being more than man which is the touchstone of the highest excellence." This Promethean temper, then, of the soul which "builds on the firm foundation of unyielding despair," seems to Mr. Russell very good; but he indicates, as being still better, a temper more akin to Stoicism. We must learn the lesson of calm renunciation: "to abandon the struggle for private happiness, to expel all eagerness of temporary desire, to burn with passion for eternal things,—this is emancipation, and this is the free man's worship."

There is much that is splendid in this gospel of endurance, and although most people when they read it will probably judge that Mr. Russell is a pessimist, it will not be with any accent of reproach. But would the judgment be correct? Although, in the absence of information as to what degree of value he attaches to goods other than those he has described, it is impossible to be sure, there is yet one feature in what he does tell us from which we may perhaps infer that his view would still be pessimistic, in a certain sense, even when all the intrinsically good contents of the actual world were taken into account. I do not mean that he in the least overestimates the badness of what exists; nor yet that he would think either that there is a balance of bad over good in the world at the present moment,

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or that there will be such a balance in the long run. All I mean is that he evidently thinks some of the things which are commonly held to be good much less good than they are commonly thought; and he takes this view for a reason which would probably lead him to take a similar view about the other goods of the same kind which he does not mention. The goods in question are all the good things which actually exist at a given moment, and my point is that he has a principle on which he puts some of these goods lower in the scale of value than they would usually be put, that he would probably apply the same principle to the rest of these goods, and that this principle is mistaken. The principle he uses seems to be as follows: That whatever good thing exists, it is always possible for us to conceive something much better,—that the ideal is, broadly speaking, better than the real. Now although this is of course true in a sense, Mr. Russell seems not to notice that there is a very important sense in which the contrary is true. There is, that is to say, a sense in which it is true that nothing is any good at all except what exists, so that when we say that such and such an ideal thing is good, what we really mean is that *if* it existed it would be good. This seems to be only another way of pointing out that existence (although of course a thing's existence affords no evidence that it is good) makes an enormous difference to the goodness of some wholes: like pleasure, it immensely enhances the value of many of the wholes into which it enters, although it has no value in itself. My suggestion is that Mr. Russell's neglect of this fact is perhaps due to his preoccupation with the fact that we can always conceive something which, in a sense, *is* better than anything that exists; and that it may be partly because of this oversight that he tends to value states of mind highly in proportion as they escape from the bondage of reality and soar free from "this petty planet on which our bodies impotently crawl." I do not deny that it is good to contemplate eternal truths or the ideal creations of art; all I doubt is whether this is as superior to the contemplation of real things as Mr. Russell suggests. Merely because it is real, to attend to a real thing may be as good as to attend to a much better ideal thing. The ideal may be imperishable; but the actual, though subject to change and decay, has the privilege of existing.

Rye, England. SYDNEY WATERLOW.

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THE PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY OF PIETRO POMPONAZZI. Andrew Halliday Douglas. Edited by Charles Douglas and R. P. Hardie. Cambridge University Press, 1910. Pp. x, 318.

In reading a work like the present volume, which its author did not live to see through the press, a fair-minded critic has always to keep before him the fact that the book has not received the final revision which would have befallen it in the ordinary course of things. It should be understood, therefore, that in commenting on certain points where I seem to find omission or misconception, I do so always with a sense that it is possible that the printed page does not represent what would have been the final and deliberate opinion of Professor Douglas if he had issued his book himself. At the same time, no blame can possibly attach to the editors for the appearance of any statements or interpretations which more careful consideration would pronounce erroneous, since, as appears from their prefatory note, the work came into their hands all but complete, little remaining to be supplied except the translation of citations designed to find a place in the text. Had the manuscript been subjected to them for criticism before publication, I make little doubt that they would have suggested to the author the advisability of reconsidering some of his views; in the actual circumstances they had, of course, no option but to present them as they found them.

The editorial work has in general been most admirably carried out. It is a great merit in a work dealing with an author so little studied even by professional historians of philosophy, that the apparatus of quotations is remarkably full, so full, indeed, that even students living remote from great libraries are put in a fair position to judge of the worth of Pomponazzi's interpretation of his great master Aristotle from his own words. The care with which the very numerous quotations have been printed reflects very great credit both on the editors and on the management of the Cambridge Press. I have, in fact, noted only one certain misprint, and one probable one. In the long passage cited on page 130, *tum sensititum vegetatitum* is, of course, unmeaning, and should be *tam* (or *cum*) sensitivarum quam (or *tum*) *vegetativarum*. In the sentence quoted twice on pages 191 and 193, *si species non remaneret in intellectu hominis docti* (?) *non esset rememoratio,* the query mark of the author (or

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editors) is more than justified. The sense required by the context is clearly that "a sleeper retains the *species intellegibilis* (of a thing with which he has previously been acquainted), and yet has not intelligence of it; for if the *species* did not persist in the sleeper's understanding, recollection would not be possible (as we know that it is)." For *docti* we thus require to read *dormientis;* the source of the error may ultimately lie in a contracted writing, such as *dorītis.* There is one amusing instance of a more serious mistake due to the same cause, failure to expand a contraction rightly, on page 46. In the quotations there given from St. Thomas we have six examples of the occurrence as a 'logical example' of a name which is written *Sortes,* and means any individual man whom we may select as the subject of an illustrative proposition (like the Duke of Wellington in Mill's famous chapter about the syllogism. By the way, it were much to be wished that the compilers of handbooks would discover that the whole point of Mill's example lay in the fact that the Duke was alive when the chapter was written, and that the force of his argument is lost in reproduction unless we substitute the name of one of our own living contemporaries). The author explains that *Sortes* is a 'John Doe' or 'Richard Roe' of scholastic discussion, which is true so far as it goes, but is not the whole truth. The real fact is that *Sortes* is a mere contraction of the name *Socrates* which the schoolmen borrowed from Aristotle as the standing 'logical example;' the contraction may be found on almost any page of the fifteenth century black-letter text of scholastic logical works, and, I suppose, also in the manuscript of the period.

Turning to the contents of Professor Douglas's study, it may be said generally that the first three chapters, which deal with the relation of Pomponazzi as an expositor of Aristotle to the rival schools of the Alexandrists, Averroists, and Thomists, make no claim to do more than report at second hand the conclusions of earlier workers in the same field, while the elaborate study of Pomponazzi's Psychology, Theory of Knowledge, and Ethics is a piece of valuable original work. It is a pity, I think, that Professor Douglas should have been content to rely so completely on earlier work in his first three chapters, since to most students the history of the interpretation of Aristotle will probably be more interesting than the theories of Pomponazzi, which, I confess, I do not myself find so striking as Professor Douglas

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does. I cannot but feel that the purely naturalistic interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine of the soul championed by Pomponazzi arrives at consistency by shutting its eyes to the most fundamental features of the Aristotelian *Ethics*, and that, in spite of all that is unhistorical in form of expression, the Thomist theory comes infinitely nearer to the common master on the points which are of central importance. This comes out especially in connection with the orthodox Thomist doctrine of the 'separable intellect' as a constituent of the human soul. It is quite true, as Pomponazzi and Professor Douglas hold, that the existence of such an imperishable and 'separable' factor in the soul is quite inconsistent with the naturalistic treatment of the facts of mental life which is dominant throughout most of Aristotle's psychological work, and that, on the assumption that Aristotle's doctrine is self-consistent, Pomponazzi was right in deducing from the famous definition of ψυχή the non-existence of the 'separable' intellect, and the denial of human immortality. Thomism, in spite of its professed allegiance to the text of Aristotle, is, as Professor Douglas says, in effect a reassertion of the Platonic theories. What he forgets is that there is a fundamental inconsistency which runs right through the Metaphysics and Ethics, as well as the Psychology of Aristotle. The Platonic views are regularly denied with considerable acrimony in the premises, but as regularly reappear from no one knows where in the conclusions. The contradiction between the νοῦς χωριστὸς of the famous chapter in the third book of the '*de Anima*' and the rest of the work is no greater than the discrepancy in the '*Metaphysics*' between the vicious attacks on the Platonic εἰδη and their reappearance in the form of the intelligences which are all form and ἐνέργεια at the heart of the Theology of *Metaphysics* Λ. And we need to remember that the 'separable intellect' not only meets us in the famous chapter of the *de Anima*, but is involved in the whole scheme of the Aristotelian *Ethics*. In the usual puzzling way, we are told in *Ethics A* that 'happiness' means the life in which we discharge the special 'work' of man as man, and this is identified, exactly as it was afterwards by Pomponazzi, with the 'practical' or 'political' life, a life in which neither God, who has no 'lower' nature, nor the beasts, who are all 'lower' nature can share. But, at the end of the work, the 'separable' intellect comes on the scene, and we find that the highest blessedness

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does not lie in the 'practical' life at all, but in θεωρία, that θεωρία is not the peculiar 'work of man' at all, but a work in which man shares with God, and that, strictly speaking, so far as we live the life of θεωρία it is not we, as *men*, who do so, but 'the divine which is in us.' All this disappears completely from the conception of human good worked out by Pomponazzi, and sympathetically reproduced by Professor Douglas. It is true enough to say that the whole theory is inconsistent with the tone which Aristotle adopts when he is trying to exhibit himself as superior to the dreams of Plato, and is just Plato's thought of the end of life as 'becoming like to God' restated, but it is equally true that it is Aristotle and not another who is responsible for the inconsistency. Pomponazzi's desire for a consistent Aristotle leads him, in fact, into formal contradiction of his master. He reproaches those who cherish the hope of immortality with refusing to be content with such a god as befits man and aspiring after the state of gods. But it is Aristotle himself who says that we should not listen to the voices which bid us to "think thoughts consistent with man's estate," but should rather strive with all our might to put on immortality. And there are few, I take it, of those who have really learned the lesson of Greek philosophy, who will not share my feeling that, in spite of all differences of shading, it is St. Thomas and not the naturalistic interpreters who has seized with sound insight the most precious truth in the Platonic-Aristotelian theory of the moral end. The last thing philosophy should lend itself to is that lowering of the pitch of the moral life which inevitably follows an attempt to get rid of the sense of the infinite value of individual personality. This, and no mere 'false abstraction' ('abstraction' is as much Professor Douglas's bugbear as finitude is that of some other thinkers), is really at stake in the dispute over the imperishable 'separable intelligence.'

Incidentally, I may call attention to a curious error which seems to show not only that Professor Douglas's knowledge of St. Thomas was not very profound, but also that, like many other divines, he was not always clear about the cardinal doctrines of his own faith. We are told on page 79 that Pomponazzi affirmed, whereas St. Thomas denied, that "relation to the body is essential to the existence of the soul." Now St. Thomas did not forget, as Professor Douglas seems to do, that belief in the resurrection of the body is *de fide* in the Chris-

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tian Church, and he actually makes the proposition that relation to the body is of the *essentia* of the soul, his main philosophical argument against objectors to the dogma of resurrection. Thus, in the *Summa contra Gentiles* (IV, 79), we read: Anima corpori naturaliter unitur, est enim *secundum suam essentiam* corporis forma; est igitur *contra naturam animæ* absque corpore esse, and there is much more to the same effect in II, 83, 84, of the same work. It is true that we constantly find divines of our own time confusing the Platonic conception of the immortality of the disembodied soul with the Christian belief in the redemption of the body and the resurrection of the whole man to everlasting life, but the confusion is not one which was current among scholastic theologians, and should be impossible to a modern divine who remembers the familiar formula which ends "preserve thy *body* and soul unto everlasting life."

I have said so much on these points that I have no further space left except to recommend this book very warmly to all readers who wish to get real insight into the nature of that revived interest in Aristotelianism which, side by side with the better-known Florentine rebirth of Neo-Platonism, prepared the way for the coming of Modern Philosophy in the latter half of the fifteenth century and the beginning of the sixteenth.

P. S.—I could wish that the excellent practice of accurate transliteration of Oriental names had been a little more rigidly adhered to. "Avicebron" should surely fare as well in this respect as Avicenna and Averroes, and the great Caliph Al-Ma'mûn is hardly recognizable under the disguise of "Mahmound" (p. 30).

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L'INDIVIDUALISMO NELLE DOTTRINE MORALI DEL SECOLO XIX. Di Giovanni Vidari. (Opera premiata dalle Reale Accademia di scienze moralie politiche di Napoli.) Milano: Ulrico Hoepli, 1909. Pp. xx, 400.

For extensive and masterly learning, combined with an uncommon power of subtle analysis, this essay must have amply deserved the prize for which it was composed. The author's own ethical point of view is indicated in the last chapter (pp. 324-388), where he gives a general estimate of the doctrines re-

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viewed in the course of the work, and endeavors to extract from the very diverse phases of individualism which they exhibit, some common element or message which deserves to be incorporated in a complete moral philosophy. Here and there he seems to employ a kind of Hegelian dialectic, exhibiting doctrines as developing into their own opposites, and demanding a higher synthesis; but this method is not applied with much rigor, nor, so far as I can judge, with any convincing success. Still, the method may have helped the author more than it is likely to help his readers in penetrating sympathetically to the essential and central characters of a great variety of doctrines and tendencies, all of which he presents with judicial fairness and with the generous enthusiasm of a philosophic mind. The comparative critical study of so many thinkers,—French, German, and English, Scandinavia being represented by Kierkegaard and Ibsen, Russia by Tolstoy and Kropotkin, Italy being wholly unrepresented,—has suggested to the author many fine and valuable features of resemblance and difference, and his expositions can hardly fail to present to the systematic student of the thinkers of the nineteenth century many new points of view. An English reader, for example, nourished on the current antagonism to hedonism in general, and to Mill and Spencer in particular, might learn much from the luminous exposition here given of the various elements in the thought of these two thinkers, with their sources and tendencies. Three main species of individualistic thought are distinguished, which, subject to a few exceptions, are each assigned to different countries: Rationalistic Individualism, represented chiefly by French thinkers; Sensationistic Individualism, by English thinkers; and Instinctivistic Individualism, by German and Russian thinkers. This distribution of the respective varieties of individualism, the author seeks to connect with differences in the national characters of the various peoples. He refrains however from straining his conception of national characters, and even a reader who finds this description of the 'psyche' of the European nations superficial or, in the case of the French people, bewildering, need be in no fear that 'national character' will at any point be abused by the author for the purpose of sham explanation. No objection will, I think, be taken by one who has read the book, to the inclusion of any of the writers ranked as individualists, surprising as might appear, at a first view, the grouping of

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Nietzsche and Tolstoy as Individualists of Instinct. But good reasons could be given for the inclusion of many important writers and movements which the writer has not included. The merit which he claims as common to all the thinkers classed as individualistic is that they have insisted on the personal aspect of morals: more particularly that they have recognized that the moral motive force is individual. This, he contends, is consistent with maintaining that the moral end is social or supra-individual. Further, he argues forcibly that the individual conscience can find no content and no opportunity for its exercise apart from social organization and unity.

The appreciation of historic forces is inadequate, though by no means absent. The author is well equipped for the task of writing the history of ethical thought and for the valuation of the social and intellectual forces at work in our own time.

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SOCIOLOGY AND MODERN SOCIAL PROBLEMS. By Charles A. Ellwood, Ph.D., Professor of Sociology, University of Missouri. New York: American Book Company, 1910. Pp. 331.

The reader must not expect to find in this book what its title might suggest, an outline of modern sociological principles. The author hastens to disavow in the preface any attempt "to give a systematic presentation of theory." He goes further to explain that he has left the student "to work out his own system of theory." The optimism of this plan is emphasized by the statement that the book is for use "where but a short time can be given to the subject" and is "especially suited for use in University Extension Courses and in Teachers' Reading Circles."

This sociology, with most of the sociology left out, consists of comprehensible discussions of the family and of a miscellaneous group of 'social problems,' the doctrine of population, immigration, the negro, the city, pauperism, crime, political socialism, and some aspects of education. The five chapters dealing with the family form the most nearly integrated portion of the book, and there is a slight suggestion of an intention of treating all the succeeding topics in relation to this central theme. The family ideal presented is not radical or iconoclastic: it is old-fashioned monogamy refined by the new democratic spirit,

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the parents united by affection, and the children growing into comradeship rather than ruled by paternal authority. The treatment of each and all of these topics is suggestive, fair-minded, tolerant, and hopeful. The author acknowledges his obligations to three of his former teachers, Professors Small, Henderson, and Willcox, "directly or indirectly for much of the substance of the book."

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MONTAIGNE AND SHAKESPEARE AND OTHER ESSAYS ON COGNATE QUESTIONS. By John M. Robertson, M.P. London: A. & C. Black, 1909. Pp. vii, 358.

The object of this collection of essays is not merely to prove that Shakespeare borrowed extensively from Montaigne, but that the influence of Montaigne is "of that high sort in which he that takes becomes co-thinker with him that gives." The author is overconcerned perhaps to find analogies for commonplaces, such as the idea of "the country from whose bourne no traveller returns," and lays too little stress to the tags and methods of expression which are common to contemporary writers, though he frankly anticipates such a criticism in his introduction. However, Mr. Robertson has shown conclusively that sentiments and expressions, which posterity must regard as platitudes, have that elusive simplicity which requires a genius for their first conception. The very fact that they have passed into the common stock of human thought and speech is proof positive of their inspiration. Mr. Robertson's essays are, above all things, reasonable, and he declares himself emancipated from the abstract æsthetics of such writers as Coleridge, Schlegel, Knight, and even Swinburne, being content to prove that, after all, Shakespeare's materials belonged to the sixteenth and the preceding centuries. Poets should be judged, not by abstract æsthetic standards, the success of which reflects credit on the critic himself rather than on the poet, but by the measure of their ability to deal with the materials nearest at hand. Mr. Robertson, by implication rather than by definite statements, has pressed forward this view throughout the book, and has given the study of Shakespeare a new interest, delivering it from a class of critics whose methods recall the schoolmen. He is certainly no idolater,

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and the ordinary reader who prefers sound reasoning to the esoteric sententiousness of the other school, will find that this book creates a new Shakespeare, or rather, resurrects him from the grave which his critics have dug.

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THE INTERMEDIATE SEX. A STUDY OF SOME TRANSITIONAL TYPES OF MEN AND WOMEN. By Edward Carpenter. Second Edition. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Ltd., 1909. Pp. 175.

There is in nature a great variety in the degree of sex differentiation,—hermaphroditism is common, and there are well-known cases in which an animal changes its sex in the course of its life. There is also great variety in the degree of dimorphism between males and females, from nil in sea-urchins to a maximum in the contrast between peacock and peahen, or between stag and hind. And, again, there are cases where perfect maleness is normally associated with the expression of characters which are usually regarded as feminine, and *vice versa*. Thus the male of the red-necked Phalarope is a perfect male, but very feminine in many ways; his mate is a perfect female, but very masculine in many ways. These facts are very suggestive and lend support to the view which is prominent in the book before us that it is not easy to find a sharp cleavage between all that is masculine, on the one side, and all that is feminine, on the other. Mr. Carpenter has made a study of some transitional types of men and women. He shows that there are many different degrees of feminine men and masculine women, and that a strong attraction between those of similar sex is not inconsistent with a high degree of intelligence and fine feeling. It does not necessarily imply sensual excess, and though it may sink to bestiality, so may a respectable marriage. A strong fondness between those of similar sex is a variety of the normal sex-attraction, but it is not necessarily morbid. Nature has given a verdict of approval on the normal sex-attraction, which is responsible for much misery as well as of the highest happiness, but it is not to be expected that the race has ceased evolving in this respect, and it is a great assumption that the intermediate types discussed in this book are wholly undesir-

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ables. We mean in respect of their peculiarity, of course, for it is well known that some have been geniuses. It seems likely that an artificial morbidity is sometimes induced through lack of scientific knowledge and by the intolerance of impure minds. Mr. Carpenter pleads for a better-informed and broader consideration of these transitional types,—which he shows a tendency to idealize,—and every one must admit that the day of ignorant, wholesale branding of every departure from type is over. For our part, however, we must state two convictions which have not been reached hastily: (1) That just as spaeing a pullet results in an unpleasant sort of hen, with many characters and habits of a cock, so there is some reason to suspect unwholesomeness (in the broad sense) in the constitution of the intermediate types in mankind: and (2) that the probable line of progress in the differentiation of man and woman is that which makes the most of the deeply rooted and old-established fundamental constitutional differences between them.

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